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First Person and Minimal Self-Consciousness.Thor Grünbaum - 2012 - In Sofia Miguens & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. [Place of publication not identified]: Ontos Verlag. pp. 273-296.details
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Kant and Post-Tractarian Wittgenstein: Transcendentalism, Idealism, Illusion.Bernhard Ritter - 2020 - Cham (CH): Palgrave Macmillan.details
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The Subject of Experience.Galen Strawson - 2017 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Forms of Luminosity.Hasen Khudairi - 2017details
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Xiv*—Modern Moral Philosophy Again: Isolating the Promulgation Problem.Candace Vogler - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3):345-362.details
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Xiv*—Modern Moral Philosophy Again: Isolating the Promulgation Problem.Candace Vogler - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3):345-362.details
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Modern moral philosophy again: Isolating the promulgation problem.Candace Vogler - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3):345–362.details
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Owning Intentions and Moral Responsibility.Tillmann Vierkant - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (5):507-534.details
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Anscombe, la expresión de autoconciencia y la regla de autorreferencia.Javier Vidal - 2012 - Revista de filosofía (Chile) 68:133-154.details
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On the self-ascription of deafferented bodily action.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (3):324-342.details
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The Blue Book on Solipsism and the uses of ‘I’ A Dialectical Reading.Jônadas Techio - 2012 - Doispontos 9 (2).details
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Re-reading Anscombe on ‘I’.Robert J. Stainton - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):70-93.details
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My Body: Is It Me?Thomas W. Smythe - 2012 - Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):179.details
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The First-Person Plural and Immunity to Error.Joel Smith - 2018 - Disputatio 10 (49):141-167.details
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Human Nature, Metaphysics and Evolutionary Theory.Harry Smit - 2022 - Philosophia 51 (3):1605-1626.details
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Bodily awareness, imagination, and the self.Joel Smith - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):49-68.details
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The Answering Machine Paradox.Alan Sidelle - 1991 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):525--539.details
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A plea for monsters.Philippe Schlenker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (1):29-120.details
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René Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy.David Rosenthal - 2015 - Topoi 34 (2):541-548.details
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First-person thought and the use of ‘I’.Komarine Romdenh-Romluc - 2008 - Synthese 163 (2):145-156.details
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First-Person Awareness of Intentions and Immunity to Error through Misidentification.Komarine Romdenh-Romluc - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (4):493-514.details
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First Person and Body Ownership.Sebastian Sanhueza Rodriguez - 2019 - Logos: Revista de Lingüística, Filosofía y Literatura 29 (2):230-237.details
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To structure, or not to structure?Philip Robbins - 2004 - Synthese 139 (1):55-80.details
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Joint action and recursive consciousness of consciousness.Sebastian Rödl - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):769-779.details
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Abusing One’s Position.Huw Price - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):772-779.details
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Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind.Robert B. Pippin - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):449 - 475.details
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Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3833-3860.details
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Imagination and theI.Shaun Nichols - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (5):518-535.details
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The Demonstrative Model of first-person thought.Daniel Morgan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1795-1811.details
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Reply to Professor Jaakko Hintikka’s Philosophical Research: Problems and Prospects.Dermot Moran - 2014 - Diogenes 61 (2):17-32.details
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Who Does the Sounding? The Metaphysics of the First-Person Pronoun in the Zhuangzi.Thomas Ming - 2016 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 15 (1):57-79.details
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How to Anscombe a Frege-Wittgenstein: Responses to Littlejohn, Peterman, and Geisz.Thomas Ming - 2018 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 17 (4):585-601.details
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The no-self alternative.Thomas Metzinger - 2010 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.details
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Antigone's Autonomy.David N. McNeill - 2011 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 54 (5):411-441.details
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Consciousness and Life.Gareth B. Matthews - 1977 - Philosophy 52 (199):13-26.details
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Minimal Expressivism.Neftalí Villanueva María José Frápolli - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):471-487.details
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Kant’s (Non-Question-Begging) Refutation of Cartesian Scepticism.Colin Marshall - 2019 - Kantian Review 24 (1):77-101.details
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Substance and Selfhood.E. J. Lowe - 1991 - Philosophy 66 (255):81-99.details
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Referring and Reporting: The Use of Selfing Language in the Zhuangzi.Ronnie Littlejohn - 2018 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 17 (4):547-558.details
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Subjective Facts about Consciousness.Martin A. Lipman - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10:530-553.details
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Expressivism and I‐Beliefs in Brandom’s Making it Explicit.Steven Levine - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (1):95 – 114.details
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Moore’s Paradox: An Evansian Account.Hongwoo Kwon - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):585-601.details
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Practical knowledge and error in action.Christian Kietzmann - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):586-606.details
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Indexical identification: A perspectival account.Tomis Kapitan - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (3):293 – 312.details
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The early Yogācāra theory of no-self.Jenny Hung - 2018 - Asian Philosophy 28 (4):316-331.details
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Practical Reasoning and the First Person.David Hunter - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):677-700.details
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Invitation to Autoepistemology.Lloyd Humberstone - 2002 - Theoria 68 (1):13-51.details
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Geach’s Categorial Grammar.Lloyd Humberstone - 2004 - Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (3):281 - 317.details
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The meaning of “I” in “I”‐thought.Minyao Huang - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (5):480-501.details
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