Plato: Philosophy of Science, Misc

I develop an account of the role that biology plays in the Timaeus’ view of nous and other aspects of cognitive life. I begin by outlining the biology of human cognition. I then argue that these biological views shine an important light on different aspects of the soul. I then argue that the human body is particularly friendly to nous, paying special attention to the heart and the liver. I next consider the ways that the body fails to protect our (...) nous. I conclude by comparing human nous with the cognition of non-humans. (shrink)

The principles governing elemental composition, variation, and change in Plato’s Timaeus appear to be incompatible, which has led commentators to prioritize some of the principles to the exclusion of others. Call this seeming incompatibility the problem of isomorphic variants. In this paper, I develop the theory of proportionate atomism as a solution to this problem. Proportionate atomism retains the advantages of rival interpretations but allows the principles of material composition, variation, and change to combine into an internally coherent and explanatorily (...) powerful atomic physics. (shrink)

Plato’s Timaeus reveals a cosmos governed by Necessity and Intellect; commentators have debated the relationship between them. Non-literalists hold that the demiurge, having carte blanche in taming Necessity, is omnipotent. But this omnipotence, alongside the attributes of benevolence and omniscience, creates problems when non-literalists address the problem of evil. We take the demiurge rather as limited by Necessity. This position is supported by episodes within the text, and by its larger consonance with Plato’s philosophy of evil and responsibility. By recognizing (...) the analogy between man and demiurge, the literal reading provides a moral component that its non-literal counterpart lacks. (shrink)

Plato’s Philebus has often been said to lack unity as a dialogue. In particular, what is the relation between the methodological and metaphysical reflections early in the dialogue and the investigations of pleasure and knowledge that constitutes its main subject matter? This chapter argues that Plato’s Philebus provides a division of knowledge (epistēmē), which satisfies the methodological norms explained earlier in the dialogue. In order to make this claim, Socrates is shown to provide an example of a cross-cutting division not (...) unlike those found in the Gorgias and Sophist. With this account of the division in place, we are able to better appreciate how the divine method of inquiry ensures the unity of all forms of knowledge. (shrink)

In the Timaeus, plants are granted soul, and specifically the sort of soul capable of perception and desire. But perception, according to the Timaeus, requires the involvement of to phronimon. It seems to follow that plants must be intelligent. I argue that we can neither avoid granting plants sensation in just this sense, nor can we suppose that the phronimon is something devoid of intelligence. Indeed, plants must be related to intelligence, if they are to be both orderly and good (...) – for intelligence is the cause of normativity and teleology. And yet, plants are not intelligent creatures. While plants must have individual souls if they are to be distinct from each other, each having its own orderly life, the intelligence they require for their individual sensations is not similarly individuated, but is rather that of the cosmos itself. Plants’ peculiar partial individuation arises from the fact that their ultimate good is only derivative: unlike animals, it is only by completing the body of the cosmos that a plant’s good a Good Thing. (shrink)

Scholarship on Plato's Timaeus has paid relatively little attention to Tim. 77a–81, a seemingly disjointed passage on topics including plants, respiration, blood circulation, and musical sounds. Despite this comparative neglect, commentators both ancient and modern have levelled a number of serious charges against Timaeus' remarks in the passage, questioning the coherence and explanatory power of what they take to be a theory of respiration. In this paper, I argue that the project of 77a–81e is not to sketch theories of respiration, (...) circulation, and digestion, but to explain how the human body is maintained in light of and despite constant environmental depletion. Further, I argue that in order to understand this account of “the replenishing system,” we need to understand Timaeus' striking analogy of the fish trap or nassa. Commentators have generally focused directly on the workings of the bodily construction that Timaeus likens to a fish trap, but without considering how we should understand the analogy qua analogy. I develop a functional reading of the analogy that yields a coherent account of the replenishing system on which previous criticisms of Timaeus' remarks on respiration do not arise. Aside from lending greater unity to the passage, both internally and within its immediate context in the dialogue, this account of the replenishing system contributes to our understanding of Timaeus' reason-and-necessity explanatory framework as applied to the human body and has noteworthy implications for specific explanatory principles, in particular like-to-like motion and circular thrust. (shrink)

