Thomas Hobbes

Kant’s thought from the 1750s onward can usefully be understood as a series of efforts to overcome the challenge posed in Machiavelli’s Prince: namely, to reconcile our idea of justice with what is actually possible given human nature as it is, rather than as reason tells us that it “should” be. Especially following his reading of Rousseau, this effort took the form of successive translations of the metaphysical concept of a world into the juridical language of world-citizenship, which transformed a (...) rational and physical cosmology into moral and historical cosmopolitanism. The thought of both Hobbes and Rousseau proved instrumental to those efforts. Initially, Kant thought human history oscillated between Hobbesian and Rousseauian conceptions of civil order—i.e., between orders that guarantee, respectively, security and freedom. In his later works, Kant suggested that history progressed from Hobbes to Rousseau, but he hesitated to declare that a transformation from prudence-based security to virtue-based civil independence was completable even in principle. Speaking generally, Kant sought to reconcile a kind of historical providentialism with the sovereign authority of reason. This reconciliation blurs the distinction between, on the one hand, the metaphysical and/or religious and, on the other hand, the secular—a distinction on which Michael Rosen’s perspicuous intellectual history tends to focus. That this earliest version of Kant’s rational providentialism makes reward of effort morally central also suggests that it is ultimately even more important to Kant than the punitive theme on which Rosen himself focusses. (shrink)

El trabajo apunta a presentar los argumentos de Aristóteles y de Hobbes para justificar la esclavitud. Así, por un lado, se mostrará que Aristóteles intenta defender tal institución bajo argumentos de premisas naturalistas, aunque incongruentes con sus propios fundamentos filosóficos. Por el otro, se señalará que los argumentos de Hobbes apelan a la libertad y el consentimiento, llegando a establecer dos tipos de esclavitud, una de tipo voluntario y otra que no lo es. En consecuencia, con el contraste argumental de (...) ambos autores se podrá ver la vía moderna y la antigua para justificar el esclavismo. (shrink)

Philosophers from Europe and colonial America engaged in lively debates about the morality of slavery in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and these debates provide insights into the roots of modern racism. This book explores philosophical ideas, theories, and arguments that are central to early modern discussions of slavery. Some texts explicitly examine the morality of the transatlantic slave trade or of the enslavement of indigenous people in the Americas; others discuss slavery in predominantly theoretical ways. Based on these texts, (...) the book shows that race and slavery came to be closely associated in this period. This association often occurred through an endorsement of the theory of natural slavery: Black and indigenous people were commonly viewed as natural slaves, or naturally destined for slavery. The theory that some people are natural slaves also features prominently in theoretical discussions of slavery, and many philosophers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries embraced versions of it. This book surveys a wide range of historical material, from the views of well-known authors like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, to many less widely studied philosophers like Gabrielle Suchon, Morgan Godwyn, and Epifanio de Moirans. By illustrating the significance and philosophical sophistication of early modern debates about slavery, this book serves as a valuable resource for scholars, instructors, and students who are curious about this widely neglected topic. (shrink)

Hobbes’ natural law theory has been discussed far and wide. Some interpreters ended up defining Hobbes as a natural law theorist, some others as a legal positivist. In this paper, I analyse the work of two important scholars, Howard Warrender and Norberto Bobbio, whose insights have stimulated an interesting debate about Hobbes’ political theory. Warrender gives God a central function in Hobbes’ political science. On his account, God is a lawmaker, his will is the source of a universal obligation, and (...) civil order is necessary to give force to the natural law that is the expression of divine will. In Bobbio’s interpretation, Hobbes is the first legal positivist of Modern age, as natural law is only ever given content by the sovereign’s will. Finally, I ask which is natural law and God’s function in Hobbes’ political thought, questioning some contemporary scholars in order to clarify Hobbes’ modernity. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es realizar una revisión del estado de la cuestión sobre el concepto de estado de naturaleza en el pensamiento de Thomas Hobbes. Dicha revisión permite articular una comprensión de la naturaleza humana, puesto que a diferencia del realismo político el estado de naturaleza en Hobbes no tiene un rol meramente hipotético. Precisamente, la idea de naturaleza humana articula una proto-moralidad que permite comprender la transición hacia el estado civil. Las investigaciones Kavka, Gauthier y Hampton han (...) construido una compleja compresión de la naturaleza humana, la cual permite entender cierto sustrato de proto-moralidad en el pensamiento hobbesiano. (shrink)

Hobbes argues that among the reasons for the Catholic Church’s power is the difficulty for ignorant people to understand the causes of natural phenomena. They take the motion of invisible bodies for the intervention of incorporeal agents. For Hobbes, the Church tries to perpetuate this profitable misunderstanding by spreading Scholastic doctrines supporting this idea in the sermons of all the parishes of the Christian world. Existing literature, thus far, focused almost exclusively on Hobbes’ negative claim concerning incorporeal substances, i.e., that (...) they are absurd and are only used to justify the Church’s claim to power. On the other hand, his positive proposition to replace immaterial substances with invisible bodies was not fully explored. By highlighting Hobbes’ examination of invisibility in Leviathan, it is possible to demonstrate how he uses ideas from natural philosophy to challenge some of the dominant Scholastic doctrines and, consequently, the usurpation of the sovereign’s ecclesiastical power. (shrink)

The paper investigates Hobbes’s arguments that injustice is a kind of absurdity involving a “contradiction properly so called,” concluding that although those arguments are undermined by their reliance on a mistaken temporality assumption, Hobbes’s philosophy provides other means for establishing his desired conclusion.

Today the study of Hobbes is both reputable and flourishing, to judge by the numbers in recent years of publications, submissions, conferences, workshops, and sessions at professional meetings devoted to Hobbes, along with growing interest from scholars in China and Latin America. I recently conducted a survey of colleagues working on Hobbes; a non-scientific survey, it included scholars working in a variety of departments. This research note reports the views of more than three dozen respondents, who answered three questions: (1) (...) what has been at stake in Hobbes debates?; (2) have any conclusions been decisively established?; and (3) what are the open questions for the future? The answers evidence a lack of consensus but also demonstrate that we have increasingly refined and sophisticated theoretical arguments for and against contending positions. (shrink)

Building on a number of recent studies that have turned to Hobbes in light of covid-19, I explore the context of Hobbes’ own encounters with plague while at Oxford, along with efforts to mitigate plague by the regime of James I. I then explore what role his encounters with plague may have played as he wrote his philosophical masterpiece, Leviathan.

In the free-will discussion between Hobbes and Bramhall, Hobbes’s principle that actions are necessary is not immediately action-theoretic. The fundamental theoretical context of Hobbes’s explanation of action lies in an understanding of causation more generally. However, Hobbes’s action theory is not simply modeled after the account of cause and effect in his First Philosophy. It introduces a temporal qualification which ranks necessitarianism higher than First Philosophy does: not only a voluntary action, but also the determinate moment when the mental act (...) of volition is formed, is necessitated. My paper argues that this strengthening of causal necessity is due to the Hobbesian scheme of deliberation, which must be analyzed in terms of one distinctive kind of ‘mental discourse’ and practical reasoning, not merely in terms of a series of passions. For Hobbes, the impossibility of a direct representation of the future requires the mediation of a mental construction. (shrink)

Critical approaches to the canon of Western political and legal thought from the point of view of race or gender have developed in recent years, as have studies highlighting the connections between supposedly universalist philosophies and their role in sustaining or legitimizing imperial and colonial conquests. On social contract theory in particular, seminal works include Charles Mills’ The Racial Contract and Carole Pateman’s The Sexual Contract. The importance of this type of work cannot be understated, and Mills is right to (...) insist on the “blinding whiteness of the discipline.” In the case of Hobbes, I argue, the privilege established in his texts is better qualified as “civilizational” rather than “racial.” Hobbes’s texts construct a certain image of civilization, a form of exclusion and domination that eschews biological determinism in favor of social, historical bias. This “civilizational” thinking certainly can work – and will work later on in conjunction with modern racism and white privilege – to exclude many. The racial contract – as per Mills – is only a late installment on a more fundamental one, the civilizing contract. (shrink)

