Idolatry is vehemently rejected by the Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), and closely connected with idolatry are certain varieties of anthropomorphism, which involve the attribution of a human form or personality to God. The question investigated in this paper is whether a highly anthropomorphic conception of God, one that commits the sin of idolatry, is entailed by a particular theory of religious language. This theory is the 'univocity thesis', the view that, for some substitutions for 'F', the sense of (...) '___ is F' as applied to God and its sense as applied to human creatures is exactly or substantially the same. My claim is that the univocity thesis entails a strong form of anthropomorphism that in effect reduces God to creaturely status and thus succumbs to idolatry (albeit a conceptual form of idolatry). In the course of my argument, a comparison is made between, on the one hand, the methods of Duns Scotus and modern proponents of perfect-being theology in arriving at a concept of God as maximally perfect, and on the other hand the work of Thomistic philosophers (especially Barry Miller) in showing how a more adequate conception of divinity can be reached by dispensing with some of the methods and assumptions of perfect-being theology, particularly the assumption of univocity. (shrink)

This volume examines the phenomenon of the migration of philosophical texts and traditions into other cultures, identifies places where it may have succeeded, but also where it has not, and discusses what is presupposed in introducing a text or a tradition into another intellectual culture. -- Book Jacket.

Are religious commitments beliefs or some other kind of mental state? Do religious affirmations express beliefs or other non-doxastic attitudes? These questions have been prominent in philosophical research on the language and psychology of religion since the mid-twentieth century, but the history of interest in these topics traces back to late antiquity. In a recent paper, Tim Crane approaches these questions from the perspective of research on theories about the nature of belief. According to some accounts, he argues, the attitudes (...) that we call religious “beliefs” do not exhibit the properties requisite for belief. He raises grounds for dissatisfaction with the proposed account of belief and cognate debates about cognitivism and non-cognitivism, and concludes by setting out a more descriptive approach as the basis for an understanding of religious attitudes. This paper argues that Crane’s argument relies on an unduly demanding theory of belief. However, the concerns that he raises about the belief status of religious commitment can be motivated – and are extensively debated – in recent research on religious faith. Crane’s characterisation of the cognitive/non-cognitive debate is also disputed. The paper concludes by raising concerns about Crane’s description of the scope of the field of religious language. (shrink)

This study reviews some of the principal themes in contemporary work on religious language. Unlike other recent surveys, the most pressing issues about religious language are addressed from the perspective of the philosophy of language; different positions taken on these issues by philosophers of religion and theologians are considered. Topics that are covered include: the subject matter of religious discourse, reductionism and subjectivism, expressivism, the nature of religious metaphor, religious fictionalism and truth in religious discourse. The study also looks at (...) the relationship between questions about religious language and cognate areas of philosophy of religion such as epistemology and metaphysics, and potential future directions of research. (shrink)

This study reviews some of the principal themes in contemporary work on religious language. Unlike other recent surveys, the most pressing issues about religious language are addressed from the perspective of the philosophy of language; different positions taken on these issues by philosophers of religion and theologians are considered. Topics that are covered include: the subject matter of religious discourse, reductionism and subjectivism, expressivism, the nature of religious metaphor, religious fictionalism and truth in religious discourse. The study also looks at (...) the relationship between questions about religious language and cognate areas of philosophy of religion such as epistemology and metaphysics, and potential future directions of research. (shrink)

I explore some of the reasons why, under specific circumstances, it may be rational to make-believe or imagine certain religious beliefs. Adopting a jargon familiar to certain contemporary philosophers, my main concern here is to assess what reasons can be given for adopting a fictionalist stance towards some religious beliefs. My understanding of fictionalism does not involve solely a propositional attitude but a broader stance, which may include certain acts of pretence. I also argue that a plausible reason to be (...) fictionalist about a specific set of religious beliefs and practices has to do with the value of some artistic creations; namely, those that require the adoption of a religious point of view for their understanding. (shrink)

I outline what I call the ‘deniability problem’, explain why it is problematic, and identify the range of utterances to which it applies (using religious discourse as an example). The problem is as follows: To assign content to many utterances audiences must rely on their contextual knowledge. This generates a lot of scope for error. Thus, speakers are able to make assertions and deny responsibility for the proposition asserted, claiming that the audience made a mistake. I outline the problem (a (...) limited version of which Fricker 2012 discusses), before explaining why it is problematic. Firstly it blocks testimonial knowledge according to assurance views. Secondly it prevents epistemic buck passing (the importance of which is emphasized by Goldberg 2006 and McMyler 2013). Finally, it removes a key disincentive to dishonesty. The recent literature on context sensitivity (particularly Cappelen and Lepore 2004) seems to entail that the problem applies to a very wide range of utterances. I consider a series of responses which fail to provide a solution, but which help us narrow down the scope of the problem. (shrink)

