Recently, I’ve championed the doctrine that fundamentally different sorts of things exist in fundamentally different ways.1 On this view, what it is for an entity to be can differ across ontological categories.2 Although historically this doctrine was very popular, and several important challenges to this doctrine have been dealt with, I suspect that contemporary metaphysicians will continue to treat this view with suspicion until it is made clearer when one is warranted in positing different modes of existence.3 I address this (...) concern here. The question of when to posit ways of being is closely related to a more general question: when should one think that some philosophically interesting expression is analogous? Accordingly, my strategy here is as follows. First, I briefly explain my interpretation of ontological pluralism, the doctrine that there are ways of being.4 Second, I introduce the notion of an analogous term, and show how, on most ways of implementing ontological pluralism, “existence” is analogous. Third, I discuss two sufficient conditions for when one is warranted in claiming that a philosophically interesting term is analogous. Fourth, I present a series of ontological schemes, each of which satisfies at least one of the sufficient conditions. The upshot is this: if you are attracted to one of these ontologies, you have reason to believe in ways of being. The careful reader will have noted the apparent modesty of my conclusion. Unfortunately, I do not believe that one could ever be rationally required to believe in ways of being. Still, in general a metaphysic is a live option to the extent that it is shown to be rationally permissible to believe. Since the apparent consensus among contemporary analytic metaphysicians is that believing that things can exist in different ways is silly or confused, establishing the rational permissibility of belief in ways of being is a non-trivial task. Let us begin. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Ecological Ethics: An IntroductionDavid Keller (bio)Patrick Curry, Ecological Ethics: An Introduction. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2007, 173pages.Were I in Bath having drinks with Patrick Curry, we would have much to agree about. Explaining his choice of title of his book, Ecological Ethics, he rightly points out that the more common descriptor "environmental ethics" presupposes a dualism between human beings and the nonhuman environment—an assumption which is itself anthropocentric (...) (p. 4). For philosophers interested in studying the human/ nonhuman dynamic, the legitimacy of anthropocentrism is itself an open question. Because the word 'ecology' treats humans, as biota, as integral parts of ecological systems, the phrase "ecological ethics" is less presumptuous and hence more accurate. The word 'ecological' also has the benefit of conveying the message that the subject is notgoing to involve extending moral considerability from humans out into the "environment." Instead, ecological systems as the locus of value provide the starting point for the elaboration of ethics (p. 2). For Curry, as for Leopold (1960) and Callicott (1989), "ecological community" is coextensive with the ethical community.To correlate the ethical community with the biotic community within the rubric of "ecological ethics" is nothing novel. Curry's claim that "there is something ancient about an ecological ethic" (p. 7) got me thinking: [End Page 153]prior to Abrahamic monotheism and Greek rationalism, ancient peoples, particularly nomadic hunter-gatherers, probably considered themselves as integral parts of what encompassed them, moving with herds, in concert with meteorological and seasonal changes, seeing themselves as one amongst other living beings. They probably did not see themselves apart from the "environment" as we have learned to do. Then with the advent of agriculture, linear furrows and controlled inundations must have fostered an addictive sense of security from flood and famine. Later, the innovations of industrial civilization further distanced us from the caprice of nature's wild vicissitudes. Yet that comfort comes at the expense of lost awareness of our responsibilities as bioticcitizens. Therefore, Curry says, following Sylvan (1973), we need a new ecological ethic since traditional Western morality "is no longer up to the job" (ibid.).Curry remarks that ethics, cast in this light, is not something "optional," something to be addressed after one's belly is full, debts settled, and lodging secured. Rather, ethics cuts directly to the core of human action, of all human activity (p. 5)—a claim reminiscent of Socrates' exhortation to Thrasymachus that it is no small matter that they are discussing, nothing of less importance than the right way to live one's life (Plato 2005, p. 603).Over the first sips of ale, I would praise him for giving his book a simple and straightforward structure that makes a challenging subject accessible, especially to students. After laying down the groundwork of basic concepts in moral philosophy (chapter 3)—objectivism versus relativism, the problem of the is/ought gap, religious morality and environmental philosophy (domination, stewardship, and managerialism), and virtue and rule-based ethics (chapter 4)—Curry addresses axiology (chapter 5). Are humans the sole locus of value (anthropocentrism), or are there other entities worthy of some sort of moral consideration who themselves do not carry the burden of moral responsibility (zoocentrism, biocentrism, ecocentrism)? Curry answers the latter in the affirmative, arguing that ontological interconnectedness of humans with other living beings within ecological systems discloses that something greater than humanity is the locus of value (p. 46).The most useful part of the book for my students out in Utah would be the middle chapters (6–8) in which Curry casts degrees of nonanthropocentrism [End Page 154]in shades of green. These shades range from light green or "shallow" anthropocentric ethics such Bookchin's Social Ecology (p. 50), Hardin's Lifeboat Ethics (pp. 52–54), and mainstream environmentalism (p. 51), through medium green ethics based on the extension of traditional human-oriented moral philosophy to nonhumans such as Singer's Animal Liberation (pp. 56–59), Regan's Animal Rights (pp. 59–60), and Taylor's Biocentrism (pp. 60–62). Curry proceeds to the dark green ethics of ecocentrism, such as Land Ethics (pp. 65–68), the Gaia Hypothesis (pp. 68–71... (shrink)