Gregorio Baldin’s book, La croisée des savoirs, concerns the intellectual relations among Hobbes, Mersenne, and Descartes. The study is limited to the time between 1634 and 1648, starting when Hobbes first met Mersenne in Paris and ending when Mersenne died. It covers three main topics. Part i is devoted to the relations maintained by Hobbes with the circle of Mersenne during 1634–1636, which Baldin thinks are essential for the development of Hobbes’ scientific thought. Part ii develops the theme of the (...) “hidden” influence of Mersenne on Hobbes’ thought, highlighting points of contact between the two authors, such as mechanism, research in optics, and their approach to epistemology. Part iii concerns Hobbes’ influence on Mersenne’s thought. It addresses several themes, starting with Mersenne’s interest in Hobbes’ system, the attitudes of Mersenne, Gassendi, and Hobbes toward Cartesian metaphysics, and ending with scientific themes debated in Mersenne’s circle during the 1640s. (shrink)

This essay reads Hobbes’ account of human action against Aristotle’s accounts of animal motion and human action, thus offering a new perspective for understanding Hobbes’ account and illuminating a neglected aspect of Hobbes’ relationship to Aristotle. I argue that the basic structure of Hobbes’ account is indebted to Aristotle’s account of animal motion, except that Hobbes purges the teleological elements from his predecessor and presents a picture that is mechanistic and explicitly deterministic. Moreover, while Aristotle introduces ‘deliberation’ as a way (...) of explaining the diversity of human actions as their varied attempts at realizing the distinctly human end of the good life, Hobbes’ radically anti-Aristotelian notion of ‘deliberation’ explains that diversity in terms of the fundamental uncertainty of the passions. I conclude with some reflections on two related tensions in Hobbes: between Hobbes’ determinism and his account of human action, and between his ethical project of reducing human life to mere life and his separate ethical project of justifying diverse ways of life. This essay contributes to our understanding of the significance of Hobbes’ account of human action in both the history of the debate on determinism and the history of ethics. (shrink)

This article seeks to correlate some topics from Hobbes (especially the sovereignty problem) to reconstruct, in Foucault, the resistance problem. To this end, working with the state of nature example and with several commentators from both authors, an analysis will be carried out whose intersection point is the command­obedience pair, more specifically concerning the voice issue, such as referenced by Veyne. Merging two theoretical approaches, as far as Hobbes is concerned, a structural perspective was chosen, respecting the author's geometric methodology; (...) regarding Foucault, it is operated from a heuristic aspect, aiming to approach his experimentalism. (shrink)

Si Bentham s’oppose explicitement plus souvent à Hobbes qu’il ne lui donne raison, la dette qu’il contracte à son égard est beaucoup plus étendue qu’il ne le laisse paraître. Sans doute le primat des affaires civiles sur les affaires religieuses est incontestable chez les deux auteurs. Toutefois, si les ouvrages de Hobbes sont directement en prise sur la guerre civile qui sévit en Angleterre, l’œuvre de Bentham affronte un autre problème : est-il possible de rendre le christianisme compatible avec l’utilitarisme? (...) Malgré ces différences importantes, l’articulation du religieux et du politique repose étonnamment, chez l’un comme chez l’autre, sur la théorie des fictions, entendue plutôt comme dépendante de l’imagination chez Hobbes, et du langage chez Bentham, mais dans les deux cas comme technique pour problématiser les inversions que permet la distinction de ce qui doit être pris tantôt comme entité réelle, tantôt comme entité fictive. (shrink)

