Pyrrhonists, Misc

Why does Kant say that a “skeptical satisfaction of pure reason” is “impossible” (A758/B786)? I answer this question by giving a reading of “The Discipline of Pure Reason in Respect of Its Polemic Employment.” I explain that Kant must address skepticism in this context because his warning against developing counterarguments to dogmatic attacks encourages a comparison between the critical and the skeptical methods. I then argue that skepticism fails to “satisfy” [befriedigen] reason insofar as it cannot “pacify” reason’s tendency to (...) go beyond its own boundaries. The skeptical method reveals the past failures of dogmatic metaphysics but cannot rule out future successes. Only critical knowledge of reason’s proper bounds can do this, thereby pacifying our restless reason. I close by arguing that Kant’s discussion implies that a skeptic must feel dissatisfied with her renunciation of metaphysics, and that this dissatisfaction can lead her to take interest in Kant’s critical philosophy. (shrink)

This monograph reevaluates a school of thought concerned with truth and inquiry. It examines the critique which asserts that it's not possible to live this Early Greek philosophy in practice. The investigation also details new discoveries on the reception of Skepticism by Empiricist Doctors, Early Greek Fathers, Medieval Arabic Thinkers, and Renaissance Thinkers. The author takes a careful look at the apraxia argument and how critics used it. He shows how anti-skeptical arguments rose in different stages of the development of (...) the Skepticism. Coverage also details how the skeptics replied and gave more pragmatic coherence to their philosophy, starting with the proto-skeptics and continuing with the works of Sextus Empiricus. Readers will learn how skepticism endured despite the criticisms, becoming a coherent response to dogmatic philosophies such as Stoicism. The investigation also analyzes the two common approaches that philosophers have used to interpret Sextan philosophy. It considers their benefits as well as defects. In the process, the author presents an original way of interpreting Sextan thought, which the author calls the “suburban interpretation”. He then applies this "middle way" to two works: Against the Grammarians and Against the Rhetoricians. Overall, the book provides readers with an insightful look at how this school of thought survived and spread throughout the ages. (shrink)

Hume describes his own “open, social, and cheerful humour” as “a turn of mind which it is more happy to possess, than to be born to an estate of ten thousand a year.” Why does he value a cheerful character so highly? I argue that, for Hume, cheerfulness has two aspects—one manifests as mirth in social situations, and the other as steadfastness against life’s misfortunes. This second aspect is of special interest to Hume in that it safeguards the other virtues. (...) And its connection with the first aspect helps explain how it differs from Stoic tranquility. For Hume, I argue, philosophy has a modest role in promoting human happiness by preserving cheerfulness. (shrink)

The majority of the excerpts traditionally taken to derive from a planned book 8 of Clement of Alexandria’s Stromateis concern the theory of demonstration (apodeixis) and related matters of logic. The suspension of judgement (epochē), a recognisably sceptical response to disagreement and a lack of demonstrative certainty, receives two brief treatments in this context. Apart from an attempted refutation of scepticism which points to the allegedly self-refuting character of universal epochē (5.15.2–16.3), the text also includes an account of the causes (...) that lead one to suspend judgement (7.22.1–4). ... First, I will give a brief overview of both the argument from self-refutation employed in the first Clementine excerpt and Sextus Empiricus' rejection of a related argument. I will argue that the comparison does not support definite claims about the origin of the Clementine material (section 1). Then I will discuss the second excerpt, which offers a series of remarks on the causal origin of epochē (section 2). I will then contrast it to Sextus’s account of the origin of suspensive disposition in terms of originative principles (archai) rather than causes (aitiai), arguing that Sextus’s formulation allows for a more nuanced sceptical position (section 3). In conclusion, I will briefly consider possible views on the relevance of this material, or the lack thereof, for Clement’s Christian project (section 4). (shrink)

22 page Critical Notice of Herophilus: The Art of Medicine in Early Alexandria by Heinrich von Staden. Sections IV and V deal with the question of Herophilus' views in epistemology and his relation to skepticism.