Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Preferences, Reasoning Errors, and Resource Egalitarianism.Alexandru Volacu - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1851-1870.
    In this paper I aim to examine some problematic implications of the fact that individuals are prone to making systematic reasoning errors, for resource egalitarianism. I begin by disentangling the concepts of preferences, choices and ambitions, which are sometimes used interchangeably by egalitarians. Subsequently, I claim that the most plausible interpretation of resource egalitarianism takes preferences, not choices, as the site of responsibility. This distinction is salient, since preference-sensitive resource egalitarianism is faced with an important objection when applied to situations (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Hypothetical Insurance and Higher Education.Ben Colburn & Hugh Lazenby - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 50 (4):587-604.
    What level of government subsidy of higher education is justified, in what form, and for what reasons? We answer these questions by applying the hypothetical insurance approach, originally developed by Ronald Dworkin in his work on distributive justice. On this approach, when asking how to fund and deliver public services in a particular domain, we should seek to model what would be the outcome of a hypothetical insurance market: we stipulate that participants lack knowledge about their specific resources and risks, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Disadvantage, Disagreement, and Disability: Re-Evaluating the Continuity Test.Jessica Begon - forthcoming - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-30.
    The suggestion that individuals should be considered disadvantaged, and consequently entitled to compensation, only if they consider themselves disadvantaged (Dworkin’s ‘continuity test’) is initially appealing. However, it also faces problems. First, if individuals are routinely mistaken, then we routinely fail to assist the deserving. Second, if individuals assess their circumstances differently then the state will provide different levels of assistance to people in identical situations. Thus, should we instead ignore individuals’ convictions and provide assistance that some, at least, do not (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark