In Logique du Fantasme, Lacan argues that the compulsion to repeat does not obey the same discharge logic as homeostatic processes. Repetition installs a realm that is categorically different from the one related to homeostatic pleasure seeking, a properly subjective one, one in which the mark “stands for,” “takes the place of,” what we have ventured to call “an event,” and what only in the movement of return, in what Lacan calls a “thinking of repetition,” confirms and ever reconfirms this (...) point of no return, which is also a qualitative cut and a structural loss. The kind of “standing for” Lacan intends here with the concept of repetition is certainly not something like an image or a faithful description. No, what Lacan wishes to stress is that this mark is situated at another level, at another place, it is “entstellt,” and as such, it is punctually impinging upon the bodily dynamics without rendering the event, without having an external meta-point of view, but cutting across registers according to a logics that is not the homeostatic memory logics. This paper elaborates on this distinction on the basis of a confrontation with what Freud says about the pleasure principle and its beyond in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, and also takes inspiration from Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology. We argue that Lacan’s theory of enjoyment takes up and generalizes what Freud was after in Beyond the Pleasure Principle with the Wiederholungszwang, and pushes Freud’s thoughts to a more articulated point: to the point where a subject is considered to speak only when it has allowed the other, through discourse, to have impacted and cut into his bodily pleasure dynamics. (shrink)

This paper examines the nature of Aristotelian phronesis , how it is attained, and who is able to attain it inside the polis . I argue that, for Aristotle, attaining phronesis does not require an individual to perfect his practical wisdom to the point where he never makes a mistake, but rather it is attained by certain individuals who are unable to make a mistake of this kind due to their education, habituation, and position in society.

This paper examines Pomponazzi's arguments against Averroes in his De Immortalitate Animae, focusing on the question whether thought is possible without a body. The first part of the paper will sketch the history of the problem, namely the interpretation of Aristotle's remarks about the intellect in De Anima 3.4-5, touching on Alexander, Themistius, and Averroes. The second part will focus on Pomponazzi's response to Averroes, including his use of arguments by Aquinas. It will conclude by suggesting that Pomponazzi's discussion stands (...) as the first properly modern account of Aristotle's psychology. (shrink)

RESUMEN Recientes intentos por conectar la ética y la biología aristotélicas marcan una suerte de continuidad entre el carácter de los animales no racionales y de los seres humanos, de modo tal que en la descripción de los caracteres de los animales no racionales puede identificarse el punto de partida biológico del propio ser humano en el desarrollo de su carácter moral. En este artículo, propongo señalar los límites de este tipo de lectura, ya que, entendida de cierto modo, ella (...) implica una continuidad entre la normatividad natural y la normatividadpráctica propia de un naturalismo fundacionalista que no puede atribuirse a Aristóteles. En conexión con ello, sostengo que el concepto de virtud natural no es un concepto natural, sino ético, tal que sólo cobra sentido en el marco de la normatividad práctica; la virtud natural, en este sentido, no forma parte de una explicación genética de la virtud sino de un análisis que va del todo a las partes, de acuerdo al cual ella no es anterior sino posterior a la virtud ética. ABSTRACT A recent trend in Aristotelian scholarship tries to link ethics and biology. Within these attempts, some sort of continuity between the character of non-rational animals and that of human beings has been proposed, so that the starting point ofmoral development could be identified in Aristotle’s description of animal’s character. In this article I argue that this reading should strongly qualified, for understood in some ways it entails a sort of continuity between natural normativity and practical normativity that belongs to an Archimedean ethical naturalism, which cannot be reconstructed from Aristotle’s writings. Connected to this, I argue that the concept of natural virtue is not a natural concept, but an ethical one that only makes sense from within the realm of practical normativity; natural virtue, thus understood, is not part of a genetic explanation of virtue, but emerges from a conceptual whole-part analysis. In this manner, natural virtue is no prior, but posterior to ethical virtue. (shrink)

