This book has been written as a basic introduction to the Muslim Philosophy. It comprises of some fundamental philosophical problems on which Muslim Philosophy is based upon. Muslim Philosophy is the philosophical study of interpretations and knowledge derived from the Quran, the Hadiths and other significant sources of teachings of Islam. Among these, Quran is the divine source of philosophy which explains the different aspects of world and guides to the true knowledge. Muslim Philosophy is the philosophy which discusses the (...) fundamental problems of the world like existence, universals, mind, thought, language, God, world, soul, reality, knowledge and values. However, these problems or questions demand answers from the philosophers’ attitudes and points of view which are highlighted in this book at a beginner’s level. It is also a matter of fact that these problems or issues could not be answered through other ways. The need of the hour is that the philosophical ways, Islamic principles and methods distinguish these matters of facts from other disciplines. So, this book is helpful for undergraduate, postgraduate, and multidisciplinary scholars and thinkers interested in studying the basics of the Muslim Philosophy. It is also a valuable source for those who are just interested in acquiring knowledge in the field of Muslim Philosophy. This work shall guide them to understand the basic principles of Islamic Philosophy. The most notable Muslim Philosophers who are mentioned in this book are: Al-Kindi, Al-Gazali, Ibn Rushd, Al-Farabi, Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi, Ibn-Arabi, Sheikh Nurrudin Wali (Nund-Reshi), Ibn Tayamiyya, Ibn-Sina, Shah Waliullah, Hamza Makhdhoomi, Allama Iqbal and Lal Ded. Furthermore, a few other important concepts of philosophy that have been mentioned in this book are Mutazalism, Asharism, Sufism and Articles of Faith. (shrink)

Ibn Sīnā's celestial kinematics represents an important aspect of his cosmology but has up to now received little attention in the secondary literature. After a short overview of some key features of his cosmology, this article attempts to clarify the role played by the separate intellects, the celestial souls, and the celestial bodies in causing celestial motion. It challenges the common view that Ibn Sīnā adhered to the theory of ten separate intellects developed by al-Fārābī and attempts to reconstruct his (...) astronomical-metaphysical model on the basis of his main philosophical works. In addition, the article addresses the thorny question of how motion is transmitted from the intellectual to the physical plane, and it sheds light on the place of physics, metaphysics, and astronomy in Ibn Sīnā's cosmological method. Résumé La théorie avicenienne du mouvement des orbes célestes représente un aspect important de sa cosmologie qui n'a cependant pas encore été l'objet d'une étude approfondie. Cet article compte combler ce manque en fournissant une analyse des différents principes à l'origine du mouvement céleste, ainsi qu'une réflexion sur le rôle des disciplines astronomique, physique, et métaphysique dans les explications que fournit Ibn Sīnā à ce sujet. L'accent est mis sur le rapport des intelligences aux orbes et sur la problématique du passage de l'intellectif au physique, un moment charnière dans la cinématique avicenienne. En outre, l'étude remet en question l'adhésion d'Ibn Sīnā à la théorie farabienne des dix intelligences et entreprend une reconstitution de son modèle cosmologique. (shrink)

Translated from: W.V.O.Quine, W. H. O. (1986): Philosophy of Logic. Second Edition. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 47-61.

A discussion of the different ways in which the Islamicate philosophical tradition has been characterized and categorized in Anglo-European scholarship.

