Social and Political Philosophy

I hold profound respect for all individuals, regardless of gender, race, sexual orientation, or any other characteristic, advocating strongly for equality and equity worldwide. Throughout my career as a scientist, I have demonstrated this respect, including for female students and colleagues, supporting them with recommendations and accolades. I have always cherished diversity in my academic and professional circles and I hugely value the contributions of women like Marie Curie and Maryam Mirzakhani, as well as authors such as Agatha Christie and (...) J.K. Rowling. In my personal life, I express my love and admiration for my girlfriend through poetry and gestures, while also honoring my parents, especially my mother, who instilled in me a deep respect for all individuals. Raised in a family that values and respects women, I have been positively impacted by my mother, a retired teacher, and my father, a novelist who often portrays the life of Turkmen women in his works. Overall, my commitment to respecting and valuing all individuals, regardless of their background or identity, remains unwavering. (shrink)

Despite the growing attention to oppression and resistance in social and political philosophy as well as ethics, philosophers continue to struggle to describe and appropriately attribute agency under non-ideal circumstances of oppression and structural injustice. This chapter identifies some features of new accounts of non-ideal agency and then examines a particular problem for such theories, what Serene Khader has called the agency dilemma. Under the agency dilemma, attempts to articulate the agency of subjects living under oppression must on the one (...) hand avoid overemphasizing constraints on agency, and thereby producing paternalistic theories that “deny agency” for oppressed subjects, and on the other hand avoid failing to fully appreciate the effects of oppression on agency, thereby missing crucial features of how oppression unjustly shapes a person’s lived possibilities. This chapter traces this dilemma to a preoccupation with ascribing agency, which produces problematic descriptive and political effects for theorizing agency under oppression: what the author calls an asymmetry problem and a disenfranchisement problem. Finally, the chapter proposes that the agency dilemma might be ameliorated if theorists scrutinize more closely how moral, epistemic, and political agency interact and overlap in life under oppression. (shrink)

The well-respected, South African Philosopher, Abdullah Beni, writes his critique of neoliberalism from a feminist perspective. Abdullah Beni, who’s academic focus is on Ethics, political philosophy and feminist theory, writes an article expressing his philosophical views on contemporary issues. This article challenges the prevailing notion of feminist freedom rooted in individual choice, influenced by neoliberal ideology. While choice is integral, it argues for a broader perspective acknowledging systemic inequalities shaping women's options. Highlighting the flawed promises of neoliberalism, it discusses how (...) economic disparities and workplace discrimination hinder genuine choice. It advocates for policies promoting economic justice, workplace equality, and reproductive rights as essential for feminist freedom. Ultimately, it calls for collective action to dismantle barriers and create a society where all women have the genuine power to shape their lives. (shrink)

A thought, taken as a propositional attitude or the content of psychological predicates such as believe, wish, desire, hope, is ascribed to an entity with mental states. A thought is not only allegedly ascribed to particular non-mental things like computer, book, it is also ascribed to non-material things, linguistically in plural terms, e.g. plural pronouns (e.g. we, they), collective names or singular proper names (e.g. the United States), proper names in plural form or general terms (e.g. the Microsoft, feminists). Plural (...) terms are terms referring to groups of entities. The question is - what is it for a group to have a thought? Two main views are currently on centered stage – the literal view and the metaphorical view. This paper argues that the main argument supporting the literal view, in particular Pettit’s view, faces three main problems, namely, the problem of rule-following in propositional coawareness, the problem of an independent verifiability for group beliefs and the problem of the indexical ‘we’- thought. -/- Keywords: thoughts, collective intentionality, social ontology, group agency, group consciousness . (shrink)

The political issue of Catalan independence requires us to think about it as Europeans. Since the end of the Second World War, we have created a space for democracy in Europe. This is why the question of Catalonia concerns us. This is not an internal political conflict within the Spanish state – the conflict between Catalonia and Spain is our responsibility. Responsibility means the response we make to the political demands of our world through our understanding, as giving a response (...) is an existential way of being specific to humans. Attempting to "understand the world", a task of reflection called for by Hannah Arendt, is to be concerned about the shared world. Human rights are at stake. We will ask ourselves whether the right to self-determination can be applied to Catalans. Therefore, it is the fundamental political concepts of people, sovereignty, nation and independence on which this right is based that need to be clarified. Our phenomenological analysis will consist of untangling the knots, removing prejudices, and dismantling ideological constructions to be able to judge freely. (shrink)