Can there be an objective morality without God? Derek Parfit argues that it can and offers a theory of morality that is neither theistic nor naturalistic. This book provides a critical assessment of Parfit's metaethical theory. Jakobsen identifies some problems in Parfit’s theory – problems concerning moral normativity, the ontological status of morality, and evolutionary influence on our moral beliefs – and argues that theological resources can help solve them. By showing how Parfit’s theory may be improved by the help (...) of theology, Jakobsen demonstrates the relevance of theology in philosophical and metaethical debates and argues that Christian theism offers a better explanation of morality than what Parfit’s non-naturalism does. (shrink)

В монографии представлены несколько смысловых блоков, связанных с восприятием и интерпретацией человеком исторического бытия. Ранние греческие мыслители пытались получить доступ к исходникам (началам) бытия, и эти интенции легли в основу научного знания, а также привели к появлению метафизики. В классической (и в неклассической) метафизике за основу была принята догма Пифагора и Платона о неизменности подлинной реальности, из чего следовало отрицание бытийного характера времени. Автор монографии отказывается от этой догмы и предлагает стратегию обновления метафизики и перехода ее к новому — постнеклассическому (...) — этапу. Поскольку трансформационный потенциал реальности наиболее явно представлен в историческом становлении, авторская стратегия реализуется в метафизике истории. При этом выявляются начала истории, в каком качестве выступают «дух», «культурно-историческая матрица» и «метафизический проект организации бытия» («онтологический проект»). Исследуются формы и механизмы «работы» человека с прошлым, обсуждаются вопросы, связанные с постижением логики исторического процесса, а также с ролью (творческой) личности в истории. Анализируются причины цивилизационных кризисов и очерчиваются возможные пути их разрешения, предлагается метафизическая интерпретация социальных и военных конфликтов. Завершает исследование рассмотрение трансформации человеческого естества под влиянием информационных, био- и нанотехнологий. (shrink)

This book investigates what change is, according to Aristotle, and how it affects his conception of being. Mark Sentesy argues that change leads Aristotle to develop first-order metaphysical concepts such as matter, potency, actuality, sources of being, and the teleology of emerging things. He shows that Aristotle’s distinctive ontological claim—that being is inescapably diverse in kind—is anchored in his argument for the existence of change. -/- Aristotle may be the only thinker to have given a noncircular definition of change. When (...) he gave this definition, arguing that change is real was a losing proposition. To show that it exists, he had to rework the way philosophers understood reality. His groundbreaking analysis of change has long been interpreted through a Platonist lens, however, in which being is conceived as unchanging. Offering a comprehensive reexamination of the relationship between change and being in Aristotle, Sentesy makes an important contribution to scholarship on Aristotle, ancient philosophy, the history and philosophy of science, and metaphysics. (shrink)

Many philosophers have shown sympathy to the thought that reality is fundamentally positive. Julio De Rizzo formulates this idea precisely by means of the notion of grounding, and examines how the resulting thesis fares with respect to three much discussed classes of negative truths, namely that of negative predications, that of negative causal reports, and that of negative existential truths. By shedding light on the issues advocates of the thesis have to deal with, this work shows the positivist account to (...) be a tenable position in metaphysics. (shrink)

