Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Why broad content can’t influence behaviour.Cressida Gaukroger - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3005–3020.
    This article examines one argument in favour of the position that the relational properties of mental states do not have causal powers over behaviour. This argument states that we establish that the relational properties of mental states do not have causal powers by considering cases where intrinsic properties remain the same but relational properties vary to see whether, under such circumstances, behaviour would ever vary. The individualist argues that behaviour will not vary with relational properties alone, which means that they (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Externalism, Physicalism, Statues, and Hunks.Bryan Frances - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (2):199-232.
    Content externalism is the dominant view in the philosophy of mind. Content essentialism, the thesis that thought tokens have their contents essentially, is also popular. And many externalists are supporters of such essentialism. However, endorsing the conjunction of those views either (i) commits one to a counterintuitive view of the underlying physical nature of thought tokens or (ii) commits one to a slightly different but still counterintuitive view of the relation of thought tokens to physical tokens as well as a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Functions and goal directedness.Berent Enç & Fred Adams - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (4):635-654.
    We examine two approaches to functions: etiological and forward-looking. In the context of functions, we raise the question, familiar to philosophers of mind, about the explanatory role of properties that are not supervenient on the mere dispositional features of a system. We first argue that the question has no easy answer in either of the two approaches. We then draw a parallel between functions and goal directedness. We conclude by proposing an answer to the question: The explanatory importance of nonsupervenient (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Thoughts without objects.Fred Adams, Gary Fullerd & Robert Stecker - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (1):90-104.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Reply to Russow.Frederick Adams - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):63 – 65.
    In 'Fodor's Modal Argument' I claim that Fodor's latest defence of narrow content does not work. I claim that Fodor's modal argument is an unsuccessful resurrection of the Logical Connection Argument. Russow claims that my arguments fail because I confuse cause properties with causal powers, focus on events rather than properties, and overlook the fact that Fodor is trying only to explain narrow behavior. In this paper, I plead 'not guilty' to all of Fodor's charges. Narrow content still does not (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation