O estatuto da ideia de Filosofia Primeira na Fenomenologia de Husserl Resumo: O objetivo do artigo que se segue é se dedicar a uma leitura e interpretação dos textos de Edmund Husserl que fazem uso do conceito de “Filosofia Primeira” para se referir em geral à fenomenologia e propor a tese de que a ideia de “primeira” surge de início na obra husserliana como uma privilegiada chave de demarcação do projeto fenomenológico em relação à hierarquia das ciências, e que ele (...) traduz no final, com a evolução e o alargamento dos horizontes abertos por esse projeto, o duplo sentido da fenomenologia como “ciência de rigor” e como “filosofia”, e o esforço de elevar a fenomenologia pura ao estatuto de uma filosofia fenomenológica. Palavras-chave: Husserl; Filosofia Primeira; Fenomenologia pura; Filosofia Fenomenológica. The status of the First Philosophy idea in Husserl’s Phenomenology Abstract: The aim of the following paper is to read and to interpret Edmund Husserl's texts that make use of the concept of “First Philosophy” to refer in general to phenomenology and propose the thesis that the idea of “first” arises from the beginning in Husserlian work as a privileged key of demarcation of the phenomenological project in relation to the hierarchy of sciences, and that it finally translates, with the evolution and broadening of the horizons opened by this project, the double meaning of phenomenology as “rigorous science” and as “philosophy”, and the effort to rise pure phenomenology to the status of a phenomenological philosophy. Keywords: First Philosophy; Pure Phenomenology; Phenomenological Philosophy. Die Stellung der Idee von der Ersten Philosophie in Husserls Phänomenologie Zusammenfassung: Der begreiffende Text handelt sich um die Vorstellung, deren Grund des folgenden Abschnitt darin besteht, die Texte von Edmund Husserl zu lesen und zu interpretieren. Dies verwenden den Begriff der „Ersten Philosophie“, um allgemein auf die Phänomenologie zu verweisen und die These aufzustellen, sodass die Idee von „Ersten“ von Anfang an in Husserlian Arbeit entsteht als privilegierter Abgrenzungsschlüssel des phänomenologischen Projekts in Bezug auf die Hierarchie der Wissenschaften. Laut Husserl wird die doppelte Bedeutung der Phänomenologie schließlich durch die Entwicklung und Erweiterung des vom Projekt verbreitenden Horizons verwirklicht. Er hält die als „strenge Wissenschaft“ und als „Philosophie“ und fasst den Entschluss, die reine Phänomenologie in der Stellung einer phänomenologischen Philosophie zu erheben. Stichworte: Husserl; Erste Philosophie; Reine Phänomenologie; Phänomenologische Philosophie. Data de registro: 26/07/2021 Data de aceite: 01/12/2021. (shrink)

This paper aims to focus on the concept of experience and reconstruct its evolutions within Royce’s thought. To do so, I divide this paper in three parts. I begin by analysing Royce’s concept of experience, which takes roots in his interpretation of the British empiricists, such as Locke, Berkeley and Hume, in The Spirit of Modern Philosophy (1892). In the second part I outline Royce’s theory of experience from a philosophical and psychological point of view. My claim is that, in (...) his philosophical writings, Royce argues that cognitions are not abstract ideas but plans of actions: meanings and concepts are embodied, situated and time-oriented. I refer also to Royce’s contribution to the psychological field, with regard to embodied aspects of cognitions. According to Royce, cognitions are enriched with elements related to sensorimotor, imaginative and perceptual faculties. Action and perception are no separated aspects of cognitions, because perception implies sensorimotor dynamics. At the same time, the perception of the object is entangled with the imagination of the would be, i.e., the result of doing different actions with the object. (shrink)