Pourquoi les catalans revendiquent-ils l'indépendance de la Catalogne ? Sont-ils un peuple, une nation ? Une nation en Europe peut-elle encore établir son État ? L'auteure propose une analyse en pensant à neuf les concepts politiques pour entendre ce qui est en jeu en ce moment décisif de l'histoire européenne. Il devient alors possible de comprendre la raison pour laquelle le droit à l'autodétermination s'applique à leur cas. Il importe de distinguer nation et nationalisme. Ces Discours sont trois essais de (...) phénoménologie politique qui s'adressent aux catalans et aux européens. Ouvrir les possibles – telle est l'affaire de la philosophie. (shrink)

While Hermann Levin Goldschmidt didn’t read Yiddish anarchists, there seems to have been a convergent evolution in their thinking. Goldschmidt’s looking up to Jewish lore as a source of liberating creativity is commonly encountered in Yiddish anarchist texts. His view of action as a constant response to internal and external challenges in the struggle for an open future is developed by Isaac Nachman Steinberg on the basis of nineteenth-century vitalism. Goldschmidt’s theory of anarchist individualism as willed self-limiting solidarity has a (...) compelling parallel in Hillel Solotaroff’s view of history. His use of impressionism and photography to eternalize the immediacy of human actuality is akin to Rudolf Rocker’s championing of decadent literature. In both cases, the goal of anarchism is not a dictatorship of the former downtrodden, but a continuous and contradictory evolution of freedom in ever-changing contexts. (shrink)

This paper offers a neo-Aristotelian approach to PCSR aimed at enabling us to more systematically ascertain which sorts of corporate political activities, if any, might be politically acceptable. Part 1 sketches Aristotle’s account of the “political.” Aristotelian politics have at least four key dimensions. When we speak of PCSR, we should, from this Aristotelian perspective, evaluate how specific behaviors accord with or undermine these four aspects of political life. Part 2 of the paper explores which forms of activity by corporations (...) qualify as genuinely (and thus acceptably) political within a neo-Aristotelian framework. Part 3 highlights strengths and limitations of this approach to PCSR. (shrink)

This article reconstructs a Received View of the right to marry in the European Convention on Human Rights and provides its philosophical interpretation. According to the Received View, the right to marry is a right to a legal institution of marriage. Recent case law from the European Court of Human Rights is analysed, with a focus on the protection and recognition of personal relationships under the law. According to the Fedotova case, the rights pertaining to the protection of conjugal relationships (...) stem from the right to family life. The problem of non-distinctiveness of the right to marry is being discussed. If substantial rights protecting conjugal couples stem from the right to family life, then the right to marry does not offer any additional protection for the couple. The Received View addresses this issue. However, it is politically and morally unjust. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Democracy in an Uncertain World:Expertise as a Provisional Response to VulnerabilityRobert Smid (bio)In the final chapter of American Immanence, Michael Hogue writes that "[r]ather than asking the foundationalist question of what epistemology is needed to ground or justify democracy, the pragmatist asks what epistemology democracy entails. What 'way of knowing' follows from, or is appropriate to, democracy as an associational ethos of vulnerable life?"1 While Hogue and I have (...) explored similar themes in our research on the promises and perils of democracy, this statement identifies a key difference in our respective approaches that has significant implications for the role that democracy can and should play in inquiry as well as for its potential to revolutionize civilization as we know it in the Anthropocene.In what follows, I raise three interrelated points that interrogate that difference. The first pertains to the role of foundations, provisional or otherwise, in Hogue's work, and results in a challenge to the special status seemingly given to democracy and a proposed inversion of the relation he poses between epistemology and democracy. The second pertains to the role of education in a democracy. This is a dimension of traditional pragmatist discourse on democracy that is conspicuously absent in Hogue's book, yet one that has significant implications for his argument. In this section, I will draw out the Deweyan strains of that discourse that appear to inform Hogue's work and contrast them with a Peircean take that yields notably different outcomes. The third point addresses the relation between democracy and sovereignty, a relation that Hogue explicitly eschews but that I will argue maintains some validity within democratic discourse, albeit in a more modest and provisional form. Finally, I draw these three points together in a conclusion that affirms much of Hogue's argument—including the profound vulnerability manifested by the Anthropocene and the need for more resilient forms of associated life—but assert that democracy is no less vulnerable than any other aspect of our uncertain world and therefore cannot be expected to possess within itself all that is necessary for its ongoing development. Building on the inversion of democracy and epistemology in the first section, the constitutive role of education in a [End Page 30] democracy as laid out in the second section, and the argument for a mitigated sovereignty in the third section, I argue that professional expertise provides an acceptable and necessary default when democratic structures fail.I. Provisional FoundationsAs a theopolitics rooted in religious naturalism, Hogue's understanding of democracy is one that is "embodied, relational, and vulnerable."2 That is, knowledge, meaning, and value all emerge out of and are conditioned by their social context, and shift according to the interests and needs of those who lay claim to them. Accordingly, Hogue's argument for democracy is that it is the way of life that allows for the broadest possible participation in such constructions, and which responds most effectively to the conditions of uncertainty and vulnerability surrounding them. It comes as no surprise, then, that his account of democracy is antifoundational, recognizing not only that all inquiry begins in medias res, but also that it emerges from a wide variety of media and that, while one goal of democratic discourse may be to chart a coherent path forward, both the media and the proposed paths are subject to change at any moment. Such antifoundationalism is a fairly standard commitment in pragmatist and process discourse, and thus relatively uncontroversial in its own right. It is worth noting, however, that being committed to antifoundationalism and actually being antifoundationalist in practice are often two very different things, our best efforts to the contrary notwithstanding.It is clear from Hogue's book that he resists any foundationalist epistemology, opting instead to derive his epistemology from democratic practice. As noted above, he asks "[w]hat 'way of knowing' follows from, or is appropriate to, democracy as an associational ethos of vulnerable life?"3 While it is possible that there is one epistemology that is best suited to democracy understood in this way, that epistemology would not, by his account, stand on its own foundation but be contingent on one... (shrink)

The article discusses retributive justice and punitive restraint in response to the worst types of crime. I take the Breivik Case as a starting point. Anders Behring Breivik was sentenced to 21 years of preventive detention for killing 69 people, mainly youths, at Utøya and 8 people in Oslo on July 22nd, 2011. Retributivist theories as well as commonly held retributive intuitions suggest that much harsher punishment is required for such crimes. According to some retributivist theories, most notably on the (...) influential theories of Kant and Hegel, the death penalty is warranted for murderers like Breivik. This suggests that the rationale for punitive restraint in a case like the Breivik Case can only be found in forward- looking, consequentialist theories of punishment, or by adding to retributivist theories a side-constraint in the form of a principle of parsimony. However, I argue that if we look closer at the function of punishment in the retributivist theories of Kant and Hegel, they too imply a rationale for punitive restraint, even for such horrific crimes as here discussed. Against Kant and Hegel’s own views on the death penalty, I argue that their broader “freedom theories” of retributive justice do not imply the justice of the death penalty or life imprisonment. In the last part of the article, I explore differences in the concepts of freedom entailed by Kant and Hegel’s theories, and I relate these to some of the background factors relevant to the Breivik Case. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Toward Resilient DemocracyCognitive Resources and ConstraintsJohn Teehan (bio)I. Introduction: The Cognitive Science of ReligionAmerican Immanence, an important and insightful work, offers an analysis of the existential crisis facing American democracy, and a possible path through this crisis. In developing this path, Michael Hogue asks, "can the feeling and awareness of the precarious value of life …awaken us to the precious depths of immanence, to living as if this, our (...) one and only world, matters ultimately?"1 Such an awakening, he argues, is vital to developing a "resilient democracy." I believe the answer to his question is "yes," and a positive answer to this profound question is sufficient warrant for exploring the path Hogue sets out. However, there is another question, one with broader implications: can this moral vision be adopted on a wide enough scale to attain the critical mass necessary to develop a democracy sufficiently resilient to weather this crisis? I will explore this second question using the insights derived from cognitive science, and particularly from the cognitive science of religion. This approach picks up on Hogue's invitation to interpret religion "within the evolutionary contexts of natural history,"2 and concurs with his claim that in "demystifying religion" an "evolutionary account …opens the way to a religious experience."3The Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) is grounded in an evolutionary understanding of human cognitive and emotional processes, as these processes have developed to enable the species to respond to the challenges of survival and reproduction in dynamic environments, both physical and social. These cognitive tools were not shaped to discern some pre-given reality, but rather to serve the practical goals of natural beings embedded in natural situations. CSR, then, is congruent with the immanental philosophy, grounded in pragmatism, that Hogue develops in his book. Indeed, it can be argued that the methodology of CSR implicitly entails a pragmatist epistemology4. The various [End Page 65] mental tools and resultant religious beliefs and rituals all serve the ultimate goal of successful action within natural situations. CSR, then, can provide an empirical account of at least some of the processes that would be involved in actualizing an immanental political theology, and may identify some of the cognitive obstacles to that project.It is beyond the scope of this essay to set out a detailed account of CSR, but it will suffice to introduce some general tenets that have played a seminal role in the field.5 Those elements of a cultural system that we would deem religious are derived from natural cognitive processes that evolved to allow our earliest ancestors to successfully navigate an uncertain and dangerous environment.6 As an example, let's consider the gods, understanding by the "gods" any of the various beings that might commonly be termed "supernatural" (e.g., gods, spirits, ghosts, demons, fairies, divine ancestors, etc.). Belief in gods is theorized to flow, in part, from natural cognitive mechanisms for the detection of agents (that is, beings that act with intent). The ability to detect such beings—beings that might pose a danger—is essential to surviving in an uncertain and dangerous world. This ability was so vital that natural selection favored the evolution of a cognitive process for detecting agents that is hypersensitive.7 Detecting the presence of an agent when none is actually present is a much safer error than failing to detect an actual predator, and so this cognitive strategy could regularly give rise to false positives.Detecting the presence of an agent is the beginning phase of devising effective action, but to determine how to respond to this perceived agent, we must make sense of its possible intent. Therefore, we do not merely perceive a presence, we ascribe intention and purpose to that agent. In doing so, we engage the mental process termed Theory of Mind (ToM).8 Detecting the [End Page 66] action of agents, and determining intention and purpose, are vital to successful action. In a dangerous and uncertain world—i.e. the world in which humans have lived for millennia—these skills are essential to survival, and it follows that natural selection would favor cognitive processes that erred on the side of... (shrink)