Readers of Plato since antiquity have generally taken Socrates’ intellectual autobiography in the Phaedo as a signal of his turn away from the study of natural philosophy. They have turned instead to characters such as Timaeus for evidence of Plato’s pursuit of physics. This article argues that Plato’s Socrates himself developed a philosophy of nature in his criticism of Anaxagoras and his subsequent philosophic pursuits. Socrates’ autobiography places the study of nature in a foundational position within the development of his (...) philosophic method. In the Apology, Socrates further elaborated his investigation into nature through his understanding of theology. Finally, in the Phaedrus, Socrates connects the study of nature with the study of rhetoric as tools for virtue. Therefore, Plato’s Socrates does not reject or abandon physics, as has often been suggested, but rather, he incorporates it into his own philosophic project and challenges its practitioners to connect their own inquiries with human affairs. (shrink)

At Plato’s Phaedrus 270c, Socrates asks whether one can know souls without knowing ‘the whole.’ Phaedrus answers that ‘according to Hippocrates’ the same demand on knowing the whole applies to bodies. What parallel is intended between soul-knowledge and body-knowledge and which medical passages illustrate the analogy have been much debated. Three dominant interpretations read ‘the whole’ as respectively (1) environment, (2) kosmos, and (3) individual soul or body; and adduce supporting Hippocratic passages. But none of these interpretations accounts for the (...) Phaedrus’ rhetorical method. A better reading sees the whole as the genos ‘soul,’ as the Phaedrus’ taxonomies divide that genus. (shrink)

This book examines the birth of the scientific understanding of motion. It investigates which logical tools and methodological principles had to be in place to give a consistent account of motion, and which mathematical notions were introduced to gain control over conceptual problems of motion. It shows how the idea of motion raised two fundamental problems in the 5th and 4th century BCE: bringing together being and non-being, and bringing together time and space. The first problem leads to the exclusion (...) of motion from the realm of rational investigation in Parmenides, the second to Zeno's paradoxes of motion. Methodological and logical developments reacting to these puzzles are shown to be present implicitly in the atomists, and explicitly in Plato who also employs mathematical structures to make motion intelligible. With Aristotle we finally see the first outline of the fundamental framework with which we conceptualise motion today. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a new reading of Phaedo 99b6-d2. My main thesis is that in 99c6-9, Socrates does not refer to the teleological αἰτία but to the αἰτία that will be provided by a stronger ‘Atlas’ (99c4-5). This means that the passage offers no evidence that Socrates abandons teleology or modifies his views about it. He acknowledges, instead, that he could not find or learn any αἰτία stronger than the teleological one. This, I suggest, allows an interpretation of (...) the Phaedo in which Socrates offers a consistent account of the αἰτία of generation and destruction. (shrink)

At 252e1 to 253c9 in Plato’s Sophist, the Eleatic Visitor explains why philosophy is a science. Like the art of grammar, philosophical knowledge corresponds to a generic structure of discrete kinds and is acquired by systematic analysis of how these kinds intermingle. In the literature, the Visitor’s science is either understood as an expression of a mature and authentic platonic metaphysics, or as a sophisticated illusion staged to illustrate the seductive lure of sophistic deception. By showing how the Visitor’s account (...) of the science of philosophy is just as comprehensive, phantasmatic and self-concealing as the art of sophistry identified at the dialogue’s outset, this paper argues in favor of the latter view. (shrink)

At Timaeus 48e2–52d4 Timaeus sets out to establish that there are three principles or kinds underlying the creation of the cosmos, not just the two he acknowledged earlier. The way he does so is not simply by adding an account of the third kind to the accounts of being and becoming that he has already given. Rather he does so by showing how each of the three differs from the others. It has not been noticed how this procedure structures the (...) receptacle passage. The passage divides up into three parts, each punctuated by a list of the three kinds in a significant order. If we take X, Y and Z to stand for ‘becoming’, ‘being’ and ‘receptacle’ ’ respectively, the structure is X≠Z, X≠Y, Y≠Z. By showing the distinctness of each pair, Timaeus demonstrates that all the kinds are distinct and that they are indeed three in number. (shrink)

In the tripartite psychology of the Republic, Plato characterizes the “spirited” part of the soul as the “ally of reason”: like the auxiliaries of the just city, whose distinctive job is to support the policies and judgments passed down by the rulers, spirit’s distinctive “job” in the soul is to support and defend the practical decisions and commands of the reasoning part. This is to include not only defense against external enemies who might interfere with those commands, but also, and (...) most importantly, defense against unruly appetites within the individual’s own soul.1 Spirit, according to this picture, is by nature reason’s faithful auxiliary in the soul, while appetite is always a potential enemy to be watched .. (shrink)

Reading the Timaeus as an early attempt at mathematizing natural science runs into serious difficulties. The so-called Platonic Solids are five in number, one more than the traditional 'elements'. Plato provides a proportional ratio for these elements but this ratio fails to tie in with their geometrical features. Appealing to the authority of mathematics appears to be a rhetorical move with no further consequences.

