Varieties of Equality

Suppose that the basic structures of two societies conform to Rawls’s principles of justice. One of these societies, however, includes—in addition to a just basic structure—an egalitarian ethos that further reduces inequalities that do not benefit the least advantaged. G. A. Cohen and others have argued that the second society is more just, thus rejecting any restriction of Rawls’s principles of justice to the basic structure. Andrew Williams has revived the basic structure restriction in the form of a publicity requirement. (...) This paper highlights various problems with this attempt. In addition, it shows that an egalitarian ethos admits various plausible reformulations that could meet Williams’s publicity requirements. This only amounts to a partial victory for Cohen, however. In fact, the Rawlsian position could come out of this discussion strengthened, not because it can resist the egalitarian critique, but because it can incorporate its essence in the form of a set of more precise and specific public rules. (shrink)

Rather than making another attempt at proposing a single and unifying theory of global health justice, this timely collection brings together, instead, scholars from a range of traditions to frame the issue more broadly, highlighting not only different perspectives but also key topics and debates. -/- The volume features chapters that offer both new theoretical approaches to global health justice, as well as fresh takes on existing frameworks. Others adopt a bottom-up approach to tackle specific problems, including the sexual rights (...) of children and adolescents, artificial intelligence (AI) in medicine, framing of neglected tropical diseases, securitization of health, and trademarks in global health. Brought together within one volume, the breadth of these chapters provides a unique and enlightening contribution to the wider Global Health field. -/- This important volume will be a fascinating read for students and researchers across Global Health, Bioethics, Political Philosophy, and Global Development. (shrink)

Geschwisterlichkeit wird in der Tradition des politischen Liberalismus häufig als moralischer Wert verstanden, der über das Ideal der Gerechtigkeit hinausgeht. Im Unterschied dazu argumentiert Jochen Bojanowski für ein neues Verständnis: Demnach sind wir im politischen Kontext zueinander geschwisterlich eingestellt, wenn wir einen gesellschaftlichen Kooperationsrahmen befürworten, in dem bloße Glücksunterschiede nicht in distributive Vorteile umgemünzt werden können. Ausgehend von dieser Idee entwickelt Bojanowski eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit, der zufolge Geschwisterlichkeit einen konstitutiven Teil von Gerechtigkeit darstellt.

This article is concerned with social and political equality. In its prescriptive usage, ‘equality’ is a highly contested concept. Its normally positive connotation gives it a rhetorical power suitable for use in political slogans (Westen 1990). At least since the French Revolution, equality has served as one of the leading ideals of the body politic; in this respect, it is at present probably the most controversial of the great social ideals. There is controversy concerning the precise notion of equality, the (...) relation of justice and equality (the principles of equality), the material requirements and measure of the ideal of equality (equality of what?), the extension of equality (equality among whom?), and its status within a comprehensive (liberal) theory of justice (the value of equality). First published Tue Mar 27, 2001; substantive revision Mon Apr 26, 2021. (shrink)

Recent philosophical accounts of discrimination face challenges in accommodating robust intuitions about the particular way in which it is wrongful—most prominently, the intuition that discriminatory actions intrinsically violate equality irrespective of their contingent consequences. The paper suggests that we understand the normative structure of discrimination in a way that is different from the one implicitly assumed by these accounts. It argues that core discriminatory wrongs—such as segregation in Apartheid South Africa—divide into two types, corresponding to violations of relational and distributive (...) equality; and that a pluralistic view of the internal structure of each type should be adopted. This normative structure serves to appropriately vindicate the mentioned intuitions; it also contributes to clarifying the normative underpinnings of legal concepts associated with discrimination (including the distinctions between direct and indirect, or ‘disparate treatment/impact’ discrimination, and intentional vs. unintentional discrimination), and developing a more productive public discourse around allegations of discrimination. (shrink)