This essay attempts to retrieve the notion of ‘common sense’ within the writings of Descartes and Montaigne. I suggest that both writers represent distinct traditions in which the notion is employed. Descartes represents a modernist tradition in which common sense is understood to be a cognitive faculty, while Montaigne represents a humanist tradition in which common sense is understood as a political virtue. I also suggest that both writers work with the notion as a way of responding to diversity in (...) the world. The paper concludes with a discussion of how the notion of common sense employed by Descartes and Montaigne emerges out of the scholastic tradition and the assertion that both writers are responding to the educational consequences of scholasticism. I also discuss how the reconstruction of Descartes in this paper can provide some ground for raising new questions about the Cartesian project and educational philosophy. Finally, I gesture toward the idea that the humanist tradition with its understanding of common sense as political virtue can provide benefit for contemporary responses to diversity. (shrink)

This essay proposes a new theory of agentive modals: ability modals and their duals, compulsion modals. After criticizing existing approaches—the existential quantificational analysis, the universal quantificational analysis, and the conditional analysis—it presents a new account that builds on both the existential and conditional analyses. On this account, the act conditional analysis, a sentence like ‘John can swim across the river’ says that there is some practically available action that is such that if John tries to do it, he swims across (...) the river. The essay argues that the act conditional analysis avoids the problems faced by existing accounts of agentive modality and shows how the act conditional analysis can be extended to an account of generic agentive modal claims. The upshot is a new vantage point on the role of agentive modal ascriptions in practical discourse: ability ascriptions serve as a kind of hypothetical guarantee, and compulsion ascriptions as a kind of nonhypothetical guarantee. (shrink)

Dieser Aufsatz ist eine Besinnung auf den Begriff Individuum, wie dieser in der Biologie gebraucht wird, und er beabsichtigt, den Inhalt dieses Begriffes theoretisch zu begründen. Es ist aber unmöglich für die nähere Bestimmung des Begriffes Individuum von der etymologischen Bedeutung „unteilbar” auszugehen, weil die biologischen Individuen nicht immer unteilbar sind. Beim Suchen nach einem richtigen Untersuchungsverfahren wird zunächst dargelegt, wie diese Untersuchung wesentlich ein Teil der theoretischen Biologie, also der Wissenschaft, ist, wenn man auch von deutlichen Zusammenhängen mit der (...) Philosophie und dem spontanen Denken sprechen kann. Deshalb wird die Methode, nach der wir vorangehen müssen, die induktive Methode sein, weil diese in der Wissenschaft mit Recht hoch eingeschätzt wird.Bei den grossen Vertretern der verschiedenen Richtungen in der Biologie, beiHaeckel, von Bertalanffy, Driesch undBergson, werden in ihre Auffassungen über Individuum und Individualität derartige Übereinstimmungen festgestellt, dass darin nach den Gesetzen der Induktion die wesentlichen Momente des biologischen Individuumbegriffes erkannt werden können. Ausserdem stimmen diese Momente mit dem Inhalt des Begriffs zusammen, wie der sich aus dem spontanen Denken ergibt.Diese Momente sind: Subsistenz, Einheit und Totalität, Tendenz nach einem geschlossenen System und schliesslich die Unmöglichkeit einer erschöpfenden Definition. In dieser Reihenfolge werden sie kritisch erörtert, und daraufhin werden folgende biologische Begriffsbestimmungen vorgeschlagen : Individualität ist die Tendenz des einzelnen Organismus nach ungeteilter subsistenter Totalität. Etwas ist Individuum in dem Masse, wo diese Tendenz verwirklicht ist.Durch einige Beispiele aus dem System und der Ontogenie wird die Anwendung dieses dynamischen Begriffes erläutert.Dans cette étude nous avons soumis à un examen l'idée d'individu, telle qu'elle est d'un usage courant en biologie. Nous avons cherché à fonder la théorie du contenu de cette idée. Pour en donner une définition plus exacte, nous ne pouvons pas prendre pour point de départ le sens étymologique d'„indivisible”, puisque les individus biologiques ne le sont pas toujours. En essayant d'abord d'établir la vraie méthode de notre recherche, nous avons expliqué que celle-ci est une branche de la biologie théorique, par conséquent de la science positive, bien qu'il y ait des rapports avec la philosophie et avec la simple pensée spontanée. Il nous faudra donc procéder d'après la méthode qui est surtout demandée par les sciences exactes, à savoir la méthode inductive.Chez les grands représentants des différents courants de la pensée en biologie, notamment chezHaeckel, von Bertalanffy, Driesch etBergson, nous rencontrons dans leurs conceptions sur l'individu et sur l'individualité des correspondances tellement frappantes que nous sommes autorisé à y voir, d'après les lois mêmes de l'induction, les éléments essentiels de l'idée d'individu biologique. Ces éléments s'accordent d'ailleurs avec le contenu de l'idée que nous nous en formons spontanément.Ces éléments sont les suivants: subsistance, unité et totalité, tendance à devenir un système clos, et enfin l'impossibilité d'une définition adéquate. Nous en avons fait la critique dans cet ordre. En suite nous avons proposé les définitions biologiques suivantes : l'individualité consiste en la tendance que possède un organisme naturellement isolé à devenir une totalité subsistante et non-divisée. On aura donc un individu dans la mesure que cette tendance a été réalisée.Enfin, nous avons illustré l'application de cette notion par quelques exemples empruntés au système et à l'ontogénie. (shrink)

