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Peripatetic negations

Jonathan Barnes

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 4:201-214 (1986)

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Affirmation and Denial in Aristotle’s De interpretatione.Mika Perälä - 2020 - Topoi 39 (3):645-656.details Modern logicians have complained that Aristotelian logic lacks a distinction between predication and assertion, and that predication, according to the Aristotelians, implies assertion. The present paper addresses the question of whether this criticism can be levelled against Aristotle’s logic. Based on a careful study of the De interpretatione, the paper shows that even if Aristotle defines what he calls simple assertion in terms of predication, he does not confound predication and assertion. That is because, first, he does not understand compound (...) Value Theory Direct download (2 more) Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Which 'Athenodorus' Commented on Aristotle's Categories?Michael J. Griffin - 2013 - Classical Quarterly 63 (1):199-208.details The principate of Augustus coincided with a surge of interest in the short Aristotelian treatise which we now entitle Categories, contributing to its later installation at the outset of the philosophical curriculum and its traditional function as an introduction to logic. Thanks in part to remarks made by Plutarch and Porphyry , the origin of this interest has often been traced to Andronicus of Rhodes: his catalogue and publication of the Aristotelian corpus began with the Categories and may have drawn (...) Aristotelian Commentators in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy Aristotle: Categories in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy Stoics: Logic in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy Direct download (4 more) Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Fatalism and False Futures in De Interpretatione 9.Jason W. Carter - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy.details In De interpretatione 9, Aristotle argues against the fatalist view that if statements about future contingent singular events (e.g. ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow,’ ‘There will not be a sea battle tomorrow’) are already true or false, then the events to which those statements refer will necessarily occur or necessarily not occur. Scholars have generally held that, to refute this argument, Aristotle allows that future contingent statements are exempt from either the principle of bivalence, or the law of (...) Aristotle: Necessity and Contingency in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy Aristotle: Necessity and Possibility in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy Aristotle: Time in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy Fatalism in Philosophy of Action Direct download Export citation Bookmark

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