A wide-ranging exploration and critical assessment of the work of a major figure in Chinese and comparative philosophy. In this volume, prominent philosophers working in Chinese thought and related areas critically reflect upon the work of Roger T. Ames, one of the most significant contemporary figures working in the field of Chinese philosophy. Through his decades of collaborative work in comparative methodology and cross-cultural interpretation, along with a number of pathbreaking translations of Chinese philosophical texts, Ames has managed to challenge (...) standing paradigms and open fresh avenues of research into the Chinese tradition. His work will be read and studied for years to come. The original essays presented here, which are substantive philosophical contributions in their own right, cover the full range of Ames’s scholarly output. They address methodological questions as well as specific issues in textual interpretation, including ample discussion of Ames’s most recent and provocative contribution: Confucian “role ethics.” In the final section of the book, Ames responds to each essay. The result is a conversation and engagement that both underscores the vitality of his thinking and indicates the directions it may take in the future. Altogether, this work provides a snapshot of a remarkable career—and an invitation to continue reflecting upon its meaning and importance. “This is an outstanding collection, critically and constructively engaging a scholar whose work has shaped the entire field of Chinese philosophy.” — Franklin Perkins, author of Heaven and Earth Are Not Humane: The Problem of Evil in Classical Chinese Philosophy. (shrink)

Reevaluates Western and Chinese philosophical traditions to question the boundaries of entrenched conceptual frameworks.

This paper focuses on evaluating Odera Oruka’s role as an expert witness in customary law for the Luo community during the Nairobi, Kenya-based trial in 1987 to decide on the place of the burial of S.M. Otieno. During that trial, an understanding of Luo burial and widow guardianship (ter) practices was essential. Odera Oruka described the practices carefully and defended them against misunderstanding and stereotype. He revisited related topics in several delivered papers, published articles, and even interviews and columns in (...) the Kenyan newspapers. The paper will raise the questions: How does Odera Oruka’s role as expert on Luo customs fit in with his sage philosophy project? In his testimony at the trial and subsequent public addresses and published work, does he accomplish two important goals, the first being defending African traditions against prejudice and anti-African bias, and secondly, does he champion reform of traditions when reform is needed? And, can Odera Oruka’s participation in the famous trial avoid seeming ethnic chauvinism and marginalization of women? My conclusion is that he achieves the first goal, but some problems remain in the achievement of the other goals. While he often asserted the need to evaluate traditions and to jettison those that have become unhelpful, in this context he evaluated traditions so strongly that the need for evaluation and possible change was muted. (shrink)

Both an emphasis on logic and an emphasis on rhetoric lead to a kind of care for language. However, in early Greece this care for language through the lens of logic manifested in the drive to ‘get it right’, whereas in early China the care for language manifested in the pervasive concern for zhengming, for using names properly. For the early Chinese thinkers, especially the early Confucians, this was not predominantly a linguistic affair—zhengming is a key component of moral cultivation. (...) As we explore the ethical import of Confucian role ethics, we need to pay attention to the philosophical vocabulary of this worldview and to how our understanding of these crucial terms changes if persons are seen as relational—a central premise of Confucian role ethics. In this essay I argue against reading zhengming as fagu, merely a conservative retrieval of historical meaning, as suggested by the political philosopher Hsiao Kung-chuan, among others. Instead, I argue for three theses: (1) although stubbornly persistent, ‘rectification of names’ is not an adequate translation for zhengming; (2) the conservative reading of zhengming is problematic and needs to be rethought as an hermeneutic process intersecting past meanings, present circumstances, and future possibilities; and (3) zhengming is, in an important sense, the ‘art’ of Confucian role ethics, for achieving moral competency in this tradition is a matter of constantly revising one's roles and relationships. (shrink)

While researchers have offered remonstration-oriented, reciprocal, voluntary, and gratitude-based accounts of political obligation in classical Confucianism, I argue that these interpretations are either in conflict with the textual evidence or merely scratch the surface of Confucius’ theory of political obligation without fully elaborating its essence. Instead, I demonstrate that the theory of political obligation in Confucianism is a specific argument from paternalistic gratitude in which the people’s political obligation is analogically compared to children’s grateful duty to their parents. Moreover, I (...) use the Confucian theory of paternalistic gratitude to critically examine China’s recent politics of political obligation in the wake of the 2008 Sichuan 四川 earthquake. Although the Confucian-sounding references, such as kindness and the parent-state analogy, figure into the CPC’s Gratitude Education campaign, the Party’s politics of political obligation does not meet the Confucian normative standard. Specifically, in the Confucian theory of paternalistic gratitude, the people will be grateful to a benevolent ruler without this feeling being demanded by the state. However, in the Gratitude Education campaign, the Party self-righteously exacted the earthquake survivors’ gratitude. Local dissidents were subject to the stigmatization of “ungratefulness” and faced political violence as a consequence. The case of the Gratitude Education campaign serves as another example of the CPC’s political use of Confucianism for its non-Confucian goals. (shrink)

