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  1. Truth and What is Said.Elia Zardini - 2008 - Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):545-574.
    A notion of truth as applicable to events of assertoric use ( utterances ) of a sentence token is arguably presupposed and required by our evaluative practices of the use of language. The truth of an utterance seems clearly to depend on what the utterance says . This fundamental dependence seems in turn to be captured by the schema that, if an utterance u says that P , then u is true iff P . Such a schema may thus be (...)
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  • Reply to Bacon, Hawthorne and Uzquiano.Timothy Williamson - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5):542-547.
  • Ramified structure.Gabriel Uzquiano - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    The Russell–Myhill theorem threatens a familiar structured conception of propositions according to which two sentences express the same proposition only if they share the same syntactic structure and their corresponding syntactic constituents share the same semantic value. Given the role of the principle of universal instantiation in the derivation of the theorem in simple type theory, one may hope to rehabilitate the core of the structured view of propositions in ramified type theory, where the principle is systematically restricted. We suggest (...)
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  • Elusive Propositions.Gabriel Uzquiano - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (4):705-725.
    David Kaplan observed in Kaplan that the principle \\) cannot be verified at a world in a standard possible worlds model for a quantified bimodal propositional language. This raises a puzzle for certain interpretations of the operator Q: it seems that some proposition p is such that is not possible to query p, and p alone. On the other hand, Arthur Prior had observed in Prior that on pain of contradiction, ∀p is Q only if one true proposition is Q (...)
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  • Modality and Paradox.Gabriel Uzquiano - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (4):284-300.
    Philosophers often explain what could be the case in terms of what is, in fact, the case at one possible world or another. They may differ in what they take possible worlds to be or in their gloss of what is for something to be the case at a possible world. Still, they stand united by the threat of paradox. A family of paradoxes akin to the set-theoretic antinomies seem to allow one to derive a contradiction from apparently plausible principles. (...)
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  • A "Distributive" or a "Collective" Approach to Sentences?Piotr Łukowski - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1.
  • Paradoxes of Intensionality.Dustin Tucker & Richmond H. Thomason - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):394-411.
    We identify a class of paradoxes that is neither set-theoretical nor semantical, but that seems to depend on intensionality. In particular, these paradoxes arise out of plausible properties of propositional attitudes and their objects. We try to explain why logicians have neglected these paradoxes, and to show that, like the Russell Paradox and the direct discourse Liar Paradox, these intensional paradoxes are recalcitrant and challenge logical analysis. Indeed, when we take these paradoxes seriously, we may need to rethink the commonly (...)
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  • Paradoxes and Restricted Quantification: A Non‐Hierarchical Approach.Dustin Tucker - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):190-199.
    Andrew Bacon, John Hawthorne, and Gabriel Uzquiano have recently argued that free logics—logics that reject or restrict Universal Instantiation—are ultimately not promising approaches to resolving a family of intensional paradoxes due to Arthur Prior. These logics encompass ramified and contextualist approaches to paradoxes, and broadly speaking, there are two kinds of criticism they face. First, they fail to address every version of the Priorean paradoxes. Second, the theoretical considerations behind the logics make absolutely general statements about all propositions, properties of (...)
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  • Paradoxes and the Limits of Theorizing About Propositional Attitudes.Dustin Tucker - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 5):1075-1094.
    Propositions are central to at least most theorizing about the connection between our mental lives and the world: we use them in our theories of an array of attitudes including belief, desire, hope, fear, knowledge, and understanding. Unfortunately, when we press on these theories, we encounter a relatively neglected family of paradoxes first studied by Arthur Prior. I argue that these paradoxes present a fatal problem for most familiar resolutions of paradoxes. In particular, I argue that truth-value gap, contextualist, situation (...)
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  • Intensionality and Paradoxes in Ramsey’s ‘the Foundations of Mathematics’.Dustin Tucker - 2010 - Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (1):1-25.
    In , Frank Ramsey separates paradoxes into two groups, now taken to be the logical and the semantical. But he also revises the logical system developed in Whitehead and Russellthe intensional paradoxess interest in these problems seriously, then the intensional paradoxes deserve more widespread attention than they have historically received.
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  • A Model Theory for Propositional Attitudes.Richmond H. Thomason - 1980 - Linguistics and Philosophy 4 (1):47 - 70.
    My chief aim has been to convey the thought that the application of model theoretic techniques to natural languages needn't force a distortion of intentional phenomena. I hope that at least I have succeeded in accomplishing this.
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  • Yablo's Paradox and Kindred Infinite Liars.Roy A. Sorensen - 1998 - Mind 107 (425):137-155.
    This is a defense and extension of Stephen Yablo's claim that self-reference is completely inessential to the liar paradox. An infinite sequence of sentences of the form 'None of these subsequent sentences are true' generates the same instability in assigning truth values. I argue Yablo's technique of substituting infinity for self-reference applies to all so-called 'self-referential' paradoxes. A representative sample is provided which includes counterparts of the preface paradox, Pseudo-Scotus's validity paradox, the Knower, and other enigmas of the genre. I (...)
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  • Liar Syllogisms and Related Paradoxes.B. H. Slater - 1991 - Analysis 51 (3):146 - 153.
  • Variations on a Montagovian Theme.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3377-3395.
    What are the objects of knowledge, belief, probability, apriority or analyticity? For at least some of these properties, it seems plausible that the objects are sentences, or sentence-like entities. However, results from mathematical logic indicate that sentential properties are subject to severe formal limitations. After surveying these results, I argue that they are more problematic than often assumed, that they can be avoided by taking the objects of the relevant property to be coarse-grained (“sets of worlds”) propositions, and that all (...)
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  • On Hierarchical Propositions.Giorgio Sbardolini - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (1):1-11.
    There is an apparent dilemma for hierarchical accounts of propositions, raised by Bruno Whittle : either such accounts do not offer adequate treatment of connectives and quantifiers, or they eviscerate the logic. I discuss what a plausible hierarchical conception of propositions might amount to, and show that on that conception, Whittle’s dilemma is not compelling. Thus, there are good reasons why proponents of hierarchical accounts of propositions did not see the difficulty Whittle raises.
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  • Two-Dimensional Paradox.Giorgio Sbardolini - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):605-617.
    ABSTRACTTwo-dimensional accounts of speech and thought make use of so-called ‘diagonal’ propositions. If diagonals are indeed propositions, they can be negated: an ‘anti-diagonal’ is the negation o...
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  • Truth and Meaning.Ian Rumfitt - 2014 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):21-55.
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  • I—Ian Rumfitt: Truth and Meaning.Ian Rumfitt - 2014 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):21-55.
    Should we explicate truth in terms of meaning, or meaning in terms of truth? Ramsey, Prior and Strawson all favoured the former approach: a statement is true if and only if things are as the speaker, in making the statement, states them to be; similarly, a belief is true if and only if things are as a thinker with that belief thereby believes them to be. I defend this explication of truth against a range of objections.Ramsey formalized this account of (...)
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  • Psychophysiological Approach to the Liar Paradox: Jean Buridan’s Virtual Entailment Principle Put to the Test.Konrad Rudnicki & Piotr Łukowski - 2019 - Synthese 198 (S22):5573-5592.
    This article presents an empirical examination of the consequences of the virtual entailment principle proposed by Jean Buridan to resolve the Liar paradox. This principle states that every sentence in natural language implicitly asserts its own truth. Adopting this principle means that the Liar sentence is not paradoxical but false, because its content is contradictory to what is virtually implied. As a result, humans should perceive the Liar sentence the same way as any other false sentence. This solution to the (...)
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  • From Paradox to Judgment: Towards a Metaphysics of Expression.Mariam Thalos - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Logic 3:76-107.
    The Liar sentence is a singularly important piece of philosophical evidence. It is an instrument for investigating the metaphysics of expressing truths and falsehoods. And an instrument too for investigating the varieties of conflict that can give rise to paradox. It shall serve as perhaps the most important clue to the shape of human judgment, as well as to the nature of the dependence of judgment upon language use.
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  • Yablo's Paradox.Graham Priest - 1997 - Analysis 57 (4):236-242.