Why, if at all, should we object to economic inequality? Some central arguments – the argument from decreasing marginal utility for example – invoke instrumental reasons and object to inequality because of its effects. Such instrumental arguments, however, often concern only the static effects of inequality and neglect its intertemporal conse- quences. In this article, we address this striking gap and investigate income inequality’s intertemporal consequences, including its potential effects on humanity’s (very) long-term future. Following recent arguments around future generations (...) and so-called longtermism, those effects might arguably matter more than inequality’s short-term con- sequences. We assess whether we have instrumental reason to reduce economic inequality based on its intertemporal effects in the short, medium, and the very long term. We find a good short and medium-term instrumental case for lower economic inequality. We then argue, somewhat speculatively, that we have instrumental reasons for inequality reduction from a longtermist perspective too, primarily because greater inequality could increase existential risk. We thus have instrumental reasons to reduce inequality, regardless of which time-horizon we take. We then argue that from most consequentialist perspectives, this pro tanto reason also gives us all-things-considered reason. And even across most non-consequentialist views in philosophy, this argument gives us either an all-things-considered or at least weighty pro tanto reason against inequality. (shrink)

According to relational egalitarians, the fundamental value that grounds requirements of justice is egalitarian social relationships. Hierarchical authority relations appear to be a threat to relational equality. Such relations, however, are pervasive in our working lives. Contemporary workplaces, then, seem to be potential sites of substantial injustice for relational egalitarians. This presents us with a challenge: the view that justice requires that individuals relate as equals appears difficult to reconcile with the view that it is permissible for firms to be (...) organized with hierarchical authority structures, and yet both claims seem independently plausible. This chapter argues that these claims can be reconciled, but only if we reject the widely accepted Rawlsian “institutionalist” view that principles of justice apply to the institutions of the basic structure of society, but do not apply directly to the conduct of agents within those institutions. (shrink)

In public reason liberalism, equal respect requires that conceptions of justice be publicly justifiable to relevant people in a manner that allocates to each an equal say. But all liberal public justification also excludes: e.g., it accords no say, or a lesser say, to people it deems unreasonable. Can liberal public justification be aligned with the equal respect that allegedly grounds it, if the latter calls for discursive equality? The chapter explores this challenge with a focus on Rawls-type political liberalism. (...) I suggest that political liberalism’s commitment to equal respect can cohere with the standing of the unreasonable in public justification if that standing is not impermissibly unequal in discursive purchase. I then consider one candidate view of the permissibility of purchase inequality. On this broadly sufficientarian view, purchase inequality is permissible provided relevant people have standing of enough purchase to be able to avoid relevant bads. A plausible variant of this view suggests that political liberalism’s commitment to equal respect does not cohere with the discursive standing of the unreasonable. It emerges that where liberal public justification accords actual people discursive respect but relevantly idealizes at least around its fringes, the permissibility of purchase inequality must be a central concern. (shrink)

In her recent book, Faces of Inequality (2020), Moreau aims at developing a normative account of discrimination that is guided by the main features of anti-discrimination law. The critical comment argues against this methodology, indicating that due to indeterminacy relative to their underlying normative principles, central anti-discrimination norms cannot fulfill this guiding role. Further, using the content of such norms to guide ethical discussions is likely to be misleading, as it reflects evidentiary considerations that are unique to the legal context. (...) The critical comment’s claims are developed based on a close examination of indirect discrimination (or disparate impact) norms, and, as such, have wider implications for ongoing moral and political debates that are heavily influenced by the content of these norms. (shrink)

Alasdair MacIntyre doubts that Confucianism can discuss the relationship between individuals and community because he maintains that it is impossible to discuss the topic in depth without a Western conception of individual rights. In this article, I show that Neo-Confucianism pays extensive attention to the relationship between individuals and community by working through several Chinese thinkers’ theories from the 11th to the 17th centuries. Neo-Confucianism seems to be focused on the exploration of the common principles of a community, but its (...) real intention is ensuring the fundamentality of individual selves and making up for limitations caused by an excess of individual limitations. Thus, a new relationship is formed between individuals and community; that is, all individuals are equal and the common principles of community are independent of any individual. In order to make each individual harmonize with common principles, some mainstream Neo-Confucian thinkers attached great importance to the effort (gongfu 工夫) of “eliminating personal desires” (qu renyu 去人欲) since they thought that personal desires represented a selfish appeal that contradicts common principles. Influenced by this line of thinking, Neo-Confucianism fell into the predicament where individuals were suppressed, but this shortcoming was corrected in its later stage by defending the right to satisfy individual desires for survival. This study shows that Neo-Confucian discourse has given much thought to the problem of the relationship between individuals and community. (shrink)