This paper reflects on the problems of cross-cultural interpretations and translations analysing how these are rooted in theories and philosophical assumptions. Inquiring the concept of philosophy per se, the paper discusses key passages of Heidegger and the related problem of 有 and 無. The conclusion is that to translate such terms, it is necessary to revise the coercive onto-theological assumptions of metaphysics. This can trigger a process of re-grounding grounds with the consequent possibility of language transformation, which, in turn, activates (...) new relations between cultural diversities. Thus, philosophy itself becomes an eminently comparative dialogue between cultures. Without setting a single method for all these problems, the paper argues that comparisons themselves call for necessarily different methodological approaches. Hence, whilst Daoism helps to illuminate these issues defining one of the possibilities that a philosophy of comparisons entails, this same reasoning opens a way for another reading of the Daodejing. (shrink)

In this article we examine Classical Confucian political thinking through the lens of paternalism. We situate Confucianism amid contemporary models of paternalism to show that Confucianism can be understood as a soft form of paternalism regarding its method. Confucianism stresses cultivation of the people by moral exemplars to guide the people to act in ways that are in their own best interests. This is in contrast to use of law and punishment as a deterrent of unwanted behaviours of the people. (...) We demonstrate that Confucian paternalism does not advocate for a static top-down structure of governance that is incapable of reform, underscoring its non-authoritarian ideal. We do this by stressing the vital upward momentum constituted in general cultivation of the wider population utilizing li. The picture that emerges from an examination of Confucian political thought through the lens of paternalism is what we name “exemplary paternalism.”. (shrink)

Within the literature, Daoist political philosophy has often been linked with anarchism. While some extended arguments have been offered in favor of this conclusion, I take this position to be tenuous and predicated on an assumption that coercive authority cannot be applied through wuwei. Focusing on the Laozi as the fundamental political text of classical Daoism, I lay out a general account of why one ought to be skeptical of classifying it as anarchistic. Keeping this skepticism in mind and recognizing (...) the importance of wuwei in arguments for the anarchist conclusion, I provide a non-anarchistic interpretation of wuwei as a political technique that is consistent with the text of the Laozi. Having presented a plausible alternative to the anarchist understanding of wuwei, I close my discussion with a brief sketch of a positive account of the political theory of the Laozi. (shrink)

One of the many senses of the word spirituality—surely one of the vaguest words in the modern English language—is that of a special quality of life, a sublime fulfillment that somehow transcends the vicissitudes of fortune. According to this sense, spiritual people experience life as having such abundance of value or meaning that they can endure great hardship and tragedy without coming to despair. This abiding fullness and the equanimity it provides are perhaps the greatest prize of the spiritual life.Spiritual (...) fulfillment was once claimed as the special reward of religion, but no longer. In late modernity "spiritual but not religious" has become a commonplace self-description, and presumably this concept of .. (shrink)

This dissertation examines the philosophy of Masaaki Kōsaka from the East Asian perspective of Confucianism, which I believe is the most appropriate moral paradigm for comprehending his political speculations. Although largely neglected in post-war scholarship, Kōsaka was a prominent member of the Kyoto School during the 1930s and 40s. This was a group of Japanese thinkers strongly associated with the philosophies of Kitarō Nishida and Hajime Tanabe. Kōsaka is now best known for his participation in the three Chūō Kōron symposia (...) held in 1941 and 1942. These meetings have been routinely denounced by liberal historians due to the participants’ support for the Pacific War and the Co-Prosperity Sphere. However, many of these liberal portrayals have failed to take into account the full extent of the group’s resistance to the military junta of Hideki Tōjō. Adopting the methods and techniques of the empirical disciplines of academic history and Orientalism, I develop an interpretative framework that is more receptive to the political values that mattered to Kōsaka as a Confucian inspired intellectual. This has necessitated the rejection of moral history, which typically prioritises modern liberal values brought a priori to the historical record of wartime Japan, as well as recognition of the different ontological foundations that inform the unique political theories of the East Asian intellectual tradition. Reinforced by the prior research of Michel Dalissier and Graham Parkes, as well as my own reading of the Confucian canon, I adopt David Williams’s thesis of ‘Confucian Revolution’ as my principle schema of interpretation. This, I believe, is better able to reconcile Kōsaka’s support for the war with his strong condemnation of the imperialist practices of the Japanese military. Moreover, acknowledging the importance of Confucianism allows us to fully appreciate Kōsaka’s strong affinity for Kant’s practical metaphysics, Hegel’s political philosophy and Ranke’s historiography. (shrink)

In this paper, I delineate a variety of questions related to personal identity and ontology. I develop and compare the Confucian conception of the person and the view of the person developed throughout Derek Parfit’s work on personal identity and ontology. I will demonstrate that the Confucian conception of the person has numerous instructive similarities with Parfit’s work on personal identity, despite a number of differences. I argue, briefly, that this project is worthwhile as a piece of comparative philosophy. One (...) of the final two sections of the paper develop a new hybrid account of personal identity and ontology that combine the Confucian and Parfitian views of personal identity and personal ontology. The last section of the paper goes into detail developing this view in response to potential questions, and responds to some objections to this hybrid account, including objections based on a similarity between the Confucian account and the narrative account of personal identity. (shrink)