  • Myers' Paradox.Graham Priest - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):147-154.
    This note is an analysis of the paradox given by Myers. It is shown, assuming that the resources available in paraconsistent logic may be applied, how the conclusion of the paradox may be perfectly acceptable, but that the argument is, nonetheless, invalid. This provides a dialethic solution to the paradox.
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  • A Logic of Defeasible Argumentation: Constructing Arguments in Justification Logic.Stipe Pandžić - 2022 - Argument and Computation 13 (1):3-47.
    In the 1980s, Pollock’s work on default reasons started the quest in the AI community for a formal system of defeasible argumentation. The main goal of this paper is to provide a logic of structured defeasible arguments using the language of justification logic. In this logic, we introduce defeasible justification assertions of the type t : F that read as “t is a defeasible reason that justifies F”. Such formulas are then interpreted as arguments and their acceptance semantics is given (...)
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  • Reference and Paradox.Claire Ortiz Hill - 2004 - Synthese 138 (2):207-232.
    Evidence is drawn together to connect sources of inconsistency that Frege discerned in his foundations for arithmetic with the origins of the paradox derived by Russell in "Basic Laws" I and then with antinomies, paradoxes, contradictions, riddles associated with modal and intensional logics. Examined are: Frege's efforts to grasp logical objects; the philosophical arguments that compelled Russell to adopt a description theory of names and a eliminative theory of descriptions; the resurfacing of issues surrounding reference, descriptions, identity, substitutivity, paradox in (...)
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  • Truth, Predication and a Family of Contingent Paradoxes.Francesco Orilia & Gregory Landini - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):113-136.
    In truth theory one aims at general formal laws governing the attribution of truth to statements. Gupta’s and Belnap’s revision-theoretic approach provides various well-motivated theories of truth, in particular T* and T#, which tame the Liar and related paradoxes without a Tarskian hierarchy of languages. In property theory, one similarly aims at general formal laws governing the predication of properties. To avoid Russell’s paradox in this area a recourse to type theory is still popular, as testified by recent work in (...)
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  • Wrongfulness Rewarded?: A Normative Paradox.David O’Brien & Ben Schwan - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6897-6916.
    In this paper, we raise and discuss a puzzle about the relationships among goods, reasons, and deontic status. Suppose you have it within your power to give someone something they would enjoy. The following claims seem platitudinous: you can use this power to reward whatever kind of option you want, thereby making that option better and generating a reason for that person to perform it; this reason is then weighed alongside and against the other reasons at play; and altogether, the (...)
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  • Does This Sentence Have No Truthmaker?Dan López de Sa & Elia Zardini - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):154–157.
    Reponse to Peter Milne (2005)'s argument agaist maximalism about truthmaking.
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  • Who Cares What You Accurately Believe?Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):217-248.
    This is a critical discussion of the accuracy-first approach to epistemic norms. If you think of accuracy (gradational or categorical) as the fundamental epistemic good and think of epistemic goods as things that call for promotion, you might think that we should use broadly consequentialist reasoning to determine which norms govern partial and full belief. After presenting consequentialist arguments for probabilism and the normative Lockean view, I shall argue that the consequentialist framework isn't nearly as promising as it might first (...)
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  • Paradoxical Desires.Ethan Jerzak - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (3):335-355.
    I present a paradoxical combination of desires. I show why it's paradoxical, and consider ways of responding. The paradox saddles us with an unappealing trilemma: either we reject the possibility of the case by placing surprising restrictions on what we can desire, or we deny plausibly constitutive principles linking desires to the conditions under which they are satisfied, or we revise some bit of classical logic. I argue that denying the possibility of the case is unmotivated on any reasonable way (...)
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  • Not So Phenomenal!John Hawthorne & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (1):1-43.
    The main aims in this article are to discuss and criticize the core thesis of a position that has become known as phenomenal conservatism. According to this thesis, its seeming to one that p provides enough justification for a belief in p to be prima facie justified. This thesis captures the special kind of epistemic import that seemings are claimed to have. To get clearer on this thesis, the article embeds it, first, in a probabilistic framework in which updating on (...)
