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  1. Common Minds, Uncommon Thoughts: A Philosophical Anthropological Investigation of Uniquely Human Creative Behavior, with an Emphasis on Artistic Ability, Religious Reflection, and Scientific Study.Johan De Smedt - unknown
    The aim of this dissertation is to create a naturalistic philosophical picture of creative capacities that are specific to our species, focusing on artistic ability, religious reflection, and scientific study. By integrating data from diverse domains within a philosophical anthropological framework, I have presented a cognitive and evolutionary approach to the question of why humans, but not other animals engage in such activities. Through an application of cognitive and evolutionary perspectives to the study of these behaviors, I have sought to (...)
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  • El Darwinismo Neural y los orígenes de la conciencia humana: una crítica desde la dialéctica.Ivonne Kuri & Julio Muñoz Rubio - 2017 - Signos Filosóficos 19 (37):170-195.
    Resumen En este artículo se examina el Darwinismo Neural en su explicación de la evolución de la conciencia humana, contrastando su metodología con la utilizada por Richard Lewontin, Richard Levins y Steven Rose, quienes han hecho importantes aportaciones en el estudio de los sistemas vivos desde un punto de vista dialéctico. Concluimos que la explicación interaccionista de la evolución de la conciencia planteada en el DN, supera muchas de las deficiencias del determinismo biológico; sin embargo, al compartir algunos lineamientos con (...)
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  • Toward a Glossary of Self-Related Terms.Alain Morin - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  • What Memory Is.Stan Klein - 2015 - WIREs Cognitive Science 6 (1):1-38.
    I argue that our current practice of ascribing the term “ memory ” to mental states and processes lacks epistemic warrant. Memory, according to the “received view”, is any state or process that results from the sequential stages of encoding, storage and retrieval. By these criteria, memory, or its footprint, can be seen in virtually every mental state we are capable of having. This, I argue, stretches the term to the breaking point. I draw on phenomenological, historical and conceptual considerations (...)
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