The assumptions of democracy as an associational ethos of vulnerable life are, first, that we don't already know how best to order our common life and, second, that we don't know what the abstract ideals of empathy, emancipation, and equity entail in the concrete.In American Immanence: Democracy for an Uncertain World, Michael S. Hogue grounds his proposal for a political theology in a critique of American exceptionalism and its supportive "redeemer symbolic."2 In the Anthropocene era, Hogue states, American exceptionalism "legitimates (...) the extraction of diverse forms of value and justifies the externalization of diverse costs" (29) with unconscionable costs to the natural environment and international justice. As... Read More. (shrink)

Dans les débats contemporains sur la justice, la vulnérabilité est porteuse d’un puissant contenu normatif et pratique. Elle offre des descriptions riches des expériences humaines prenant en considération des relations complexes et ambivalentes qui sont tues sous la seule norme de l’individualisme libéral. Il ne s’agit pas de rejeter l’importance d’une vie autonome, mais de repenser les cadres normatifs qui lui donnent un sens et de revoir les moyens de l’atteindre. La vulnérabilité, bien qu’elle se manifeste comme un idéal normatif (...) fort, révélateur de changements conceptuels et pratiques, n’est toutefois pas un concept univoque. Les chapitres qui composent cet ouvrage illustrent la diversité des significations et des contextes de vie auxquels renvoie la vulnérabilité. Faut-il s’en surprendre? Non, si l’on prend en compte que son usage comme idée phare de la théorie politique est encore récent, et qu’à ce titre sa signification et sa pratique sont encore l’objet de débats. (shrink)

Jean-Marc Narbonne est reconnu internationalement pour ses travaux sur le néoplatonisme et la métaphysique grecque. Il dirige actuellement la Chaire de recherche du Canada en Antiquité critique et modernité émergente (ACMÉ), qui vise à mettre en lumière le rôle que l’héritage philosophique et littéraire de la Grèce antique a joué dans la modernité, et son importance pour la démocratie telle que nous la connaissons et qu’il nous revient encore aujourd’hui de la construire. Les présents entretiens permettent de mieux comprendre les (...) liens qui unissent ces deux moments de sa trajectoire, depuis son point de départ dans la vie intellectuelle au Québec et dans les débats contemporains de la philosophie continentale. Il se veulent ainsi le portrait d’un penseur original, qui est resté fidèle à des questions posées dès ses années de formation et à une culture antique qu’il n’a cessé par ses travaux d’illustrer et de faire connaître. (shrink)

Comme une symphonie, la justice s’écoute et se déchiffre grâce aux notes qui la composent. Le résultat est l’effet dynamique des notes. On ne dit pas ce qu’est la justice, mais ce qui est conforme à la justice qui fait partie de nous, de l’Être et de la société. Dans la symphonie de la justice, le droit ou les droits interviennent comme une sorte d’interludes pour assurer l’oralité et les tonalités musicales de la justice.Le droit ou les droits prescrivent les (...) contours de la justice. Les interludes garantissent l’accord des discordants dans une cohésion sonore qui témoigne de proportions musicales. Dans ce livre, nous proposons une nouvelle lecture de la culture juridique et politique des Hellènes ainsi que les perspectives qu’elle ouvre pour la postmodernité, autour des chapitres suivants : a. Le cosmos chez les Hellènes. Le droit en éthique et politique ; b. Le pathétique philosophique et tragique dans la musique de la physis ; c. Les harmoniques du dikaion physikon (droit naturel) et les notes de la dialectique dans l’univers de la justice politique ; d. L’existence et la personne avec les prétendants de la justice dans les interludes de l’Être ; e. Les interludes de la justice personnaliste moderne ; f. Les revenants grecs dans les visions d’aujourd’hui. (shrink)

Examines the political dimensions of Aristophanes’ comic poetry. This original and wide-ranging collection of essays offers, for the first time, a comprehensive examination of the political dimensions of that madcap comic poet Aristophanes. Rejecting the claim that Aristophanes is little more than a mere comedian, the contributors to this fascinating volume demonstrate that Aristophanes deserves to be placed in the ranks of the greatest Greek political thinkers. As these essays reveal, all of Aristophanes’ plays treat issues of fundamental political importance, (...) from war and peace, poverty and wealth, the relation between the sexes, demagoguery and democracy to the role of philosophy and poetry in political society. Accessible to students as well as scholars, The Political Theory of Aristophanes can be utilized easily in the classroom, but at the same time serve as a valuable source for those conducting more advanced research. Whether the field is political philosophy, classical studies, history, or literary criticism, this work will make it necessary to reconceptualize how we understand this great Athenian poet and force us to recognize the political ramifications and underpinnings of his uproarious comedies. Jeremy J. Mhire is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Louisiana Tech University. Bryan-Paul Frost is James A. and Kaye L. Crocker Endowed Professor of Political Science at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette and the coeditor (with Jeffrey Sikkenga) of History of American Political Thought. (shrink)

Foundation models such as GPT-4 are fine-tuned to avoid unsafe or otherwise problematic behavior, so that, for example, they refuse to comply with requests for help with committing crimes or with producing racist text. One approach to fine-tuning, called reinforcement learning from human feedback, learns from humans' expressed preferences over multiple outputs. Another approach is constitutional AI, in which the input from humans is a list of high-level principles. But how do we deal with potentially diverging input from humans? How (...) can we aggregate the input into consistent data about "collective" preferences or otherwise use it to make collective choices about model behavior? In this paper, we argue that the field of social choice is well positioned to address these questions, and we discuss ways forward for this agenda, drawing on discussions in a recent workshop on Social Choice for AI Ethics and Safety held in Berkeley, CA, USA in December 2023. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that parents have a fundamental moral obligation to consider and treat their children as each other’s equals. Yet the question of what grounds the equality of status among children in the eyes of their parents has so far been largely neglected in the literature on the philosophy of childhood and the ethics of parenthood. This paper fills this gap by developing a novel theory of the basis of filial equality: it argues that parents ought to consider (...) and treat their children as equals by virtue of loving them. Parental love is the basis of filial equality. (shrink)

This study attempted to answer the question of how to share the values and ethics of youth work among practitioners and with policymakers, funders, and society. Although social interest in youth support in Japan has been on rise recently due to the increase number of difficulties surrounding young people, the ‘ethics and values’ in practice and in the field can be driven by the neoliberal social and political trends present in our society. This study presents a way to resist and (...) counter the penetration of neoliberal practical ethics and organisational management through the process of visualising, sharing and legitimising the ‘practical ethics and values’ embedded in the fields where youth work has been developed with young people. This is the research-based practice of ‘practitioners collectively telling, writing, sharing, and communicating the stories of practice’. (shrink)

Palestinian rock climbers in the West Bank ascend towering limestone cliffs despite being forcibly dispossessed and targeted by Israeli military and violent settlers. This paper examines their actions from the perspective of Quiet Resistance – a form of resistance where one is motivated by personal reasons to pursue activities that are obstructed by oppression. I explain what Quiet Resistance is, how it differs from political protest, and what makes it distinctively valuable. Then, I explain how Quiet Resistance allows the Palestinian (...) climbers to maintain sources of meaning in life under oppressive circumstances. Further, as a form of symbolic action, it allows the climbers to forge a profound connection to their rightful land. (shrink)

The Dialogues of Confucius (Kongzi Jia Yu 孔子家語) is an unexplored resource for the philosophy of Confucius. In this article, I make a first attempt at mining its riches. Focusing on Chapters 21 and 32, I reconstruct a multilevel theory of governing that is a cyclic process proceeding from the moral psychology of the individual to social organization, to the society as grounded in natural processes, and to the metaphysics of the natural processes themselves, thus adumbrating a metaphysics of morals (...) from the microcosmic to the macrocosmic. This movement between macrocosmic and microcosmic levels encompasses moral psychology, economics, politics, aesthetics, and metaphysics. The metaphysical forces that account for the blowing of the wind and the motivation of human behavior are forces that flow when functioning properly and that otherwise stagnate. Maintaining that flow is the task of the leadership. Once that task is accomplished, and the flywheel spins of its own momentum, the people become self-governing. This multilevel cyclic process is compared to contemporary Western economic and political theory that is based on the unimpeded individual, aggregated into majoritarian democratic rule, based on the social contract, and vulnerable to the tragedy of the commons. Contrary to current Confucian-based correctives to democracy that seek to limit the power of the people, this Confucian argument empowers the people via a frugal, caring, well-regulated leadership. (shrink)

Democracy is a political system that has some universal appeal, and, this seems to invest it with some kind of legitimacy over other systems of government. But this in no way suggests that it is homogenously conceived or practiced across the world—particularly in Western and African countries. Yet there is some supposition that some cultures have (almost) perfected their practice of democracy while others are learning its rudiments. This tends to arouse the philosopher's interest in the conceptual and practical bases (...) for the supposition. In African philosophy, the notion of consensus has often been touted as a kernel and mēnsūra for evidence of democracy in traditional African thought. This paper examines the propriety of this move, taking into account the specific positions of the Ghanaian philosophers, Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye. It explores the political dynamics of contemporary Africa and brings out the challenges and prospects for the sort of democracy that is being practiced—or, at least, is said to be practiced—in Africa. It is often debated in African political thought whether consensus or majoritarian rule (characterized by such activities as voting and multipartism) defines democracy, but the paper argues that neither of them really brings about democracy. It then highlights the humanistic end of democracy. Using the Ghanaian experience especially, the paper proposes ways of improving the understanding and practice of democracy in Africa. (shrink)

This is the supplementary dataset to the article entitled "Online Knowledge Production in Polarized Political Memes: The Case of Critical Race Theory." This study, completed by Alyvia Walters, Tawfiq Ammari, Kiran Garimella, and Shagun Jhaver, was accepted for publication in New Media & Society in 2024. Description of files: Memes Codebook.dox - Codebook used for qualitative coding of memes. Memes Project.qdpx - NVivo coding project, exported. all_posts.jsonl, clusters.zip, images.zip, & image_data.csv - the complete collection of data and images used for (...) this project. Please see publication in New Media & Society for more information on the use and collection of these items. (shrink)

I claim that the revisions John Rawls made to his theory of justice—as seen in his political conception of justice as fairness in the revised edition of Political Liberalism and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement—result in him being able to secure justice for all persons even in their private lives. Thus, I defend his theory against common communitarian and feminist criticisms, viz the lack of moral community and inability to secure justice for individuals in the private domain. I demonstrate that (...) justice is secured from the categorical requirement that all associational life and moral doctrines must adhere to the constraints of justice, by (what Rawls terms) the indirect application of the first principle of justice. The implications of and necessity for this indirect application are precisely what I interrogate in this thesis. I suggest that this indirect application requires unconditional acknowledgement and internalisation of the values of liberty and equality (political values of the first principle) into all aspects of civil society. I claim that Rawls realised this necessity for the congruence between the moral powers of persons, the spheres of society, and the right and the good and, as such, developed a complementary relation between these three features. Coherence between these three aspects is essential; without coherence, citizens would have a split moral personality, the public and the non-public spheres would be in conflict, and the political values and the moral doctrines of individuals would undermine one another. The significance of this strict coherence is that it can ensure the adequate development of individuals’ capacity for citizenship during the three stages of moral development. This results in citizens being able to form bonds of civic friendship necessary for justice as reciprocity to be realised. Thus, in this thesis, I position my argument against theorists such as Nancy Rosenblum, who argue for a more relaxed congruence between political institutions and civil society, as according to her illiberal forms of associational life can help form the necessary bonds of love and care needed for mutual cooperation in a liberal society. In opposition to this, I claim that strict congruence is necessary; without it, a stable liberal society is not possible as the citizens would not be able to able to respect one another on free, equal, and mutually beneficial terms. I rely on Hochschild’s sociological evidence to demonstrate that civic friendship has not been developed, due to a lack of reciprocity, impacting the negative development of one’s sense of justice. I then illustrate how this lack of reciprocity is amplified by digital and artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. The significance of this thesis is that I claim, firstly, Rawls’s last revisions and works before his death demonstrate that justice is a collective non-comprehensive good that results by constraining individuals’ associational life and their partial comprehensive doctrines to Rawlsian demands of justice. Thus, Rawls takes seriously the feminist and communitarian critiques he received. Secondly, I claim that this interpretation of Rawls’s theory of justice cannot be conceptualised in terms of a binary presentation of the priority of the right versus the good debate and, instead, I argue for a reconceptualisation of the priority of the right versus the good as ranges on a continuum of structural relations between the right and the good. (shrink)

Who is responsible for growing political polarization? To many, the answer is obvious: Irrational voters are to blame. This irrationality results in motivated, in-group reasoning that only serves to further deepen the political divide. In this piece, I examine a perspective that holds that polarization results, not from irrationality, but from rational responses by voters to their limited epistemic resources.

One of the predominant debates in AI Ethics is the worry and necessity to create fair, transparent and accountable algorithms that do not perpetuate current social inequities. I offer a critical analysis of Reuben Binns’s argument in which he suggests using public reason to address the potential bias of the outcomes of machine learning algorithms. In contrast to him, I argue that ultimately what is needed is not public reason per se, but an audit of the implicit moral assumptions of (...) societies within which algorithms are built and applied. Public justification is appealing since it offers us the possibility to align the decision-making outcomes of the algorithm with the core moral values of stakeholders within a constitutional democratic society. My concern is that the common moral principles that form the foundation of public reason are not necessarily neutral, as they still express specific moral ideals and normative standards even if there is moral agreement by society as a whole, or among different stakeholders within society. Appealing to such normative standards may thus still lead to algorithmic outcomes being biased as common moral values may very well still be discriminatory even though they are formed from a consensus, and even if public reason is applied as a kind of filter for potential algorithmic outcomes. Hence, I argue that these implicit moral norms within society that we take as a given in public reasoning, need to be audited from generation to generation in order to effectively mitigate potential algorithmic bias. (shrink)

In his collection of articles, "Where Are We Now - The Epidemic as Politics", Giorgio Agamben appears to make some very startling (if not downright outrageous) claims concerning the political situation in Italy and elsewhere in Europe during the Covid-19 pandemic. In this piece [in German] I analyse how these claims are rooted in the philosophy of Agamben's "Homo sacer" project. Focussing on three central notions (Schmitt's "state of exception", Foucault's "biopolitics", and Agamben's very own "bare life"), I show how (...) Agamben's illegitimate identification of the bare life with the subject of biopolitics leads to the derailment of his theory as well as to some of the grave political misjudgments he makes regarding the pandemic. (shrink)

This dissertation offers a critical discussion of the prioritisation of ‘the right’ in John Rawls’s theory of justice. Rawls’s theory of justice – ‘justice as fairness’ – is arguably one of the best illustrations of the prioritisation of ‘the right’ in current political literature. However, his theory has been criticised by a diversity of thinkers for its implied structural relation between ‘the right’ and ‘the good’. Some theorists argue that conceptually ‘the good’ can never be derived from ‘the right’; others (...) argue that, even if it were possible, the social implications of such a conceptualisation would devastating as it would result in a so-called “community of strangers” (Rorty 1988, 273). In this dissertation, I argue that be on the one hand, theories that prioritise ‘the right’– such as ‘justice as fairness’ – enable the attractive possibility of the multiple coexistence of ‘comprehensive goods’. This is attractive as it upholds the liberating ethos: ‘I have the freedom to determine my own ends’. This possibility is attributed to the fact of neutrality, which characterises the priority of ‘the right’. The claim of neutrality is embedded in the ideal that political principles can be developed prior to and independently of any content of ‘the good’. This is then supposed to justify the claim that political principles are non-reliant on comprehensive moral ideals. In this way, the prioritisation of ‘the right’, as evident in ‘justice as fairness’, supposedly enables citizens to construct impartial universal principles that govern their society. Yet, on the other hand, I question the degree of neutrality present in ‘justice as fairness’. I argue that ‘justice as fairness’, although its justification is independent of a singular moral truth, is not neutral concerning ‘the good’. In fact, the moral values encapsulated in the priority of ‘the right’, I argue, set the conditions of justification of all doctrines of ‘the good’ because any idea of ‘the good’ that embodies contradictory values to those encapsulated in the priority of ‘the right’ would necessarily be excluded from a Rawlsian society. Therefore, I argue that Rawls’s theory of justice cannot be said to take into account “a diversity of conflicting and irreconcilable yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines” (Rawls 2001, 34); as moral values are already implied in the prioritising of ‘the right’. In light of how Rawls’s theory of justice is simultaneously neutral and prescriptive regarding ‘the good’, I suggest a re-problematisation of the debate on the relationship between ‘the right’ and ‘the good’. The literature on theories that prioritise ‘the right’ or ‘the good’ seems to imply such theories either embody the one or the other methodological approach. I argue that this debate has been presented as a false dichotomy and, as such, the debate itself seems to be exhausted, because it creates a kind of natural impasse. Therefore, I suggest recasting the debate in terms of representing ‘the right’ and ‘the good’ as two methodological positions on a continuum, that are at the same time both more or less gradually similar and divergent from one another. The purpose of this continuum is to demonstrate that notions such as neutrality, objectivity and comprehensiveness are not clear-cut. (shrink)

Artificial intellgence and fundamental rights from a European perspective.

Work has always been a significant source of ethical questions, philosophical reflection, and political struggle. Although the future of work in a sense is always at stake, the issue is particularly relevant right now, in light of the advent of advanced AI systems and the collective experience of the COVID-19 pandemic. This has reinvigorated philosophical discussion and interest in the study of the future of work. The purpose of this survey article is to provide an overview of the emerging philosophical (...) field that engages with the future of work, with a special focus on equality and justice, and to outline a research agenda that can help the field to develop further. Section 2 provides some historical context for the current surge in interest in the topic. Then, we discuss what work is and whether there is a philosophy of work (Section 3). The four main sub-debates we then turn to concern the value of work (Section 4), distributive justice and work (Section 5), productive justice (Section 6), and institutional reforms prompted by changes in how work is organized (Section 7). The final section discusses the importance of the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory in philosophical investigations into the future of work. (shrink)

A New Theory of Serendipity đạt mức rank tốt nhất xưa nay trong phân mục Knowledge Capital...

Workplace AI is transforming labor but decisions on which AI applications are developed or implemented are made with little to no input from workers themselves. In this piece for AI & Society, I argue for nationalization as a strategy for democratizing AI.

At the beginning of a new reign it seems appropriate to re-assess the meaning of monarchy in modern Britain. The new King heads a fractured royal family, a divided nation, and a disaffected Commonwealth. How can we as scholars make sense of where the monarchy has been, and where it might be going? This article suggests a new scholarly approach is required. Through a critical analysis of three classic studies of monarchy: Walter Bagehot’s The English constitution (1867), Kingsley Martin’s The (...) magic of monarchy (1937) and Tom Nairn’s The enchanted glass (1988), the lecture traces the lineage of modern interpretations of the British monarchy and points up their limitations. Preoccupied with the symbolism of monarchy, conventional scholarship neglects its important political functions. As the lecture argues, in the era of Brexit at home and populist regimes around the world, modern democracies may actually need monarchy more than ever before. (shrink)

Sharing of social, economic, and political opportunities is crucial for the stability of many African states. Democracy has been identified as an inclusive framework that allows individuals to freely contest for these opportunities. However, in Africa, democracy appears not to work as compared to Western democratic societies. Some African political philosophers blame the problem on liberal democratic type practiced in the continent, which is modeled after the hegemonic socio‐political discourse in Europe and North America. Thus, it is argued that workable (...) democratic model for Africa must be embedded in the continent's cultural and historical nuances. Consequently, initial effort by the Ghanaian philosopher Kwasi Wiredu appealed to the nonpartisan Consensus Democracy of traditional Akan society. But it is doubtful that the consensual model, which was successful in the mono‐ethnic traditional Akan society, will produce the same effect in a multi‐ethnic society as the modern African states. At present, ethnicity inter alia remains a major obstruction to democratization of the continent. Africa needs a democratic model that takes its rigid multi‐ethnic character into account instead of uncritically imposing global democratic knowledge to African situations or totally disregarding local knowledge of democracy. Therefore, I investigate how ethnicity inter alia can be accommodated in democratic practice. An experimental model called “Rotational Democracy” is introduced based on the traditional African social practice of One Cup, which embodies the phenomena of power rotation and rationing of the traditional society. The article demonstrates how indigenous knowledge can be the starting point for democratic practice in Africa. (shrink)

The concept of feasibility has received a significant amount of scrutiny in recent years. Despite the diversity of accounts, all agree on the assumption that feasibility considerations have a practical function in guiding action. However, the two most important accounts (by Gilabert and Lawford-Smith, and by Wiens) seem to scarcely speak to this practical function because they provide a third-personal reconstruction of feasibility constraints. In this paper, I argue that, to understand feasibility constraints in a way that matters for guiding (...) action, we should switch from a third-personal to an agent-centered perspective. I show that relevant constraints can be Barriers, Limitations, Boundaries, and Rubber Walls to the extent that they concern nomic impossibilities (Barriers), resources (Limitations), agents’ abilities (Boundaries) or other people’s unwillingness (Rubber Walls). Understanding constraints through the lens of their qualitatively different natures opens the way for addressing the problem of how to respond to them. (shrink)