Rationality

Who is responsible for growing political polarization? To many, the answer is obvious: Irrational voters are to blame. This irrationality results in motivated, in-group reasoning that only serves to further deepen the political divide. In this piece, I examine a perspective that holds that polarization results, not from irrationality, but from rational responses by voters to their limited epistemic resources.

It is not uncommon in the history of science and philosophy to encounter crucial experiments or crucial objections the truth-value of which we are ignorant, that is, about which we suspend judgment. Should we ignore such objections? Contrary to widespread practice, I show that in and only in some circumstances they should not be ignored, for the epistemically rational doxastic attitude is to suspend judgment also about the hypothesis that the objection targets. In other words, suspension of judgment “propagates” from (...) the crucial objection to the hypothesis. In this paper I study under which conditions this phenomenon occurs, and discuss its significance for the topics of skepticism, scientific realism, and peer disagreement. (shrink)

The main contribution of this article is to apply Herbert Marcuse’s work in contemporary neoliberal society. Specifically, this article will focus on Marcuse’s critique of advanced industrial society and the role that technology plays in the quantification of the self. In this article, I will argue that in recent years, the development of technology has created the possibility to measure, calculate and quantify even the most trivial aspects of our lives, reducing people to numbers. The quantification of people is done (...) with the specific purpose of enhancing efficacy and productivity. I will unpack this notion by first looking to Marcuse’s critique of an advanced industrial society which he argues has the unique purpose of quantifying people to achieve a universal norm of calculated efficiency. Specifically, I will refer to Marcuse’s critique of industrial rationality as the prevailing rationality in advanced industrial societies which encourages the quantification of people. Secondly, I argue that Marcuse’s critique has evolved in the work of contemporary thinkers such as political economist Wendy Brown and cultural theorist Byung-Chul Han. I argue that Brown expands on Marcuse’s theories and contextualises those theories in contemporary neoliberalism. Specifically, I will focus on the concept of governmentality as a political rationality in neoliberal societies and how it advances a one-dimensional political passivity in neoliberal subjects. Finally, I refer to Han, whose theories explore the influence of new forms of technology in a neoliberal society and the development of the neoliberal subject as a “quantified self”. (shrink)

Two seminal notions of Harold Garfinkel have endured despite some uncertainty and indeterminacy that accompany them: “autochthonous” and “tendentious”. These terms, which respect the dynamic and evolving nature of social interaction, describe how local parties discover, come upon, or develop coherent accounts that can assist them to lay hold of a local orderliness that is governing some mundane interaction. This paper illuminates these two notions, first theoretically and then empirically. Drawing upon the reflections of Garfinkel, Sacks, Schegloff, Mead, Husserl, Schutz, (...) Gurwitsch, and others, the radical consequences of these two notions are elucidated and then applied to two perspicuous conversations where it is possible to witness autochthony and tendentiousness in action. This provides a clearer understanding of the importance that these features of social interaction can play in our everyday lives. The two illustrations reveal occasions where a local orderliness appears on its own, autochthonously, without requiring a heavy dose of deliberate conceptual control by parties. (shrink)

Weak judgmentalism of emotions posits that emotions necessarily involve judgments. However, a standard critique of weak judgmentalism is that it cannot adequately account for the rationality of recalcitrant emotions, which persist despite the agent holding beliefs that conflict with them. This leads to the seemingly counter-intuitive conclusion that recalcitrant emotions are as irrational as logical mistakes. In response to this critique, I make two arguments. First, I distinguish between low-level and high-level beliefs, and argue that having two beliefs with contrary (...) contents at different levels can be rational to some extent. Therefore, weak judgmentalism can explain why recalcitrant emotions are not as irrational as logical mistakes. Second, I argue that recalcitrant emotions involve mental conflicts, while normal emotions do not. By framing the issue in this way, weak judgmentalism can also explain why recalcitrant emotions are not as rational as normal emotions. (shrink)

