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Truth in philosophy

Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (1993)

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  1. The Question of Transcendence and Constraint in a Panartifactual Account of Being, Knowing and Making.Büke Temizler & Murat Baç - 2022 - Metaphysica 23 (2):409-425.
    Barry Allen defends a highly unorthodox and compact account of humans and their evolutionary adventure, which comprises inter alia epistemological, alethic, technological, and artistic aspects. His anthropocentric view distinguishes itself from traditional forms of realism and anti-realism by virtue of its dynamic and non-reductionist character. Allen adopts a certain perspective of techno-artistic and onto-epistemic construction, which we dub “panartifactualism,” claiming principally that nothing at all escapes the artifactualizing power of human beings. We maintain that, under closer scrutiny, various dimensions of (...)
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  • Naturalizing idealizations: Pragmatism and the interpretivist strategy.Bjørn Ramberg - 2004 - Contemporary Pragmatism 1 (2):1-63.
    Following Quine, Davidson, and Dennett, I take mental states and linguistic meaning to be individuated with reference to interpretation. The regulative principle of ideal interpretation is to maximize rationality, and this accounts for the distinctiveness and autonomy of the vocabulary of agency. This rationality-maxim can accommodate empirical cognitive-psychological investigation into the nature and limitations of human mental processing. Interpretivism is explicitly anti-reductionist, but in the context of Rorty's neo-pragmatism provides a naturalized view of agents. The interpretivist strategy affords a less (...)
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  • Foucault, Habermas and the claims of reason.David Owen - 1996 - History of the Human Sciences 9 (2):119-138.
  • The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.Mark Okrent - 1993 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):381 – 404.
    While avoiding relativism, Rorty claims that: (1) truth is just for a time and a place; (2) ?truth? and ?rationality? are indexed to a community's standards of warranted assertibility; and (3) there is nothing more to be said about truth and rationality than is contained, in a community's procedures for evaluating claims. He makes these assertions because he believes that the cautionary uses of ?true? and ?rational? crucially depend upon the endorsing uses of these terms. I argue that Rorty is (...)
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  • Pragmatism as a philosophy of hope: Emerson, James, Dewey, Rorty.Colin Koopman - 2006 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 20 (2):106-116.
  • Critical Notice of Beyond the Analytic-Continental Divide: Pluralist Philosophy in the Twenty-First Century. Edited by Jeffrey A. Bell, Andrew Cutrofello, and Paul M. Livingston. [REVIEW]Michael Hymers - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):694-713.
    This collection maintains a dialogue between the analytic and continental traditions, while aspiring to situate itself beyond the analytic-continental divide. It divides into four parts, Methodologies, Truth and Meaning, Metaphysics and Ontology, and Values, Personhood and Agency, though there is considerable overlap among the categories. History and temporality are recurrent themes, but there is a lot of metaphysics generally, with some philosophy of language, philosophy of social science, ethics, political philosophy and epistemology. Less prominent is a pragmatic, deflationary attitude, and (...)
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  • Scheme-based alethic realism: Agency, the environment, and truthmaking.Murat Baç & Renée Elio - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (2):173-196.
    This paper presents a position called Scheme-based Alethic Realism, which reconciles a realist position on the nature of truth with a pluralistic Kantian perspective that allows for multiple environments in which truthmaking relationships are established. We argue that truthmaking functions are constrained by a stable phenomenal world and a stable cognitive architecture. This account takes truth as normatively distinct from epistemic justification while relativizing the truth conditions of our statements to what we call Frameworks. The pluralistic aspect allows that these (...)
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  • Propositional knowledge and the enigma of realism.Murat Baç - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (1-2):199-223.
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  • The controversy over res in philosophy of science and the mysteries of ontological neutrality.Ontological Neutrality - 2011 - Filozofia 66 (2):141.
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  • Wie individuell sind intentionale Einstellungen wirklich?Ralf Stoecker - 2000 - Metaphysica 1:107-119.
    So selbstverständlich es klingt, vom Geist, der Psyche oder auch der Seele eines Menschen zu reden, und so vertraut uns wissenschaftliche Disziplinen sind, die sich philosophisch oder empirisch damit beschäftigen, so schwer fällt es, ein einheitliches Merkmale dafür anzugeben, wann etwas ein psychisches Phänomen ist. Viele der potentiellen Merkmale decken eben nur einen Teil des Spektrums dessen ab, was wir gewöhnlich als psychisch bezeichnen würden, und sind damit bestenfalls hinreichende, aber sicher keine notwendigen Bedingungen des Psychischen. Im Mittelpunkt des folgenden (...)
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