Souvent délaissée, la pensée politique de l’international chez Hobbes et Bentham recèle plus de points communs qu’on ne pourrait le penser. Pour reconstruire philosophiquement cette pensée, en s’attachant plus spécifiquement au rapport entre économie et politique, on explique d’abord leur commune opposition aux colonies et aux politiques étrangères bellicistes. On montre ensuite comment ils comprennent le commerce international, l’économie et le marché en relation avec l’État, et enfin qu’on ne saurait constituer une théorie politique internationale assurant la sécurité, la paix (...) et la prospérité qui soit autonome et séparée de la théorie de l’État. (shrink)

Entre l’œuvre de Hobbes et celle de Bentham, la proximité conceptuelle est grande : l’un et l’autre semblent réfléchir depuis un vocabulaire partagé. Suivre cette proximité conduit notamment à révéler l’importance, dans leurs théories politiques respectives, de la règle de majorité, déterminante dans le processus qui permet de constituer le peuple. Hobbes transforme l’accord majoritaire à l’entrée en société en unanimité proclamée, tandis que Bentham fait de la règle de majorité l’outil permettant de donner une consistance immanente à l’unité du (...) peuple. L’usage qu’ils font de la règle de majorité permet ainsi de préciser les rapports que chacun conçoit entre peuple et multitude et, de là, de concevoir une voie anglo-saxonne de penser positivement la multitude. (shrink)

La doctrine classique de la Common Law est la cible de nombreuses critiques de la part de Hobbes et de Bentham. Tous deux remettent en cause les principes qui fondent et justifient cette composante fondamentale du droit anglais. Sont notamment visés le caractère coutumier qui lui est attribué, sa prétendue rationalité ainsi que l’interprétation qu’en font les juges. Moment décisif dans l’histoire des théories du droit, cette controverse tend à faire prévaloir l’idée d’un droit créé par un acte de volonté (...) sur un droit non écrit, tiré de la coutume, que les juges s’efforcent d’appliquer et de perpétuer. Mais, au-delà de leur portée critique, les textes de Hobbes et Bentham présentent des divergences qui font apparaître deux conceptions distinctes de la Common Law et de la décision judiciaire. (shrink)

Alors que plus d’un siècle sépare Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) et Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), leurs philosophies respectives entretiennent des rapports étroits qui, bien qu’ils aient souvent retenu l’attention des historiens de la philosophie et commentateurs, n’ont jamais été étudiés spécifiquement. On cherche ici à pallier ce manque par une étude des rapports entre Hobbes et Bentham dans le champ de la philosophie politique, juridique et morale. On espère ainsi expliquer les points communs, influences, réappropriations, différences et oppositions existant entre ces deux (...) pensées et contribuer par là à faire mieux comprendre leur rôle dans l’histoire de la philosophie moderne anglaise. (shrink)

El propósito de esta investigación radica en determinar el rol unificador entre estado de naturaleza y Estado civil de la representación desarrollado en el capítulo XVI del Leviatán. La representación es un momento de transición entre estado natural y Estado civil: donde lo simbólico toma el lugar de la racionalidad práctica y se sedimenta como lo real para los hombres. Es por la capacidad de crear personas artificiales que los hombres pueden atribuir libremente predicados a cosas que no los tienen (...) realmente y, además de donar su cuerpo físico, pueden crear la persona del Estado, el Leviatán; asumir la soberanía y la sujeción y recrear la subjetividad humana políticamente. (shrink)

1. Nicholas Robbins argues that, like many other thinkers, Hobbes adopted the monster genre narrative. The commonwealth is interpreted as representing humanity, which is frequently threatened not o...

Thomas Hobbes’s most important recommendations for a sovereign reader concerned the governing of opinion. Due to the spread of false doctrines and their powerful champions, Hobbes was afraid that subjects would have opinions contrary to the maintenance of peace. His solution comprehended a combination of civic education and censorship. This text explains how Hobbes justifies his recommendations from the perspective of individual deliberation. It argues that Hobbes conceived censoring circulating doctrines as a way of keeping subjects’ minds like clean paper, (...) ready for the sovereign to imprint civil doctrine in them through teaching, thereby increasing the chances of influencing subjects’ (free) deliberation, and thus of producing obedience. (shrink)

A reprint of the 1972 Doubleday edition. Contains the most helpful version of Hobbes's political and moral philosophy available in English. Includes the only English translation of De Homine, chapters X-XV. Features the English translation of De Cive attributed to Hobbes.