While most other works focus on conspiracy theories, this book examines conspiracy panics, or the anxiety over the phenomenon of conspiracy theories. Jack Z. Bratich argues that conspiracy theories are portals into the major social issues defining U.S. and global political culture. These issues include the rise of new technologies, the social function of journalism, U.S. race relations, citizenship and dissent, globalization, biowarfare and biomedicine, and the shifting positions within the Left. Using a Foucauldian governmentality analysis, Bratich maintains that conspiracy (...) panics contribute to a broader political rationality, a (neo)liberal strategy of governing at a distance through the use of reason. He also explores the growing popularity of 9/11 conspiracy research in terms of what he calls the "sphere of legitimate dissensus." Conspiracy Panics concludes that we are witnessing a new fusion of culture and rationality, one that is increasingly shared across the political spectrum. (shrink)

A dominant strand of second wave feminism, represented in this essay by Firestone, is tied to a belief in technology to achieve reproductive justice, echoing Western somatophobic rationality. As such, it has difficulty formulating a critique of institutionalized reproductive technologies that have the capacity to perpetuate systemic racializing and misogynous violence, and envisioning a philosophy of reproductive justice where care for the body takes central stage. In this essay, we offer a perspective on achieving reproductive justice from an age-old position (...) largely neglected by feminism: that of midwifery. Midwifery has always been wary of technology in the field of reproduction, having first-hand experience with its consequences in birth and pregnancy, and has developed a field of scholarship critiquing its misuse. Simultaneously, midwifery negotiates technology from a position that prioritizes experiential, embodied, and tacit knowledge. Midwifery’s epistemological standpoint is that of a somatophilic rationality of thinking with the body, guarding women and birthing people’s reproductive autonomy through a specific technē that uses both technology and nature. A certain tendency in midwifery is, however, developing more and more towards an anti-technological essentialism. This essay therefore brings into dialogue Firestone’s Marxist women’s liberation through the elimination of biological sex with the help of technology, and midwifery’s somatophilic epistemic standpoint, to develop a feminist rational engagement with nature that can achieve reproductive justice, on the basis of their shared biological materialism. (shrink)

Epistemic reliabilism holds that a belief is justified if and only if it is produced by a reliable or truth-conducive process. I argue that reliabilism offers an epistemology for bounded rationality. This latter concept refers to normative and descriptive accounts of real-world reasoning instead of some ideal reasoning. However, as initially formulated, reliabilism involves an absolute, context-independent assessment of rationality that does not do justice to the fact that several processes are reliable in some reasoning environments but not in others, (...) as is widely reported in the cognitive sciences literature. I consider possible solutions to this problem. Resorting to ‘normality reliabilism’, a variant of the theory, is one; but I find it insufficient. Therefore, in addition, I propose to relativise the reliability assessment to reasoning environments. This novel version of reliabilism fits bounded rationality better than the original one does. (shrink)