The embodied human subject is dynamically connected to his or her historico-sociocultural context, the soil from which a person’s psyche is nourished as multiplex meanings are absorbed and enable personal development. In each culture certain towering artistic works embody this perspective. The Dream of the Red Chamber introduces Jia Bao-yu—a scion of the prestigious Jia family—and his relationships with a large cast of characters. Bao-yu is controversial but, at the time of the family’s tragic collapse, he can be seen as (...) embodying a spiritual struggle in which his instinct, nature, sensitivity, and creativity are grounded in his transcendent relationship with a fragment of the world stone, an eternal source of energy and creativity. We are invited to draw on a metaphysical level of thought to consider his struggles with man-made hierarchies and a situated historico-sociocultural order in such a way as to live out his spiritual being. As such, the novel is closely relevant to questions of spirituality in bioethics. Through personal experiences, passions, creativity, and relationships with others, the body is inscribed, forming the soul, which may be misconstrued (for instance, through a medical or Cartesian reformulation of events) but which can be seen as the site of ethical and spiritual thought. (shrink)

The central question raised in the present article concerns the ontological nature of the intentional act, previous to the proper moral action, in Aristotle’s and Abelard’s thinking. More precisely, we examine two subjects indirectly interconnected. First, we treat the secular problem of the exact nature of will (boulêsis) in Aristotle, which certainly refers to a rational act (logikos), the source of which is, however, the appetite (orexis). The second point is related to the notion of consent (consensus) in Abelard, which (...) also raises the question of its voluntary or rational ontological character. Both topics are connected in so far as the Abelardian consent is similar to the Aristotelian idea of choice (proairesis), and particularly to that of the Stoic assent (sunkatathesis), and not, as some commentators believe, to the Augustinian notion of will as a free and spontaneous act. This identification of the Abelardian consent with the Augustine’s will comes from a confusion, which is more terminological and perspectival than interpretative. (shrink)

T h i s article examines the ethical implications of the desirefor disembodiment situated in the texts and technologies of cyberspace. The article is divided into 2 parts. The first traces the conceptual history of dualism, demonstrating its exclusive cultural politics and investigating the socio-political consequences of encoding this metaphysical information in contemporary media technology. The second part examines the material conditions of new communication technology, arguing that the issue of access reduplicates in practice the exclusivity of dualism. The article (...) concludes by investigating the ethical implications of employing dualistic metaphysics as a legitimizing narrative of media technology and cyberculture. (shrink)