Introduction. The article analyzes the state-society relationship in the theory of social contract by T. Hobbes. The etatist interpretation of his socio-political doctrine, widespread in Russian philosophical thought, fundamentally opposing society to the state, does not seem to reflect the understanding of their relationship. From our point of view this is inherent in the contractual theory of the English thinker. Theoretical analysis. The author shows that the original conceptual and theoretical principles of T. Hobbes are the unity of sociogenesis and (...) politogenesis, the actual identification of sociality and statehood, and the assertion of the need for security as the most important factor in the transition of people from the «state of nature» to the state-public organization of their life together. Analyzing the nature of state power, T. Hobbes believes that the political activity of the sovereign, as the source and bearer of the first, is subject, first of all, to the interests of the society he controls. Conclusion. The etatist interpretation of the state-society relationship does not find sufficient confirmation in the theory of the social contract of T. Hobbes. The analysis made it possible to reveal that his point of view on this problem can be described with the idea of the syncretism of society and the state, which implies the unity of the processes of sociogenesis and politogenesis and, accordingly, the simultaneous emergence of these forms of common life. (shrink)

Ralph Cudworth was an expounder of “Cambridge Platonism.” His main tenet is that natural phenomena cannot be explained only by the principles of mechanism; therefore, the existence of a “plastic nature,” which orders the world in accordance with divine decrees, has to be postulated. The order of creation, in turn, does not depend only on divine will but also on the essences present in God’s intellect. These essences can be known through the notions innate to human soul, which recollects them (...) by means of its active nature. On this basis, Cudworth opposes the Calvinist and the Hobbesian voluntarism, for which divine will is the only source of natural and moral laws. Hobbes is also attacked as a main expounder of atheism, which Cudworth traces back to the idea that matter alone is the source of any activity and phenomenon. To this idea, Cudworth opposes an argument of the existence of God that foreruns Locke’s. (shrink)

Margaret Cavendish was a philosopher and writer active in mid-seventeenth century England. She is important not just as one of the first women active in philosophy in early modern age but as the expounder of an original scientific theory based on vitalism and materialism, by which she rejected the mechanical philosophy of Descartes and Hobbes and the experimental philosophy of Boyle and Hooke. Also, while not developing a theory of gender equality, she envisaged a form of emancipation of women based (...) on intellectual activity as a way to social recognition and to the exercise of influence on society and politics. (shrink)

Draft for Bender and Perler (ed.), Powers and Abilities in Early Modern Philosophy. Thomas Hobbes often includes powers and abilities in his descriptions of the world. Meanwhile, Hobbes’s philosophical picture of the world appears quite reductive, and he seems sometimes to say that nothing exists but bodies in motion. In more extreme versions of such a picture, there would be no room for powers. Hobbes is not an eliminativist about powers, but his view does tend toward ontological minimalism. It would (...) be good to have an account of what Hobbes thinks powers are, and how they fit into his understanding of the world. In this chapter, I investigate Hobbes’s account of the metaphysics of powers and abilities. Section 1 considers three important aspects of Hobbes’s account of powers: the connection between powers and causes; the modal aspects of powers; and the connection between powers and motions. Sections 2 and 3 then consider interpretive arguments about whether Hobbes identifies powers with underlying corporeal features. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes's name often comes up as scholars debate the history of biopower, which regulates the biological life of individual bodies and entire populations. This article examines whether and to what extent Hobbes may be regarded as the first biopolitical philosopher. I investigate this question by performing a close reading of Hobbes's political texts and by comparing them to some of the most influential theories on biopolitics proposed by Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben, Roberto Esposito, and others. Hobbes is indeed the (...) first great thinker to assert the supreme political importance of safeguarding life. Furthermore, this prominence of non-contemplative life is not limited to mere survival but also seeks to allow for the people's happiness. This may indeed allow us to consider him as the first biopolitical philosopher, at least in some limited capacity. However, the Englishman's biopolitical stance lacks the practical aspects seen in examples of ‘properly modern’ biopolitics. Moreover, peoples’ lives were already governed radically in antiquity. I argue that Hobbes's biopolitical system was, therefore, minimal in the sense of a ‘biopolitical nightwatchman state’. However, he acted as an undeniable catalyst to the ‘properly biopolitical era of modernity’, when mundane life and happiness became the explicit main objects of virtually all politics. (shrink)

