_ Source: _Volume 95, Issue 2, pp 265 - 286 The author argues that when Lichtenberg recommends saying “It is thinking” instead of “I am thinking”, he is not suggesting that thought might be a subjectless occurrence. Lichtenberg’s point is, rather, that we are often the _passive_ subject or medium of our thoughts. The author further argues that Descartes’ _cogito_ argument is not affected by this point, because Descartes does not claim that we must be the active subject of all (...) our thoughts. Moreover, the author suggests that the _cogito_ argument operates with the notion of a qua-object: it consists in the move from “I am thinking” to “I-qua-thinking am”. Seen in this way, the _cogito_ argument by itself leaves entirely open what might be true of me insofar as I am _not_ thinking. (shrink)

Descartes's philosophy of mind does not reduce to the mind-body dualism of his Meditations. Indeed, we can find a certain theory of consciousness scattered throughout his writings; though the term „consciousness‟, understood as phenomenal consciousness, is not part of his vocabulary. His dualistic ontology is a consequence of the conceptual limitations and the metaphysical preconceptions of his time. However, Descartes‟s theory of perception, his concept of „mind‟, his theory of ideas, and his theory of the passions form a sophisticated theory (...) of human experience commensurable with contemporary theories of consciousness. (shrink)