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  • Truth and Paradox.Anil Gupta - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):1-60.
  • The Innocence of Truth in Semantic Paradox.Eric Guindon - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (1):71-93.
    According to some philosophers, the Liar paradox arises because of a mistaken theory of truth. Its lesson is that we must reject some instances of the naive propositional truth-schema \It is true that \ if and only if \\. In this paper, I construct a novel semantic paradox in which no principle even analogous to the truth-schema plays any role. I argue that this undermines the claim that we ought to respond to the Liar by revising our theory of truth.
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  • If A, Then B Too, but Only If C: A Reply to Varzi.Gilberto Gomes - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):157–161.
    Varzi (2005) discussed 6 ways of symbolizing the sentence 'If Alf went to the movies then Beth went too, but only if she found a taxi-cab.' In the present reply, a seventh symbolization is offered, along with an analysis of the six alternatives discussed by Varzi.
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  • Use, Mention and Quotation.L. Goddard & R. Routley - 1966 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):1 – 49.
  • Pointers to Truth.Haim Gaifman - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (5):223.
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  • What is the Correct Logic of Necessity, Actuality and Apriority?Peter Fritz - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):385-414.
    This paper is concerned with a propositional modal logic with operators for necessity, actuality and apriority. The logic is characterized by a class of relational structures defined according to ideas of epistemic two-dimensional semantics, and can therefore be seen as formalizing the relations between necessity, actuality and apriority according to epistemic two-dimensional semantics. We can ask whether this logic is correct, in the sense that its theorems are all and only the informally valid formulas. This paper gives outlines of two (...)
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  • Closed Structure.Peter Fritz, Harvey Lederman & Gabriel Uzquiano - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (6):1249-1291.
    According to the structured theory of propositions, if two sentences express the same proposition, then they have the same syntactic structure, with corresponding syntactic constituents expressing the same entities. A number of philosophers have recently focused attention on a powerful argument against this theory, based on a result by Bertrand Russell, which shows that the theory of structured propositions is inconsistent in higher order-logic. This paper explores a response to this argument, which involves restricting the scope of the claim that (...)
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  • A Purely Recombinatorial Puzzle.Fritz Peter - 2017 - Noûs 51 (3):547-564.
    A new puzzle of modal recombination is presented which relies purely on resources of first-order modal logic. It shows that naive recombinatorial reasoning, which has previously been shown to be inconsistent with various assumptions concerning propositions, sets and classes, leads to inconsistency by itself. The context sensitivity of modal expressions is suggested as the source of the puzzle, and it is argued that it gives us reason to reconsider the assumption that the notion of metaphysical necessity is in good standing.
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  • Cretan Deductions.Rachel Elizabeth Fraser & John Hawthorne - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):163-178.
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  • In Search of Modal Hypodoxes Using Paradox Hypodox Duality.Peter Eldridge-Smith - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-20.
    The concept of hypodox is dual to the concept of paradox. Whereas a paradox is incompatibly overdetermined, a hypodox is underdetermined. Indeed, many particular paradoxes have dual hypodoxes. So, naively the dual of Russell’s Paradox is whether the set of all sets that are members of themselves is self-membered. The dual of the Liar Paradox is the Truth-teller, and a hypodoxical dual of the Heterological paradox is whether ‘autological’ is autological. I provide some analysis of the duality and I search (...)
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  • Prior, Translational Semantics, and the Barcan Formula.B. Jack Copeland - 2016 - Synthese 193 (11):3507-3519.
    The revolution in semantics in the late 1960s and 1970s overturned an earlier competing paradigm, ‘translational’ semantics. I revive and defend Prior’s translational semantics for modals and tense-modals. I also show how to extend Prior’s propositional modal semantics to quantificational modal logic, and use the resulting semantics to formalize Prior’s own counterexample to the Barcan Formula.
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  • A Paradox for Some Theories of Welfare.Ben Bradley - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):45 - 53.
    Sometimes people desire that their lives go badly, take pleasure in their lives going badly, or believe that their lives are going badly. As a result, some popular theories of welfare are paradoxical. I show that no attempt to defend those theories from the paradox fully succeeds.