The article starts with the introduction of the Lithuanian reader into the expected utility theory which is the core of the decision theory known under the name of the rational choice theory or by the name of the thin theory of practical rationality too. This theroy conceives practical rationality as maximization of the expected utility defined as the measure of the preferences which satisfy the following conditions: (1) reflexivity; (2) completeness; (3) transitivity; (4) continuity; (5) preference increasing with probability and (...) (6) strong independence. This theory is qualified as the formal or minimal theory of the practical rationality. This theory is unique having two ways of application: as the empirical theory and as the normative one. The main task of the article is the disentangling and discussing of the different and mainly divergent "thickenings" which this theory undergoes in its various applications. The name of "thickenings" is given to auxiliary assumptions or supplementary conditions supplementing the core axioms of the expected utility theory. The auxiliary assumptions current in the empirical applications of decision theory are those of the self-interested behavior, of the transpersonal homogeneity and of the transpersonal stability of preferences. While vindicated by the main methodological principle of the rational choice approach in the social sciences - to keep the models as simple as possible and to make them complex only as much as necessary - the assumptions abovementioned are counterintuitive if the rational choice theory is considered as normative theory. The main problem confronting a constructor of the thick (substantive) normative theory of rationality is the diversity and incoherence of the preanalytic intuitions concerning the content of the preferences deserving to be qualified as rational. The ethical theory capable to reach the reflective equilibrium with all those intuitions could pretend the title of the theory of the absolute practical rationality. As a matter of fact such theory is as yet nonexistent, the theorists of the thick rationality beeing divided into the consequentialists relying on the Humean instrumentalist concept of rationality explicated in the decision theory and the deontologists exploiting the Kantian universalist intuitions on rationality. The article discusses the idea of the "broad" concept of rationality which is intermediate between the minimalist (thin) or formal one and the maximalist (thick) or substantive ethical one, exposed in the work of Jon Elster, Amartya Sen, Albert O. Hirschman, Martin Hollis, Stefan Gosepath et all. The rational decision in this intermediate sense is named in the article (following the proposal of S. Gosepath) "relatively practically rational decision". Relatively practically rational is the choice of an agent whose preferences in addition to the standard 6 axioms of the theory of expected utility satisfy two supplementary ones: (7) preferences are realistic and (8) they are shaped in some specific way. This way can be charaterized in the negative terms or in the positive ones. Speaking in the negative terms, to be rational the preferences must not be the products of some subintentional mechanisms or to remain acceptable for the agent after she comes to know the causal story of their genesis. Speaking in the positive terms, the rationality of the preferences is warranted if they are chosen by the agent guided by the metapreferences satisfying conditions (1)-(3). The distinction between preferences and preferences proposed by Harry G. Frankfurt gives handy means to demarcate the bounds of practical rationality too: human agents cannot pretend to achieve the absolute practical rationality in their choices because they in their choices of the preferences (or ethical preferences) cannot rely on arguments having the validating power not coming up to that possessed by the arguments substantiating the choices between the empirical hypotheses. They can achieve the relative practical rationality in so far as the rational choice between preferences is a feasible one. The concept of relative pratical rationality is thick enough to assimilate one of the most powerful intuitions concerning rationality, characteristic for the modern Western culture and proclaimed as early as in 1486 by Pico della Mirandola in his famous "Oratio de hominis dignitate". In this intuition the human rationality and the human autonomy are indissolubly bounded. The concept of relative practical rationality preserves this intuition equating the rational and the autonomous choice and defining the rational choice as the consistent choice guided by the realistic preferences which are themselves chosen on the ground of the ethical preferences (metapreferences) directing the characters planning of an agent. (shrink)

The study aims to analyze the changes in the status of rationality in the field of the New Rhetoric – the most influential direction in the modern theory of argumentation, which appeared in the 1960s with the scientific works of C. Perelman – L. Olbrechts – Titeka and S. Toulmin. The thesis presented is that the practices of contemporary public discourse find their most logical and comprehensive theoretical explanation in the teachings of the New Rhetoric, which change the traditional status (...) of rationality and transform it into a logic of practical philosophy. The novelties are ascertained by tracking the dynamics in the understanding of the main categories of argumentation – evidence, argumentation, deductive validity, evaluation criteria, arguments, facts, assumptions, values, consent. Perelman’s model of rational argumentation outlines the transition from logical to communicative rationality, which introduces the factors of contextuality and functionality; affirms the validity of a communicative reasonableness in which the mechanisms of thought are synchronized with the processes of language; introduces practical reasoning, which functions as a strategic interaction between logical thinking, imagination, and language. (shrink)