With the publication of this inaugural issue of the internationally peer-reviewed journal Biosemiotics, our still-developing young interdiscipline marks yet another milestone in its journey towards adulthood. For this occasion, the editors of Biosemiotics have asked me to provide for those readers who may be newcomers to our field a very brief overview of the history of biosemiotics, contextualizing it within and against the larger currents of philosophical and scientific thinking from which it has emerged. To explain the origins of this (...) most twenty-first century endeavour effectively, however, will require tracing—at least to the level of a thumbnail sketch—how the ‘sign’ concept appeared, was lost, and now must be painstakingly rediscovered and refined in science. To relate this long history, this article will appear in Biosemiotics in three instalments, examining, respectively: (1) The History of the Sign Concept in Pre-Modernist Science, (2) The History of the Sign Concept in Modernist Science, and (3) The Biosemiotic Attempt to Develop a More Useful Sign Concept for Contemporary Science. In this instalment, we begin our introductory ‘stroll through the woods of sciences and signs’ by following the development of the sign concept within the context of scientific inquiry, in necessarily broad outline, from the beginnings of such inquiry in sixth century BCE, through its long development in the Middle Ages, and up unto the onset of modernity. For only within this larger historical context can our contemporary attempt to develop a naturalistic understanding of sign relations be understood. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Artikel plädiert dafür, die meist auf die Aspekte Todesdefinition, -kriterium und -feststellung fokussierte Diskussion über die moralische (Un-)Zulässigkeit der Spende und Transplantation vitaler Organe aufzubrechen und beim Nachdenken darüber das zum Ausgangspunkt der Überlegungen zu machen, was mit dem Tod eigentlich verloren geht, nämlich das Leben. Nach einer Antwort auf die Frage „Was ist Leben?“ suchend wird hierbei aufgezeigt, dass Leben nicht auf das Vorhandensein gewisser beobachtbarer physiologischer Größen reduzierbar ist, sondern in seinem wesentlichen Kern nur mit den (...) Mitteln der Philosophie als der actus primus alles Lebendigen und das, was wir gemeinhin Seele nennen, erklärt werden kann. Auf Basis der so gewonnenen Erkenntnisse wird geschlussfolgert, dass die Entnahme vitalen organischen Materials aus einer Person, deren Gehirnaktivitäten ausgefallen sind, immer prämortal erfolgt und damit einen Verstoß gegen die Tote-Spender-Regel bedeutet. (shrink)

I examine the passages where Aristotle maintains that intellectual activity employs φαντάσματα (images) and argue that he requires awareness of the relevant images. This, together with Aristotle’s claims about the universality of understanding, gives us reason to reject the interpretation of Michael Wedin and Victor Caston, on which φαντάσματα serve as the material basis for thinking. I develop a new interpretation by unpacking the comparison Aristotle makes to the role of diagrams in doing geometry. In theoretical understanding of mathematical and (...) natural beings, we usually need to employ appropriate φαντάσματα in order to grasp explanatory connections. Aristotle does not, however, commit himself to thinking that images are required for exercising all theoretical understanding. Understanding immaterial things, in particular, may not involve employing phantasmata. Thus the connection that Aristotle makes between images and understanding does not rule out the possibility that human intellectual activity could occur apart from the body. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to address some of the questions on the notion of agent and agency in relation to property and personhood. I argue that following the Kantian criticism of Aristotelian metaphysics, contemporary biotechnology and information and communication technologies bring about a new challenge—this time, with regard to the Kantian moral subject understood in the subject’s unique metaphysical qualities of dignity and autonomy. The concept of human dignity underlies the foundation of many democratic systems, particularly in Europe (...) as well as of international treaties, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Digital agents, artificial organisms as well as new capabilities of the human agents related to their embeddedness in digital and biotechnological environments bring about an important transformation of the human self-appraisal. A critical comparative reflection of this transformation is important because of its ethical implications. I deal first with the concept of agent within the framework of Aristotelian philosophy, which is the basis for further theories in accordance with and/or in opposition to it, particularly since modernity. In the second part of this paper, I deal with the concept of personhood in Kantian philosophy, which supersedes the Aristotelian metaphysics of substance and builds the basis of a metaphysics of the moral human subject. In the third part, I discuss the question of artificial agents arising from modern biology and ICT. Blurring the difference between the human and the natural and/or artificial opens a “new space” for philosophical reflection as well as for debate in law and practical policy. (shrink)

