This article is a result of a unique project that brought together academics and military practitioners with a mind to addressing difficult moral questions in a way that is philosophically careful,...

Is it necessary to have an ideal of perfection in mind to identify and evaluate true biotechnological human “enhancements”, or can one do without? To answer this question we suggest employing the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory, found in the debate in political philosophy about theories of justice: the distinctive views about whether one needs an idea of a perfectly just society or not when it comes to assessing the current situation and recommending steps to increase justice. In this (...) paper we argue that evaluating human enhancements from a non-ideal perspective has some serious shortcomings, which can be avoided when endorsing an ideal approach. Our argument starts from a definition of human enhancement as improvement, which can be understood in two ways. The first approach is backward-looking and assesses improvements with regard to a status quo ante. The second, a forward-looking approach, evaluates improvements with regard to their proximity to a goal or according to an ideal. After outlining the limitations of an exclusively backward-looking view, we answer possible objections against a forward-looking view. Ultimately, we argue that the human enhancement debate would lack some important moral insights if a forward-looking view of improvement is not taken into consideration. (shrink)

Recent developments in neuroscience have enabled technological advances to modulate cognitive functions of the brain. Despite ethical concerns about cognitive enhancement, both individuals and society as a whole can benefit greatly from these technologies, depending on how we regulate their use. To date, regulatory analyses of neuromodulation technologies have focused on a technology itself – for instance, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration regulation of a brain stimulation device – rather than the use of a technology, such as the use (...) of a brain stimulation device at work or school. Given that some forms of cognitive enhancement have already started to penetrate the general public’s everyday life, we should begin our discussion on potential regulatory issues regarding their use in various real-world situations. The goal of the article is to fill the gap by providing an analytic framework to examine these regulatory issues. More specifically, it aims to illustrate the issues around respecting autonomy and preventing coercive use of cognitive enhancement. The proposed framework categories the real-world settings where a neuromodulation technology can be used for cognitive enhancement based on two criteria – who is subjected to cognitive enhancement and who imposes cognitive enhancement. Based on this framework, the article analyzes regulatory issues arising out of every combination of subject/imposing party by taking one example case. Focusing on the regulations in the U.S., this analysis shows the current lack of adequate safeguards against the coercive use and calls for more attention from government agencies and researchers to develop sound policies regarding current and potentially more widespread use of cognitive enhancement. (shrink)

Exoskeletons, i.e., wearable robotics, are designed and built to amplify human strength and agility. In many cases, their purpose is to replace diminished or lost limb functionality, helping people regain some ambulatory freedom. As such, exoskeletons are particularly suited to help those with restricted mobility due to paralysis or weakened limbs. For all their promise, exoskeletons and other wearable robotics raise a number of ethical and social concerns that will need to be confronted by ethicists, the industry, and society as (...) a whole. General social concerns relate to the personal and psychological impact on disabled individuals and their families. And as a society, we may need to reconsider ableness, in light of these and other technological opportunities for overcoming our limitations. But that's only for those who can afford these machines: with exoskeletons costing as much as a luxury car, there are social justice concerns relating to access to this cost-prohibitive technology, as well as the eventual dependencies on such an expensive device. Ought insurers be required to purchase these for paralyzed individuals to significantly improve their quality of life; or are there competing interests and ideals that might support an insurer's refusal to invest in this technology? Some exoskeleton manufacturers, in conjunction with defense contractors, are reportedly pursuing military grade as well as industrial grade exoskeleton solutions. These solution enable soldiers and workers to perform longer and harder. In upgrading humans into quasi-machines, however, we run the risk of treating them more like machines than humans. In the workplace this may result in the overworking of an employee, in the military this could further dehumanize warfare and its very human actors. The prospect of augmenting otherwise healthy individuals raises further ethical concerns relating to human enhancement, an area fraught with slippery slopes. These issues are not only limited to our regular daily interactions, but also arise in sports, as the disabled Olympian, Oscar Pistorius, has shown us. There are no simple solutions for any of these issues, although many solutions may arise organically; for example, costs and access issues may be lessened as the technology becomes more widespread and cheaper. Other issues can be dealt with through well thought out regulatory solutions. But, for society at large, exoskeletons and other future human enhancements technologies raise much more longstanding and complex questions that will force us to redefine how we perceive humanity and self. (shrink)

Objections to the use of assistive technologies in elite sports are generally raised when the technology in question is perceived to afford the user a potentially “unfair advantage,” when it is perceived as a threat to the purity of the sport, and/or when it is perceived as a precursor to a slippery slope toward undesirable changes in the sport. These objections rely on being able to quantify standards of “normal” within a sport so that changes attributed to the use of (...) assistive technology can be judged as causing a significant deviation from some baseline standard. This holds athletes using assistive technologies accountable to standards that restrict their opportunities to achieve greatness, while athletes who do not use assistive technologies are able to push beyond the boundaries of these standards without moral scrutiny. This paper explores how constructions of fairness and “normality” impact athletes who use assistive technology to compete in a sporting venue traditionally populated with “able-bodied” competitors. It argues that the dynamic and obfuscated construction of “normal” standards in elite sports should move away from using body performance as the measuring stick of “normal,” toward alternate forms of constructing norms such as defining, quantifying, and regulating the mechanical actions that constitute the critical components of a sport. Though framed within the context of elite sports, this paper can be interpreted more broadly to consider problems with defining “normal” bodies in a society in which technologies are constantly changing our abilities and expectations of what normal means. (shrink)