The research is devoted to the problem of philosophically justifying rationality, which inevitably takes the form of a circular argument: to define what rationality is, we must refrain from referring to its criteria, which must be rationally defined beforehand. This epistemic circle is compared to the so-called “experimenter’s regress”. The experimenter’s regress involves reasoning in which judging the correctness of obtained scientific results can only be based on the correctness of the procedure of obtaining them and judging the correctness of (...) the procedure of obtaining them can only be done by relying on the obtained results. From the perspective of social researchers of science, the experimenter’s (and the theoretician’s) regress casts a shadow on traditional theories of rationality that take science as a model of rational knowledge. The research analyzes the experimenter’s regress in the context of virtuous and vicious circles. It is shown that the experimenter’s regress is overcome by turning to external factors. These factors are proposed to be interpreted in terms of extended rationality. By analyzing the experimenter’s regress, social epistemologists consciously or unconsciously rationalize these “external” factors and enrich the concept of rationality. This allows qualifying the circle described by rationality in defining itself as virtuous and the work of the epistemologist as a progressive activity, during which both epistemology and its subject undergo qualitative changes. (shrink)

The paper gives an overview of Arthur Schopenhauer's theory of rationality. For Schopenhauer, rationality is a human faculty based on language, which, in addition to language, is primarily concerned with knowledge or philosophy of science and practical action. For Schopenhauer, language is the umbrella term under which he subsumes logic and eristics. This paper will first introduce Schopenhauer's logic and clarify its connection to the philosophy of language. This is followed by eristic dialectics, which reflects on how one can protect (...) oneself from people who argue irrationally in a goal-oriented way. Schopenhauer's philosophy of mathematics belongs to the field of philosophy of science. Unlike many other authors of his time, Schopenhauer does not advocate a rationalist but a representationalist approach, which, however, includes a theory of rationality. Therefore, Schopenhauer's representationalist approach will finally be discussed, emphasizing its relationship to his theory of rationality. (shrink)

This book uses the psychological literature on rationality to weigh in on the recent debate between virtue epistemologists and epistemic situationists. It argues that both sides have misconstrued the literature and that an interactionist framework is needed to square epistemic theory with empirical facts about reasoning and inference. The explosion of empirical literature on human rationality has led to seismic shifts across a multitude of academic disciplines. This book considers its implications for epistemology. In particular, it critically evaluates the treatment (...) of the rationality literature within the recent controversy between virtue epistemologists, who attempt to ground knowledge in stable epistemic virtues, and epistemic situationists, who claim that such a project is doomed by empirical evidence of widespread irrationality. It links this foundational controversy to two of the most important debates in psychology: the Rationality Wars and the person-situation debate. The book argues that both virtue theorists and epistemic situationists have misunderstood the implications of these debates, leading them to focus exclusively on personal dispositions and situational factors as two independent sources of epistemic success, failure, and improvement. A more accurate reading of the empirical literature implies that interactions between epistemic agents and their social, informational, and institutional environments are the fundamental drivers of both rational and irrational behaviour. An interactionist framework motivated by this insight conceives of epistemic virtues and vices as both responsive to and responsible for the environments in which they're manifested and cultivated. The central aim of this book is to present and defend this novel type of virtue epistemology. Rationality in Context will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of psychology, cognitive psychology, and social psychology. (shrink)

Bounded rationality gets a bad rap in epistemology. It is argued that theories of bounded rationality are overly context‐sensitive; conventionalist; or dependent on ordinary language (Carr, 2022; Pasnau, 2013). In this paper, I have three aims. The first is to set out and motivate an approach to bounded rationality in epistemology inspired by traditional theories of bounded rationality in cognitive science. My second aim is to show how this approach can answer recent challenges raised for theories of bounded rationality. My (...) third aim is to clarify the role of rational ideals in bounded rationality. (shrink)

Utilitarians think that what matters in ethics is making the world a better place. In that case, it might seem that we each rationally ought to do our best—perform the actions, out of those open to each of us, with the best expected outcomes. In other words, we should follow act-utilitarian reasons. But often the result of many altruistic agents following such individualistic reasons is worse than the result of them following collectivist ‘team-reasons’. So utilitarians should reject act utilitarianism, and (...) accept a dualist view according to which both individualistic and team reasons are fundamental. In order to align these distinct kinds of reason, utilitarians must focus centrally on questions of political and social reform—as did their historical forebears. (shrink)

This short article aims to strengthen Hume's case against the rationality of believing in religious miracles by incorporating certain lessons borrowed from the growing literature on the history and psychology of magic tricks.

