We prove that all extensions of Heyting Arithmetic with a logic that has the finite frame property possess the de Jongh property.

We prove that all extensions of Heyting Arithmetic with a logic that has the finite frame property possess the de Jongh property.

A theory T is trustworthy iff, whenever a theory U is interpretable in T, then it is faithfully interpretable. In this paper we give a characterization of trustworthiness. We provide a simple proof of Friedman’s Theorem that finitely axiomatized, sequential, consistent theories are trustworthy. We provide an example of a theory whose schematic predicate logic is complete Π20.

The language of the basic logic of proofs extends the usual propositional language by forming sentences of the sort x is a proof of F for any sentence F. In this paper a complete axiomatization for the basic logic of proofs in Heyting Arithmetic HA was found.

This paper is concerned with the logical structure of intuitionistic equality theories. We prove that De Jongh theorem holds for the theory of decidable equality, but uniform De Jongh theorem fails even for the theory of weakly decidable equality. We also show that the theory of weakly decidable equality is the weakest equality theory which enjoys Glivenko theorem.

This paper is a presentation of astatus quæstionis, to wit of the problemof the interpretability logic of all reasonablearithmetical theories.We present both the arithmetical side and themodal side of the question.Dedicated to Dick de Jongh on the occasion of his 60th birthday.

We investigate the logical structure of intuitionistic Kripke-Platek set theory , and show that the first-order logic of is intuitionistic first-order logic IQC.

This paper contains a brief overview of the area of admissible rules with an emphasis on results about intermediate and modal propositional logics. No proofs are given but many references to the literature are provided.

If the Visser rules are admissible for an intermediate logic, they form a basis for the admissible rules of the logic. How to characterize the admissible rules of intermediate logics for which not all of the Visser rules are admissible is not known. In this paper we give a brief overview of results on admissible rules in the context of intermediate logics. We apply these results to some well-known intermediate logics. We provide natural examples of logics for which the Visser (...) rule are derivable, admissible but nonderivable, or not admissible. (shrink)

In this paper we study the modal behavior of Σ‐preservativity, an extension of provability which is equivalent to interpretability for classical superarithmetical theories. We explain the connection between the principles of this logic and some well‐known properties of HA, like the disjunction property and its admissible rules. We show that the intuitionistic modal logic given by the preservativity principles of HA known so far, is complete with respect to a certain class of frames.

In this paper we study the modal behavior of Σ-preservativity, an extension of provability which is equivalent to interpretability for classical superarithmetical theories. We explain the connection between the principles of this logic and some well-known properties of HA, like the disjunction property and its admissible rules. We show that the intuitionistic modal logic given by the preservativity principles of HA known so far, is complete with respect to a certain class of frames.

Rybakov proved that the admissible rules of $\mathsf {IPC}$ are decidable. We give a proof of the same theorem, using the same core idea, but couched in the many notions that have been developed in the mean time. In particular, we illustrate how the argument can be interpreted as using refinements of the notions of exactness and extendibility.

Conventionalism about logic is the view that logical principles hold in virtue of some linguistic conventions. According to explicit conventionalism, these conventions have to be stipulated explicitly. Explicit conventionalism is subject to a famous criticism by Quine, who accused it of leading to an infinite regress. In response to the criticism, several authors have suggested reconstructing conventionalism as implicit in our linguistic behaviour. In this paper, drawing on a distinction from proof theory between derivable and admissible rules, I argue that (...) implicit conventionalism has not been stated in a sufficiently precise way, as it leaves open what one needs to say about admissible yet underivable rules. Moreover, it turns out that this challenge cannot be easily met, and that any attempt to meet the challenge makes conventionalism much less attractive a thesis. (shrink)

The paper is dedicated to the 80th birthday of the outstanding Russian logician A.V. Kuznetsov. It is addressing a history of the ideas and research conducted by him in non-classical and intermediate logics.

In this paper, we show that the predicate logics of consistent extensions of Heyting's Arithmetic plus Church's Thesis with uniqueness condition are complete $\Pi _{2}^{0}$. Similarly, we show that the predicate logic of HA*, i.e. Heyting's Arithmetic plus the Completeness Principle (for HA*) is complete $\Pi _{2}^{0}$. These results extend the known results due to Valery Plisko. To prove the results we adapt Plisko's method to use Tennenbaum's Theorem to prove 'categoricity of interpretations' under certain assumptions.

-/- Provability logic is a modal logic that is used to investigate what arithmetical theories can express in a restricted language about their provability predicates. The logic has been inspired by developments in meta-mathematics such as Gödel’s incompleteness theorems of 1931 and Löb’s theorem of 1953. As a modal logic, provability logic has been studied since the early seventies, and has had important applications in the foundations of mathematics. -/- From a philosophical point of view, provability logic is interesting because (...) the concept of provability in a fixed theory of arithmetic has a unique and non-problematic meaning, other than concepts like necessity and knowledge studied in modal and epistemic logic. Furthermore, provability logic provides tools to study the notion of self-reference. (shrink)