In managers' dynamic, real-world environments, they often feel it is necessary to exercise some creative discretion over employee ratings. Most managers do not describe their ratings of subordinates in performance appraisals as completely honest or accurate. The inaccuracy is often in the form of inflated ratings. They justify the inaccuracy by sighting, among other things, the need to avoid confrontation with subordinates, damaging working relationships, and creating permanent written documents which may later harm a subordinate's career. Many of these motives (...) are not only well intentioned, but are designed to enhance individual, unit, and organizational performance (some of the ultimate objectives of performance appraisal systems.) This paper examines the ethics of this sort of deliberate manipulation of performance appraisal systems. It suggests that at the organizational level, performance appraisal is usually seen as an end in itself, and a formalist ethical critique is applied. At the managerial level, performance appraisal is usually seen as a means to an end, and a utilitarian critique is applied. Since both perspectives are essential, we conclude that a Janus-Headed analysis is needed. We suggest some duties and obligations for both the organization and the manager engaged in performance appraisal. (shrink)

This paper primarily reports the findings of content analyses of seventy-five codes of ethics ofFinancial Post 500 corporations. The contents of each code were comprehensively evaluated along sixty-one criteria according to four levels. It was found that the focus of these codes was the protection of the firm. While some of them refer to issues of social responsibility, they are principally concerned with conduct against the firm.

In China, Buddhism and Taoism are two major religions. Using a sample of 10,363 firm-year observations from the Chinese stock market for the period of 2001–2010, I provide strong and robust evidence that religion (i.e., Buddhism and Taoism on the whole) is significantly negatively associated with owner-manager agency costs. In particular, using firm-level religion data measured by the number of religious sites within a radius of certain distance around a listed firm’s registered address, I find that religion is significantly negatively (...) (positively) associated with expense ratio (asset utilization ratio), the positive (reverse) proxy for owner-manager agency costs. This finding is consistent with the following view: religiosity has remarkable effects on the way how an individual thinks and behaves, and thereof can curb managers from unethical business practices. Moreover, my findings suggest that the negative association between religion and owner-manager agency costs is attenuated for firms with strong external monitoring mechanisms such as higher Marketization and high-quality auditors. Furthermore, after separating Buddhism from Taoism, my finding indicates that above conclusions are only available for Buddhism, suggesting that different religions may have asymmetric influence on owner-manager agency costs. Above results are robust to various measures of religiosity and a variety of robustness checks. (shrink)