Real human agents, even when they are rational by everyday standards, sometimes assign different credences to objectively equivalent statements, such as “George Orwell is a writer” and “Eric Arthur Blair is a writer”, or credences less than 1 to necessarily true statements, such as not-yet-proven theorems of arithmetic. Anna Mahtani calls this the phenomenon of “opacity” (a form of hyperintensionality). Opaque credences seem probabilistically incoherent, which goes against a key modelling assumption of probability theory. I sketch a modelling strategy for (...) capturing opaque credence assignments without abandoning probabilistic coherence. I draw on ideas from judgment-aggregation theory, where we face similar challenges of defining the “objects of judgment”. (shrink)

The “private” dimension of social life is problematic, posing conceptual, political, and ecological challenges. Some of these problems arise from the very nature of private property as it is enshrined in social life, which demands special privileges be granted to “private” matters on the grounds that these are private, because the predominant representation of the involved rights is that they reflect claims of the holders, rather than legitimate claims of society as a whole in allocating responsibilities, benefits, and duties. The (...) claim to the rationality of allocations of property rights, this article argues, must be questioned in light of the kind of commonality that is revealed in a striking manner by environmental issues (although it is not restricted to environmental matters). This questioning makes sense in relation to an analysis of social interactions, beyond the problematic opposition between the private sphere and public life. (shrink)

In reasoning, we draw conclusions from multiple premises. But thinkers can be fragmented. And if there is no single fragment of the agent that thinks all of the premises, then the agent cannot draw any conclusions from them. It follows that reasoning from multiple premises depends on their being thought together. But what is it to think premises together? What is the condition that contrasts with fragmentation? This paper provides an answer to this question that is simple but compelling: to (...) think premises together is to attribute those very thoughts to one and the same self. The ability to reason depends on the ability to attribute the thoughts from which one reasons to oneself. Reasoning—at least the sort of reasoning that we do—requires de se thought. (shrink)

Within collective epistemology, there is a class of theories that understand the epistemic status of collective attitude ascriptions, such as ‘the college union knows that the industrial action is going to plan’, or ‘the jury justifiedly believes that the suspect is guilty’, as saying that a sufficient subset of group member attitudes have the relevant epistemic status. In this paper, I will demonstrate that these summativist approaches to collective epistemology are incompatible with epistemic permissivism, the doctrine that a single body (...) of evidence may rationalize multiple doxastic attitudes. In particular, I will make use of epistemic permissivism to provide a general recipe for generating so-called divergence cases, which demonstrate situations in which rationality requires group-level and member-level attitudes to diverge. I will call this class of cases permissive divergence cases. While other divergence cases have been discussed in the literature, permissive divergence cases prove themselves to be less susceptible to many of the worries raised against their competitors, while being directly built on an often-defended epistemological thesis. (shrink)

John Tillson concludes the symposium on his Children, Religion and the Ethics of Influence by replying to his five respondents. The reply focusses on Michael Hand’s defence of parental rights to raise their children in their faith; Ruth Wareham’s suggestion that the value of autonomy rules out a wider range of impermissible religious influences than Tillson’s account is able to; David Lewin’s alternative criteria for ethical influence and scepticism about rationality’s objectivity; Anca Gheaus’ proposal that initiation into multiple contradictory religious (...) faiths is permissible; and Matthew Clayton’s rejection of the book’s perfectionist political morality. (shrink)

