Theories of Value

Many of the leading accounts of what makes a life meaningful are goal-based theories, according to which it is the pursuit of some specific goal (such as love for things that are worthy of love) that gives meaning to our lives. In this chapter I consider how these goal-based theories of meaning in life interact with the two main theories of the nature of time that have been defended in the recent metaphysics literature, namely, The Dynamic Theory of Time and (...) The Static Theory of Time. I argue that The Dynamic Theory fits well with goal-based theories of meaning in life, but The Static Theory does not. Then I close with some thoughts about what a Static Theorist should make of this conclusion. (shrink)

El trabajo busca acercarse a la comprensión de los rasgos particulares de los valores estéticos, fundamentalmente en las obras de arte. Para ello parte de la premisa de que el valor estético no es en sí mismo un atributo del objeto artístico, ni el resultado exclusivo de la plasmación en él de cierto ideal estético. Para que un objeto sea portador de valor estético ha de funcionar precisamente como tal, lo cual presupone la presencia y participación de otros sujetos que (...) así lo perciban y un contexto social que favorezca esa percepción. Asociar el valor estético a la función social del objeto, particularmente a su capacidad de enriquecer espiritualmente a su público receptor, permite comprenderlo dinámicamente y resolver muchas dificultades generadas por diferentes concepciones unilaterales del valor artístico . (shrink)

Perfectionism, broadly speaking, is the view that the development of certain characteristically human capacities is good. The view gains motivation in part from the intuitive pull of an objective approach to wellbeing, but dissatisfaction with objective list theory. According to objective list theory, goods such as knowledge, achievement, and friendship constitute good in a life. The objective list has terrific intuitive appeal – after all, it’s a list generated by reflecting on the good life. But as a theory, some find (...) it unsatisfying. What justifies presence on the list? On the traditional conception it is just a list and not much of a theory at all. Perfectionism captures the intuitive pull of the objective list and provides a unifying justification: the entries on the list share in common a special relationship to human nature. This essay gives an overview of perfectionism. (shrink)

To believe that every single scientist ought to be individually engaged in ethical thinking in order for science to be responsible at a collective level may be too demanding, if not plainly unrealistic. In fact, ethical labor is typically distributed across different kinds of scientists within the scientific community. Based on the empirical data collected within the Horizon 2020 ‘RRI-Practice’ project, we propose a classification of the members of the scientific community depending on their engagement in this collective activity. Our (...) classification offers, on the one hand, a model of how the ethical aspects of science are taken into consideration by scientists and, on the other, some indications on how to institutionalize ethics in science. (shrink)

Es posible abordar un tema como el que anuncia el título de este trabajo -la relación entre la educación у los valores- desde múltiples horizontes. Podemos tratar el asunto desde una perspectiva pedagógica, psicológica, histórica, sociológica, incluso, antropológica. En este trabajo se enfrenta la cuestión desde una dimensión más general, filosófica о axiológica, si tenemos en cuenta aquella rama de la filosofía que estudia de manera especial el tema de los valores. Para ello se parte de un acercamiento filosófico-axiológico a (...) los dos conceptos básicos del trabajo: la educación y los valores. (shrink)

A partir del reto axiológico que presupone el hecho de que sea el propio ser humano el creador de los principales peligros que amenazan su supervivencia, tanto en sus efectos naturales como sociales, en el trabajo se argumenta por qué ello es indicador del extravío de los valores fundamentales que debe guiar el accionar humano y cómo el rescate de una confiable brújula axiológica debe partir por asumir a la vida como el criterio último de lo valioso.

It is customary to think that Objective List (“OL), Desire-Satisfaction (“D-S”) and Hedonistic (“HED”) theories of prudential value pretty much cover the waterfront, and that those of the three that are “subjective” are naturalistic (in the sense attacked by Moore, Ross and Ewing), while those that are “objective” must be Platonic, Aristotelian or commit the naturalist fallacy. I here argue for a theory that is both naturalistic (because voluntaristic) and objective but neither Platonic, Aristotelian, nor (I hope) fallacious. In addition, (...) this proposal, called “CHOICE,” is an example of neither an OL, D-S, nor HED theory. It is a theory according to which uncoerced choosings create objective values that we (even everyone) may be wrong about, because valuations are conative rather than epistemic activities. On this view, intrinsic prudential goods necessarily involve likely (pursuant to lawlike regularities) net increases in successful free choosings . (shrink)

What is it exactly that we are attributing to a thing when we judge it to be good? According to the orthodox answer, at least in some cases when we judge that something is good we are attributing to it a monadic property. That is, good things are “just plain good.” I reject the orthodox view. In arguing against it, I begin with the idea that a plausible account of goodness must take seriously the intuitive claim that there is something (...) in common between moral and non-moral goodness—something in virtue of which it makes sense to call ‘good’ both the things that are morally good and the things that are non-morally good. However, it is implausible that all judgments about the goodness of things attribute a monadic property to those things, as this does not capture what we mean when we judge something to be non-morally good. Instead, I propose and defend my own relational theory of goodness according to which goodness is a relation that holds between things and ends (or goals). That is, goodness is a relational property such that to be good is to be related in the relevant way to some goal or another. This is true in both the mundane everyday cases and in loftier cases concerned with moral goodness. (shrink)

“Bioconservatives” in the human enhancement debate endorse the conservative claim that we should reject the use of biotechnologies that enhance natural human capacities. However, they often ground their objections to enhancement with contestable claims about human nature that are also in tension with other common tenets of conservatism. We argue that bioconservatives could raise a more plausible objection to enhancement by invoking a strain of conservative thought developed by G.A. Cohen. Although Cohen’s conservatism is not sufficient to fully revive the (...) bioconservative objection, we argue that it can be supplemented by an account of reasonable partiality for humanity in a way that provides further support to the bioconservative position in a manner congruous with broader conservatism. We propose that the idea of partiality to humanity can buttress the bioconservative objection into its strongest possible form. However, we conclude by arguing that, even in this form, the objection cannot do all the work that bioconservatives expect of it. (shrink)

The article starts with a brief overview of the kinds of approaches that have been attempted for the presentation of Phenomenology’s view on the emotions. I then pass to Husserl’s unsatisfactory efforts to disclose the intentionality of emotions and their intentional correlation with values. Next, I outline the idea of a new, “normalized phenomenological” approach of emotions and values. Pleasure and pain, then, are first explored as affective feelings . In the cases examined, it is shown that, primordially, pleasure and (...) pain are recordings for our bodily and spiritual states resulting from our confrontation with beings and situations in the world. Delight and distress are, subsequently, approached as the first full-fledged emotive acts that animate or intentionally interpret pleasure and pain in specific ways. The elementary values of agreeableness and disagreeableness appear correspondingly to the latter in relation to the very pleasure or pain and to what has caused them. In other words, agreeable and disagreeable show how what we confront in the world weighs for us, what value it has for the embodied intentional consciousness, for its state and functioning as well as for its existentio-praxial possibilities in the lifeworld. (shrink)

