Contents
8 found
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  1. Meaningfulness, Conventions, and Rules.Indrek Reiland - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    n the middle of the 20th century, it was a common Wittgenstein-inspired idea in philosophy that languages are analogous to games and for a linguistic expression to have a meaning in a language is for it to be governed by a rule of use. However, due to the influence of David Lewis’s work it is now standard to understand meaningfulness in terms of conventional regularities in use instead (Lewis 1969, 1975). In this paper I will present a simplified Lewis-inspired Conventions (...)
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  2. Meaning without content: on the metasemantics of register.Thorsten Sander - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    What, exactly, is the difference between words such as ‘dead’ and ‘deceased’? In this paper, I argue that such differences in register, or style, ought to be construed as genuine differences in non-truth-conditional meaning. I also show that register cannot plausibly accounted for in terms of either presupposition or conventional implicature. Register is, rather, an instance of what I call pure use-conditional meaning. In the case of register, a difference in meaning does not correspond to a difference in the contents (...)
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  3. Basic Rules of Arithmetic.Julian J. Schloeder - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Inferential expressivism makes a systematic distinction between inferences that are valid qua preserving commitment and inferences that are valid qua preserving evidence. I argue that the characteristic inferences licensed by the principle of comprehension, from "x is P" to "x is in the extension of P" and vice versa, fail to preserve evidence, but do preserve commitment. Taking this observation into account allows one to phrase inference rules for unrestricted comprehension without running into Russell’s paradox. In the resulting logic, one (...)
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  4. Modal Knowledge for Expressivists.Peter Hawke - 2024 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 53 (4):1109-1143.
    What does ‘Smith knows that it might be raining’ mean? Expressivism here faces a challenge, as its basic forms entail a pernicious type of transparency, according to which ‘Smith knows that it might be raining’ is equivalent to ‘it is consistent with everything that Smith knows that it is raining’ or ‘Smith doesn’t know that it isn’t raining’. Pernicious transparency has direct counterexamples and undermines vanilla principles of epistemic logic, such as that knowledge entails true belief and that something can (...)
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  5. Reasons for Logic, Logic for Reasons: Pragmatics, Semantics, and Conceptual Roles.Ulf Hlobil & Robert Brandom - 2024 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Robert Brandom.
    This book presents a philosophical conception of logic -- "logical expressivism"-- according to which the role of logic is to make explicit reason relations, which are often neither monotonic nor transitive. It reveals new perspectives on inferential roles, sequent calculi, representation, truthmakers, and many extant logical theories.
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  6. Meaning and the World.Ryan Simonelli - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Chicago
    I motivate and develop a use-based semantic theory in opposition to the dominant paradigm in philosophical and linguistic semantics. Drawing inspiration from Wilfrid Sellars, I argue that contemporary semantic theories are faced with a basic problem of explanatory circularity. These theories universally presuppose that worldly knowledge of such things as properties or sets of possible worlds precedes and underlies knowledge of meaning. However, I argue that it is only through learning a language--mastering the rules governing the use of the expressions (...)
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  7. Inferentialism is as Compositional as it Needs to be.Nicholas Tebben - 2021 - Contemporary Pragmatism 18 (3):263-286.
    Normative inferentialism is a semantic theory according to which the meaning of an expression is, or is determined by, its proper inferential role. Critics of inferentialism often argue that it violates the principle of compositionality, and that it is therefore unable to explain some important linguistic data. I have two tasks in this paper: the first is to demonstrate that inferentialism, appearances perhaps to the contrary, does not violate the principle of compositionality, and the second is to explain why this (...)
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  8. Anti-representational semantics : four themes.Nicholas Tebben - 2015 - In Steven Gross, Nicholas Tebben & Michael Williams (eds.), Meaning Without Representation: Expression, Truth, Normativity, and Naturalism. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 3-21.