This paper identifies a challenge for liberal relational egalitarians—namely, how to respond to the prospect of emergent inequalities of power, status, and influence arising unintentionally through the free exercise of fundamental individual liberties over time. I argue that these emergent social inequalities can be produced through patterns of nonmalicious choices, that they can in fact impede the full realization of relational equality, and that it is possible they cannot be eliminated entirely without abandoning fundamental liberal commitments to leave individuals substantial (...) discretion in their personal lives. In such cases, I argue that liberal egalitarians should accept fair relational equality—a demanding but nevertheless imperfect form of relational equality. (shrink)

This article provides an overview of the contributions to philosophy of Nigerian philosopher Sophie Bọ´sẹ`dé Olúwọlé. The first woman to earn a philosophy PhD in Nigeria, Olúwọlé headed the Department of Philosophy at the University of Lagos before retiring to found and run the Centre for African Culture and Development. She devoted her career to studying Yoruba philosophy, translating the ancient Yoruba Ifá canon, which embodies the teachings of Orunmila, a philosopher revered as an Óríṣá in the Ifá pantheon. Seeing (...) his works as examples of secular reasoning and argument, she compared Orunmila's and Socrates' philosophies and methods and explored similarities and differences between African and European philosophies. A champion of African oral traditions, Olúwọlé argued that songs, proverbs, liturgies, and stories are important sources of African responses to perennial philosophical questions as well as to contemporary issues, including feminism. She argued that the complementarity that ran throughout Yoruba philosophy guaranteed women's rights and status, and preserved an important role for women, youths, and foreigners in politics. (shrink)

Eriarvoisuuspuheella voidaan viitata moniin eri asioihin. Usein sillä tarkoitetaan hyvien asioiden epätasaista jakautumista. Ei kuitenkaan ole itsessään huono asia, että joillakin menee paremmin kuin toisilla. Silloin kun taloudellinen eriarvoisuus on ongelma, kyse on sen syistä tai seurauksista. On kuitenkin myös itsessään moraalisesti ongelmallinen eriarvoisuuden muoto, jota kutsun erivertaisuudeksi. Siinä on kyse joidenkin herruudesta ja ylivallasta toisiin nähden tai siitä, että joitakin suositaan järjestelmällisesti toisten kustannuksella. Erivertaisuus ei sovi yhteen jokaisen yksilön moraalisen tasa-arvoisuuden kanssa, joten se on itsessään huono asia. Oikeudenmukaisuus (...) vaatii kansalaisten tasavertaisuutta, jota merkittävä taloudellinen eriarvoisuus uhkaa monella tavalla. (shrink)

This article contributes to the debate on automation and justice by discussing two under-represented concerns: labour justice and equality. Since automation involves both winners and losers, and given that there is no ‘end of work’ on the horizon, it is argued that most normative views on the subject – i.e. the ‘allocative’ view of basic income, and the ‘desirability’ views of post-work and workist ethics – do not provide many resources with which to address unjustly unequal divisions of labour involved (...) in technological innovation. This article problematises these common responses reframing the problem from the perspective of labour justice. While the allocative view assumes that labour justice follows ‘spontaneously’ from income redistribution, the desirability views are chiefly interested in either defining or contesting the meanings of work for individuals, overlooking the interdependent nature of work and concerns of equality other than autonomy. Two conceptions of labour justice are thus applied to the problem: Paul Gomberg’s contributive justice, and Iris Young’s democratic division of labour. Instead of deciding between them, the normative core of ‘contributive parity’ is suggested as a critical standard for assessing unequal labour structures, and for envisaging a future in which technology can be an ally in making social cooperation fair. (shrink)