Formal Axiology and Its Critics consists of two parts, both of which present criticisms of the formal theory of values developed by Robert S. Hartman, replies to these criticisms, plus a short introduction to formal axiology.Part I consists of articles published or made public during the lifetime of Hartman to which he personally replied. It contains previously published replies to Hector Neri Castañeda, William Eckhardt, and Robert S. Brumbaugh, and previously unpublished replies to Charles Hartshorne, Rem B. Edwards, Robert E. (...) Carter, G.R. Grice, Nicholas Rescher, Robert W. Mueller, Gordon Welty, Pete Gunter, and George K. Plochmann in an unfinished but now completed article on which Hartman was working at the time of his death in 1973.Part II consists of articles presented at recent annual meetings of the R.S. Hartman Institute for Formal and Applied Axiology that continue to criticize and further develop Hartman's formal axiology. An article by Rem B. Edwards raises serious unanswered questions about formal axiology and ethics. Another by Frank G. Forrest shows how the formal value calculus based on set theory might answer these questions, and an article by Mark A. Moore points out weaknesses in the Hartman/Forrest value calculus and develops an alternative calculus based upon the mathematics of quantum mechanics. While recognizing that unsolved problems remain, the book intends to make the theoretical foundations and future promise of formal axiology much more secure. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss practical reasons and value, assuming a coexistence thesis according to which reasons and value always go together. I start by doing some taxonomy, distinguishing among three different ways of accounting for the relation between practical reasons and the good. I argue that, of these views, the most plausible one is that according to which something’s being good just consists in how certain facts about the thing in question – other than that of how it is (...) good – give us reasons to want it. It has been argued that this reasons-based account of goodness is open to various counter-examples. I consider a few, and argue that they misfire. (shrink)

In an intriguing essay, G. A. Cohen has defended a conservative bias in favour of existing value. In this paper, we consider whether Cohen’s conservatism raises a new challenge to the use of human enhancement technologies. We develop some of Cohen’s suggestive remarks into a new line of argument against human enhancement that, we believe, is in several ways superior to existing objections. However, we shall argue that on closer inspection, Cohen’s conservatism fails to offer grounds for a strong sweeping (...) objection to enhancement, and may even offer positive support for forms of enhancement that preserve valuable features of human beings. Nevertheless, we concede that Cohen’s arguments may suggest some plausible and important constraints on the modality of legitimate and desirable enhancements. (shrink)

The article is a presentation of Henryk Elzenberg’s system of formal axiology He is one of the most eminent Polish axiologists and moral philosophers of the 20th century. His system of philosophy of value is built on three pillars: a clear differentiation between two concepts of value: utilitarian and perfect; connection of the concept of perfect value with that of obligation by definition; approaches obligation pertaining to being as oppose to deed. The starting point is differentiation into utilitarian value and (...) perfect value, at the same time the main aim of his researches is the determination and analysis of the term perfect value “a valuable object in a perfect sense this is an object as it should be”. The perfect value contains, as it were, an imperative to fulfill it. Beauty, goodness and sanctity are the basic variations of perfect value. (shrink)

A Book Review on Rethinking language education and linguistic diversity in schools: Thematic report from a programme of expert workshops and peer learning activities (2016-17) European Commission, Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture, Day, L., Meierkord, A., (Publications Office), 2018, 14 pages, ISBN 978-92-79- 79241-0. Review by Thobias Sarbunan.

El objetivo de este trabajo consistió en establecer las bases metodológicas fundamentales de la concepción marxista de los valores al nivel que ellas se encontraban elaboradas por el autor a la altura de 1987. Esto se hace en contraposición crítica con diferentes teorías axiológicas no-marxistas occidentales y también con respecto a otros autores de inspiración marxista.

Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 5, May 2022.

El trabajo abordó críticamente la concepción axiológica del filósofo mexicano Eduardo García Maynez (1908-1993), quien defendió una postura objetivista en axiología, muy cercana a la del pensador alemán Nicolai Hartmann. Para García Maynez los problemas capitales de la axiología pueden ser reducidos a cuatro: 1.- El problema de la existencia del valor; 2.- El problema del conocimiento estimativo o valorativo; 3.- El problema de la realización de lo valioso; 4.- -El problema de la libertad de la persona frente a los (...) valores. En este trabajo se analizaron las principales ideas de este autor, fundamentalmente en relación con el primero de estos grandes problemas: el de la existencia de! Valor . (shrink)

