One of the major concerns of advocates of common morality is that respect for cultural diversity may result in moral relativism. On their part, proponents of culturally responsive bioethics are concerned that common morality may result in moral imperialism because of the asymmetry of power in the world. It is in this context that critics argue that global bioethics is impossible because of the difficulties to address these two theoretical concerns. In this paper, I argue that global bioethics is possible (...) if we adopt a culturally responsive and self-critical attitude towards our moral values and those of others. I use the example of women’s reproductive autonomy in indigenous African culture to show that the difference between the leading Euro-American and indigenous African construal of autonomy is that the former ascribes greater weight on individual self-determination while the latter emphasizes responsibilities towards the community. One develops dignity in virtue of their capacity for communing with others. Hence, women have rights, but as members of the community, they also have obligations including the duty to procreate. The involvement of the family in reproductive decisions does not contravene women’s dignity and human rights. In applying the principle of autonomy in this communitarian context, one has to be sensitive to these ontological and moral specificities. The aim of global bioethics should not be to reach common grounds at all costs; any common norms should be the result of a negotiated democratic dialogue between cultures and not the result of imposition by the preponderant culture. (shrink)

Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, The Australian National University, LPO Box 8260, ANU, Canberra ACT 2601, Australia. Email: michael.selgelid{at}anu.edu.au ' + u + '@ ' + d + ' '/ /- ->. Home page: http: //www.cappe.edu.au/staff/michael-selgelid.htmThis article advocates the development of a moderate pluralist theory of political philosophy that recognizes that utility, liberty and equality are legitimate, independent social values and that none should have absolute priority over the others. Inter alia, such a theory would provide a principled (...) means for striking a balance, or making trade-offs, between these values in cases of conflict. Recent developments in public health ethics have made progress in thinking about how to make trade-offs between liberty and utility in particular. While public health ethicists often claim that the least restrictive alternative should be used to achieve the public health goal in question, I argue that a plausible but under-recognized idea is that the least restrictive alternative might sometimes involve improvement of global health via redistributive taxation—i.e., rather than coercive social distancing measures. I conclude by demonstrating that the proportionality principle leaves open the question of when exactly utility outweighs liberty or vice versa—and I argue that, rather than speaking about the morality of liberty-infringing public health interventions in categorical/binary terms, it would be more fruitful and realistic to think and speak about the degree to which a liberty-infringing public health intervention is morally appropriate. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Organ trafficking is officially banned in several countries and by the main Nephrology Societies. However, this practice is widespread and is allowed or tolerated in many countries, hence, in the absence of a universal law, the caregiver may be asked for advice, placing him/her in a difficult balance between legal aspects, moral principles and ethical judgments.In spite of the Istanbul declaration, which is a widely shared position statement against organ trafficking, the controversy on mercenary organ donation is still open and (...) some experts argue against taking a negative stance. In the absence of clear evidence showing the clinical disadvantages of mercenary transplantation compared to chronic dialysis, self-determination of the patient may conflict with other ethical principles, first of all non-maleficence. The present paper was drawn up with the participation of the students, as part of the ethics course at our medical school. It discusses the situation in which the physician acts as a counselor for the patient in the way of a sort of “reverse” informed consent, in which the patient asks advice regarding a complex personal decision, and includes a peculiar application of the four principles to the donor and recipient parties. (shrink)

Background: The four principles of Beauchamp and Childress - autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice - havebeen extremely influential in the field of medical ethics, and are fundamental for understanding the currentapproach to ethical assessment in health care. This study tests whether these principles can be quantitativelymeasured on an individual level, and then subsequently if they are used in the decision making process whenindividuals are faced with ethical dilemmas. Methods: The Analytic Hierarchy Process was used as a tool for the measurement (...) of the principles. Four scenarios, whichinvolved conflicts between the medical ethical principles, were presented to participants and they madejudgments about the ethicality of the action in the scenario, and their intentions to act in the same manner if theywere in the situation. Results: Individual preferences for these medical ethical principles can be measured using the Analytic HierarchyProcess. This technique provides a useful tool in which to highlight individual medical ethical values. Onaverage individuals have a significant preference for non-maleficence over the other principles, however, andperhaps counter-intuitively, this preference does not seem to relate to applied ethical judgements in specificethical dilemmas. Conclusions: People state they value these medical ethical principles but they do not actually seem to use them directly in thedecision making process. The reasons for this are explained through the lack of a behavioural model to accountfor the relevant situational factors not captured by the principles. The limitations of the principles in predictingethical decision making are discussed. (shrink)

In this article, we use the principlist approach to identify, analyse and attempt to solve the ethical problem raised by a pregnant woman's request for cesarean delivery in absence of medical indications.We use two different types of premises: factual (facts about cesarean delivery and specifically attitudes of obstetricians as derived from the EUROBS European study) and value premises (principles of beneficence and non-maleficence, respect for autonomy and justice).Beneficence/non-maleficence entails physicians' responsibility to minimise harms and maximise benefits. Avoiding its inherent risks (...) makes a prima facie case against cesarean section without medical indication. However, as vaginal delivery can have unintended consequences, there is a need to balance the somewhat dissimilar risks and benefits. The principle of autonomy poses a challenge in case of disagreement between the pregnant woman and the physician. Improved communication aimed to enable better informed choice may overcome some instances of disagreement. The principle of justice prohibits unfair discrimination, and broadly favours optimising resource utilisation.Available evidence supports vaginal birth in uncomplicated term pregnancies as the standard of care. The principlist approach offered a useful framework for ethical analysis of cesarean delivery on maternal request, identified the rights and duties of those involved, and helped reach a conclusion, although conflict at the individual level may remain challenging. (shrink)

