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  1. Thanks, We’Re Good: Why Moral Realism is Not Morally Objectionable.David Enoch - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1689-1699.
    This paper responds to a recently popular objection to non-naturalist, robust moral realism. The objection is that moral realism is morally objectionable, because realists are committed to taking evidence about the distribution of non-natural properties to be relevant to their first-order moral commitments. I argue that such objections fail. The moral realist is indeed committed to conditionals such as “If there are no non-natural properties, then no action is wrong.” But the realist is not committed to using this conditional in (...)
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  • Correction To: Thanks, We’Re Good: Why Moral Realism is Not Morally Objectionable.David Enoch - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2357-2357.
    In the original publication of the article, some of the references were published incorrectly. The corrected references are provided below.
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