The emerging epistemic community of ecosemioticians and the multidisciplinary field of inquiry known as ecosemiotics offer a radical and relevant approach to so-called global environmental crisis. There are no environmental fixes within the dominant code, since that code overdetermines the future, thereby perpetuating ecologically untenable cultural forms. The possibility of a sustainability transition (the attempt to overcome destitution and avoid ecocatastrophe) becomes real when mediated by and through ecosemiotics. In short, reflexive awareness of humankind's linguisticality is a necessary condition for (...) transforming ecologically maladaptive cultural forms. As a multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary research program integrating the human and natural sciences, ecosemiotic inquiry closes the gap between biophysical ecology and human ecology. A provisional outline of a pragmatic theory of ecoserniotics attempts to describe the processes by which adaptive cultural changes might be facilitated and points toward substantive content areas that constitute sites for further research. Ecosemiotic inquiry frames cultural codes as these shape and reproduce the ongoing stream of individual and societal choices that shape distinctively human existence in a larger context of biophysical realities that drive natural selection. However, while ecosemiotics is a necessary condition for the sustainability transition, it is not a sufficient condition. (shrink)

Finding an adequate definition of "life" has proven to be a tricky affair. In this article, I discuss the idea that nothing is really alive: we only say so. I shall argue that 'being alive' is not a genuine property of things, and that it only reflects the way we think and talk about things. An eliminativist strategy will then allow us to free ourselves from the burden of having to find a definition of life, and will allow us to (...) focus on the genuinely interesting properties of living (and non-living) entities. (shrink)

A tendência de algumas visões naturalistas de deduzir o sentido da ação humana da sua natureza biológica conduz a naturalizar a violência como fenômeno político inexorável. A violência naturalizada leva a sociedade para a dinâmica da inexorável violência, cuja única solução é a legitimação de uma violência total. Propomos, neste ensaio, a desconstrução crítica dos determinismos naturalistas por meio da análise da ação humana e da especificidade de sua potência que se manifesta como potência criadora (Cornelius Castoriadis) e potência do (...) não (Giorgio Agamben). A potência da ação humana transcende os determinismos da sua natureza biológica, embora por eles esteja condicionada. The tendency some naturalist visions have to deduce the meaning of human action from their biological nature, leads to a naturalization of violence as an inexorable political phenomenon. Naturalized violence leads the society towards the dynamics of inexorable violence, whose only solution is legitimazing total violence. In this article we propose the critical deconstruction of naturalistic determinism by means of the analysis of human action and the specificity of its power, which is manifested as creative power (Cornelius Castoriadis) and power of no (Giorgio Agamben). The power of human action transcends the biological determinisms of its biologic nature, although the power of human action is conditioned by them. (shrink)

Claimed Aristotle the immortality of the soul? Suarez responds: Suarez discussed the question of the immortality of the soul in Aristotle twice: in his youthful commentary and at the end of his life. In both devotes great attention, facing the most debated Aristotelian texts; but with special focus on the spirituality of human intelligence. According to Suarez, although are found ambiguous texts, Aristotle affirming the spirituality of intelligence know the immortality of the human soul. In this way, Suárez rebuts Cayetano, (...) and he approaches the positions advanced by Aquinas. (shrink)

En el artículo se analiza la naturaleza dialéctica del libro III de la Metafísica de Aristóteles a la luz del contenido, procedimiento y utilidad del método dialéctico expuestos por el Estagirita en los Tópicos.