Future-bias is the preference, all else being equal, for positive states of affairs to be located in the future not the past, and for negative states of affairs to be located in the past not the future. Three explanations for future-bias have been posited: the temporal metaphysics explanation, the practical irrelevance explanation, and the three mechanisms explanation. Understanding what explains future-bias is important not only for better understanding the phenomenon itself, but also because many philosophers think that which explanation is (...) the correct one has implications for our evaluation of the normative status of future-bias. In this paper we focus on the connection between future-bias and the temporal value asymmetry. The latter refers to the fact that people tend to assign more value to a state of affairs when it is located in the future, as opposed to being equidistant in the past. All three candidate explanations offered for future-bias proceed by explaining the temporal value asymmetry, and then supposing that future-bias is simply a manifestation of that asymmetry. Recently, however, it has been argued that the conditions under which people display the temporal value asymmetry and future-bias are different, and that this is reason to doubt that the latter is a manifestation of the former. In this paper we empirically test one response to this argument against the manifestation thesis—the simulation response—according to which once we control for the degree to which people can simulate the object of their preference, we find that people display future-bias and the temporal value asymmetry in the same conditions. We find no evidence in favour of the simulation response. Moreover, our results support some previous research that suggests that the temporal value asymmetry is less robust than previously thought, and this in itself casts doubt on the idea that future bias is just a manifestation of this asymmetry. (shrink)

This paper uses the idea of a proxy, which figures in discussions of bounded rationality, to construct an argument for a revisionary conclusion about ideal instrumental rationality. I consider how subjective responses can figure as proxies in heuristics and develop the following argument: (1) Proxies, even if relatively easy to recognize, can sometimes be messy, prompting incomplete or cyclic preferences. (2) From the point of view of ideal instrumental rationality, it is permissible for an agent to be concerned with a (...) proxy rather than with what it is a proxy for. And so, (3) although it is standardly assumed, as part of the prevailing conception of ideal instrumental rationality, that rational preferences are complete and acyclic, neither incomplete preferences nor cyclic preferences can be dismissed as invariably irrational from the point of view of ideal instrumental rationality. (shrink)

In updating our beliefs on the basis of our background attitudes and evidence we frequently employ objects in our environment to represent pertinent information. For example, we may write our premises and lemmas on a whiteboard to aid in a proof or move the beads of an abacus to assist in a calculation. In both cases, we generate extramental (that is, occurring outside of the mind) representational states, and, at least in the case of the abacus, we operate over these (...) states in light of their contents (e.g., the integers represented by the beads) to generate new representations. In this paper, I argue that our belief updating processes and the grounds of their rational evaluation are partly constituted by extramental representations and operations. In other words, we don’t merely update our attitudes through an internal process of reasoning on the basis of available evidence. If we are to accurately understand and rationally evaluate our belief updating processes and resultant attitudes, we need to examine how we representationally appropriate our extramental environment in the updating process. (shrink)

In this thesis I examine the debate between John McDowell and Hubert Dreyfus. I narrow the debate down to what I believe is its most fundamental concern: the extent to which conceptual rationality plays a role in our skillful engagement with the world. I provide an exposition of the main arguments presented by each thinker in an attempt to lead the reader to a clearer understanding of the debate. I side with McDowell, I claim that his distinction between two psychological (...) states enables him to successfully rebut Dreyfus’ strongest critique, and provide a coherent account of the mind-world relation. (shrink)

Ambivalence, i.e., the simultaneous holding of negative and positive evaluations toward the same object, is an empirically well-documented phenomenon and an important aspect of ordinary experience. However, it has not received sufficient philosophical attention. This essay accomplishes two aims: first, a comprehensive and empirically informed account of ambivalence is provided; second, the rationality of ambivalence in practical and nonpractical contexts is defended.