Avec sa succession de bouleversements institutionnels, le dix-septième siècle anglais fut un fabuleux terrain d'expérimentation et de réflexion politique d'où surgirent les grandes théories modernes. A cette période, philosophes et acteurs engagés tentèrent de penser, avec une acuité particulière liée aux événements (guerres civiles, régicide, république, dictature), les tensions inhérentes au pouvoir, tout à la fois perçu comme contraignant, tyrannique et libérateur. Quatre d'entre eux ont été retenus : Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), le théoricien de l’absolutisme, James Harrington (1611-1677), le républicain (...) classique, Algernon Sidney (1623-1683), le martyr whig, John Locke (1632-1704), le père du libéralisme. Le propos de l’ouvrage est de montrer que, par-delà leurs différences, ces quatre penseurs partagent une approche qui constitue le socle commun d’une théorie de l’Etat moderne. Leur doctrine s’affranchit de l’exercice utopique comme de la théorie de la raison d’Etat et se conçoit comme une anatomie du corps politique. Par un examen minutieux des textes, l’auteur cherche à s’écarter de l' interprétation trop « idéologique » sans doute accentuée par les combats de l’histoire. Elle met en évidence un objet philosophique commun aux quatre auteurs, que l’on retrouve au cœur de toute conception moderne du pouvoir. (shrink)

Hobbes thinks that people who submit to government can not only hope for, but actually experience, something they recognize as a good life. The good life involves the exercise of harmless liberty—activity that the sovereign should not prohibit. The exchange of harmless liberty in the commonwealth for ruthless self-protection in the state of nature is what might be called Hobbes's peace dividend: the liberty of ordinary citizens to buy, sell, choose, and practice a trade as a source of income, and (...) the liberty to keep some of the proceeds if the state does not need resources for public protection. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes was an English philosopher who was roiled by the bloodshed and turmoil of the English Civil War. During this period of ceaseless in-fighting, he wrote his masterpiece, Leviathan, which established the foundation for Western political thought. His work has inspired both hate and awe, as he reveals the darker side of human nature and the value of authority. Though he claims man's nature is inherently competitive and selfish, he also shows us how to utilize these traits to our (...) advantage to flourish, be fearless, and free. (shrink)

Hobbes thinks that people who submit to government can not only hope for, but actually experience, something they recognize as a good life. The good life involves the exercise of harmless liberty—activity that the sovereign should not prohibit. The exchange of harmless liberty in the commonwealth for ruthless self-protection in the state of nature is what might be called Hobbes's peace dividend: the liberty of ordinary citizens to buy, sell, choose, and practice a trade as a source of income, and (...) the liberty to keep some of the proceeds if the state does not need resources for public protection. (shrink)

Hobbes’s account of the sovereign’s right to punish in Leviathan has led to a longstanding interpretive dispute. The debate is prompted by the fact that, prima facie, Hobbes makes two inconsistent claims: subjects (i) authorize all the acts of the sovereign, and are hence authors of their own punishment, yet (ii) have the liberty to resist such punishment. I argue that attending to Hobbes’s surprisingly neglected account of power yields a novel interpretation of his theory of punishment. Hobbes, it turns (...) out, is working with two conceptions of power: potestas, a juridical power, and potentia, a factual power. Each power grounds one of the ‘inconsistent’ claims above: potestas founds the authorized condemnation by the legal system, and potentia the factual enforced penalty, which is not directly authorized and can be resisted. (shrink)