Al-Kindi was influenced by two Greek traditions in his attempts to explain vision, light and color. Most obviously, his works on optics are indebted to Euclid and, perhaps indirectly, to Ptolemy. But he also knew some works from the Aristotelian tradition that touch on the nature of color and vision. Al-Kindi explicitly rejects the Aristotelian account of vision in his De Aspectibus, and adopts a theory according to which we see by means of a visual ray emitted from the eye. (...) But in the same work, al-Kindi draws on Philoponus. (shrink)

Durand of Saint-Pourçain's earliest treatment of cognitive habits is contained in his Sentences Commentary, Book 3, Distinction 23. In the first two questions, he discusses the ontological status of habits and their causal role, establishing his own unique view alongside the views of Godfrey of Fontaines and Hervaeus Natalis. What follows is the Latin text and an English translation of Durand's Sentences (A/B) III, d. 23, qq. 1-2.

The Thomistic proof of the immateriality of human reason consists in the argument from the fact that intellection has as its object not empirical particulars but abstract universals. A standard objection against dualism plays up the problem with the causal influence of the soul on the body . The Thomistic solution depends on the hylemorphic conception of the soul as substantial form of body, i.e. on the view that the human soul is that in virtue of which a human body (...) has those essential properties which it has. (shrink)

In this entry I will offer a systematic novel taxonomy of our imaginative abilities coherent with standard treatments in cognitive science, philosophy of mind and aesthetics. In particular, I will distinguish between the non-propositional imagination and the propositional imagination, which include several further sub-varieties such as the objectual imagination, imagery, experiential imagination, supposition, make-believe and more.

In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel states unequivocally that the category of “life” is a strictly logical, or pure, form of thinking. His treatment of actual life – i.e., that which empirically constitutes nature – arises first in his *Philosophy of Nature* when the logic is applied under the conditions of space and time. Nevertheless, many commentators find Hegel’s development of this category as a purely logical one especially difficult to accept. Indeed, they find this development only comprehensible as long (...) as one simultaneously assumes that Hegel breaks his promise to let the logic do the leading. However, if Hegel were to in fact allow the logical development to be led by biological analogies at this point, problems would ensue. Not only would it contradict his own speculative method, which should secure the necessity of the categories, but it would also endanger the ontological generality of the category of life itself. Beyond undermining his method and the logical integrity of the category, however, I will argue that such a reading makes the transition to the next category of “cognition” unintelligible and problematic. My aim in the first part of this paper is to argue how logical life can be read as a pure category. I then argue in the second part how my reconstruction makes the transition to cognition intelligible without resorting to profane or supernatural interpretations. (shrink)

As a result of vocal autism activists pushing against traditional views of autism, there is a bilateral debate that reflects a deeper philosophical divide between medical and social definitions of disability. Both sides seek to determine the manner in which autistics and their communities view autism, and thus influence the manner in which cures or treatments are sought, dispensed and taken up. Through an investigation of this debate, this project will explore the practical benefits and ethical obligations of accommodating autistic (...) differences. One side of this debate, which we will call the cure theory approach, seeks treatments that will eradicate or at least minimize autistic symptoms. The philosophical assertion that lies behind this objective is that autistic differences, particularly disruptive autistic differences, ought to be removed. The other side of the debate, which we will call the neurodiverse perspective, seeks to define autism as neurological difference, that is relationally determined, rather than a disorder or a syndrome. The neurodiversity movement recommends educating autistics and their communities regarding how to fully accommodate autistic differences. The underlying philosophical commitment of the neurodiverse perspective is that it is in the best interests of autistics and their communities to accommodate differences, rather than seek treatments that encourage conformity. I will argue that these two sides are not mutually exclusive. Through a synthesis of the neurodiverse and cure theory points of view I will enable the development of a method, which facilitates justice for autistics and their communities. This synthesis garners the maximum capabilities that the expression of autistic differences can offer, and maintains the freedom for all community members to actualize their capabilities. (shrink)