Tsenay Serequeberhan’s hermeneutics has been crucial to the development of African philosophy. Initially employed as a pathway through the ethno- and professional philosophical debates, scholars have engaged how Serequeberhan’s hermeneutics grapples with one’s own place within a socio-historical world in service of liberation/self-determination. However, this scholarship mainly has focused on his adaptation of Gadamer’s ‘effective-historical consciousness’ for his own concept of heritage. This consequently leaves his concept of a ‘lived existence’ – which is equally crucial – under-examined. This paper probes (...) what a ‘lived existence’ entails and its essentiality when explicating how one even begins to authentically think, which is the groundwork to Serequeberhan’s hermeneutics. This deepens why his concept of heritage matters as a starting point for self-determination. Addressing this lacuna, this article asks, where does philosophy begin and where should it go, particularly when rationality has been historically denied? Serequeberhan’s point of departure to answer this question proposes Heidegger’s concept of thinking itself to arrive at a notion of existence; contrariwise to most African scholars who employ a Sartrean existentialism via Frantz Fanon. As such, this paper gives an in-depth exploration of Serequeberhan’s initial reading of Heidegger, and then unfolds how he appropriates Heidegger to craft his notion of ‘lived existence’. The upshot this is twofold: First, a broader understanding of Serequeberhan’s project, its non-existentialist view of existence; Second, it describes how he specifically tailors his ‘lived existence’ to undergird his hermeneutical approach to heritage as a prescriptive, activist project which dynamically addresses the postcolonial situation. (shrink)

This article analyses the rationality of the principle of proportionality as a justificatory method for solving cases involving conflicts of constitutional principles. It addresses the “problem of comparability”: a set of arguments claiming that proportionalists fail to understand what happens when constitutional principles collide. The problem of comparability suggests that balancing cannot be done if some conflicts of constitutional principles are, in reality, cases of noncomparability, incommensurability, incomparability, or vagueness. In this article, I challenge the views of both proportionalists and (...) their skeptics. Against the skeptics, I argue that proportionality can survive the challenge posed by the problem of comparability. Against the proportionalists, I submit that proportionality cannot be understood as a system of tradeoffs between degrees of satisfaction of principles. If comparison among constitutional principles is to be rational, we need a different approach to normativity—one that allows for the possibility of parity. (shrink)

The purpose of the paper is to study the interrelatedness of rationality, virtue, and practical wisdom in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics by offering a critical interpretation of the bipartition of the soul presented in Chap. 13 of the first book. Aristotle relies on the partition of the soul into a rational and a non-rational part when he distinguishes between ethical and intellectual virtues. The paper will question the adequacy of these divisions and show that Aristotle himself casts doubt on them while (...) leaving open the possibility of understanding the soul in an alternative way which will prove to fit better with his own exposition of deliberate choice and the integration of virtuous action and practical wisdom. (shrink)

Questions surrounding deep disagreement have gained significant attention in recent years. One of the central debates is metaphysical, focusing on the features that make a disagreement deep. Proposals for what makes disagreements deep include theories about hinge propositions and first epistemic principles. In this paper, I criticize this metaphysical discussion by arguing that it is methodologically flawed. Deep disagreement is a technical or semi-technical term, but the metaphysical discussion mistakenly treats it as a common-sense concept to be analyzed and captured (...) by our pre-theoretical intuitions. Since the literature on deep disagreement is subject to this fundamental confusion and deep disagreement is not a helpful umbrella term either, I propose eliminating the notion of deep disagreement from the philosophical discourse. Instead of analyzing the nature of deep disagreement, we should develop theories about different forms of disagreement, including disagreement about hinge propositions and disagreement about epistemic principles, and, in particular, a theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement. (shrink)

There are scenarios in which letting one’s own views on the question whether p direct one’s inquiry into that question brings about individual and collective epistemic benefits. However, these scenarios are also such that one’s evidence doesn’t support believing one’s own views. So, how to vindicate the epistemic benefits of directing one’s inquiry in such an asymmetric way, without asking one to hold a seemingly irrational doxastic attitude? To answer this question, the paper understands asymmetric inquiry direction in terms of (...) having one’s inquiry be guided by a doxastic attitude, which I call hypothesis, that’s governed by the following norm: One’s hypothesis that p is rational just in case it is a manifestation of the best feasible way to form a doxastic attitude regarding p that promotes the best feasible ways to advance towards settling the question of p’s (or of any other suitably related proposition’s) truth-value. (shrink)

Book review - Bounded Rationality: Heuristics, Judgement, and Public Policy Sanjit Dhami and Cass R. Sunstein. MIT Press, 2022, 533 pp.

