This paper pursues the philosophical significance of a relatively unexplored point of Platonic aesthetics: the social dimension of beauty. The social dimension of beauty resides in its conceptual connection to shame and honour. This dimension of beauty is fundamental to the aesthetic education of the Republic, as becoming virtuous for Plato presupposes a desire to appear and to be admired as beautiful. The ethical significance of beauty, shame, and honour redound to an ethically rich notion of appearing before others which (...) corresponds to a public conception of virtue. I suggest how this dimension of beauty in Plato – particularly the emphasis on beautification – proves fruitful for reconsidering the scope and the nature of aesthetic experience. (shrink)

In Nicomachean Ethics II 4 Aristotle famously raises a puzzle concerning moral habituation, and he seems to dissolve it by recourse to the analogy between moral virtue and skills. A new interpretation of the chapter is offered on the basis of an important evaluative dissimilarity then noted by Aristotle, one almost universally disregarded by interpreters of the chapter. I elucidate the nature of the dissimilarity in question and argue for its paramount importance for understanding Aristotle’s conception of moral agency. I (...) also show that it is the particularly intricate and puzzling character of the chapter that has prevented scholars from noticing such a dissimilarity and from integrating it to the interpretation of the chapter. (shrink)

Shame is by and large dichotomized into hrī and apatrāpya in the Buddhist context. In the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra scholasticism, both hrī and apatrāpya are subsumed under the wholesome states. In this paper, firstly, previous studies and the etymologies of the two terms above will be closely reviewed; secondly, the exposition and contrast of hrī and apatrāpya between the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra will be minutely contextualized; thirdly, the merit of possessing dichotomized states of shame will be thoroughly investigated. Central to (...) my research is a glimpse of the scholastic Indian Buddhist sophistication, exemplified by two kinds of shame, as well as the initial consideration of hrī and apatrāpya in the context of shame, guilt, and conscience in the Anglophone philosophy, while also taking their association with Buddhist morality and concentration into account. (shrink)

Within the space of a few years, the idea of Responsible Research and Innovation, and its acronym RRI, catapulted from an obscure phrase to the topic of conferences and attempts to specify and realize it. How did this come about, and against which backdrop? What are the dynamics at present, and what do these imply for the future of RRI as a discourse, and as a patchwork of practices? It is a social innovation which creates opening in existing divisions of (...) moral labour, a notion that is explained with the help of the history of responsibility language. It is filled in for the present situation and ongoing developments. Some elements may stabilize and this creates a path into the future. There will be reductions of the originally open-ended innovation, some productive, others less so. This is a reason to regularly inquire into the value of the reductions and the directions the path is taking. (shrink)

This paper examines whether Socrates provides his interlocutors with good reasons to seek knowledge of what virtue is, reasons that they are in a position to appreciate. I argue that in the Laches he does provide such reasons, but they are not the reasons that are most commonly identified as Socratic. Socrates thinks his interlocutors should be motivated not by the idea that virtue is knowledge nor by the idea that knowledge is good for its own sake, but rather by (...) the idea that knowledge is needed to recognize what to aim at. His argument reaches the potentially life-altering conclusion that we should all seek knowledge of what virtue is. It is powerful precisely because it relies on uncontroversial premises that his interlocutors could be expected to accept. In laying out this argument, I distinguish different ways in which someone could count as a teacher of virtue. At the end of the article, I situate the argument within the debate about whether virtue is teachable. (shrink)

La filosofía política platónica está atravesada por una marcada preocupación epistemológica, sobre cuya base Platón adopta el así llamado “intelectualismo socrático”, lo cual implica un rechazo tajante del actuar incontinente o _akrasía_. En el presente trabajo intentaremos mostrar que el propio Platón llevó adelante una revisión de dicha posición, ante todo debido a un cambio profundo en su concepción de la naturaleza humana en el diálogo _Leyes_.

The challenge from the sophists with whom Plato is confronted is: Who can prove that the just man without power is happy whereas the unjust man with power is not? This challenge concerns the basic issue of politics: the relationship between justice and happiness. Will the unjust man gain the exceptional happiness of the strong by abusing his power and by injustice? The gist of Plato’s reply is to speak not of justice but of intrinsic justice, i.e., the strength of (...) virtue which, in his account, is the fundamental good of man. Nevertheless, many contend that intrinsic justice is actually injustice, for the division of power in the state is undemocratic while in the soul, the suppression of desire by the reason. Plato’s advocacy of hierarchical, elite political system has enraged democrats, while his idea of philosopher king has enraged the aristocrats as well. So, who will appreciate Plato’s effort? (shrink)

From earliest times, Homer was regarded as an authority in education, and in shaping social and political life. For Homer in Iliad and Odyssey describes the dominant values, moral virtues of the Greek culture via its heroes. In fact, this narration has opened the way for him to be regarded as the first teacher of the Greeks. His most famous students are Achilles and Telemachus. He talks about Achilles’ education in Iliad, Telemachus’ in Odyssey through his teachers. But the education (...) of these two heroes is both similar and different in some ways. From the moment Achilles was born, he knows the values of the class he belongs to, who he is. On the contrary, Telemachus as a child without a father does not know who he is. Yet, their education which is centered around not only words but also deeds, makes these two heroes know what to say and what to do. In the end, they gain the honor of becoming a Homeric hero. So the aim of this paper is to elaborate both different and similar educations of these heroes. (shrink)

Meleagro pertenece a la generación previa a la de los héroes homéricos. In- tervino en la cacería del jabalí de Calidón, episodio contemporáneo a otras grandes empresas como la expedición de los Argonautas o la cruzada contra Tebas. Posee una particularidad que lo diferencia del resto de sus compañeros y que consiste en que su destino se halla ligado a un objeto externo a él. Este concepto denominado por Frazer “alma externada” es frecuente en las cultu- ras primitivas, pero poco (...) común en la mitología griega. Su heroica figura ha sido conservada en antiguas cerámicas y su historia, utilizada como argumento ejemplar en fuentes de épocas diferentes. En el presente trabajo veremos cómo Meleagro es evocado en el discurso de Fénix en el Canto IX de la Ilíada, vv. 496-605 y en la Oda V de Baquílides, vv. 56-175 y cómo, a pesar de que coinci- den en utilizar el mito con un propósito aleccionador, el mensaje principal con sus presupuestos morales y religiosos se adecua a contextos diferentes. (shrink)