In this paper, I join the so-called voluntarism debate on Descartes’s theory of will and judgment, arguing for an indirect doxastic voluntarism reading of Descartes, as opposed to a classic, or direct doxastic voluntarism. More specifically, I examine the question whether Descartes thinks the will can have a direct and full control over one’s suspension of judgment. Descartes was a doxastic voluntarist, maintaining that the will has some kind of control over one’s doxastic states, such as belief and doubt. According (...) to a long-held reading, the control that the will has over doxastic states in Descartes’s theory is direct; the doxastic states are affected by the mere act of will. This reading is called direct doxastic voluntarism (DDV), or direct voluntarism (DV) for short, and it states that we are capable of assenting, rejecting and suspending a judgment based only on our will to do so. Thus, these actions would be utterly and merely volitional. DV can be divided into two further positions, direct positive voluntarism (+DV) and direct negative voluntarism (-DV). Direct positive voluntarism deals with the act of forming judgments, maintaining that one can accept or deny a proposition wilfully and either merely believe or not believe something voluntarily. Direct negative voluntarism deals with the suspension of judgment, maintaining that it can likewise be accomplished by a simple act of will. However, I support an alternate account of Descartes’s voluntarism, which is called indirect doxastic voluntarism (IDV), or indirect voluntarism (IV) for short. By this account, the will is capable of affecting a doxastic state indirectly by making one concentrate on essential tasks for forming that state, such as gathering up and paying attention to strong reasons and evidence. IV is also possible to divide into indirect positive voluntarism (+IV) and indirect negative voluntarism (-IV). Per indirect positive voluntarism the will needs to pay attention to reasons for accepting or denying some proposition. Likewise, by indirect negative voluntarism, in order to suspend judgment the will needs to direct this attention to the reasons for doubt. By attending to these reasons, the will also comes face-to-face with its own freedom. This feeling of freedom can be described as affectivity of the reasons for belief (assent) and doubt (suspension). (shrink)