Tracing the leading role of emotions in the evolution of the mind, a philosopher and a psychologist pair up to reveal how thought and culture owe less to our faculty for reason than to our capacity to feel. Many accounts of the human mind concentrate on the brain’s computational power. Yet, in evolutionary terms, rational cognition emerged only the day before yesterday. For nearly 200 million years before humans developed a capacity to reason, the emotional centers of the brain were (...) hard at work. If we want to properly understand the evolution of the mind, we must explore this more primal capability that we share with other animals: the power to feel. Emotions saturate every thought and perception with the weight of feelings. The Emotional Mind reveals that many of the distinctive behaviors and social structures of our species are best discerned through the lens of emotions. Even the roots of so much that makes us uniquely human—art, mythology, religion—can be traced to feelings of caring, longing, fear, loneliness, awe, rage, lust, playfulness, and more. From prehistoric cave art to the songs of Hank Williams, Stephen T. Asma and Rami Gabriel explore how the evolution of the emotional mind stimulated our species’ cultural expression in all its rich variety. Bringing together insights and data from philosophy, biology, anthropology, neuroscience, and psychology, The Emotional Mind offers a new paradigm for understanding what it is that makes us so unique. (shrink)

This study tries to show the relation between technê and the ethical sphere in the Ancient Greek through mythology and the philosophical literature. Both in mythology and in the philosophical framework the benefits of technê and the power provided by technê for humanity are emphasized. And technê is considered as competence increases the control of human beings in practical areas. However, the ambiguous character of the human experience related to technê and the morally problematic character of this field is also (...) pointed out in the literature. Because, if not controlled, technê has a potential to turn easily against humanity and to produce things that would harm human beings. At this point, ethical values have a crucial role in the control of technê. Technê as a type of knowledge which gives how to do things and how to control the environment but does not give why something is to be done and cannot give an ultimate goal should be subject to higher spheres in the philosophical framework. Therefore technê is subject to ethical and ultimately metaphysical sphere. (shrink)

In this paper I show that a novel ontic reading of explanation, intending to capture the de re essential features of individuals, can support the qualitative view of individual essences. It is argued further that the putative harmful consequences of the Leibniz Principle and its converse for the qualitative view can be avoided, provided that individual essences are not construed in the style of the naïve bundle theory with set-theoretical identity- conditions. Adopting either the more sophisticated two-tier BT or, alternatively, (...) the neo-Aristotelian position of taking essences as natures in the Aristotelian sense, can help to evade these main charges against the qualitative view. The functional parallels with the alternative haecceitistic view of individuation and individual essence will also be considered. (shrink)

Prompted by Eryximachus’ speech about the relationship between Eros and health in Plato’s Symposium, this paper engages the nature of poiēsis as it arises in the works of Martin Heidegger, Julia Kristeva, and Aristotle. All three address poiēsis as a human activity that points beyond an individual person, and in so doing speaks to what’s possible for human life. Section I addresses Heidegger, whose insistance on the interplay between “earth” and “world” in “The Origin of a Work of Art” speaks (...) to a continuous strife at the heart of poiēsis. Section II explains Kristeva’s situating of rhythm as the unarticulated undulation driving human life, grounding any subsequent articulation in poiēsis. Section III engages Aristotle, who, in his Poetics, opens his discussion of poiēsis and mimesis through rhythmos. All do so, I submit, with catharsis—itself a kind of love and health—in view. This catharsis is seen through an affirmation of poietic possibility in art (Heidegger), the practice of the speaking subject (Kristeva), and tragedy (Aristotle). (shrink)

Pain: the most senseless of things or the most vital of phenomena? This essay aims at a defense of the meaning of pain through an inquiry into the ek-static temporality that structures a being-in-pain. The argument considers the common understanding of pain as a symptom. As the present result of a source of injury that demands a cure, a being-in-pain pictures a movement from something to something else, that is, it pictures the ek-static structure discovered by Aristotle. Furthermore, the argument (...) recalls the Aristotelian apprehension of pain as responsible for the innermost secret of dynamics as such. Pain causes unease and demands change, and hence it opens up a future dimension that marks a beginning of motion and change in general, and of time in particular. When confronted with a pain bound to be chronic, when no change can be expected, time remains. The concluding reading of witness-literature, supports the guiding intuition of pain as a passion in service of things forgotten, in futural light of an eventually new beginning. (shrink)