Среди выдающихся латиноамериканских философов, которые так или иначе занимаются аксиологическими nроблемами, находится месиканец Эдуардo Гарсия Майнез. По мнению Майнеза, каnитальные проблемы аксиологии могут быть сведены к четырем: а) проблема существования ценности; б) nроблема оценочного nознания; в) проблема реализации ценности; д) проблема свободы выбора личностью ценности. В данной работе анализируется в основном те идеи этого автора, которые касаются nервой из этих больших nроблем - вопроса о существовании ценностей. Entre los más destacados filósofos mexicanos que trabajan la problemática axiológica se encuentra el (...) mexicano Eduardo García Maynez. En opinión de Maynez los problemas capitales de la axiología son cuatro: a) el problema de la existencia del valor; b) el problema del conocimiento valorativo; c) el problema de la realización del valor; d) el problema de la libertad del hombre en la elección del valor. En este trabajo se analiza, en los fundamental, las ideas de este autor referidas al primero de estos grandes problemas: el tema de la existencia de los valores. (shrink)

Отражая объективную действительность, мы не только познаем окружающий нас мир, но и оцениваем его с определенных позиций, с точки зрения тех или иных потребностей, стремлений, целей. Целью настоящей статьи является обсуждение некоторых идей о природе оценки и механизме ее вsаимоотношения с познанием. Al reflejar la realidad objetiva, no solo conocemos el mundo que nos rodea, sino que los valoramos desde determinadas posiciones, desde el punto de vista de unas u otras necesidades, inclinaciones, fines. El objetivo del presente artículo consiste en (...) el análisis de algunas ideas relacionadas con la naturaleza de la valoración y el mecanismo de su interrelación con el conocimiento. (shrink)

Диссертация на соискание ученой стеnени кандидата философских наук. Работа выnолнена в Московском государственном университете им. М.В.Ломоносова. Защита диссертации состоялась 27 января 1984 г. на заседании сnециализированного совета по философским наукам Цель диссертационного исследования состояла в том, чтобы показать природу оценочного отражения действительности и органическую связь познавательной и практической деятельности людей с деятельностью оценочной. Достижение поставленной цели предполагало решение следующих задач: 1.- определить объект оценочного отражения; 2.- раскрыть природу оценки как субъективного явления; 3.-выявить механизм взаимоотношения оценки и nознания в сруктуре человеческого (...) сознания; 4.- уточнить роль оценки в движении от практики к познанию и от познания к практике. Tesis en opción al grado científico de doctor en ciencias filosóficas. El trabajo se realizó en la Universidad Estatal de Moscú M. V. Lomonósov. La defensa de la tesis tuvo lugar el 27 de enero de 1984 en sesión del consejo especializado en ciencias filosóficas. El objetivo de la tesis consistió en mostrar la naturaleza del reflejo valorativo de la realidad y su nexo orgánico con las actividades cognoscitiva y práctica. El alcance de este objetivo presupuso solucionar las siguientes tareas: 1.- definir el objeto del reflejo valorativo; 2.- develar la naturaleza de la valoración como fenómeno subjetivo; 3.- describir el mecanismo de interrelación de la valoración con el conocimiento en la estructura de la conciencia humana; 4.- puntualizar el papel de la valoración en el movimiento de la práctica al conocimiento y del conocimiento a la práctica. (shrink)

Атореферат диссертации на соискание ученой стеnени кандидата философских наук. Работа выnолнена в Московском государственном университете им. М.В.Ломоносова. Защита диссертации состоялась 27 января 1984 г. на заседании сnециализированного совета по философским наукам Цель диссертационного исследования состояла в том, чтобы показать природу оценочного отражения действительности и органическую связь познавательной и практической деятельности людей с деятельностью оценочной. Resumen de la tesis en opción al grado científico de doctor en ciencias filosóficas. El trabajo se realizó en la Universidad Estatal de Moscú M. V. Lomonósov. (...) La defensa de la tesis tuvo lugar el 27 de enero de 1984 en sesión del consejo especializado en ciencias filosóficas. El objetivo de la tesis consistió en mostrar la naturaleza del reflejo valorativo de la realidad y su nexo orgánico con las actividades cognoscitiva y práctica. (shrink)