What are we? Despite much discussion in historical and contemporary philosophy, we have not yet settled on an answer. A satisfactory personal ontology, an account of our metaphysical nature, will be informed by issues in the metaphysics of material objects. In the dissertation, I target two prominent materialist ontologies: animalism, the view that we are numerically identical to human organisms, and constitutionalism, the view that we are constituted by, but not identical to, human organisms. Because of the problems that arise (...) from endorsing these ontologies, I instead advance immaterialism, the view that we are essentially immaterial. In Chapter 2, I discuss how animalists must respond to a widely-discussed metaphysical puzzle, the problem of the many. This puzzle prompts some to endorse revisionary ontologies of material objects, and I argue that the animalist cannot appeal to these revisionary ontologies to solve the puzzle as it arises for personal ontology. In addition, solutions that don’t involve a commitment to revisionary ontology will be unavailable to the animalist: I argue that if animalists make use of non-revisionary solutions to the problem, they must abandon the most successful argument for their view. Absent their most successful argument, animalists will need to motivate the view in some other way. Some new arguments for animalism have been proposed, and I argue that they fail to give us reason to endorse animalism over competing ontologies. Without a strong argument, we should not prefer animalism over the other, more attractive, views. In Chapter 3, I show how constitutionalists face a different problem: explaining how the person is not the very same thing as the human organism, despite sharing the very same parts and occupying the very same physical space. We think that the person and the organism are different things because they have different modal profiles – the human organism can survive permanent loss of psychological life, but the person, presumably, cannot. Constitutionalists must then explain what grounds the difference in modal profiles, but such an explanation is hard to come by. This is an instance of the grounding problem, which is notoriously intractable. While the grounding problem is a well-known challenge to constitutional accounts of objects, I demonstrate that this puzzle is even more threatening when applied to persons. Some “solutions” to the problem fail to solve it at all, and solutions that might get the right result for ordinary objects require accepting that there are a multitude of persons where we ordinarily take there to be only one. We should not accept a personal ontology that requires a commitment to that multitude. I argue that the threat of the grounding problem is so great that we must reject the constitutionalist personal ontology. We will see from these puzzles in personal ontology that materialist solutions are either unsuccessful or yield unacceptable consequences. This should prompt us toward considering, instead, immaterialism. According to immaterialism, persons are not material objects, and the immaterialist can then provide solutions to the puzzles that threatened materialist ontologies. In Chapter 4, I outline these immaterialist solutions and show that the puzzles cannot be reinstantiated successfully against the immaterialist. I then discuss different available varieties of immaterialism and argue in defense of my preferred version. Ultimately, I argue that we are simple, immaterial entities that come into existence at the proper functioning of the brain. Endorsing this view of personal ontology permits us to adequately respond to metaphysical puzzles and retain judgments about persons that should be most important to us. In particular, the immaterialist has the resources to avoid the problem of too many thinkers and retain the judgment that there is exactly one person in circumstances where we take there to be just one. The immaterialist also has the resources to plausibly analyze thought experiments, such as cerebrum-swap cases, that threaten materialist ontologies. All things considered, it remains to be seen which personal ontology has the most evidence in its favor. In the context of debates that arise from material object metaphysics, however, evidence weighs in favor of immaterialism. Materialist personal ontologies are saddled with unacceptable responses to metaphysical puzzles, and endorsing materialism about persons requires taking on a very high cost: Either there are far more of us than we ordinarily take there to be, or there are no persons – far fewer of us than we ordinarily take there to be. Some might argue that these are the only acceptable options, so cost be damned. But we cannot afford to be so cavalier about our personal ontology. Instead, I advance immaterialist solutions to puzzles in personal ontology and propose that, in the interest of saving ourselves and everyone we love, we should seriously consider accounts according to which we are immaterial entities. (shrink)

This paper comprises two parts. The first part is an introduction to Auriol’s moderate conceptualism, as it is presented in his Commentary on Book II of the Sentences, distinction 9, question 2, article 1. The second part is an edition of the text. In the introduction, I focus on Auriol’s use of the noetic tool of connotation. My thesis, in particular, is that connotation is a necessary prerequisite to his moderate conceptu- alism. To this purpose, the first part of this (...) introduction will be devoted to a brief presentation of Auriol’s conceptualism. In the second part, Auriol’s theory of essential predication will be presented. In the third part, I will present my claim that Auriol’s theory of essential predication can only be made sense of when read against the background of his theory of connotation as applied to intellectual cognition. Finally, I will offer a collation of Auriol’s Commentary on Book II of the Sentences, dis- tinction 9, question 2, article 1, obtained by collating eight manuscripts, which hand down Auriol’s text, that is, Firenze, Biblioteca nazionale centrale, ms. Conv. Soppr. B.6.121, Firenze, ms. Conv. Soppr. A. 3.120, Napoli, Biblioteca nazionale, ms. VII.C.3, Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana, ms. 161, scaff. ix, Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, ms. latin 15867; Pelplin, Biblioteka Seminarium duchownego, ms. 46/85, Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica, ms. Borgiano 404, Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica, ms. Vat. lat. 942. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Max Deutscher’s recent accounts of thinking, willing and judging, derived from his reading of Hannah Arendt’s 'The Life of the Mind', as set out in his book 'Judgment After Arendt'. Against Deutscher I argue that thinking does not presuppose thoughtfulness, that being willing is compatible with willing reluctantly, and that actor and spectator judgments are distinct types of judgments.