This paper identifies a problem that Aristotle revealed and that Heidegger’s own insights, into the diverse forms that the Being of entities takes, exacerbated: the problem is whether there is sense to the idea of ‘Being in general’—‘Being as a whole’—and this is a problem because there not being such sense threatens the very possibility of the discipline of ontology. The paper proposes that Heidegger envisaged the project which a completed Being and Time would have carried out as an attempt (...) to solve this problem. The project considers what the subject who intends ‘Being as a whole’ would have to be like; crucially this requires reflection on what it would be for that subject itself to be a whole; and we find such reflection in Heidegger’s discussion of authenticity. By looking in particular at his notions of ‘guilt’ and ‘Being-towards-death’, and the role that they play in identifying an ‘ecstatic’ form of temporality, we can identify a ‘horizon’ against which the authentic can be seen as ‘being-a-whole’ and as living in the light of an understanding of what might indeed be called ‘Being as a whole’. (shrink)

This paper examines the metaphor of harmony as a criterion of hermeneutic understanding. Taking harmony as a play of integrated parts within a dynamic whole, we can see the hermeneutic task of interpretation as a process of harmonizing parts meaningfully with each other and with the larger whole. Holding up a sufficiently rich notion of harmony as an ideal of interpretation can guide our hermeneutic practices. After distinguishing subtle differences in the Greek and Chinese conceptions of harmony, I argue that (...) the Chinese conception more closely aligns with the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s approach to hermeneutic understanding. In the end, I suggest that these insights can lead us to progress in social harmony. (shrink)

By denying to vegetal life the core values of autonomy, individualization, self-identity, originality, and essentiality, traditional philosophy not only marginalizes plants but, inadvertently, confers on them a crucial role in the current transvaluation of metaphysical value systems. From the position of absolute exteriority and heteronomy, vegetation accomplishes a living reversal of metaphysical values and points toward the collapse of hierarchical dualisms.

The philosophers agree that philosophy begins in wonder. How wonder is understood, however, is not at all clear and has implications for contemporary work in feminist phenomenology. Luce Irigaray, for example, has insisted on wonder as the passion that will renew relationships between women and men, provide a foundation for democracy, and launch a new era in history. She calls on women to enact practices of wonder in relation to men. In what follows I briefly review the most significant claims (...) about wonder in the history of philosophy generally, and as related to the phenomenological practice of the epoché particularly. I consider Irigaray’s claims about wonder as they arise out of this tradition, and try to spell out both what is promised to women and what is asked of them through affirmations of wonder. I suggest that this prescriptive notion is at the heart of a new conservatism in “feminist” thought that turns on nostalgia for age-old beliefs about women’s proper mode of relation toward men and their accomplishments, and is deeply homophobic. I urge readers to adopt a more critical attitude toward wonder as related to sexual difference by historicizing the inquiry in keeping with the phenomenological practice of Simone de Beauvoir. Drawing on Kant, Beauvoir, and contemporary work by Sara Ahmed, I suggest that there is a politics of wonder at work here which feminists have every reason to question. Reflecting on the politics of wonder also discloses some key features of critical feminist phenomenological practice. (shrink)

This article is focused on the notions of health and illness, as they appear in the context of philosophical reflections on finitude and contingency of human existence. Criticizing Heidegger's approach to health and illness which is based on the Aristotelian concept of privation, the author tries to find an alternative to the privative concept of illness with the help of Schelling's treatise on human freedom which explicates Evil not as a privation of Good, but as a sort of illness that (...) has its own phenomenal positivity. Even Schelling's philosophical investigation of the nature of Evil, however, doesn't seem to provide a solid ground for a non-privative and non-normative approach to pathological phenomena. Only when Schelling's treatise on human freedom is de-contextualized and radicalized in a way suggested, for instance, by Deleuze in his Difference and Repetition, does it seem possible to elucidate pathological, and especially psychopathological phenomena, as they show themselves from themselves, and not from the perspective given by the normative ideal of health. (shrink)

