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  1. Explanationist aid for the theory of inductive logic.Michael Huemer - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):345-375.
    A central problem facing a probabilistic approach to the problem of induction is the difficulty of sufficiently constraining prior probabilities so as to yield the conclusion that induction is cogent. The Principle of Indifference, according to which alternatives are equiprobable when one has no grounds for preferring one over another, represents one way of addressing this problem; however, the Principle faces the well-known problem that multiple interpretations of it are possible, leading to incompatible conclusions. I propose a partial solution to (...)
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  • Robust evidence and secure evidence claims.Kent W. Staley - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4):467-488.
    Many philosophers have claimed that evidence for a theory is better when multiple independent tests yield the same result, i.e., when experimental results are robust. Little has been said about the grounds on which such a claim rests, however. The present essay presents an analysis of the evidential value of robustness that rests on the fallibility of assumptions about the reliability of testing procedures and a distinction between the strength of evidence and the security of an evidence claim. Robustness can (...)
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  • Why not all evidence is scientific evidence.Carlos Santana - 2018 - Episteme 15 (2):209-227.
    Data which constitute satisfactory evidence in other contexts are sometimes not treated as valid evidence in the context of scientic conrmation. I give a justicatory explanation of this fact, appealing to the incentives, biases, and social situatedness of scientists.
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  • Empirical evidence claims are a priori.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2821-2834.
    This paper responds to Achinstein’s criticism of the thesis that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim such as ‘e is evidence for h’ (or ‘e confirms h to degree r’) is the truth of e. It shows that cases involving evidential flaws, which form the basis for Achinstein’s objections to the thesis, can satisfactorily be accounted for by appeal to changes in background information and working assumptions. The paper also argues that the (...)
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  • What's Wrong With Our Theories of Evidence?Julian Reiss - 2014 - Theoria 29 (2):283-306.
    This paper reviews all major theories of evidence such as the Bayesian theory, hypothetico-deductivism, satisfaction theories, error-statistics, Achinstein's explanationist theory and Cartwright's argument theory. All these theories fail to take adequate account of the context in which a hypothesis is established and used. It is argued that the context of an inquiry determines important facts about what evidence is, and how much and what kind has to be collected to establish a hypothesis for a given purpose.
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  • What’s Wrong With Our Theories of Evidence?Julian Reiss - 2014 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 29 (2):283-306.
    This paper surveys and critically assesses existing theories of evidence with respect to four desiderata. A good theory of evidence should be both a theory of evidential support (i.e., be informative about what kinds of facts speak in favour of a hypothesis), and of warrant (i.e., be informative about how strongly a given set of facts speaks in favour of the hypothesis), it should apply to the non-ideal cases in which scientists typically find themselves, and it should be ‘descriptively adequate’, (...)
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  • A Tool-Based View of Theories of Evidence.Chien-Yang Huang - 2020 - Dissertation, Durham University
    Philosophical theories of evidence have been on offer, but they are mostly evaluated in terms of all-or-none desiderata — if they fail to meet one of the desiderata, they are not a satisfactory theory. In this thesis, I aim to accomplish three missions. Firstly, I construct a new way of evaluating theories of evidence, which I call a tool-based view. Secondly, I analyse the nature of what I will call the various relevance-mediating vehicles that each theory of evidence employs. Thirdly, (...)
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