Drawing on remarks scattered through his writings, I argue that Leibniz has a highly distinctive and interesting theory of color. The central feature of the theory is the way in which it combines a nuanced subjectivism about color with a reductive approach of a sort usually associated with objectivist theories of color. After reconstructing Leibniz's theory and calling attention to some of its most notable attractions, I turn to the apparent incompatibility of its subjective and reductive components. I argue that (...) this apparent tension vanishes in light of his rejection of a widely accepted doctrine concerning the nature of bodies and their geometrical qualities. (shrink)

Consider the distinctive qualitative property grass visually appears to have when it visually appears to be green. This property is an example of what I call sensuous color. Whereas early modern mechanists typically argue that bodies are not sensuously colored, Margaret Cavendish (1623–73) disagrees. In cases of veridical perception, she holds that grass is green in precisely the way it visually appears to be. In defense of her realist approach to sensuous colors, Cavendish argues that (i) it is impossible to (...) conceive of colorless bodies, (ii) the very possibility of color experience requires that bodies are sensuously colored, and (iii) the attribution of sensuous colors to bodies provides the best explanation of color constancy. Although some passages might suggest that Cavendish endorses a reductive account of sensuous color, according to which sensuous color reduces to a body's microscopic surface texture (or some other mechanistically respectable property), I argue that she accepts a nonreductive account, on which sensuous color is not thus reducible. (shrink)

The philosophy of perception has been dominated by vision, with very little discussion of the chemical senses – olfaction and gustation. In this second entry of a pair on olfactory experience, I consider what olfaction has to tell us about two issues: the nature of perceptual objects and the nature of perceptual properties and, in particular, the secondary qualities. Given the scant work on olfaction in the philosophical literature, my discussion not only surveys what philosophers have said about olfaction so (...) far, but considers the most plausible views and/or most pressing questions in each area of inquiry. (shrink)

This dissertation is a defense of a deflationary interpretation of Lockean ideas. The orthodox view is that Locke uses the term ‘idea’ to designate a collection of things that share some philosophically significant characteristic in common. While there is much debate over what this unifying characteristic might be, it is largely agreed upon that there is one, and only one, such characteristic. This is the assumption that I deny. I argue that Locke uses ‘idea’ as an umbrella term to cover (...) several different types of mental items. In Chapter 1, I look at six non-deflationary interpretations of Locke’s theory of ideas and show that while a few of these readings can account for some Lockean ideas, none of these readings can account for all of them. In Chapters 2 and 3, I argue for my deflationist view. I proceed by outlining the various parameters Locke uses to distinguish ideas into several distinct categories. The source, means of acquisition, content and the way in which ideas are related to their targets are all factors that create these divisions. The most basic division I draw is between actual sensations and stored ideas. I argue that reading sensations as appearances, i.e external objects as they appear to an observer, not only better accords with the text, but also circumvents notorious veil of perception worries. This reading is controversial insofar as I read Locke as subscribing to a form of direct realism rather than the strong form of indirect realism that is usually attributed to him. I then divide stored ideas into ectypes, , archetypes, and fantastical ideas. Simple ideas and real ideas of substances are ectypes, ideas of modes and relations are archetypes and fantastical ideas are ideas of substances that we create that have no conformity to the real existence of things. Ectypes and fantastical ideas are images, whereas ideas of modes and relations are definitions or signs. While my reading of Locke is more complex than the standard non-deflationary views, it is preferable for several reasons. First, it accounts for all categories of Lockean ideas. Secondly, it is consistent with the text, whereas traditional readings are forced to explain away text that doesn’t support their non-deflationary views. And lastly, it avoids skeptical concerns concerning the veil of perception. The more simplistic readings that have pervaded the Lockean literature simply do not do justice to the complexities of Locke’s theory of ideas. Adviser: Albert Casullo. (shrink)