In a comprehensive survey of contemporary scholarship on Zhang Zai's (1020-1077) development of the notion qi ( 'vital energy') in the context of his critique of the Buddhist, I observe that there is a prevalent imposition of a Western concept, namely, 'substance monism', on his understanding of qi . It is assumed that he posits that 'the myriad things ( wanwu )' and 'the vast emptiness ( taixu )' are simultaneously differentiated and unified in that they are but different manifestations (...) of an undifferentiated singular entity, that is, qi . I argue that such understanding distorts the 'logic' of Zhang Zai's qi that accounts for the simultaneous differentiation and the unity of 'the myriad things' and 'the vast emptiness' in terms of relationally opposed polarities and the dynamic unity amongst them. I also argue that this understanding distorts his practical message that emphasizes the endeavor to create coherence among our differences without recourse to a realm of 'oneness' that transcends our differences. (shrink)

It has been suggested that a rational being stands in what is called a “second-personal relation” to herself. According to philosophers like S. Darwall and Ch. Korsgaard, being a rational agent is to interact with oneself, to make demands on oneself. The thesis of the paper is that this view rests on a logical confusion. Transitive verbs like “asking”, “making a demand” or “obligating” can occur with the reflexive pronoun, but it is a mistake to assume that the reflexive and (...) the non-reflexive use exhibit the same logical grammar. The thesis that they do is in part motivated by the assumption that to show that my relation to you bears the same form as my practical self-relation is to show that, fundamentally, you are not an object for me to think about and act on, but a subject with whom to think and act together. I argue, to the contrary, that if my addressing you exhibited the same form as a relation I could literally be said to stand in to myself, then the nexus between us would be such that I am irretr.. (shrink)

Work on analogy has been done from a number of disciplinary perspectives throughout the history of Western thought. This work is a multidisciplinary guide to theorizing about analogy. It contains 1,406 references, primarily to journal articles and monographs, and primarily to English language material. classical through to contemporary sources are included. The work is classified into eight different sections (with a number of subsections). A brief introduction to each section is provided. Keywords and key expressions of importance to research on (...) analogy are discussed in the introductory material. Electronic resources for conducting research on analogy are listed as well. (shrink)

Aquinas’ doctrine of materia signata or “designated matter” is an important deviation from the traditional doctrines on matter. Through in-depth typological and genetic analyses of the related concepts, this essay explores materia signata’s ontological qualities, generative mechanism and function, as well as its academic significance in the history of both Christian theology and Western philosophy.

In this paper, I explore the problems of cultivating a critical attitude in pedagogy given problems with accounts grounded in critical social theory, rational liberalism and pragmatic esthetic theory. I offer instead an alternative account of criticism for education in open, pluralistic, liberal, democratic societies called 'pedagogy of difference' that is grounded in the diversity liberalism of Isaiah Berlin and the dialogical philosophy of Martin Buber. In our current condition in which there is no agreement as to the proper criteria (...) for assessing attitudes and actions, for a critical attitude to gain a foothold one must learn to evaluate proposed beliefs and behaviour-based standards within a particular tradition as well as those drawn from another viewpoint. To know oneself, one must engage others who are different. But to engage others in a meaningful way one must be immersed in a tradition to which one is heir or with which one chooses to affiliate. (shrink)

How should we assess programs dedicated to education in virtue? One influential answer draws on quantitative research designs. By measuring the inputs and processes that produce the highest levels of virtue among participants according to some reasonable criterion, in this view, we can determine which programs engender the most desired results. Although many outcomes of character education can undoubtedly be assessed in this way, taken on its own, this approach may support favorable judgments about programs that indoctrinate rather than educate, (...) because education in character entails teleological thinking that is volitional not merely determined. I argue instead that proper assessment of virtue requires an expansive view of character education in both particular and common goods that avoids the tendency to indoctrinate and an inclusive conception of measurement that takes into account qualitative in addition to quantitative methodologies. (shrink)

This book proposes to identify three long-term structures in causal reasoning - in particular, in terms of the relationship between cause and identity - that appear to be of value in categorizing and organizing various trends in philosophical thought.<br>Such conceptual schemes involve a host of philosophical dilemmas (such as the problem of relativism), which are examined in the first chapter. A number of naturalistic and transcendental approaches to this problem are also analysed.<br>In particular, the book attempts to construct a theoretical (...) basis for Foucault's tripartite classification of epistemological structures in European thought.<br>The final chapter attempts to buttress the above schema by extending the analysis from cause and identity to growth, change, and stability, critiquing certain ideas of Foucault and Heidegger, as well as examining the contemporary thought of process philosophy and complexity theory.<br><br>Contents<br><br>Contents: Plurality and Causality - What is a Paradigm? - Paradigms and Causal Structure - Universality and Mathesis Universalis - Temporality and Visibility - Classical and Modern Probability Theory - The Environment and Non-Monotonicity - The Marburg School and the Limit Concept; Foucault's concept of 'Man' - Nineteenth Century Philosophy of Science - A Dynamic Model - Foucault and the Birth of the Clinic - Process, Growth and Complexity - Time and History. (shrink)