Why should be ‘better than’ be transitive? The leading answer in ethics is that values do not change with context. But this cannot be the entire source of transitivity, I argue, since transitivity can fail even if values never change, so long as they are complex, with multiple dimensions combined non-additively. I conclude by exploring a new hypothesis: that all alleged cases of nontransitive betterness, such as Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion, can and should be modeled as the result of complexity, not (...) context-relativity. (shrink)

This essay introduces a new type of measure of social welfare, where populations are evaluated by their resemblance to an optimum population, which is an (in principle) possible population with the highest degree of social welfare, relative to some circumstances. Here it is argued to be the largest possible population where everyone fares maximally well. The new measure is responsive to quality of welfare, equality of welfare, and the number of people. It satisfies dominance and negative monotonicity, and it avoids (...) both the repugnant conclusion and a reverse repugnant conclusion for comparisons relative to our future on earth. (shrink)

John Martin Fischer’s Death, Immortality, and Meaning in Life puts forth a view that individual experiences could provide us with sources of endless fascination, motivation, and value if only we could live forever to continue to enjoy them. In this article I advocate for more caution about embracing this picture by pointing to three points of tension in Fischer's book. First, I argue that taking meaningfulness in life to be holistic is not compatible with the view immortal lives would be (...) recognizably humanlike. Next, I interrogate Fischer’s claim that that worries about boredom in immortal lives are predicated on the false view that our pursuits are compelling to us because we value them instrumentally, showing that he relies on a more controversial view of the value of our pursuits. Finally, I argue that Fischer’s naturalistic reinterpretation of the value of Near-Death experiences falls somewhat short of capturing their poignancy. Given Fischer’s seeming acknowledgment that what we get from an experience is sometimes ineffable, I argue that he ought to be less skeptical that a genuine Near-Death Experience would give the person experiencing it some (defeasible) evidence of the supernatural. (shrink)

This chapter presents several arguments related to Parfit's notion of evaluative imprecision and his imprecisionist lexical view of population ethics. After sketching Parfit's view, it argues that, contrary to Parfit, imprecision and lexicality are both compatible with thinking about goodness in terms of positions on a scale of value. Then, by examining the role that imprecision is meant to play in defusing spectrum argument, it suggests that imprecision should be identified with vagueness. Next, it argues that there is space for (...) robust moral realists to think of evaluative vagueness as a semantic phenomenon, illustrating this view with a version of conceptual role semantics on which the precisifications of betterness are correctness conditions for the precisifications of preference. Finally, it gives a probability-based argument against the imprecisionist lexical view. (shrink)

I consider paradoxical spectrum arguments involving transitive relations like 'better than'. I argue that, despite being formally different from sorites arguments, at least some spectrum arguments arise from vagueness, and that vagueness might often be the most natural diagnosis.

This book attempts to open up a path towards a phenomenological theory of values. By drawing on everyday experience, and dissociating the notion of value from that of tradition, it shows how emotional sensibility can be integrated to practical reason. This project was prompted by the persuasion that the fragility of democracy, and the current public irrelevance of the ideal principles which support it, largely depend on the inability of modern philosophy to overcome the well-entrenched skepticism about the power of (...) practical reason. The book begins with a phenomenology of cynical consciousness, continues with a survey of still influential theories of value rooted in 20th century philosophy, and finally offers an outline of a bottom-up axiology that revives the anti-skeptical legacy of phenomenology, without ignoring the standards set by contemporary metaethics. (shrink)

The ‘black box’ in Stoic axiology refers to the mysterious connection between the input of Stoic deliberation (reasons generated by the value of indifferents) and the output (appropriate actions). In this paper, I peer into the black box by drawing an analogy between Stoic and Kantian axiology. The value and disvalue of indifferents is intrinsic, but conditional. An extrinsic condition on the value of a token indifferent is that one's selection of that indifferent is sanctioned by context-relative ethical principles. The (...) value of an indifferent that does not meet this condition is normatively silenced, such that it fails to constitute a reason for action. (shrink)

