Este capítulo es una guía para conocer los elementos básicos de la fundamentación metafísica. Ofrece una revisión accesible de sus características y usos, comparando este concepto con otras formas de dependencia que se pueden encontrar en la literatura. Enfatiza dos roles teóricos centrales que la fundamentación supuestamente juega en la teorización filosófica: (i) dar cuenta de una forma distintiva de determinación no causal y (ii) entender mejor la estructura jerárquica de la realidad. El capítulo apunta a persuadir a las lectoras (...) de la utilidad de la fundamentación discutiendo cómo pueden mitigarse algunas objeciones dirigidas a esos roles. (shrink)

Truthmaking non-maximalism usually assumes that some truths do not have truthmakers. I suggest, however, that non-maximalism can be understood more specifically, and that different types of non-maximalism can be distinguished. To do so, I refer to two positions. The first is deflationary truthmaking, some of whose proponents assume that no truths have truthmakers. The second distinguishes between truths that do not have truthmakers but depend on being, and truths that do not have truthmakers and moreover do not depend on being. (...) Given the combinations of these positions, I propose a new classification indicating the positions available to a non-maximalist. I argue that one of these positions is particularly worth adopting because of its advantages over the other options. (shrink)

O desenvolvimento da filosofia acadêmica no Brasil é direcionada, entre vários fatores, pelas investigações dos diversos Grupos de Trabalho (GTs) da Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia (ANPOF). Esses GTs se dividem de acordo com a temática investigada. O GT de Metafísica Analítica é relativamente novo e ainda tem poucos membros, mas os temas nele trabalhados são variados e todos centrais no debate metafísico contemporâneo internacional. A sua investigação se caracteriza pelo rigor lógico e conceitual com o qual aborda esses (...) tradicionais tópicos da metafísica. Embora os assuntos tratados tenham sido, em sua grande maioria, tópicos abordados e discutidos em reuniões remotas do GT, nem todos os membros do nosso grupo estão aqui representados. Esperamos apresentar seus trabalhos em futuros livros. Por enquanto, queremos apenas divulgar ao público acadêmico algumas de nossas produções, trabalhadas e produzidas exclusivamente para este livro. Segundo a caracterização tradicional, com a qual plenamente concordamos, a metafísica se ocupa com a natureza mais íntima e geral da realidade. Essa metafísica é, por um lado, ambiciosa: não pretende apenas expor a realidade segundo o modo como ela se apresenta para nós, mas como ela é ‘em si mesma’. Por outro lado, ela é modesta: ela sabe da sua dívida para com as outras disciplinas, especialmente lógica, linguagem e epistemologia. Além disso, ela se entende como sempre tentativa, provisória, aberta a críticas e revisões. Neste livro, tratamos temas como as categorias ontológicas fundamentais e as suas relações de dependência e de fundamentalidade, a natureza da composição mereológica, da persistência temporal e do próprio tempo, a natureza dos objetos abstratos e dos mundos possíveis, as naturezas do mundo quântico, da causalidade nômica do mundo físico, e, finalmente, de um dos objetos mais característicos da presença humana no nosso mundo físico, que é o objeto de arte. É claro que essa coletânea está longe de apresentar exaustivamente todos os tópicos da metafísica. Tentamos selecionar e organizar os textos da forma mais fluida possível, de modo que eles possam levar tanto a uma reflexão específica quanto a uma reflexão geral sobre a natureza da realidade. Ainda que tenha uma inerente incompletude, o livro serve à finalidade de levar o/a estudante de graduação e pós-graduação a refletir sobre temas contemporâneos da Metafísica Analítica. Justamente por ter esse objetivo de formentar a pesquisa em metafísica analítica nacional, optamos por traduzir muitos termos do inglês que ainda não tem uma tradução canônica, a fim de evitar anglicismos e contribuir para uma leitura mais natural. Muito mais do que leitores complacentes, esse livro pede por leitores críticos, debatedores corajosos, que estejam dispostos a contribuir e a propor novas teorias e argumentos. Agradecemos a todos os membros do GT de Metafísica Analítica da ANPOF e a todos os autores deste livro, que decidiram apresentar publicamente suas pesquisas à academia; aos membros do Grupo de Pesquisa Investigação Filosófica, que decidiram pela publicação deste livro; à Pró-Reitoria de PósGraduação e Pesquisa da Universidade Federal do Amapá, que o financiou; e ao NEPFIL Online e à Editora da UFPel, que o editaram e publicaram. [Guido Imaguire e Rodrigo Reis Lastra Cid, Organizadores] . (shrink)

Necessitarianism, as we shall use the term, is the view that natural properties and causal powers are necessarily connected in some way. In recent decades the most popular forms of necessitarianism have been the anti-Humean powers-based theories of properties, such as dispositional essentialism and the identity theory. These versions of necessitarianism have come under fire in recent years and I believe it is time for necessitarians to develop a new approach. In this paper I identify unexplored ways of positing metaphysically (...) necessary connections in nature, using the concepts of grounding and essential dependence. For example, I show that one could be a necessitarian by insisting that the properties of things necessarily ground their powers, and that one can maintain this while rejecting dispositional essentialism. Using different combinations of claims about grounding and essential dependence, I map out a spectrum of new positions and compare them to previous theories of natural modality. Some of these positions are compatible with Humean metaphysics while others are not. The overall aim of the paper is to provide a new metaphysical framework for understanding theories of powers and thereby launch a new necessitarian research programme. (shrink)