In this paper, I hope to i. briefly explain Nyaya dualist ontology and identify the implications involved in accepting this view, ii. provide a comparison of Nyaya dualism to Cartesian dualism, and iii. provide an analysis of Nyaya dualism vis-à-vis some contemporary non-dualist theories of mind, in an attempt to gauge the viability of Nyaya Dualism as a theory of mind. I will briefly identify the context and history of this school in Indian Philosophy and will attempt to describe how (...) this paper approaches and interprets Nyaya thinking. (shrink)

This paper examines causal theories of reference with respect to how plausible an account they give of non-physical natural kind terms such as ‘gene’ as well as of the truth of the associated theoretical claims. I first show that reference fixism for ‘gene’ fails. By this, I mean the claim that the reference of ‘gene’ was stable over longer historical periods, for example, since the classical period of transmission genetics. Second, I show that the theory of partial reference does not (...) do justice to some widely held realist intuitions about classical genetics. This result is at loggerheads with the explicit goals usually associated with partial theories of reference, which is to defend a realist semantics for scientific terms. Thirdly, I show that, contrary to received wisdom and perhaps contrary to physics and chemistry, neither reference fixism nor partial reference are necessary in order to hold on to scientific realism about biology. I pinpoint the reasons for this in the nature of biological kinds, which do not even remotely resemble natural kinds (i.e., Lockean real essences) as traditionally conceived. (shrink)

This essay seeks to explore the meaning and significance of Angst from the standpoint of hermeneutic phenomenology. Employing a five chapter structure, the essay investigates this phenomenon from two modes of hermeneutic inquiry: what we have called the "macro-" and the "micro-" approaches to hermeneutics. ;Chapter I traces the development of our ground phenomenon, "primordial Angst," from 6000 BCE to the time of Jacob Boehme. In doing so we attempted to uncover four facets of primordial Angst, facets we termed "onto-theological (...) Angst," "strictural Angst," "pneumatical Angst," and finally, "passional Angst." ;Chapter II explores the first in-depth treatment of Angst and the hermeneutic horizons which made Soren Kierkegaard's Begrebnet Angest possible. We discovered that Angst for Kierkegaard must be grasped by an organic and collateral hermeneutic which we termed the "cognitive" as opposed to the "experimental/psychological" approaches. ;Chapter III examines primordial Angst from the perspective of Martin Heidegger's early mature thought. We attempted to again display the hermeneutic horizons of this perspective, showing how Heidegger saw Angst as the condition of the possibility of Dasein's authentic mode of Being as well as the basic attitude of scientific Dasein. ;Chapter IV inquires into Angst from the viewpoint of existential thought. There we looked at Jean Paul Sartre in juxtaposition to Paul Tillich with regard to their markedly different visions of Angst, again attempting to disclose their respective hermeneutic horizons as well as their conclusions. ;Finally, Chapter V returned to the macro-hermeneutic perspective, attempting to summarize, contrast, and compare the micro-hermeneutic of the three preceding chapters. Then we suggested that at the very epicenter of the Angst phenomenon there resides an equally primordial Urwille, or a basic craving for ontological wholeness on the part of Dasein. Thus to bridge the abyss between the finite and the infinite, Dasein created "representational thinking." We argued that only by dwelling in primordial Angst and by abiding in Gelassenheit, the renouncing of representational thought, can Dasein overcome all cognitive distinctions and dwell as one with Being, through what the later Heidegger called "meditative thinking.". (shrink)

