- No practical reasons for belief: the epistemic significance of practical considerations.Hamid Vahid - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-18.details
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A Reverse Interpretation Model of Testimony.Hamid Vahid - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):85-102.details
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Knowledge without credit, exhibit 4: Extended cognition. [REVIEW]Krist Vaesen - 2011 - Synthese 181 (3):515-529.details
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Evidence of factive norms of belief and decision.John Turri - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):4009-4030.details
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Reasons for action and reasons for belief.Christopher Tollefsen - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):55 – 65.details
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The Level-Splitting View and the Non-Akrasia Constraint.Marco Tiozzo - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):917-923.details
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Explaining Higher-order Defeat.Marco Tiozzo - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (3):453-469.details
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Is panpsychism simple?Henry Taylor - 2019 - Analysis 79 (2):265-275.details
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Truth promoting non-evidential reasons for belief.Brian Talbot - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):599-618.details
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The illusion of discretion.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1635-1665.details
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Epistemic instrumentalism, permissibility, and reasons for belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press. pp. 260-280.details
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An Instrumentalist Account of How to Weigh Epistemic and Practical Reasons for Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1071-1094.details
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A Bayesian Approach to Absent Evidence Reasoning.Christopher Lee Stephens - 2011 - Informal Logic 31 (1):56-65.details
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Epistemic duties and failure to understand one’s evidence.Scott Stapleford - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (1):147-177.details
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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On the Relationship Between Belief and Acceptance of Evolution as Goals of Evolution Education.Mike U. Smith & Harvey Siegel - 2016 - Science & Education 25 (5-6):473-496.details
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Knowledge, Justification and Normative Coincidence1.Martin Smith - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):273-295.details
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The epistemic normativity of conjecture.Mona Simion - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (11):3447-3471.details
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Telepresence and Trust: a Speech-Act Theory of Mediated Communication.Thomas W. Simpson - 2017 - Philosophy and Technology 30 (4):443-459.details
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Saying and believing: the norm commonality assumption.Mona Simion - 2018 - Philosophical Studies:1-16.details
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Epistemic Norm Correspondence and the Belief–Assertion Parallel.Mona Simion - 2018 - Analysis:any048.details
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Truth, Thinking, Testimony and Trust: Alvin Goldman on Epistemology and Education.Harvey Siegel - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):345-366.details
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Epistemology and Education: An Incomplete Guide to the Social-Epistemological Issues.Harvey Siegel - 2004 - Episteme 1 (2):129-137.details
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The Nought Belief Paradox.Nicholas Shackel - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):523-529.details
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Pseudoscience and Idiosyncratic Theories of Rational Belief.Nicholas Shackel - 2013 - In M. Pigliucci & M. Boudry (eds.), Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem. University of Chicago Press. pp. 417-438.details
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Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?Nathaniel P. Sharadin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):1-19.details
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Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?Nathaniel P. Sharadin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):343-361.details
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The will and evidence toward belief: A critical essay on Jonathan E. Adler's belief's own ethics.Nathan Segars - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):79 – 91.details
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The fundamental reason for reasons fundamentalism.Mark Schroeder - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3107-3127.details
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The cognitive act and the first-person perspective: an epistemology for constructive type theory.Maria van der Schaar - 2011 - Synthese 180 (3):391 - 417.details
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Strong knowledge, weak belief?Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8741-8753.details
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Practical reasoning and degrees of outright belief.Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8069-8090.details
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Können wir uns entscheiden, etwas zu glauben? Zur Möglichkeit und Unmöglichkeit eines doxastischen Willens.Sebastian Schmidt - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (4):571-582.details
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Intending is Believing: A Defense of Strong Cognitivism.Berislav Marušić & John Schwenkler - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):309-340.details
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Bullshit, Truth, and Reason.Eldar Sarajlic - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):865-879.details
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Hedging and the ignorance norm on inquiry.Yasha Sapir & Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5837-5859.details
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Elusive Externalism.Bernhard Salow - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):397-427.details
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Beyond words: Communication, truthfulness, and understanding.Patrick Rysiew - 2007 - Episteme 4 (3):285-304.details
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Problems for factive accounts of assertion.Sven Rosenkranz - 2023 - Noûs 57 (1):128-143.details
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Reasons to Not Believe (and Reasons to Act).Blake Roeber - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):439-48.details
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Evidence, Judgment, and Belief at Will.Blake Roeber - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):837-859.details
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Anti-Intellectualism.Blake Roeber - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):437-466.details
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Believing for Practical Reasons.Susanna Rinard - 2018 - Noûs (4):763-784.details
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Distribution and ignorance.Juha Räikkä - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):2641-2657.details
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Why epistemologists are so down on their luck.Wayne Riggs - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):329 - 344.details
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Epistemic Akrasia.Brian Ribeiro - 2011 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (1):18-25.details
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We Are Not All ‘Self-Blind’: A Defense of a Modest Introspectionism.Georges Rey - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (3):259-285.details
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We Are Not All ‘Self-Blind’: A Defense of a Modest Introspectionism.R. E. Y. Georges - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (3):259-285.details
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Justification as the appearance of knowledge.Steven L. Reynolds - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):367-383.details
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Epistemic and dialectical regress.Michael Rescorla - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):43 – 60.details
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