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  1. Visual Asynchrony & Temporally Extended Contents.Philippe Chuard - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.
    Temporal experiences, according to retentionalism, essentially have temporally extended contents: contents which represent distinct events at distinct temporal locations, and some of their temporal relations. This means, retentionalists insist, that temporal experiences themselves needn’t be extended in time: only their contents are. The paper reviews an experiment by Moutoussis and Zeki, which demonstrates a colour-motion visual asynchrony (§2): information about motion seems to be processed more slowly than information about colour, so that the former is delayed relative to the latter. (...)
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  • Do We See Facts?Alfredo Vernazzani - 2020 - Mind and Language (4):674-693.
    Philosophers of perception frequently assume that we see actual states of affairs, or facts. Call this claim factualism. In his book, William Fish suggests that factualism is supported by phenomenological observation as well as by experimental studies on multiple object tracking and dynamic feature-object integration. In this paper, I examine the alleged evidence for factualism, focusing mainly on object detection and tracking. I argue that there is no scientific evidence for factualism. This conclusion has implications for studies on the phenomenology (...)
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  • From Physical Time to a Dualistic Model of Human Time.Ronald P. Gruber, Carlos Montemayor & Richard A. Block - 2020 - Foundations of Science 25 (4):927-954.
    There is a long standing debate as to whether or not time is ‘real’ or illusory, and whether or not human time is a direct reflection of physical time. Differing spacetime cosmologies have opposing views. Exactly what human time entails has, in our opinion, led to the failure to resolve this ‘two times’ problem. To help resolve this issue we propose a dualistic model of human time in which each component has both an illusory and non-illusory aspect. With the dualistic (...)
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  • Dynamic perceptual completion and the dynamic snapshot view to help solve the ‘two times’ problem.Ronald P. Gruber, Ryan P. Smith & Richard A. Block - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (4):773-790.
    Perceptual completion fills the gap for discrete perception to become continuous. Similarly, dynamic perceptual completion provides an experience of dynamic continuity. Our recent discovery of the ‘happening’ element of DPC completes the total experience for dynamism in the flow of time. However, a phenomenological explanation for these experiences is essential. The Snapshot Hypotheses especially the Dynamic Snapshot View provides the most comprehensive explanation. From that understanding the ‘two times’ problem can be addressed. The static time of spacetime cosmologies has been (...)
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  • Keeping postdiction simple.Valtteri Arstila - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 38:205-216.
    abstract Postdiction effects are phenomena in which a stimulus influences the appearance of events taking place before it. In metacontrast masking, for instance, a masking stimulus can ren- der a target stimulus shown before the mask invisible. This and other postdiction effects have been considered incompatible with a simple explanation according to which (i) our perceptual experiences are delayed for only the time it takes for a distal stimulus to reach our sensory receptors and for our neural mechanisms to process (...)
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  • Explanation in theories of the specious present.Valtteri Arstila - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1–24.
    Time-consciousness theories aim to explain what our experi­ences must be like so that we can experience change, succes­sion, and other temporally extended events (or at least why we believe we have such experiences). The most popular and influential explanations are versions of theories of the spe­ cious present, which maintain that what we experience appears to us as temporally extended. However, the role that specious presents have in bringing about temporal experiences remains undescribed. The briefly mentioned suggestions maintain that having (...)
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