It can be rational to inquire into what you already know, as cases of double-checking suggest. But, I argue, this is compatible with a knowledge aim of inquiry. In general, it can be rational to pursue an aim you’ve already achieved, and inquiry is no different. In particular, I argue that to double-check what you already know is to make sure you have knowledge, and that is still to aim at knowledge.

Epistemologists have recently proposed a number of norms governing rational inquiry. My aim in this paper is to unify and explain recently proposed norms of inquiry by developing a general account of the conditions under which inquiries are rational, analogous to theories such as evidentialism and reliabilism for rational belief. I begin with a reason-responsiveness conception of rationality as responding correctly to possessed normative reasons. I extend this account with a series of claims about the normative reasons for inquiry that (...) we possess. I apply the account to shed light on two classes of norms that have featured prominently in recent discussions: norms of clutter avoidance forbidding agents from engaging in trivial inquiries, and norms of logical non-omniscience governing properties such as the deductive closure and consistency of an agent's belief state. I conclude with a discussion of the sense in which norms of inquiry should be regarded as epistemic norms. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between education and technological rationality from the perspective of the philosophy of education, and to show that while education is deeply related to technique, skills, or technology, it can never be reduced to technical knowledge, and that there are things in education that overflow technical knowledge. I will here ask why there is something in education that overflows technical knowledge — I will define it as knowledge of pathos — and (...) why it is necessary to redefine the meaning of education in terms of knowledge of pathos. In order to address this issue, I will first examine the relationship between technology and transcendence in the world of education in Kei Hachiya’s Education and Transcendence. Second, I will show that recent outstanding theoretical achievements of Japanese philosophers of education — Satoji Yano’s Education from the Perspectives of Gift and Exchange, Yasuo Imai’s Medial Perspective on Education, and Tsunemi Tanaka’s Clinical Theory of Human Becoming — are all located within the problematic area of ‘technology-pathos-education’. Finally, I would like to propose a ‘philosophy of education built on fragile parts’, with a view to redefining education through the knowledge of pathos, paying attention to the experience of pathei mathos and the opportunity of weakness in the philosophy of education. (shrink)

Philosophers and cognitive scientists have been debating about the nature of practical knowledge in skilled action. A big challenge is that of establishing whether and how practical knowledge (knowledge-how) is influenced by, or related to propositional knowledge (knowledge-that). This becomes even more challenging when trying to understand how propositional and motor representations may cooperate in making action performance flexible, while also remaining rational. In this paper, we offer an account that explains how practical knowledge leads to the execution of our (...) actions in a way that accounts for its relation to propositional knowledge, and with respect to the possibility of granting flexibility and rationality. (shrink)

Root, branch, and blossom, attention is intertwined with epistemology. It is essential to our capacity to learn and decisive of the evidence we obtain, it influences the intellectual connections we forge and those we remember, and it is the cognitive tool whereby we enact decisions about inquiry. Moreover, because it is both an epistemic practice and a site of agency, attention is a natural locus for questions about epistemic morality. This article surveys the emerging epistemology of attention, reviewing the existing (...) literature and sketching avenues for future investigation. It also argues for a reorientation of epistemology itself. This argument is the focus of Section 1. Section 2 briefly reviews philosophical accounts of attention, Section 3 focuses on issues in traditional, individualistic epistemology, and Section 4 turns to social epistemology. (shrink)