The author investigates whether the model prevalent today of an “humble reason” - based on fallibilism and epistemic humility - is the most appropriate to express the theological truth, even in the light of the debate within the contemporary theism (rational theology). To answer this question it is necessary to examine the epistemological status of “human truth” and the “truth of faith”, in order to develop a common approach to sciences, philosophy and theology. Finally, the author shows how the communitarian (...) dimension and the “choice” (a call for freedom) are inherent to theology understood as “critical faith”, whose peculiarity is to posit itself without nostalgia in the middle between fideism, rationalism and a certain relativism. From the path, finally, it emerges the proposal of a new “cristeologia”. Il rapporto tra fede e ragione è la questione meta-teologica per eccellenza. L’autore si propone dunque d’indagare se il modello oggi prevalente di “ragione umile” – basato su fallibilismo e umiltà epistemica – sia il più adeguato per esprimere le verità teologiche, anche alla luce del dibattito interno al teismo contemporaneo (teologia razionale). Per rispondere a questa domanda è necessario esaminare lo statuto epistemologico della verità umana e della verità di fede, per poter elaborare un metodo comune alle discipline scientifiche, filosofiche e teologiche, capace di trovare un equilibrio tra fideismo e positivismo teologico. Dopo una breve panoramica storica dei rapporti tra fede e ragione nel pensiero occidentale (con particolare attenzione alla dottrina dei praeambula fidei), l’articolo cercherà di mostrare come, nel paradigma della verità relazionale e del fallibilismo sia necessario integrare il problema delle fonti, dell’autorità, del concetto di ispirazione e della nozione di “rivelazione”, giacché contraddistinguono la teologia rispetto alla filosofia. Si mostrerà infine come la dimensione comunitaria e della scelta (appello alla libertà) siano connaturate alla teologia intesa come fede critica, la cui peculiarità è di collocarsi senza nostalgie nel mezzo tra fideismo, razionalismo e un certo relativismo. Dal percorso emergerà infine la proposta di una nuova "cristeologia". (shrink)

This paper examines different functions of metaphors in religious language. In order to do that it will be analyzed in which ways metaphorical language can be understood as irreducible. First, it will be argued that metaphors communicate more than just propositional contents. They also frame their targets with an imagistic perspective that cannot be reduced to a literal paraphrase. Furthermore, there are also cases where metaphors are used to fill gaps of what can be expressed with literal language. In order (...) to clarify this function of catachresis the notion of de re metaphors will be introduced. With those metaphors we can convey contents that we cannot conceptualize independently from a certain context of utterance. Hence, with such metaphors we can reach beyond the limits of our conceptual repertoire which is a crucial function for religious language. Finally, the consistency and plausibility of the radical position that all assertions about God are irreducibly and necessarily metaphorical if they are supposed to be true will be discussed on the basis of the results of the former considerations about the irreducibility of metaphors. (shrink)

As an English analytic philosopher, Stace considers religion to be identical with mysticism and mystical experience to be its core. According to him, mystical experiences and thus religious propositions are ineffable. Existence consists of temporal and eternal realms each of which has its special language. While the temporal world is the realm of finite reason, religion belongs to the eternal level that can be perceived only by intuition. Religious language is symbolic. Symbolic proposition is not a report of reality, but (...) its function is to stimulate religious emotions in believers and to bring about religious experience. In this article, I shall begin by explaining Stace’s notions of religion, reason and mysticism. I shall, then, describe Stace’s analysis of the symbolic language of religion with reference to its function, that is, stimulation of experience and religious emotions in believers. Finally, I will explore the epistemological foundations of Stace’s theory of religious language. (shrink)

El artículo, que supone una determinada interpretación de la filosofía de la religión de Zubiri, intenta reconstruir el hipotético diálogo de ella con la filosofía analítica de la religión. así, primeramente, expone las varias coincidencias de ambas en torno a la cuestión del significado del lenguaje religioso. Enseguida, muestra tanto sus acuerdos como sus divergencias en lo que toca a la racionalidad de las creencias religiosas. Y dentro de esto último, por fin, sugiere que para las dos la teología filosófica (...) y la teodicea constituyen un terreno imprescindible para cualquier filosofía de la religión que pretenda ser rigurosa y actual. (shrink)