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Switch to: References
Citations of:
The Ontology of Justifications in the Logical Setting
Studia Logica 100 (1-2):17-30 (2012)
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The paper relates evidence and justification logics, both philosophically and technically. On the philosophical side, it is suggested that the difference between the approaches to evidence in the two families of logics can be explained as a result of their focusing on two different notions of support provided by evidence. On the technical side, a justification logic with operators pertaining to both kinds of support is shown to be sound and complete with respect to a special class of awareness models. (...)  |
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Presenting the first comprehensive, in-depth study of hyperintensionality, this book equips readers with the basic tools needed to appreciate some of current and future debates in the philosophy of language, semantics, and metaphysics. After introducing and explaining the major approaches to hyperintensionality found in the literature, the book tackles its systematic connections to normativity and offers some contributions to the current debates. The book offers undergraduate and graduate students an essential introduction to the topic, while also helping professionals in related (...) No categories |
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In relevant logics, necessary truths need not imply each other. In justification logic, necessary truths need not all be justified by the same reason. There is an affinity to these two approaches that suggests their pairing will provide good logics for tracking reasons in a fine-grained way. In this paper, I will show how to extend relevant logics with some of the basic operators of justification logic in order to track justifications or reasons. I will define and study three kinds (...) |
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Justification logics are a family of modal logics whose non-normal modalities are parametrised by a type-theoretic calculus of terms. The first justification logic was developed by Sergei Artemov to provide an explicit modal logic for arithmetical provability in which these terms were taken to pick out proofs. But, justification logics have been given various other interpretations as well. In this paper, we will rely on an interpretation in which the modality \ is read ‘S accepts \ as justification for \’. (...) |
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Justification logics are modal-like logics that provide a framework for reasoning about justifications. This paper introduces labeled sequent calculi for justification logics, as well as for combined modal-justification logics. Using a method due to Sara Negri, we internalize the Kripke-style semantics of justification and modal-justification logics, known as Fitting models, within the syntax of the sequent calculus to produce labeled sequent calculi. We show that all rules of these systems are invertible and the structural rules (weakening and contraction) and the (...) |
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We present algebraic semantics for the classical logic of proofs based on Boolean algebras. We also extend the language of the logic of proofs in order to have a Boolean structure on proof terms and equality predicate on terms. Moreover, the completeness theorem and certain generalizations of Stone’s representation theorem are obtained for all proposed algebras. |
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In this paper we argue that normative reasons are hyperintensional and put forward a formal account of this thesis. That reasons are hyperintensional means that a reason for a proposition does not imply that it is also a reason for a logically equivalent proposition. In the first part we consider three arguments for the hyperintensionality of reasons: an argument from the nature of reasons, an argument from substitutivity and an argument from explanatory power. In the second part we describe a (...) |
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We present a complete, decidable logic for reasoning about a notion of completely trustworthy evidence and its relations to justifiable belief and knowledge, as well as to their explicit justifications. This logic makes use of a number of evidence-related notions such as availability, admissibility, and “goodness” of a piece of evidence, and is based on an innovative modification of the Fitting semantics for Artemovʼs Justification Logic designed to preempt Gettier-type counterexamples. We combine this with ideas from belief revision and awareness (...) |
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The paper outlines an epistemic logic based on the proof theory of substructural logics. The logic is a formal model of belief that i) is based on true assumptions (BTA belief) and ii) does not suffer from the usual omniscience properties. |
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