Separatists about grounding take explanations to be separate from their corresponding grounding-facts. Grounding-facts are supposed to underlie, or back, such explanations. However, the backing relation hasn’t received much attention in the literature. The aim of this paper is to provide an informative definition of backing. First, I examine two prominent proposals: backing as explaining (Kovacs 2017; 2019a) and backing as grounding (see Sjölin Wirling 2020). Finally, I put forward my own proposal. I argue that under plausible assumptions about the role (...) of backing and the nature of explanation, backing should be understood as a form of truthmaking, minimally construed. (shrink)

Brentano is often considered the originator of the fitting-attitudes analysis of value, on which to be valuable is to be that which it’s fitting to value. But there has been comparatively little attention paid to Brentano’s argument for this analysis. That argument advances the stronger claim that fittingness is part of the analysis of normativity. Since the argument rests on an analogy between truth and fittingness, its impact may seem limited by the idiosyncratic features of Brentano’s later notion of truth. (...) I argue, however, that the Brentanian argument is defensible even if fittingness is analogized to a more typical realist account of truth. The result is what I call the worldly Brentanian account of normativity. I defend this account as a form of naturalistic realism. I then show how the account can fare better than prominent alternatives against two kinds of error-theoretic arguments. (shrink)

Some revisionary ontologies are highly parsimonious: they posit far fewer entities than what we quantify over in ordinary discourse. The most radical examples are minimal ontologies, on which physical simples are the only things that exist. Highly parsimonious ontologies, and especially minimal ones, face the challenge of either accounting for the truth of our ordinary quantificational discourse, or paraphrasing such discourse away. Common strategies for addressing this challenge include classical reduction, paraphrase nihilism, and a distinction between ontological and existence commitments. (...) I argue, however, that these strategies are either implausible or fail to provide truth conditions consistent with minimal or parsimonious ontologies. I then discuss, defend, and suggest ways to strengthen an alternative framework for reduction, on which the sentences of reducing theories ground those of reducible theories. Relative to the other options for defending minimal ontology, a strengthened grounding-reductive approach can provide more defensible truth conditions for minimal ontology, better preserve scientific realist intuitions, set a more attainable standard for reduction, and allow our existence commitments to be more responsive to empirical evidence and scientific expertise. As a result, I argue that minimal ontology becomes more defensible—though not certain—on a grounding-reductive framework. But even if minimal ontology were wrong, the grounding-reductive framework makes other parsimonious but non-minimal ontologies more plausible. (shrink)

In a 2014 paper in this journal, I put forward two objections to a version of divine simplicity I call ‘Divine Truthmaker Simplicity’. James Beebe and Timothy Pawl have come to Divine Truthmaker Simplicity’s defense. In this paper, I respond to Beebe and Pawl, consider an overlooked way of defending Divine Truthmaker Simplicity, and conclude by outlining an alternative account of God’s simplicity.

In this paper I deal with the relation between the disjunction thesis—that the truthmaking relation is distributed over a disjunction—and the necessary connection thesis—that the existence of some entities requires the existence of other distinct entities. I will first show that because of this very relation, the arguments for and against the disjunction thesis that overlook its metaphysical considerations will fail. Finally, I will show that the commitment produced by truthmaker maximalism to totality states of affairs, or some relevantly similar (...) things, requires one to accept a necessary connection that disaffirms the disjunction thesis. (shrink)

Many philosophers take purportedly logical cases of ground ) to be obvious cases, and indeed such cases have been used to motivate the existence of and importance of ground. I argue against this. I do so by motivating two kinds of semantic determination relations. Intuitions of logical ground track these semantic relations. Moreover, our knowledge of semantics for first order logic can explain why we have such intuitions. And, I argue, neither semantic relation can be a species of ground even (...) on a quite broad conception of what ground is. Hence, without a positive argument for taking so-called ‘logical ground’ to be something distinct from a semantic determination relation, we should cease treating logical cases as cases of ground. (shrink)

When the meta-philosophies of Nominalism and Realism are compared, it is often said that Nominalism is motivated by a methodology of ontological economy, while Realism would be motivated by an appeal to Common Sense. In this paper, I argue that this association is misguided. After briefly comparing the meta-philosophy of Common Sense and the meta-philosophy of economy, I show that the core motivation in favour of Realism relies in fact in a principle of economy which violates the methodology of Common (...) Sense. I conclude that Common Sense philosophers should endorse Nominalism. (shrink)

Dispositionalism is the theory of modality according to which all (metaphysical and natural) modal truths are made true by some actual irreducibly dispositional property. The relationship between Dispositionalism and time is yet to be satisfactorily explored. In this paper we contribute to this task by examining how Dispositionalism deals with ‘dated truths’: propositions involving a specific time, e.g. “It might rain at 12.30”. We examine two possible accounts: the first, 'Dated Manifestations Strategy', is the idea that powers are very fine-grained, (...) and tend towards temporally very specific manifestations. We argue that such strategy should not be adopted, for it leads to unnecessary violations of ontological parsimony; it is unable to accommodate an ontology of platonic universals; and it is incapable of offering a principled explanation of the forward-looking nature of powers. We offer an alternative account, the "Duration Strategy", which relies on an independently determined arrow of time and the existence of some “duration facts” that specify how long a power takes to bring about its manifestation. We argue that the Duration Strategy is to be preferred. We then flesh out the account by exploring the connection between powers, duration facts, and processes. (shrink)

Discussion of grounding-theoretic accounts of truthmaking in terms of the theoretical role of “catching cheaters”.