This thesis investigates the structure of knowing, and it argues that existential trust is an epistemological category. The aim of the dissertation is to develop a view according to which all human activity is seen as an activity of a lived body, and in which the understanding of the structure of such activity is regarded as central for the solution even of epistemological problems. This view is not rooted in any one philosophical tradition, but circles around activity of the lived (...) body. It connects thinkers who in other respects belong to different "isms" in philosophy. Central to the dissertation are Aristotle, Dewey, Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein, Ryle, Anscombe, Polanyi, and Grene. Michael Polanyi's concept of tacit knowledge, and connected concepts like attend to, attend from, and subsidiary awareness, are presented. Different kinds of subsidiary awareness, not noted by Polanyi, are distinguished. It is also argued that Polanyi has not seen all the implicatons of his view that instruments can be interiorized and be part of the lived body. Conversely, parts of the normally lived body can be exteriorized. Nor has Polanyi seen that one has subsidiary awareness of oneself as a certain kind ofperson. This fact, in turn, is shown to have implications for the way we constitute ourselves as agents. Since we are engendered agents, we always attend from gender. In the last decade, the concept of trust has definitely entered epistemology. Mostly, it has been in terms of trusting testimony and/or testifier. This thesis wants to deepen that account. There is a more fundamental kind of trust, namely trust in oneself and trust in the world. It is called existential trust, and it is of epistemological importance, too. Existential trust, it is claimed, is necessary in all acts of knowing. Probably, this fact is hard to discover without having recourse to a distinction like that between attending from and attending to. Existential trust is shown in the way we attend from something. Observation and thinking are central epistemological categories, of course, but they should be supplemented by trust. Without trust they cannot perform any epistemological work. Linguistically, 'to know' is a state verb. Superficially, it describes only a state, not an activity. This fact, however, does not contradict the view of knowledge put forward in the dissertation. To know is to have a disposition to perform successfully either some kind of action, or to perform some kind of true assertive speech act. Basically, knowing is an activity. (shrink)

This thesis aims to determine which philosophical school, either Epicurean or Stoic, Virgil's Aeneid more accurately reflects. Explored are the characters of Anchises, Dido and Aeneas; the portrayal of piety, justice, emotions and anger and; the philosophical issues of freedom of will, Fate and the composition of the cosmos. In conclusion, the presence of freedom of will afforded to human characters within this work and the distinction made by Virgil between Jupiter and Fate, lead to the conclusion that it is (...) unlikely that this is a Stoic work. Also, this thesis argues that Virgil's presentation of piety, justice, emotion and anger are consistent with an Epicurean conception of these characteristics. Therefore, if the Aeneid can be attributed influence from either philosophical school of thought, it lends itself much more readily to an Epicurean reading. (shrink)

On all sides, one hears appeals to objectivity and exhortations to be objective. These admonitions are usually made by scientifically-minded people. Laudable as these appeals may be, they are sometimes so framed as to give the impression that objectivity is a quality or property of events that is immediately recognizable. It is thus, a finality, an ultimate for knowledge, which, when recognized, is taken as given. Ulterior questions, as to what constitutes the objective character of fact, are considered spurious meanderings (...) of minds intent on weaving a cosy scheme of the universe.[...]. (shrink)

Straipsnyje analizuojama seksualinės skirties sampratos transformacija Luce Irigaray filosofijoje. Straipsnio euristinė schema – esencializmo-konstruktyvizmo kontroversija giminės filosofijoje. Ja remiantis teigiama, kad ankstyvoji Irigaray psichoanalitinė seksualinės skirties samprata ir mimesis kaip moteriškosios subjektyvybės steigties būdas atitinka tik „strateginį esencializmą“, o transformaciniame filosofijos etape, ginčijant Hegelio subjekto paradigmą, Irigaray pateikta natūralistinė seksualinės skirties samprata jau implikuoja ontologinį esencializmą. Taip pat į analizę įtraukiamas Irigaray nenagrinėtas Hegelio giminės tapatybės principas, kuris implictiškai apima lyčių diferenciacijos aspektą. Tuo siekiama ne tik atskleisti Irigaray moteriškosios subjektyvybės (...) sampratą, kuri apima moteriškumo neredukuojamumą į reprodukcijos funkciją, vyriškosios ir moteriškosios subjektyvybių nebendramatiškumą, bet taip pat išryškinti giminės tapatybės ir seksualinės skirties kontroversiją kaip dvi skirtingas subjekto filosofijos paradigmas. (shrink)