In this paper I would like to suggest that we should distinguish between three levels of education in schools: basic education for all, the cultivation of individual talents and capacities; and the selection for higher education and the job market. On each level egalitarians should in my view demand a different kind of equality and a different kind of metric. Since for the selection for higher education and the job market equality of opportunity seems the approriate metric of justice in (...) education, I turn to an analysis of four different conceptions of equality of opportunity. (shrink)

For two decades, egalitarian analytical philosophers have sought to identify the metric to be employed in order to ascertain whether any distribution is equal or not. This essay provides a review of the seminal contributions to this debate by Amartya Sen, Ronald Dworkin, Richard Arneson and G.A. Cohen.

One of the most distinctive features of Ronald Dworkin’s egalitarian theory is its commitment to holding individuals responsible for the costs to others of their ambitions. This commitment has received much criticism. Drawing on Dworkin’s latest statement of his position in Justice for Hedgehogs, we suggest that it seems to be in tension with another crucial element of Dworkin’s own theory, namely, its endorsement of the importance of people leading authentic lives – lives that reflect their own values. We examine (...) this tension between responsibility and authenticity, and some strategies Dworkin does and could deploy to defuse it, which we think are unsuccessful. We then propose a solution for reconciling the demands of responsibility and authenticity, which is, so we claim, friendly to Dworkin’s fundamental commitments but which leads to a revisionist interpretation of the demands of equality of resources. (shrink)

T. D. Campbell; IV*—Equality of Opportunity, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 75, Issue 1, 1 June 1975, Pages 51–68, https://doi.org/10.1093/aris.

Should a liberal constitution constrain the racially discriminatory actions of state as well as nonstate employers? This essay answers in the affirmative, arguing that once we take seriously the right to nondiscrimination on the basis of race in terms of employment, we realize that such a constitution must constrain the actions of both. In doing so, this essay draws from John Rawls’s four-stage sequence, a sequence that suggests one way philosophical principles translate into constitutional design. A Theory of Justice is (...) the go-to theory for a wide range of political issues from a perspective of liberal theory, but scholars have paid less attention to it and comparative constitutional law. I take up this neglected inquiry by focusing on the distinction between the horizontal and vertical effect of a right not to be discriminated against on the basis of race in matters of employment. My analysis draws from the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. A vertical effect constrains state power: a right to nondiscrimination is violated only when a state or public body discriminates on the basis of race. A horizontal effect constrains nonstate actors: a private employer may violate rights by discriminating on the basis of race. I argue that, in line with the South African Constitution, Rawls importantly adopts a horizontal effect of the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of race by ensuring formal equality of opportunity. His theory of justice suggests that a liberal constitution ought to constrain the racially discriminatory actions of both state and nonstate employers. This, in turn, represents an important response to racism that occurs in the private sphere. (shrink)

Bottlenecks introduces a powerful new way of understanding equal opportunity. Rather than literal equalization, Joseph Fishkin argues that Americans ought to aim to broaden the range of opportunities open to people, at every stage in life, to pursue different paths.

This thesis is a work of political philosophy. It aims to set out an egalitarian understanding of the promotion of social capital. The first chapter of the thesis is an introduction to social capital, and contains a normative criticism of contemporary social capital policy-making. A typology of theoretical approaches to social capital policies are outlined in the second chapter, including neoliberal constitutionalism, civic republicanism, and egalitarian pluralism. Of these approaches, egalitarian pluralism seems best able to promote social capital while balancing (...) the competing values of freedom and equality. The third chapter builds on the egalitarian pluralist approach and investigates a relational egalitarian strategy for the promotion of social capital. (shrink)

Egalitarians have traditionally been suspicious of equality of opportunity, but recently there has been a sea-change in thinking about that concept. Shlomi Segall brings together these developments and offers a new account of 'radical equality of opportunity', which removes all obstacles (to one's opportunity-set) that lie outside one's control.

Group 6 acts of misconduct may be expelled from school and assigned to Alternative Safe Schools (CPS 2009b).1 The goal of the CPS Safe Schools program is to give students who have been expelled the opportunity to earn credits toward a ...