Parfit (2017) proposed a novel principle for outcome betterness in different people and different number choices. It is claimed to solve the Non-Identity Problem while avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion, and it shall do so in person-affecting rather than in impersonal terms. According to this Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle, one of two outcomes would be (i) in one way better if this outcome would together benefit people more, and (ii) in another way better if this outcome would benefit each person more. (...) I argue that a plausible construal of this principle has two features that make it vulnerable to objections. First, the most plausible interpretation of the second part of the principle turns out to incorporate an average function. Although this helps to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, it implausibly implies that it can be better to add further people with less bad but still miserable lives to populations consisting only of lives full of suffering. Second, the principle is not based on a comparative but on an intrinsic notion of benefit. This allows to solve the Non-Identity Problem, yet it accounts only for a weak sense of person-affecting rather than for the more substantive person-affecting intuition that it is morally significant that particular people are made better (or worse) off. Eventually, I highlight what we can, nevertheless, learn from Parfit’s idea of combining different ways in which outcomes might be better. (shrink)

In Almost Over: Aging, Dying, Dead, Frances Kamm seeks to make sense of people’s widely variant choices about which lives they would choose to continue living. She does this by defending the Prudential Prerogative, which, in analogy to the Moral Prerogative, holds that in a fairly wide range of conditions we are under no intrapersonal rational obligation to choose either to die or to live on. I argue against Kamm's case for the Prudential Prerogative in favor of Life Holism, the (...) view that you ought to live the life that would be best for you as an individual when each potential life is considered as a whole. I argue that the features of the Moral Prerogative that make it an attractive principle do not transfer to the Prudential Prerogative, and that Life Holism can better account for the perspectival and non-summative features of the normative phenomena Kamm wants to capture while retaining a tight connection between reasons and goodness. (shrink)

Should we make significant sacrifices to ever-so-slightly lower the chance of extremely bad outcomes, or to ever-so-slightly raise the chance of extremely good outcomes? *Fanaticism* says yes: for every bad outcome, there is a tiny chance of extreme disaster that is even worse, and for every good outcome, there is a tiny chance of an enormous good that is even better. I consider two related recent arguments for Fanaticism: Beckstead and Thomas's argument from *strange dependence on space and time*, and (...) Wilkinson's *Indology* argument. While both arguments are instructive, neither is persuasive. In fact, the general principles that underwrite the arguments (a *separability* principle in the first case, and a *reflection* principle in the second) are *inconsistent* with Fanaticism. In both cases, though, it is possible to rehabilitate arguments for Fanaticism based on restricted versions of those principles. The situation is unstable: plausible general principles tell *against* Fanaticism, but restrictions of those same principles (with strengthened auxiliary assumptions) *support* Fanaticism. All of the consistent views that emerge are very strange. (shrink)

The concept of natural otherness can be found throughout the environmental ethics literature. Drawing on this concept, this article pursues two aims. For one, it argues for an account of individual natural otherness as stable difference as opposed to accounts of natural otherness that put more emphasis on independence for the purpose of differentiating individual natural otherness from the concept of wildness. Secondly, this account of natural otherness is engaged to argue for a particular way of theorising the moral standing (...) of individual nonhuman entities. While individual natural otherness in itself does not provide an account of whether an entity matters morally in itself (that is, whether it is morally considerable); it points to an account of incommensurable moral significance for all entities which are attributed moral considerability. That is an often-overlooked alternative to egalitarian or hierarchical accounts or moral significance. Individual natural otherness understood in this way in turn provides another explanatory story for why relational accounts of environmental ethics that strongly emphasise the importance of concepts such as wildness are particularly salient. (shrink)

El ensayo tiene como tema central el desarrollo de la capacidad valorativa y la participación que en este proceso tienen lo genético y lo sociocultural. Nos interesa mostrar las premisas biológicas generales de esa relación y enfatizar en la especificidad cualitativamente humana de su desarrollo, todo ello sobre todo desde el ángulo del vínculo entre las influencias genéticas y del medio y sus respectivos papeles en la determinación del desarrollo de aquella capacidad que a nivel humano identificamos como valoración. -/- (...) . (shrink)

