This paper articulates and defends three interconnected claims: first, that the debate on the role of values for science misses a crucial dimension, the institutional one; second, that institutions occupy the intermediate level between scientific activities and values and that they are to be systematically integrated into the analysis; third, that the appraisal of the institutions of science with respect to values should be undertaken within the premises of a comparative approach rather than an ideal approach. Hence, I defend the (...) view that the issue be framed in reference to the following question: "What kind of institutional rules should be in place in order for the scientific process to unfold in such a way that the values that we deem more important come to the fore?" Addressing this concern is equivalent to conducting a debate on institutions and their role for science. (shrink)

This paper deals with the particularities of vagueness in law. Thereby the question of the law’s capacity for vagueness is closely related to the question of the impact of vagueness in law, since exaggerated vagueness combined with the elasticity of legal interpretation methodology may affect the constitutional principles of legal certainty, the division of powers, and the binding force of statute. To represent vagueness and the instability of legal concepts and rules, a Hyperbola of Meaning is introduced, opposing Heck’s metaphor (...) of a core and a periphery of meaning. Furthermore, evidence is provided that the use of vague legal concepts and the capability of legal methodology to affect the specific meaning of those concepts, may give rise to astonishing and irrational changes of meaning of the law. Finally the paper sets out in search of an added value of vagueness in law, and weighs several stated pros and contras of vagueness. The paper is written against a background of the German speaking realm. (shrink)

Der Krankheitsbegriff ist sowohl ein Begriff der Lebenswelt als auch ein theoretischer Begriff der medizinischen Wissenschaft. Das Paper zeigt die wichtigsten Unterschiede auf. Im ersten Teil wird die Grundstruktur der Krankheitslehre anhand von 7 Prinzipien dargestellt. Im zweiten Teil werden einige besonders wichtige Unterschiede in Form von Frage und Antwort explizit erklärt. Prinzipien: Die Krankheitslehre hat das individuelle menschliche Leben unter dem Aspekt von Krankheit und Gesundheit zum Gegenstand. Die Krankheitslehre fasst Krankheiten als abgrenzbare Anteile eines individuellen Lebens auf. Jedes (...) krankhafte Phänomen ist entweder eine Krankheit oder deren Manifestation. Jede einzelne Krankheit ist ein Fall einer allgemeinen Art: einer Krankheitsentität. Krankheitsentitäten werden definiert durch eine Kombination von Erstursachen, Wirkbedingungen, Reaktionen und Folgen im Organismus, Verlaufsformen und Ausgängen. Krankheitsentitäten sind durch sie definierende pathologische Merkmale gekennzeichnet. Die Pathologizität von Merkmalen lässt sich durch ein System von Krankheitskriterien charakterisieren. Ein fraglich pathologischer Lebensvorgang kann durch Rekurs auf die Ätiopathologie der zugehörigen Krankheitsentität theoretisch eingeordnet werden. Fragen : Gibt es eine scharfe Grenze zwischen Gesundheit und Krankheit? Gibt es zwischen Gesundheit und Krankheit einen neutralen Bereich von Zuständen? Kann die Medizin eine positive Definition von Gesundheit angeben? Kann man Gesundheit mit vollständigem subjektivem Wohlbefinden gleichsetzen? Ist Krankheit etwas Unnatürliches? Können Menschen auch dann gesund sein, wenn sie eine Krankheit oder Behinderung haben? Ist jemand krank, bei dem ein Risikofaktor festgestellt wird? Dürfen gegen eine Krankheit nur Personen mit nachgewiesener Erkrankung behandelt werden? Ist Krankheit immer ein Übel? Welche normativen Implikationen hat der wissenschaftliche Krankheitsbegriff? (shrink)

This article examines Cohen’s “transcendental method”, Windelband’s “critical method”, the neo-Kantian distinctions between natural science and the humanities (i. e., human or cultural sciences), and Weber’s account of ideal-typical explanations. The Marburg and the Southwest Schools of neo-Kantianism have in common that their respective philosophies of science focused on method, but they substantially differ in their approaches. Cohen advanced the “transcendental method”, which was taken up and transformed by Natorp and Cassirer; later, it became influential in neo-Kantian approaches to 20th (...) century physics. Windelband distinguished between facts and values, linking the former to the “genetic” method of history and the latter to the “critical” method of philosophy; and between the “nomothetic” and “idiographic” methods of the empirical sciences, a distinction further elaborated by Rickert. The distinction does not give rise to a sharp discrimination but is rather what Weber would later call an ideal type. All these approaches contribute in different ways to understanding the structure of scientific knowledge, focusing on different aspects of the general path of the empirical sciences between rationalism and empiricism. (shrink)

Critique is a concept that is constantly used as an instrument for agreement or disagreement, for reflection and discussion. There is a difference, however, between critique as a historically grounded phenomenon and critique as a utopian conception not situated in any particular socio-historical context. Educational theory resists reduction to empirical science partly because of its utopian character. Thus tensions that arise within it concerning its individual, social and emancipatory aims mean that it always has a double aspect of being both (...) utopian and socially grounded at the same time. In general there is a tension within the practice of education between upbringing, on the one hand, and self-emancipation on the other, which is reflected at the level of educational theory in the distinction between normative-utopian and dogmatic-empirical elements. Even a utopian critique, however, must make use of the social and historical materials available in order to function, and thus it becomes itself historically situated. This unavoidable situation is one that must be embraced by a self-consciously utopian form of theorising. Just like other theories of society, the theory of education has two possibilities for self-definition. It can be conceived of either as a utopian or as a factual theory. In the latter case, it follows social contingency passively, giving itself over to the ‘destiny of Being’ in order to await the ‘result’. But it can also be interested and take part in social processes, and thus contribute to the opening out of thought and culture to utopian considerations. Educational critique, even in the utopian sense, however, has to recognise its own dogmatic elements in order to function as critique. It is thus self-evident that critique without dogmatism is not only impossible but also senseless. Similarly, educational dogmatism, although it apparently excludes critique by definition, must contain within itself the possibility of new forms of critique based on its own assumptions. Its very reliance on empirical methods to address the solution of unquestioned problems can itself subvert the dogmatic normative assumptions on which that empirical enquiry is based. (shrink)

Neo-positivism is dead. Let that imperfect designation stand for the project that dominated and defined the philosophy of science, especially in its Anglophone form, during the fifty or so years following the end of the Second World War. While its critics were many,1 its death was slow, and some think still to find a pulse.2 But die it did in the cul-de-sac into which it was led by its own faulty compass.