There have been two parallel views regarding the role of voting in deliberation. The first is that deliberation before the fabrication of balloting was completely devoid of voting. The second is that voting is, not just part of deliberation, but is standard to deliberation. I argue in this article that neither of these views is correct. Implicit voting has always existed across time and space but only as a last resort in the event of a failure of natural unanimity. What (...) is relatively modern is the establishment of what I call explicit voting, namely, balloting, outside deliberation and often without deliberation. I also distinguish between natural and artificial unanimities, and clarify that artificial unanimities are products of implicit voting. I demonstrate these clarifications with some examples of deliberation. I deploy these clarifications to rid a certain debate of confusion regarding the precise role of voting in consensual deliberation. (shrink)

This paper explores how moderate communitarianism could bring about a greater sense of political morality in the practice of democracy in contemporary Africa. Moderate communitarianism is a thesis traceable to Kwame Gyekye, the Akan philosopher. This thesis is a moderation of the infl uence of the community in the Akan, an African social structure. In ensuring good political morality in the Akan, and therefore the African community, Gyekye proposes moral revolution over the enforcement of the law. I perform two main (...) tasks in this article: I reinforce the view that in a democratic framework, moderate communitarianism offers lessons on political morality, and I challenge the notion that moral revolution has greater prospects for bringing about political morality than law enforcement. (shrink)

Building on Seumas Miller’s concept of corruption leads me to conclude that the question of disposition is central to the concept of corruption, which prompts me to consider punishment theories with regard to deterring dispositions to corruption. However, problems with punishment as a stand-alone approach lead me to consider institutional reform recommendations. Although institutional reforms have the weakness of merely engaging corrupt disposition in a hide-and-seek game, I seek to reconcile institutional approaches and moral individualism by suggesting that the former (...) is intended to aid the latter, in the sense that resisting corruption is a question of cost, and the onus is to determine how to reduce this cost. In this regard, prevailing proposals are inept without an enabling environment: public deliberation (comprising publicity and deliberation) is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for combating corruption, because it (1) compels reason to function at its best, (2) demands rational accountability, and therefore account-giving, (3) increases ‘common-good’ thinking, (4) facilitates the recruitment of responsible institutional role-occupants, and (5) is a self-correcting instrument. (shrink)