Se trata de una reflexión que indaga en torno a la naturaleza de las relaciones posibles entre el ejercicio de la dominación política y los valores morales. El discurso justificador del poder, de raíces axiológicas, es revisado desde por lo menos tres miradores. El primero es el de Juan Jacobo Rousseau, el segundo el de Michael Foucault y, finalmente, el de Luis Villoro. La idea es encontrar la clave a un viejo y espinoso tema de la moral pública: la legitimidad (...) objetiva de los valores superiores al interés particular. (shrink)

La experiencia histórica confirma la necesaria presencia de relaciones mercantiles en cualquier proyecto socialista diseñado hoy con un mínimo de realismo. Parece ya evidente que no es la mera exclusión o inclusión del mercado lo que distingue al socialismo y al capitalismo. Mas el alto consenso actual que el mercado ha logrado a su favor, no mitiga las importantes secuelas negativas que este origina cuando es dejado a su funcionamiento espontáneo. De ahí que todos los modelos socialistas que se discuten (...) en la actualidad tengan este asunto como uno de sus ejes centrales de análisis. Las relaciones mercantiles en el socialismo tienen necesariamente que ser reguladas y subordinadas a determinados valores, de manera que puedan ser garantizadas las cuotas de justicia social que tal tipo de sociedad incorpora a las relaciones humanas. ¿Cuáles son esas regulaciones? ¿Hasta dónde han de limitar el libre juego de las leyes del mercado? ¿Es, en principio, posible la moralización exterior de este último? Para aproximar una respuesta a estas interrogantes, se hace imprescindible reflexionar sobre otra cuestión: ¿qué implicaciones humanas tienen las relaciones mercantiles?, ¿por qué exigen reguladores especiales externos al trascender a la nueva sociedad socialista? (shrink)

Se ofrece un grupo de reflexiones acerca del vínculo entre dos conceptos de amplio uso en el lenguaje académico y no académico contemporáneo: valores universales y problemas globales. ¿Qué son los valores universales? ¿Por qué los seres humanos difieren en cuanto a su interpretación? ¿En qué medida el surgimiento y agudización de los problemas globales se asocia a una práctica distanciada de los verdaderos valores universales? ¿Qué hacer para que sean estos últimos los que en realidad sustenten las relaciones internacionales? (...) ¿Qué papel desempeñan estos valores en la búsqueda de soluciones a los problemas globales? El presente trabajo pretende aproximar una respuesta a estas interrogantes. (shrink)

Se valoran las principales ideas axiológicas de filósofo mexicano Miguel Bueno, a través de una de sus obras medulares –“Contribución a la teoría de los valores”– con el objetivo de desentrañar, su comprensión tanto de la naturaleza de los valores, como de su jerarquía de los valores, aspectos estos nodales de la concepción axiológica del autor. Sobre esta base se realiza un enjuiciamiento crítico de sus propuestas teóricas.

El trabajo aborda, desde una perspectiva marxista, un importante y complejo problema teórico asociado a la supuesta falsedad de toda ideología. Se trata del problema de la veracidad de la valoración, calificado más de una vez como de imposible solución, dado el vínculo de los juicios valorativos con las necesidades, intereses y otros fenómenos subjetivos de la conciencia humana. La negación de la existencia de la verdad valorativa conduce inevitablemente a su negación en la ideología, compuesta fundamentalmente por juicios valorativos (...) y, por lo tanto, sirve de sustento gnoseológico a las diversas variantes de la teoría de la desideologización. El enfoque crítico de estas consideraciones se desarrolla en el artículo sobre la base del análisis de la dialéctica de lo general y lo particular en la verdad valorativa, haciendo énfasis, ante todo, en la especificidad de esta última en comparación con cualquier otra verdad del conocimiento. (shrink)