We found that pension funds may face a bottleneck as practical impediments to engaging in responsible investment with respect to the role played by defining and implementing responsible investment. Furthermore, pension funds seek additional coherence and practical guidelines in this field to enable them to take into account ethical considerations in their investment strategies and in implementing them. These findings indicate that the availability of information may affect the stance that key decision makers of pension funds adopt towards responsible investment.

In this study, we try to establish what determines the substantial differences in the Nordic countries’ size and composition of socially responsible investing (SRI). We investigate if these differences between Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden can be associated with key characteristics in economics, finance, culture, and institutions. We find that in particular economic openness, the size of the pension industry, and cultural values of masculinity (femininity) and uncertainty avoidance can be associated with the differences in SRI in the four countries. (...) On basis of these findings, we lay foundations for an international theory of SRI. (shrink)

In his 2014 paper entitled “Reason, Rationality and Fiduciary Duty”, Lydenberg ventures into the field of the moral and political philosophy dealing with distributive justice in search of fresh perspectives on fiduciary duty. Simply by doing this, Lydenberg makes the very important contribution of drawing a little more attention to the potential that this huge field of study might have in relation to understanding socially responsible investment. There are however difficulties with Lydenberg’s paper. I describe three in particular that I (...) believe warrant critical attention. The first emerges out of Lydenberg’s treatment of the central concepts of reasonableness and rationality. The second lies in his apparent suggestion that at some earlier time fiduciary duty was somehow more generally other-considering than it is today. And finally, the third is associated with the place that impartiality occupies in Lydenberg’s storyline, and the implications of this in terms of his call for a reconciliation between reasonableness and rationality. This critical scrutiny clarifies theoretical and practical implications of the transition Lydenberg is suggesting. In doing this, it makes the realization that what Lydenberg is attempting is more than likely nothing short of resolving “The fundamental problem of ethics and politics” in the specific context of fiduciary action. (shrink)