This thesis takes as a challenge to think about epistemology in a way that goes beyond epistemology understood as a philosophical discipline. I argue that it is important to deal with epistemological problems, because even in our everyday lives we are constantly in different epistemic situations that require explanations. Therefore, it is necessary to know what we claim when we claim to know something, that something we know is true, and how we explain or justify our knowledge or truth claims.Traditionally (...) speaking, all these problems have been considered within epistemology as a philosophical discipline, which is understood as abstract, disinterested and objective search for knowledge and truth, and its core concepts such as knowledge are defined as apolitical and devoid of any kind of social influence. In this thesis I argue for redefinition of the term ‘epistemology’ in order to keep the term while going beyond its understanding as a private conversation among philosophers themselves. Epistemology is understood now as an interdisciplinary field of research, which takes knowledge as a political event, and where knowledge and power are connected in various complex ways. Both French philosopher Michel Foucault and feminist epistemologists share this understanding of knowledge and in subsequent chapters I explore, first, their accounts of epistemological problems, such as knowledge, the subject of knowledge and the ways how knowledge can be a form of resistance to dominant knowledge, and second, the points of the convergence and differences between Foucault’s epistemology developed within his middle works – so-called ‘genealogical’, and feminist epistemological accounts, primarily developed by feminist standpoint theorist Nancy Hartsock and her feminist postmodern critics.The main goals of this thesis are to provide a dialogue between Foucault and feminist epistemology in order to see how and to what extent Foucault’s ideas of power, knowledge and resistance can be useful for feminist epistemological needs, and what feminist epistemological inquiry can be in the future. (shrink)

A-Theory or B-Theory of Time? An Aristotelian Answer The purpose of this paper is to provide a description of Aristotle’s theory of time, in order to understand if it could introduce a stimulus into the contemporary debate on the nature of time between A-theorists and B-theorists. The first section of the paper is devoted to a conceptual explanation of these two main positions about the nature of time and their intimate link with eternalism and presentism. The second section presents the (...) Aristotelian view on the nature of time, considering his analysis on the notion of ‘periods’ and ‘instants’ or ‘nows’ and arguing a metaphysical priority of the ‘now’ on the ‘period’. The third section tries to locate the Aristotelian theory into this contemporary debate, following two different strategies. Initially, it will be argued in favour of Aristotle present’s primacy demonstrating his preference for A-theory of time. Secondly, thorough the help of an argument from Jeffery Brower, the paper provides an account of Aristotle’s position in a specific debate on the nature of time concerning the problem of ‘temporary intrinsics’, stating an Aristotelian endurantism. In the Conclusion, the paper claims the perfect consistency of Aristotle present’s primacy with Brower’s argument in favour of Aristotle’s endurantism. Bibliography Aristotle.. Physic. Harvard University Press. Brower, J.. Aristotelian Endurantism: A new Solution to the Problem of temporary Intrinsics. Mind 112: 882-905. Strobach, N.. The Moment of Change. A Systematic History in the Philosophy of Space and Time. Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V. Key-words Aristotle – A-theory – B-theory – endurantism – metaphysics - perdurantism. (shrink)

This thesis inquires what it means to interpret non-relativistic quantum mechanics (QM), and the philosophical limits of this interpretation. In pursuit of a scientific-realist stance, a metametaphysical method is expanded and applied to evaluate rival interpretations of QM, based on the conceptual distinction between ontology and metaphysics, for objective theory choice in metaphysical discussions relating to QM. Three cases are examined, in which this metametaphysical method succeeds in indicating what are the wrong alternatives to interpret QM in metaphysical terms. The (...) first two cases failed in doing so due to different kinds of underdetermination. In the third case, unlike underdetermination, where there are many choices to be made, a “null-determination” is proposed where there may be no metaphysical choices in the available metaphysical literature. Considering what has been discussed, an agnostic philosophic position is adopted concerning the possibility of interpreting QM from a scientific-realistic point of view. (shrink)

You meet someone new; you like them; you send them to your Facebook page. But how accurate is this representation of you? We all want to look our best, which is why we are drawn to the ability to fudge things a bit online. How does this projection of who we are distort us into who we want to be? Facebook allows us to hide our flaws that are all too visible in real life. We can embellish or correct what (...) we said earlier, edit out what we don’t like about ourselves, and only show photos where our chin is down and the lighting is blown out just enough to hide the bump on our nose. Our prospective employers can even turn to Facebook to assess our desirability. So might the constructed aesthetic of Facebook affect our approach to ethics – to interacting with other people? Does the way we design ourselves on Facebook directly impact the other people in our lives? Is each of us really just a rough draft that needs immediate editing? What about Facebook makes it possible to achieve genuine beauty? (shrink)