Much has been written about the general moral duty to love one’s neighbors. In this article, I explore the specific application of this moral duty in the work setting. I argue from a secular perspective that individuals have the moral duty to love their stakeholders. Loving one’s stakeholders is an affective valuing of the stake-related values these stakeholders pursue and as such is the real recognition of one’s stakeholders as stakeholders and of oneself as a stakeholder of one’s stakeholders. This (...) moral concept of stakeholder love offers promising contributions to stakeholder theory, leadership theories, and ethical theories in general and business ethics theories in particular. (shrink)

In this paper, I start by suggesting a new definition of empathy. I go on by answering the question of “Who feels empathy?”. I list some examples of people, illustrating how the level of feeling empathy differs from one category of people to another. It’s actually almost everybody who feels empathy: the baby, the good Samaritan and the other two priests, the tax evader, the psychopath, the judges, juries, lawyers, the politician, the bully adolescent, the therapist, etc.… Then I explain, (...) “Why empathy is experienced/felt differently?”, by drawing on some neuroscience data, and some literature in psychology or philosophy along with some personal suggestions or assumptions. Just to mention one plausible data: we know that the human brain is half developed at birth. It takes twelve to fourteen years for the brain to fully develop. And the frontal lobe continues to develop until the third decade of life! I suggest we must attend to these phases of brain development to learn empathy since that is when the plasticity of the brain and the learning kick-in. Hence, the third section of the paper demonstrates “How can we develop an empathic mind/behaviour given the nature of our empathic brain?”: with some supportive research and studies, I justify the statement that “ideally from early age, and all the way up to adulthood, empathy can be learned through nurturing, education, imitation…, through alternative realities such as mindfulness and awareness, and through therapy, memory improvement, training programs, etc.…” In the conclusion, I assert, using some philosophical thoughts and analogies, that a fully developed empathic behaviour, that embraces all three aspects cognitive, affective and compassionate empathy, being the opposite of indifference, is the vehicle to a peaceful, harmonious and just society. (shrink)

Researchers who argue that moral judgment is based on emotions (`emotion-backers') and those who believe that it is based on reasoning and deliberation (`reasoning-backers') have both struggled to account for the notorious moral deviance of incarcerated psychopaths. Emotion-backers, such as Jonathan Haidt, focus on psychopaths' lack of a affect,or defciencies in particular emotions, such as sympathy. Reasoning-backers, such as Lawrence Kohlberg, focus instead on psychopaths' de cient reasoning. Both accounts offer separate descriptions of what goes wrong in the disorder, but (...) neither can fully explain psychopathic moral deviance. The moral account that I built, bridges these accounts in an attempt to better and more fully describe the empirical data available on psychopathic moral judgment. I argue that their judgment is best explained with a dual-process account of moral judgment that incorporates a large system of moral emotions as well as integrates multiple bases of morality, such as concerns of fairness, harm, and purity. It is only by focusing on both the reasoning and emotional de cits in psychopaths that we can begin to understand psychopaths' use of utilitarian reasoning, general population psychopaths, and psychopaths' di erential presence in the prison popu- lation. All of these issues are best described using a dual-process account of moral judgment that incorporates a larger system of moral emotions than other accounts of morality as well as a pluralistic conception of moral foundations. I used psychopaths because their moral deviance can teach us about morality more broadly. By understanding the cognitive processes implicated in the moral judgment of psychopaths, I better explain how moral judgment works in the general population more broadly. My account of moral judgment has both theoretical and practical applications. Theoretically, it o ers a new dual-process paradigm for describing moral behaviour which bridges reasoning-based and emotion-based accounts. This description can explain both the moral deviance of psychopaths as well as, more broadly, moral judgment in non-psychopaths. Additionally, my theory challenges accounts of moral emotion that narrowly focus on speci c emotions, such as guilt or empathy. It in- stead integrates all emotions, including disgust, fear, and sympathy, and links speci c emotions to moral judgments. Practically, my paradigm of moral judgment encourages the development of new moral judgment measurements such as new self-report questionnaires of moral reasoning. According to my research, in order for these tools to accurately measure morality, they need to account for both emotion-based and reasoning-based judgments. (shrink)