For many decades, Duhem has been considered a paradigmatic instrumentalist, and while some commentators have argued against classifying him in this way, it still seems prevalent as an interpretation of his philosophy of science. Yet such a construal bears scant resemblance to the views presented in his own works—so little, indeed, that it might be said to constitute no more than a mere phantom with respect to his actual thought. In this article, we aim to deconstruct this phantom, tracing the (...) sources of the misconceptions surrounding his ideas and pinpointing the sources and/or causes of its proliferation. We subsequently point out and discuss those elements of his philosophy that, taken together, support the view of him as a scientific realist of a sophisticated kind. Finally, we defend our own interpretation of his thought against suggestions to the effect that it is oriented towards neither instrumentalism nor scientific realism. (shrink)

Basic research or fundamental research is distinct from both pure and applied research, in that it is pure research with expected useful results. The existence of basic or fundamental research is problematic, at least for both inductivists and instrumentalists, but also for Popper. Assuming scientific research to be the search for explanatory conjectures and for refutations, and assuming technology to be the search of conjectures and some corroborations, we can easily place basic or fundamental research between science and technology as (...) a part of their overlap. As a bonus, the present view of basic or fundamental research as an overlap explains the specific hardship basic research workers encounter. (shrink)

No presente artigo, procuramos mostrar, por intermédio de numerosos exemplos, que a distinção lógica operada por Pierre Duhem entre a física e a metafísica não impossibilita que, do ponto de vista histórico, o autor reconheça a existência de um entrosamento profícuo a cingir as duas áreas do saber. Distinguimos três níveis possíveis de interação entre a física e a metafísica, porque acreditamos que ele aceita (a) que o físico trabalha constantemente movido por ambições metafísicas não autorizadas pela rigorosa lógica, (b) (...) que os sistemas metafísicos contribuíram para muitos dos progressos das teorias físicas, em especial, para o nascimento da ciência moderna e (c) que podemos identificar tradições metafísicas de pesquisa duradouras que se mostraram mais férteis do que algumas tradições positivas. In this article, we aim to show, by means of several examples, that Pierre Duhem's logical distinction operated by Pierre Duhem between physics and metaphysics does not prevent him, from a historical perspective, recognizing that there can be a fruitful interplay between the two fields of knowledge. We distinguish three possible levels of interaction that we believe Duhem accepts between physics and metaphysics: (a) that the physicist works constantly moved by metaphysical ambitions not authorized by rigorous logic; (b) that the metaphysical systems have contributed to the progress of many physical theories and, especially, to the birth of modern science, and; (c) that we can identify long-lasting metaphysical traditions of research which have shown themselves to be more fertile than the positivist traditions. (shrink)