This thesis is concerned with answering the question, what is the central argument of Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing that brings its opening ontological approach to the subject of first philosophy to its ultimate theological goal and conclusion? This dissertation contends that it is the function of the fundamental scientific first principles of metaphysics, and in particular the fundamental primary notion necessary, to provide the intelligible link that Avicenna employs to demonstrate the existence and true-nature of the divine necessary existence (...) in itself on the basis of his doctrine of being. This conclusion is pursued through a systematic and cumulative line of inquiry that begins in Part I with Avicenna’s logical–cum–epistemological doctrine of conceptualization and assent, the heuristic order of the basic scientific questions, and his theory of a demonstrative science. The thesis then moves from the wider concentric circles concerned with logical matters into a series of narrowing concentric circles pertaining to the scientific order of the MH. Part II presents a close analysis of the Metaphysics of the Healing’s novel reception and reorganization of Aristotelian metaphysics according to Avicenna’s theory of demonstrative science, which consists in a subject, scientific first principles, and objects of inquiry that includes the species, proper accidents, and the science’s ultimate goal which is the aitiological–cum–theological inquiry into the causes of being. Part III transitions into a still narrower set of concentric circles that provide a detailed explication of the formal and material aspects of the scientific first principles of the Metaphysics of the Healing. Finally, the main argument of the thesis reaches the central point and question of the dissertation in Part IV, which establishes the fundamentality of the primary notion the necessary in the ontology, aitiology, and theology of the Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing. Part IV concludes that the principal function of the fundamental primary notion the necessary is to provide the intelligible link that connects Avicenna’s doctrine of being with the divine necessary existence in itself. (shrink)

In my thesis, I aim to develop a systematic and philosophically coherent thesis of ultimate reality for Ibn Arabi. In this pursuit, I adopt the style of analytic philosophy, seeking to employ and utilise some of its methods and theories. The philosophical aspects of Ibn Arabi’s doctrine are in dire need of conceptual clarification and systematic analysis with a closer focus on argumentation. The analytic tradition will prove most helpful in this regard. In my thesis, I begin by tracing Ibn (...) Arabi’s related views and concepts as they are dispersed throughout his writings. I then clarify, sharpen and, in many cases, develop these views and concepts into fully constructed forms. Finally, I weave the developed concepts and views into a systematic thesis or set of sub-theses. Where necessary, I provide my own arguments and concepts to help substantiate and strengthen the structure of Ibn Arabi’s thesis. I propose that Ibn Arabi’s various, and sometimes apparently inconsistent, views are best presented in terms of three main concepts: the concept of ultimate reality as existence, which has long been known as Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence ; the concept of ultimate reality as the Divine Self ; and the concept of ultimate reality as God. The three concepts neither represent different ultimate realities nor different perspectives of the same ultimate reality. Instead, they represent the same ultimate reality but each one has its own unique scope and encompassment. The three concepts are aimed at encompassing Ibn Arabi’s various views and concepts of ultimate reality in a consistent and systematic manner. (shrink)

I reconstruct and analyze al-Ghazali’s arguments defending a plurality of real divine attributes in The Incoherence of the Philosophers. I show that one of these arguments can be made to engage with and defend Jeffrey E. Brower and Michael C. Rea’s “Numerical Sameness Without Identity” model of the Trinity. To that end, I provide some background on the metaphysical commitments at play in al-Ghazali’s arguments.

آیت‌الله جوادی آملی از جمله اندیشمندان مسلمانی است که هیچ‌یک از تقریرهای برهان وجودی فیلسوفان غربی و مسلمان را نمی‌پذیرد و آن‌ها را نوعی مغالطه می‌داند؛ وی همانند منتقدان غربی این برهان، معتقد است که از هیچ مفهومی، حتی مفهوم خدا یا واجب الوجود، نمی‌‌‌توان وجود خارجی آن را نتیجه گرفت. وی این انتقاد را با مفاهیم فلسفۀ اسلامی توضیح می‌‌‌‌دهد و اشکال اصلی این برهان را در خلط حمل اولی ذاتی و شایع صناعی می‌‌‌داند. انتقاد دیگر استاد جوادی به (...) این برهان این است که بر اساس این برهان ما باید از مفهوم شریک الباری هم، وجود آن را نتیجه بگیریم، چراکه در مفهوم شرک الباری نیز، تمام صفات خدا، مانند وجوب وجود و کمال مطلق، گنجانده شده است. این مقاله به بررسی دیدگاه وی دربارۀ برهان وجودی و انتقادات او به این برهان می‌‌‌‌پردازد. (shrink)