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  1. Fodorian semantics: A reply to Adams and Aizawa. [REVIEW]Ted A. Warfield - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (2):205-14.
    In a recent article in this journal (Adams and Aizawa 1992), Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa argued that Jerry Fodor's proposed naturalistic sufficient condition for meaning is unsatisfactory. In this paper, I respond to Adams and Aizawa, noting that (1) they have overestimated the importance of their “pathologies” objection, perhaps as a consequence of misunderstanding Fodor's asymmetric dependency condition, (2) they have misunderstood Fodor's asymmetric dependency condition in formulating their Twin Earth objection, and (3) they have, in addition to under (...)
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  • The cure for the cure: Networking the extended mind.Michele Merritt - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (4):463 - 485.
    The hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC), or the claim that cognitive processes are not entirely organism-bound and can extend into the world, has received a barrage of criticism. Likewise, defenders of HEC have responded and even retreated into more moderate positions. In this paper, I trace the debate, rehearsing what I take to be the three strongest cases against HEC: nonderived content, causally natural kinds, and informational integration. I then argue that so far, the replies have been unsatisfactory, mainly because (...)
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  • A dilemma for asymmetric dependence.Joseph Mendola - 2003 - Noûs 37 (2):232-257.
    Accounts of mental content rooted in asymmetric dependence hold, crudely speaking, that the content of a mental representation is the cause of that representation on which all its other causes depend.1 To speak somewhat less crudely, such accounts, hereafter.
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  • Why Fodor’s Theory of Concepts Fails.Jussi Jylkkä - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (1):25-46.
    Fodor’s theory of concepts holds that the psychological capacities, beliefs or intentions which determine how we use concepts do not determine reference. Instead, causal relations of a specific kind between properties and our dispositions to token a concept are claimed to do so. Fodor does admit that there needs to be some psychological mechanisms mediating the property–concept tokening relations, but argues that they are purely accidental for reference. In contrast, I argue that the actual mechanisms that sustain the reference determining (...)
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  • Lloyd's dialectical theory of representation.Kenneth Aizawa - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (1):1-24.
    This is a critique of Lloyd's theory which appeared in his book, Simple Minds.
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  • 'X' means X: Fodor/warfield semantics. [REVIEW]Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (2):215-31.
    In an earlier paper, we argued that Fodorian Semantics has serious difficulties. However, we suggested possible ways that one might attempt to fix this. Ted Warfield suggests that our arguments can be deflected and he does this by making the very moves that we suggested. In our current paper, we respond to Warfield's attempts to revise and defend Fodorian Semantics against our arguments that such a semantic theory is both too strong and too weak. To get around our objections, Warfield (...)
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  • "X" means X: Fodor/Warfield semantics.Fred Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (2):215-231.
    In an earlier paper, we argued that Fodorian Semantics has serious difficulties. However, we suggested possible ways that one might attempt to fix this. Ted Warfield suggests that our arguments can be deflected and he does this by making the very moves that we suggested. In our current paper, we respond to Warfield's attempts to revise and defend Fodorian Semantics against our arguments that such a semantic theory is both too strong and too weak. To get around our objections, Warfield (...)
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  • Fodorian semantics, pathologies, and "Block's problem".Fred Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 1993 - Minds and Machines 3 (1):97-104.
    In two recent books, Jerry Fodor has developed a set of sufficient conditions for an object “X” to non-naturally and non-derivatively mean X. In an earlier paper we presented three reasons for thinking Fodor's theory to be inadequate. One of these problems we have dubbed the “Pathologies Problem”. In response to queries concerning the relationship between the Pathologies Problem and what Fodor calls “Block's Problem”, we argue that, while Block's Problem does not threatenFodor's view, the Pathologies Problem does.
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  • Queering Cognition: Extended Minds and Sociotechnologically Hybridized Gender.Michele Merritt - unknown
    In the last forty years, significant developments in neuroscience, psychology, and robotic technology have been cause for major trend changes in the philosophy of mind. One such shift has been the reallocation of focus from entirely brain-centered theories of mind to more embodied, embedded, and even extended answers to the questions, what are cognitive processes and where do we find such phenomena? Given that hypotheses such as Clark and Chalmers‘ (1998) Extended Mind or Hutto‘s (2006) Radical Enactivism, systematically undermine the (...)
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  • Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Cognitive Contact.Christopher A. Young - unknown
    Part 1 of the thesis questions the traditional relation model of intentionality. After fixing reference on the target phenomenon, intentionality, and explaining my interest in it, I ask what sorts of things intentionality might be a relation to. I consider ordinary objects, properties, propositions and hybrid views, and conclude all make the intentional relation appear rather mysterious. From there, I move on to examine the relation view’s most prominent proponents, the tracking theorists—pointing out some challenges such views face, and concluding (...)
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