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  • The Logic of Opacity.Andrew Bacon & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):81-114.
    We explore the view that Frege's puzzle is a source of straightforward counterexamples to Leibniz's law. Taking this seriously requires us to revise the classical logic of quantifiers and identity; we work out the options, in the context of higher-order logic. The logics we arrive at provide the resources for a straightforward semantics of attitude reports that is consistent with the Millian thesis that the meaning of a name is just the thing it stands for. We provide models to show (...)
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  • Some Results on the Limits of Thought.Andrew Bacon & Gabriel Uzquiano - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (6):991-999.
    Generalizing on some arguments due to Arthur Prior and Dmitry Mirimanoff, we provide some further limitative results on what can be thought.
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  • Scharp on Replacing Truth.Andrew Bacon - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):370-386.
    ABSTRACTKevin Scharp’s ‘Replacing Truth’ is an ambitious and far reaching account of the semantic paradoxes. In this critical discussion we examine one the books central claims: to have provided a theory of truth that avoids the revenge paradoxes. In the first part we assess this claim, and in the second part we investigate some features of Scharp’s preferred theory of truth, ADT, and compare it with existing theories such as the Kripke–Feferman theory. In the appendix a simple model of Scharp’s (...)
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  • Radical Anti‐Disquotationalism.Andrew Bacon - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 32 (1):41-107.
    A number of `no-proposition' approaches to the liar paradox find themselves implicitly committed to a moderate disquotational principle: the principle that if an utterance of the sentence `$P$' says anything at all, it says that $P$ (with suitable restrictions). I show that this principle alone is responsible for the revenge paradoxes that plague this view. I instead propose a view in which there are several closely related language-world relations playing the `semantic expressing' role, none of which is more central to (...)
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  • Higher-Order Free Logic and the Prior-Kaplan Paradox.Andrew Bacon, John Hawthorne & Gabriel Uzquiano - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5):493-541.
    The principle of universal instantiation plays a pivotal role both in the derivation of intensional paradoxes such as Prior’s paradox and Kaplan’s paradox and the debate between necessitism and contingentism. We outline a distinctively free logical approach to the intensional paradoxes and note how the free logical outlook allows one to distinguish two different, though allied themes in higher-order necessitism. We examine the costs of this solution and compare it with the more familiar ramificationist approaches to higher-order logic. Our assessment (...)
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  • Critique of Impure Reason: Horizons of Possibility and Meaning.Steven James Bartlett - 2021 - Salem, USA: Studies in Theory and Behavior.
    This is a second Philpapers record for this book which links only to HAL's downloadable copies of the work. Please refer to the main Philpapers entry for this book which can be found by searching under the book's title. ●●●●● PLEASE NOTE: This is the corrected 2nd eBook edition, 2021. ●●●●● _Critique of Impure Reason_ has now also been published in a printed edition. To reduce the otherwise high price of this scholarly, technical book of nearly 900 pages and make (...)
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  • CRITIQUE OF IMPURE REASON: Horizons of Possibility and Meaning.Steven James Bartlett - 2021 - Salem, USA: Studies in Theory and Behavior.
    PLEASE NOTE: This is the corrected 2nd eBook edition, 2021. ●●●●● _Critique of Impure Reason_ has now also been published in a printed edition. To reduce the otherwise high price of this scholarly, technical book of nearly 900 pages and make it more widely available beyond university libraries to individual readers, the non-profit publisher and the author have agreed to issue the printed edition at cost. ●●●●● The printed edition was released on September 1, 2021 and is now available through (...)
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  • Reference to Abstract Objects in Discourse.Nicholas Asher - 1993 - Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer.
    This volume is about abstract objects and the ways we refer to them in natural language. Asher develops a semantical and metaphysical analysis of these entities in two stages. The first reflects the rich ontology of abstract objects necessitated by the forms of language in which we think and speak. A second level of analysis maps the ontology of natural language metaphysics onto a sparser domain--a more systematic realm of abstract objects that are fully analyzed. This second level reflects the (...)