- Are Epistemic Reasons Ever Reasons to Promote?Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (3):353-360.details
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Cut-off points for the rational believer.Lina Maria Lissia - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-19.details
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Inconvenient Truth and Inductive Risk in Covid-19 Science.Eli I. Lichtenstein - 2022 - Philosophy of Medicine 3 (1):1-25.details
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Assertion, practical reason, and pragmatic theories of knowledge.Janet Levin - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):359–384.details
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Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):345-361.details
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Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.details
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Group Assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (1):21-42.details
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Acting on knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):361-382.details
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Assertion and Expertise.Jennifer Lackey - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):509-517.details
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The norm of assertion: Empirical data.Markus Kneer - 2018 - Cognition 177 (C):165-171.details
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The ‘extendedness’ of scientific evidence.Eric Kerr & Axel Gelfert - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):253-281.details
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The C account of assertion: a negative result.Christoph Kelp & Mona Simion - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):125-137.details
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Not Without Justification.Christoph Kelp - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):581-595.details
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No Justification for Lottery Losers.Christoph Kelp - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (2):205-217.details
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Assertion: A Function First Account.Christoph Kelp - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):411-442.details
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Language without information exchange.Jessica Keiser - 2020 - Mind and Language 37 (1):22-37.details
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Autonomy, agency, and the value of enduring beliefs.Jason Kawall - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):pp. 107-129.details
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Two Conceptions of Weight of Evidence in Peirce’s Illustrations of the Logic of Science.Jeff Kasser - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):629-648.details
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Shedding Dialectical Tiers: A Social-Epistemic View. [REVIEW]Jonathan E. Adler - 2004 - Argumentation 18 (3):279-293.details
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The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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A Permissivist Defense of Pascal’s Wager.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2315-2340.details
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Uniqueness, Rationality, and the Norm of Belief.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):57-75.details
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Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.details
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Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.details
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Transparency and the ethics of belief.Christopher Howard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1191-1201.details
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Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.details
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If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It.Grace Helton - 2018 - Noûs 54 (3):501-526.details
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Iteration Principles in Epistemology I: Arguments For.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (11):754-764.details
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Inclusiveness in the face of anticipated disagreement.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2013 - Synthese 190 (7):1189-1207.details
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Access externalism.John Gibbons - 2006 - Mind 115 (457):19-39.details
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Discursive justification and skepticism.Mikkel Gerken - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):373-394.details
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Indefensible middle ground for local reductionism about testimony.Axel Gelfert - 2009 - Ratio 22 (2):170-190.details
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Belief’s minimal rationality.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3263-3282.details
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The rationality of eating disorders.Stephen Gadsby - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (3):732-749.details
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Group Identity, Deliberative Democracy and Diversity in Education.Sheron Fraser-Burgess - 2012 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 44 (5):480-499.details
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Agency of belief and intention.A. K. Flowerree - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2763-2784.details
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Autoengaño y voluntarismo doxástico.Gustavo Fernández Acevedo - 2018 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 57:139-160.details
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On the generality argument for the knowledge norm.Davide Fassio - 2018 - Synthese:1-22.details
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Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence.Davide Fassio & Jie Gao - 2020 - Theoria 86 (4):500-527.details
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Moral Judgments, Cognitivism and the Dispositional Nature of Belief: Why Moral Peer Intransigence is Intelligible.John Eriksson & Marco Tiozzo - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (4):1753-1766.details
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Does legal epistemology rest on a mistake? On fetishism, two‐tier system design, and conscientious fact‐finding.David Enoch, Talia Fisher & Levi Spectre - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):85-103.details
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True enough.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):113–131.details
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Epistemic internalism and testimonial justification.Jonathan Egeland - 2020 - Episteme 17 (4):458-474.details
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Truth and Consequences: When Is It Rational to Accept Falsehoods?Taner Edis & Maarten Boudry - 2019 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 19 (1-2):147-169.details
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Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do.Julien Dutant & Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3755-3772.details
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The Lottery Paradox and the Pragmatics of Belief.Igor Douven - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):351-373.details
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The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal.Igor Douven - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):204-225.details
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