- The misapplication dilemma.Daniel Webber - 2023 - Noûs.details
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Control, intentional action, and moral responsibility.Frank Hindriks - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):787 - 801.details
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Externalism Explained.Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Manifestations of Virtue.Arden Ali - 2020 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 10. Oxford University Press, Usa.details
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Respect and the Efficacy of Blame.George Tsai - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 4. Oxford University Press.details
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Moral Worth, Moral Awareness, and Virtuous Motives.Fabian Lorentzon - unknowndetails
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Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.details
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Against Second‐Order Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):398-420.details
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Admiration, Appreciation, and Aesthetic Worth.Daniel Whiting - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (2):375-389.details
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Running risks morally.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):141-163.details
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Perspectivism and the Argument from Guidance.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):361-374.details
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Reasons and Guidance.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (3):214-235.details
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Empathy, Motivating Reasons, and Morally Worthy Action.Elizabeth Ventham - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-13.details
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The Wrong Understanding of Praise.Vishnu Sridharan - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (4):1643-1660.details
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Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement?Paul Silva - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):371-387.details
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Consequentialism and Moral Worth.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (2):117-136.details
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The fundamental reason for reasons fundamentalism.Mark Schroeder - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3107-3127.details
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Desire.Tim Schroeder - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 (6):631-639.details
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No excuses for moral realism.Hanno Sauer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):553-578.details
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Elusive Reasons and the Motivational Constraint.Benjamin Cohen Rossi - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 20 (1).details
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Why Moral Enhancement is Unavoidably Normative.Paul Rezkalla - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 12 (2-3):105-106.details
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Normative Uncertainty and the Dependence Problem.Abelard Podgorski - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):43-70.details
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Testimonial worth.Andrew Peet - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):2391-2411.details
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Huck Finn, Aristotle, and Anti-Intellectualism in Moral Psychology.James Montmarquet - 2012 - Philosophy 87 (1):51-63.details
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Concerns and the Seriousness of Emotion.John M. Monteleone - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):181-207.details
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Can morally ignorant agents care enough?Daniel J. Miller - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):155-173.details
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Circumstantial ignorance and mitigated blameworthiness.Daniel J. Miller - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (1):33-43.details
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Moral Motivation, Moral Phenomenology, And The Alief/Belief Distinction.Uriah Kriegel - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):469-486.details
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Accidentally Doing the Right Thing.Zoe Johnson King - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):186-206.details
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Against reductivist character realism.Anne Jeffrey & Alina Beary - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (1):186-213.details
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Moral Worth and Doing the Right Thing by Accident.Jessica Isserow - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):251-264.details
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Sentimentalism about Moral Understanding.Nathan Robert Howard - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1065-1078.details
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One Desire Too Many.Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):302-317.details
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Beyond Bad Beliefs.Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 18 (5):500-521.details
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Moral Worth and Skillful Action.David Horst - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Why you cannot make people better by telling them what is good.Ulf Hlobil - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):986-996.details
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The Duty to Join Forces: When Individuals Lack Control.Frank Hindriks - 2019 - The Monist 102 (2):204-220.details
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Normativity in Action: How to Explain the Knobe Effect and its Relatives.Frank Hindriks - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (1):51-72.details
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Freedom under an indifferent dictator: Intentionality and responsibility.Frank Hindriks - 2017 - Economics and Philosophy 33 (1):25-41.details
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Moral Hedging and Responding to Reasons.Amelia Hicks - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):765-789.details
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Blameworthiness, Control, and Consciousness Or A Consciousness Requirement and an Argument For It.Michael Hatcher - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):389-419.details
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Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure.Daniel Fogal - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1033-1070.details
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Moral Offsetting.Thomas Foerster - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):617-635.details
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Moral Appraisal for Everyone: Neurodiversity, Epistemic Limitations, and Responding to the Right Reasons.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (3):733-752.details
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Epistemic Reasons, Transparency, and Evolutionary Debunking.Nicole Dular & Nikki Fortier - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (4):1455-1473.details
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Moral Bookkeeping.Igor Douven, Frank Hindriks & Sylvia Wenmackers - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.details
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From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (1):55-77.details
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Moral Worth and Knowing How to Respond to Reasons.J. J. Cunningham - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (2):385-405.details
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Introducing a new elusive reason.Benjamin Cohen Rossi - 2021 - Ratio 34 (3):227-235.details
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Moral worth and accidentally right actions.Allen Coates - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):389-396.details
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