In this article, we use the principlist approach to identify, analyse and attempt to solve the ethical problem raised by a pregnant woman's request for cesarean delivery in absence of medical indications. We use two different types of premises: factual and value premises. Beneficence/non-maleficence entails physicians' responsibility to minimise harms and maximise benefits. Avoiding its inherent risks makes a prima facie case against cesarean section without medical indication. However, as vaginal delivery can have unintended consequences, there is a need to (...) balance the somewhat dissimilar risks and benefits. The principle of autonomy poses a challenge in case of disagreement between the pregnant woman and the physician. Improved communication aimed to enable better informed choice may overcome some instances of disagreement. The principle of justice prohibits unfair discrimination, and broadly favours optimising resource utilisation. Available evidence supports vaginal birth in uncomplicated term pregnancies as the standard of care. The principlist approach offered a useful framework for ethical analysis of cesarean delivery on maternal request, identified the rights and duties of those involved, and helped reach a conclusion, although conflict at the individual level may remain challenging. (shrink)

The four principles approach to biomedical ethics points to respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice as the norms that should guide moral agents working in the biosciences, and particularly in health care. While the approach is well known, it is not without its critics. In this paper, which is primarily aimed at health professionals and students (from various disciplines) who are studying health care ethics, I consider four problems with the four principles, which respectively claim that the approach is (...) imperialist, inapplicable, inconsistent and inadequate. In keeping with the aims of the ‘five-minute focus’, the primary objective is to introduce these debates, rather than seek to resolve them. However, I will suggest that the approach does have its merits, not least for time-pressed clinicians who are keen to keep an eye on the ethical dimensions of their practices, and for students training in the health care professions, provided that they appreciate that the approach provides only a starting point for, and not the end point of, moral deliberation. (shrink)

The provision of health care service in resource-poor settings is associated with a broad set of ethical issues. Devakumar's case discusses the ethical issues related to the inability to treat in a cholera clinic patients who do not have cholera. This paper gives a closer look on the context in which Devakumar's case took place. It also analyses the potential local and organizational factors that gives rise to ethical dilemmas and aggravate them. It also proposes a framework to help in (...) the proactive handling of the factors that leads to ethical dilemmas and resolving the ethical issues as they appear. It adopts the four principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice as universal and prima facie principles, but with the inclusion of a local understanding of what of each of these principles means. It is based on a collaborative approach that involves the beneficiaries and other partners in the field to help share information and resources, as well as adopting the provision of a wider service to the whole community. This is done by asking three basic questions: (a) who are the relevant stakeholders? (b) what ought to be the ethical principles in place? and (c) how should we take, implement and follow the decision about service provision? (shrink)

This paper aims to critique the phenomenon of advanced patient autonomy and choice in healthcare within the specific context of self-testing devices. A growing number of self-testing medical devices are currently available for home use. The premise underpinning many of these devices is that they assist individuals to be more autonomous in the assessment and management of their health. Increased patient autonomy is assumed to be a good thing. We take issue with this assumption and argue that self-testing provides a (...) specific example how increased patient autonomy and choice within healthcare might not best serve the patient population. We propose that current interpretations of autonomy in healthcare are based on negative accounts of liberty to the detriment of a more relational understanding. We also propose that Kantian philosophy is often applied to the healthcare arena in an inappropriate manner. We draw on the philosophical literature and examples from the self-testing process to support these claims. We conclude by offering an alternative account of autonomy based on the interrelated concepts of relationality, care and responsibility. (shrink)

In this paper I provide a critique of a set of assumptions relating to agency, choice and the legitimacy of actions impacting health that can be seen in some approaches to health promotion. After a brief discussion about the definition of health promotion, I outline two contrasting approaches to this area of health care practice. The first is focused on the provision of information and the second is concerned with seeking to change people’s preferences in a particular way. It has (...) been argued by a number of critics of health promotion that only the first approach is ethical, as it is for individuals to make their own lifestyle choices and adopt their own conception of the good life. I argue against this ‘information’ approach to health promotion on two grounds. First, I suggest that given the aims of health promotion, the provision of information is, as a matter of fact, of limited effectiveness in achieving these aims. Second, I argue that we have good reasons to question the appropriateness of respecting many of the preferences that individuals happen to have, given the origins and quality of such preferences. I then go on to argue, that by contrast we have good reasons to focus on changing at least some of the preferences that people have related to their lifestyle choices. This involves a commitment to both paternalism and a defence of a certain conception of the good life, but both can be defended. I use the example of potential responses to the growing problem of obesity to illustrate my argument, arguing that only policy that, at least sometimes, aims at preference change will be both effective and ethical. (shrink)

NThere are many problems with Levi and Green’s (2010) suggestion that a computer-based decision aid will overcome the major objections to advance directives (ADs). We focus on just two here. First, we argue that the key assumption underlying Levi and Green’s paper, that autonomy always ought to take priority over other values, is false. Second, we argue that the paper misses the point of the most telling objections to the use of ADs: they lack the relevant moral authority to determine (...) treatments. It is not that they are merely subject to a set of contingent problems related to capturing the wishes of individuals or being open to misinterpretation by others.We conclude that the plug should be pulled on Levi and Green’s computer-based proposal. (shrink)