Switch to: References

Citations of:

Relativising Epistemic Advantage

In Martin Kusch (ed.), Routledge Handbook to Relativism (forthcoming)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Pluralism and Perspectivism in the American Pragmatist Tradition.Matthew Brown - 2019 - In Michela Massimi (ed.), Knowledge From a Human Point of View. Springer Verlag.
    This chapter explores perspectivism in the American Pragmatist tradition. On the one hand, the thematization of perspectivism in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science can benefit from resources in the American Pragmatist philosophical tradition. On the other hand, the Pragmatists have interesting and innovative, pluralistic views that can be illuminated through the lens of perspectivism. I pursue this inquiry primarily through examining relevant sources from the Pragmatist tradition. I will illustrate productive engagements between pragmatism and perspectivism in three areas: in (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Relativism in Feminist Epistemologies.Natalie Alana Ashton - 2020 - In Natalie Alana Ashton, Robin McKenna, Katharina Anna Sodoma & Martin Kusch (eds.), Social Epistemology and Epistemic Relativism. Routledge.
    Different views on the connection between relativism and feminist epistemologies are often asserted but rarely are these views clearly argued for. This has resulted in a confusingly polarised debate, with some people convinced that feminist epistemologies are committed to relativism (and that this is a reason so be suspicious of them) whilst others make similar criticisms of anti-feminist views and argue that relativism has no place in feminist epistemologies. This chapter is an attempt to clarify this debate. I begin by (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Privilege and Position: Formal Tools for Standpoint Epistemology.Catharine Saint-Croix - 2020 - Res Philosophica 97 (4):489-524.
    How does being a woman affect one’s epistemic life? What about being Black? Or queer? Standpoint theorists argue that such social positions can give rise to otherwise unavailable epistemic privilege. “Epistemic privilege” is a murky concept, however. Critics of standpoint theory argue that the view is offered without a clear explanation of how standpoints confer their benefits, what those benefits are, or why social positions are particularly apt to produce them. For this reason, many regard standpoint theory as being out (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Towards a Politicized Anatomy of Fundamental Disagreement.Sophie Juliane Veigl - 2023 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (3):450-466.
    Fundamental disagreement is at the core of many debates surrounding epistemic relativism. Proponents of epistemic relativism argue that certain disagreements are irresolvable because proponents base their views on fundamentally different epistemic principles and, thus, fundamentally different epistemic systems. Critics of epistemic relativism argue that this analysis is wrong since the particular epistemic principles in question are most of the time derived from or instances of the same, more basic, epistemic principle. With regard to the individuation of epistemic systems, there is, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • Notes on a complicated relationship: scientific pluralism, epistemic relativism, and stances.Sophie Juliane Veigl - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3485-3503.
    While scientific pluralism enjoys widespread popularity within the philosophy of science, a related position, epistemic relativism, does not have much traction. Defenders of scientific pluralism, however, dread the question of whether scientific pluralism entails epistemic relativism. It is often argued that if a scientific pluralist accepts epistemic relativism, she will be unable to pass judgment because she believes that “anything goes”. In this article, I will show this concern to be unnecessary. I will also argue that common strategies to differentiate (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Situating feminist epistemology.Natalie Alana Ashton & Robin McKenna - 2020 - Episteme 17 (1):28-47.
    Feminist epistemologies hold that differences in the social locations of inquirers make for epistemic differences, for instance, in the sorts of things that inquirers are justified in believing. In this paper we situate this core idea in feminist epistemologies with respect to debates about social constructivism. We address three questions. First, are feminist epistemologies committed to a form of social constructivism about knowledge? Second, to what extent are they incompatible with traditional epistemological thinking? Third, do the answers to these questions (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Can Standpoint Epistemology Avoid Inconsistency, Circularity, and Unnecessariness? A Comment on Ashton’s Remarks about Epistemic Privilege.Claudio Cormick - 2022 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (11):29-41.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation