Science of Consciousness

All organisms compute, though in vastly different ways. Whereas biological systems carry out mortal computation, contemporary AI systems and all previous general purpose computers carry out immortal computation. Here, we show that if Computational Functionalism holds true, consciousness requires mortal computation. This implies that none of the contemporary AI systems, and no AI system that runs on hardware of the type in use today, can be conscious.

The Objective of “Tranquillity’s Secret” Is To Present A New More Veridical Way Of Understanding The World, And The Meditation Technique And Its Unexcelled Support That Directly Leads One To See The World Differently. -/- In our rational attempts to understand ourselves and our world today, it is the case that in comparison to matter, which is so definite, measurable, actual, and sometimes literally concrete, we have ‘mind’ and ‘consciousness’, which is exactly the opposite: it is indefinite, unmeasurable, undiscoverable, and (...) abstract. And yet, it is the reverse within our lived experience in which it is our being aware that is actual, indisputable, irrefutable, true, and well-grounded, while matter is only an abstraction from our experiences, that is wholly contingent, and about which everything is unsure. So why do we search for ‘consciousness’ by reasoning about the world, rather than meditating upon our immediate lived experience? ‘Consciousness’ is an abstraction taken from our experience, so we cannot use ‘consciousness’ to explain experience. A contemplative science would. -/- The meditation technique that Tranquillity’s Secret presents uses Inner Spontaneous Sound as its support. These uncaused sounds which are always available to meditate with, have no material basis, and so their very presence calls into question our faith that only matter matters. These sounds appear in different forms in the myriad of contemplative traditions which have employed them for millennia and have universally acknowledged them as the most efficacious path to a direct experience of the nature of Reality. Unfortunately, during modern times, the correct use of these sounds has been almost lost, along with the reasons why they were claimed to be so highly effective. The primary condition for this loss is the mechanical materialism which frames what is allowable for thought, and constrains our reasoning to only consider reductionist mechanical explanations in every case. Even those who believe they have escaped from the limitations of this understanding, continue to be enframed because our language has been structured by it, so that there is no true escape via a simple substitution or redefinition of concepts. Instead, Tranquillity’s Secret presents a new understanding that supersedes mechanical materialism and its paradigm of physical causality. It begins with an acceptance that Time is only a formalism, and does not exist in the sense of either an arrow or a stream. This leads to a radical reorientation of what it means to be aware and conscious, and the discovery of a revolutionary understanding of coherent Responsive Naturing that supplants the never-solved paradoxes of ‘consciousness’ and ‘causal change over time’ with coherent and immediate processual reconfigurations based upon contextual conditions, potentials, and probabilities — and the recognition of each reconfiguration. -/- Thus, Responsive Naturing provides a sound foundation for veridical science, so that both science and spirituality can be founded upon a common understanding of ‘how things work’. This empowers us in ways that our disjointed and parochial schools of thought lock us out of completely, while opening up new possible methods of looking at problems and finding solutions across disciplines. (shrink)

The science of consciousness is an interdisciplinary study aimed at understanding the relationship between mental aspects, such as the mind, and physical aspects, such as the brain. While scientists engage in the scientific exploration of consciousness, philosophers also contribute to the philosophy of mind. So far, there are metaphysical questions that remain unanswered by the science of consciousness, which adopts a physicalism framework: How can the mind animate the body, or how do the mind and body interact? Panpsychism is a (...) metaphysical view in the philosophy of mind, which holds that mental properties are fundamental features that pervade all physical matter in the universe. In contemporary analytic philosophy, some philosophers take panpsychism seriously and consider it a better solution to the mind-body problem compared to other views, such as physicalism and dualism. Hence, panpsychism offers possible solutions to the unanswered metaphysical questions. -/- This research employs a literature review method to examine the scientific theories regarding the relationship between the science of consciousness and panpsychism. The point of view is panpsychism, while the subject matter is the science of consciousness. The research proceeds through four stages: inventory, classification, analysis, and results formulation, employing four philosophical methods such as interpretation, historical continuity, heuristics, and description. -/- In this thesis, I show philosophical problems within the science of consciousness and explain how panpsychism, as a non-physicalist view, can be compatible with the science of consciousness. Through panpsychism metaphysical reflection, I identify that the science of consciousness is limited to understanding structural aspects, such as neural activity, while it falls short in explaining intrinsic aspects, such as subjective experience. Furthermore, I propose three solutions to ontological problems within the scientific study of consciousness that can be addressed through panpsychism: the neural correlates of consciousness, the distribution of consciousness, and the nature of consciousness. (shrink)

This article comprehensively examines how information processing relates to attention and consciousness. We argue that no current theoretical framework investigating consciousness has a satisfactory and holistic account of their informational relationship. Our key theoretical contribution is showing how the dissociation between consciousness and attention must be understood in informational terms in order to make the debate scientifically sound. No current theories clarify the difference between attention and consciousness in terms of information. We conclude with two proposals to advance the debate. (...) First, neurobiological homeostatic processes need to be more explicitly associated with conscious information processing, since information processed through attention is algorithmic, rather than being homeostatic. Second, to understand subjectivity in informational terms, we must define information uniqueness in consciousness (e.g., irreproducible information, biologically encrypted information). These approaches could help cognitive scientists better understand conflicting accounts of the neural correlates of consciousness and work toward a more unified theoretical framework. (shrink)

Recent activities in virtually all fields engaged in consciousness studies indicate early signs of a structural turn, where verbal descriptions or simple formalisations of conscious experiences are replaced by structural tools, most notably mathematical spaces. My goal here is to offer three comments that, in my opinion, are essential to avoid misunderstandings in these developments early on. These comments concern metaphysical premises of structuralist approaches, overlooked assumptions in regard to isomorphisms, and the question of what structure to consider on the (...) side of consciousness in the first place. I will also explain what, in my opinion, are the great promises of structural methodologies and how they might impact consciousness science at large. (shrink)

Commensurate with our work on dark consciousness, we present a small extension of our previous formalism to model the mixed-frequency states as time crystals. We then posit shared intelligence as an Everettian phone, which is a looking-glass p-adic periodicity in time.

This essay sketches out a biocultural theory of religion which is based on an expanded view of cognition that is anchored in brain and body (embrained and embodied), deeply dependent on culture (enculturated) and extended and distributed beyond the borders of individual brains. Such an approach uniquely accommodates contemporary cultural and neurobiological sciences. Since the challenge that the study of religion faces, in my opinion, is at the interstices of these sciences, I have tried to develop a theory of religion (...) which acknowledges the fact. My hope is that the theory can be of use to scholars of religion and be submitted to further hypotheses and tests by cognitive scientists. (shrink)

This book offers a new theoretical framework within which to understand “the mind-body problem”. The crux of this problem is phenomenal experience, which Thomas Nagel famously described as “what it is like” to be a certain living creature. David Chalmers refers to the problem of “what-it-is-like” as “the hard problem” of consciousness and claims that this problem is so “hard” that investigators have either just ignored the issue completely, investigated a similar (but distinct) problem, or claimed that there is literally (...) nothing to investigate – that phenomenal experience is illusory. This book contends that phenomenal experience is both very real and very important. Two specific “biological naturalist” views are considered in depth. One of these two views, in particular, seems to be free from problems; adopting something along the lines of this view might finally allow us to make sense of the mind-body problem. -/- An essential read for anyone who believes that no satisfactory solution to “the mind-body problem” has yet been discovered. (shrink)

The expanding integration of artificial intelligence (AI) in various aspects of society makes the infosphere around us increasingly complex. Humanity already faces many obstacles trying to have a better understanding of our own minds, but now we have to continue finding ways to make sense of the minds of AI. The issue of AI’s capability to have independent thinking is of special attention. When dealing with such an unfamiliar concept, people may rely on existing human properties, such as survival desire, (...) to make assessments. Employing information-processing-based Bayesian Mindsponge Framework (BMF) analytics on a dataset of 266 residents in the United States, we found that the more people believe that an AI agent seeks continued functioning, the more they believe in that AI agent’s capability of having a mind of its own. Moreover, we also found that the above association becomes stronger if a person is more familiar with personally interacting with AI. This suggests a directional pattern of value reinforcement in perceptions of AI. As the information processing of AI becomes even more sophisticated in the future, it will be much harder to set clear boundaries about what it means to have an autonomous mind. (shrink)

Contemplative scholarship has reoriented attention towards the neuroscientific study of the soteriological ambition of Buddhist practice, awakening. This article evaluates the project of seeking neural correlates for awakening. We identify key definitional and operational issues demonstrating that: the nature of awakening is highly contested both within and across Buddhist traditions; the meaning of awakening is both context- and concept-dependent; and awakening may be non-conceptual and ineffable. We demonstrate that operationalised secular conceptions of awakening, divorced from soteriological and cultural factors, have (...) little relationship to traditional Buddhist construct(s) of awakening. We identify methodological issues for secular conceptions of awakening concerning introspection and neuroimaging, yet identify the value of recent advancements in empirical first-person phenomenology for attenuating introspective bias. Overall, we identify the problems with decontextualising awakening and placing it within a scientific naturalistic framework. Careful attention to the definitional, operational and methodological neuroscientific obstacles identified herein, is required in the responsible approach to the investigation of awakening states. (shrink)

Nicht durch das Denken erschaffen wir Welten. Indem wir die Welt verstehen, lernen wir zu denken. Kosmovision ist ein Begriff, der eine Reihe von Grundlagen bedeuten sollte, aus denen ein systemisches Verständnis des Universums, seiner Bestandteile als Leben, der Welt, in der wir leben, der Natur, des menschlichen Phänomens und ihrer Beziehungen hervorgehen sollte. Es handelt sich also um ein von den Wissenschaften gespeistes Feld der analytischen Philosophie, deren Ziel dieses aggregierte und erkenntnistheoretisch nachhaltige Wissen über alles ist, was wir (...) sind und beinhalten, was uns umgibt und was uns in einer Weise betrifft. Sie ist so alt wie das menschliche Denken und umfasst neben der Verwendung von Elementen der wissenschaftlichen Kosmologie alles in Philosophie und Wissenschaft, was sich auf das Universum und das Leben bezieht. Eine Kosmovision ist keine Sammlung von Ideen, Hypothesen und Annahmen, sondern ein System, das auf Beobachtung, Analyse, Beweisen und Demonstrationen basiert. Keine Kosmovision will definieren, etablieren oder vorschlagen, sondern nur verstehen, analysieren und interpretieren. Jeder von uns baut und transportiert sein ganzes Leben lang seine Kosmovision, ohne Formen zu etablieren, als Hintergrund für unser Denken und Handeln. In dieser Arbeit versuchen wir, eine Kosmovision zu skizzieren, die auf den Realitäten basiert, die die Wissenschaft heute bietet. Wir schlagen zu keinem Zeitpunkt vor, Wissenschaft zu betreiben; oder Philosophie zu theoretisieren, aber wir werden immer versuchen, von ihnen unterstützt oder zumindest vor den kognitiven Verzerrungen geschützt zu werden, die wir normalerweise mit uns herumtragen. (shrink)

A target question for the scientific study of consciousness is how dimensions of consciousness, such as the ability to feel pain and pleasure or reflect on one’s own experience, vary in different states and animal species. Considering the tight link between consciousness and moral status, answers to these questions have implications for law and ethics. Here we point out that given this link, the scientific community studying consciousness may face implicit pressure to carry out certain research programs or interpret results (...) in ways that justify current norms rather than challenge them. We show that because consciousness largely determines moral status, the use of nonhuman animals in the scientific study of consciousness introduces a direct conflict between scientific relevance and ethics—the more scientifically valuable an animal model is for studying consciousness, the more difficult it becomes to ethically justify compromises to its well-being for consciousness research. Finally, in light of these considerations, we call for a discussion of the immediate ethical corollaries of the body of knowledge that has accumulated and for a more explicit consideration of the role of ideology and ethics in the scientific study of consciousness. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that a person’s moral judgments (about both their own and others’ actions) are constrained by the nature and extent of their relevant ignorance and, thus, that such judgments are determined in the first instance by the person’s epistemic circumstances. It has been argued, in other words, that the epistemic is logically prior to other normative (e.g., ethical, prudential, pecuniary) considerations in human decision-making, that these other normative considerations figure in decision-making only after (logically and temporally) (...) relevant ignorance has constrained the decision-maker’s menu of options. If this is right, then a person’s moral judgments in some set of circumstances should vary with their knowledge and ignorance of these circumstances. In this study, we test the hypothesis of the logical priority of the epistemic. We describe two experiments in which subjects’ knowledge and ignorance of relevant consequences were manipulated. In the second experiment, we also compared the effect of ignorance on moral judgments with that of personal force, a factor previously shown to influence moral judgments. We found broad empirical support for the armchair arguments that epistemic considerations are logically prior to normative considerations. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that a person’s moral judgments (about both their own and others’ actions) are constrained by the nature and extent of their relevant ignorance and, thus, that such judgments are determined in the first instance by the person’s epistemic circumstances. It has been argued, in other words, that the epistemic is logically prior to other normative (e.g., ethical, prudential, pecuniary) considerations in human decision-making, that these other normative considerations figure in decision-making only after (logically and temporally) (...) relevant ignorance has constrained the decision-maker’s menu of options. If this is right, then a person’s moral judgments in some set of circumstances should vary with their knowledge and ignorance of these circumstances. In this study, we test the hypothesis of the logical priority of the epistemic. We describe two experiments in which subjects’ knowledge and ignorance of relevant consequences were manipulated. In the second experiment, we also compared the effect of ignorance on moral judgments with that of personal force, a factor previously shown to influence moral judgments. We found broad empirical support for the armchair arguments that epistemic considerations are logically prior to normative considerations. (shrink)

The goal of this programmatic paper is to highlight a close connection between the core problem in the philosophy of medicine, i.e. the concept of health, and the core problem of the philosophy of mind, i.e. the concept of consciousness. I show when we look at these phenomena together, taking the evolutionary perspective of modern state-based behavioural and life-history theory used as the teleonomic tool to Darwinize the agent- and subject-side of organisms, we will be in a better position to (...) make sense of them both as natural phenomena. (shrink)

In this letter we focus on the cognitive science of consciousness. The general message is that, while this interdisciplinary area has made much progress in recent years, there is a tendency of downplaying conceptual issues, and therefore underestimating the difficulties of various problems. We briefly focus on a few prominent examples only, due to the space limit, but the general message should be clear: this recent tendency can be problematic for the progress of the consciousness branch of cognitive sciences.

What occurs in the mind of an expert who is performing at their very best? In this paper, I survey the history of debate concerning this question. I suggest that expertise is neither solely a mastery of the automatic nor solely a mastery of intelligence in skilled action control. Experts are also capable of performing automatic actions intelligently. Following this, I argue that unconscious-thought theory (UTT) is a powerful tool in coming to understand the role of executive, intelligent action control (...) in the fluidly automatic performance of expertise. Relying on a body of empirical evidence concerning the cognitive structures and perceptual strategies employed by experts, I show that the realm of skilled action is an ideal environment within which the powers of unconscious cognitive processing can have positive effects on action. I conclude that experts rely upon unconscious thinking in the production of intelligently automatic skilled actions. (shrink)

In Being You, Anil Seth takes us on a comprehensive tour through the science of consciousness, drawing on the most up-to-date data, lessons and theories in the field. This is a compelling book that will leave readers pondering whether new technologies and smart experimental designs will further deepen our understanding of the mind, writes Manh Tung Ho.

This article reconstructs the theory of the Soviet-American psychologist Vladimir Lefebvre as part of the neocybernetic movement. In particular, I propose to explore such elements of his research of the 1970s—1990s as systemic vision; reflexive analysis; a search for holistic configuration and Janus cosmology; and the realization of neocybernetics. An interest in the reflexive structures of cognition and action led Lefebvre to an understanding of the limited nature of the world’s scientific picture. The conflicting objects he studied proved too complex (...) for behavioral modeling and forecasting. Lefebvre therefore expanded the boundaries of the application of his formal theory of intelligence, relying on functionalist positions, which led him to the science-fiction narrative of “The Big Correction.” I contend that Lefebvre’s works not only propose an original Soviet version of the neocybernetics the 1970s but develop their own model of inhumanism long before it appeared on the scene of modern philosophy. Lefebvre’s formal theory, reinforced by thermodynamics and elements of Russian cosmism, builds cognitive behavior into the teleology of the Big Correction, which involves the idea of overcoming the heat death of the universe. The activity of cosmic intelligence, which Lefebvre equates with magnetic-plasma structures in the finished areas of the universe, is aimed at cooperation and prolonging the existence of life and the intellect. (shrink)

How Galileo created the problem of consciousness -- Is there a ghost in the machine? -- Can physical science explain consciousness? -- How to solve the problem of consciousness -- Consciousness and the meaning of life.

What is consciousness? Where is it? What happens to our consciousness when we die? We associate consciousness with our material brain yet no one has found it there, or anywhere else. Within a framework of established science, however, the author outlines a compelling new way to think about consciousness and its workings. This first revised edition of Between Space describes our material world construed of tiny bits of space and time ("quantized space"). Each of these bits exist, as only they (...) can, within a field of non-space; an abstract reality outside of space and time... but not outside of Nature. Non-space is a reality of awareness, meanings, concepts, and ideas of every sort, while space-time is a reality of distinct objects such as your brain. The author describes in detail how self-awareness and your mind are the result of interaction between the two realms by means of Simultaneity and quantum Observation. While this little book contains scientific descriptions and speculations, it's written in common language so that it can be enjoyed by most of us who have little or no background in science or math; about a hundred pages plus many appendices and illustrations. (shrink)

Os debates sobre a existência da consciência em animais não humanos vêm ganhando cada vez mais destaque nos círculos científicos e filosóficos ao redor do mundo. Um importante empecilho que a área atualmente enfrenta diz respeito à construção de um método confiável capaz de identificar se um determinado animal não humano possui estados mentais conscientes. A literatura nomeia essa questão de “o problema da mensuração da consciência animal”. A presente dissertação possui como objetivo analisar e responder esse problema através da (...) combinação entre o uso de evidências empíricas e de ferramentas filosóficas. Dito isso, existem inúmeras formas de respondê-lo. Ao longo do texto, analisarei algumas das que são consideradas mais relevantes na discussão atual. Uma delas é a concepção cética de que não há questão de fato sobre os animais não humanos serem ou não conscientes. Em contraste, as abordagens neutras e newtonianas buscam se esquivar de compromissos metafísicos e teóricos para atribuir consciência aos animais. Ao final da dissertação defenderei a chamada “abordagem teórica leve”, posição originalmente proposta pelo filósofo Jonathan Birch. Buscarei mostrar que ela é atualmente a hipótese empiricamente mais adequada e filosoficamente plausível dentre as disponíveis na literatura. (shrink)

Which animals have conscious experiences? Many different, diverse and unrelated behaviors and cognitive capacities have been proposed as tests of the presence of consciousness in an animal. It is unclear which of these tests, if any, are valid. To remedy this problem, I develop a list consisting of eight desiderata which can be used to assess putative tests of animal consciousness. These desiderata are based either on detailed analogies between consciousness-linked human behavior and non-human behavior, on theories of consciousness or (...) on methods from human consciousness science. If a test or set of tests satisfies more of these desiderata, passing it provides stronger evidence of consciousness. Moreover, one can design future tests of animal consciousness with the intention of satisfying these desiderata to ensure their evidential strength. (shrink)

A sense of agency over wilful actions is thought to be dependent on the level of choice and the nature of the outcome. In a preregistered study, we manipulated choice and valence of outcome to assess the relationship between SoA across the depression and psychosis continuum. Participants completed a Libet Clock task, in which they had either a free or forced choice to press one of two buttons and received either a rewarding or punishing outcome. Participants also completed questionnaires on (...) depressive and psychosis-like traits. Rewarding outcomes increased intentional binding. The evidence favoured no effect of choice on average, but this was influenced by inter-individual differences. Individuals reporting more depressive traits had less of a difference in intentional binding between free and forced choice conditions. We show that implicit SoA is sensitive to outcome valence and the effect of choice differs across the depression continuum. (shrink)

As humans, we use the power of thinking to make scientific discoveries, develop technologies, manage social interactions, and transmit knowledge to the next generations. With the ability to think, we can trace back and discover the origin of the universe, the natural world, and ourselves. The content of this book, Mindsponge Theory, is part of that discovery process. -/- Product Details -/- Publisher ‏ : ‎ Walter de Gruyter (December 6, 2022) Publication date ‏ : ‎ December 6, 2022 Language (...) ‏ : ‎ English Hardcover ‏ : ‎ 214 pages ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 8367405145 ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-8367405140 Dimensions ‏ : ‎ 6.3 x 0.71 x 9.29 inches -/- . (shrink)