Unitarianism was the norm amongst ancient interpreters of Plato. One strategy they used to maintain the unity of his thinking was to argue that different works were saying the same things but in different modes. So, for example, the Republic was saying ethically what the Timaeus was saying in the manner of natural philosophy. In this paper, I want to offer an interpretation of the Cave image in Republic 7 which lends support to this division of labour, and so indirectly, (...) at least, to a unitarian understanding of Plato’s thinking across these two works. (shrink)

Plato’s Timaeus gives an account of the creation of the world and of human race. The text suggests that there was a first generation of human beings, and that they were all men. The paper raises difficulties for this traditional view, and considers an alternative, suggested in more recent literature, according to which humans of the first generation were sexually undifferentiated. The paper raises difficulties for the alternative view as well, and examines the third possibility, advocated by some ancient as (...) well as modern interpreters, according to which there were no first humans, strictly speaking. Although the latter view avoids the pitfalls of the former two views, it crucially rests on a metaphorical reading of the creation story in the Timaeus. (shrink)

Plato’s Timaeus is usually taken to be a sequel to the Republic which shows the cosmological basis of Plato’s politics. In this article I challenge the traditional understanding by arguing that neither Critias’s nor Timaeus’s speech performs the assigned function. The contrast between Timaeus’s monologue and the silently listening Socrates dramatizes the philosophical differences between investigations of “the human things,” like those conducted by Socrates, and attempts to demonstrate the intelligible, mathematically calculable order of the sensible natural world, like that (...) of Timaeus. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The “What is X?” Question, the Sciences, Virtue, and the Forms Plato's “Argument from the Sciences” for the Existence of Forms, as Apparently Represented by Aristotle, and Aristotle's Criticism of that Argument Plato the Parmenidean Sciences and Pseudo‐Sciences The Good and the Sciences A Proposal: The Forms are Attributes; and There are No Attributes that are not Forms What about Plato's Other Reasons for Believing in Forms (Logical, or Mystical‐Metaphysical‐Theological)? And Won't These Reasons Make of (...) Forms Something Rather More than Simply Attributes? Objections to the Theory of Forms The Theory of Forms in Later Dialogues Note. (shrink)

Nach Platon „vermittelt“ die Philosophie als Kunst der Dialektik durch Dialog zwischen Begriffen und Disziplinen. Um dies zu zeigen, wird hier eine Lektüre von Platons Symposion vorgestellt, in der das Verhältnis der Disziplinen mit Wissens- und Erziehungsanspruch in Platons Zeit beleuchtet wird. Jede Rede des Symposions ist wie eine Stellungnahme in einem Dialog zu verstehen, so dass das Gesamtwerk als sieben Reden zu lesen sind, die dialogisch aufeinander verweisen. Die Grundannahme dieser Lektüre besagt, dass den einzelnen Reden verschiedene Wissenschaften oder (...) Künste zuzuordnen sind, die einen Wissens- und Erziehungsanspruch vertreten, und dass der in der Rede vorgestellte und verteidigte Liebesbegriff jeweils der dieser Disziplin entsprechende ist. Die unterschiedliche Begriffsbestimmung in den einzelnen Wissenschaften und Künsten nehmen indirekt aufeinander Bezug, widersprechen sich und ergänzen sich. Die Fragen, welche Platon im Symposion diskutiert, betreffen nicht nur die Erkenntnistheorie, Ideenlehre, Rolle des Dialogs für die Philosophie, Fragen der Erziehung und der Kreativität, sondern auch ein Problem, das sich durch die bereits in Platons Zeiten aufkommende Ausdifferenzierung der Disziplinen und Wissenschaften ergibt. Welcher der Disziplinen mit Wissens- und Erziehungsanspruch kommt der Führungsanspruch in Bezug auf die Jugend und damit die Gesellschaft sowie das Wissen zu? Das Angebot Platons um diese Frage zu beantworten und die unterschiedlichen Begriffsbestimmungen und Begriffsangebote zu vereinen, besteht in einer komplizierten Konstruktion. Ein Teil der Antwort bezieht die Philosophie (Eros, Sokrates) und den philosophischen Dialog, für den der Eros unabdingbar ist, direkt mit ein. Im philosophischen Dialog sollten die Begriffsmerkmale ausfindig gemacht werden, die für einen Begriff und seine Bedeutung unabdingbar ist. Dieser Dialog wird aber nicht ausschließlich zwischen Diotima und Sokrates geführt. Er hat ebenso wie die dialogisch aufeinander bezogenen Reden der gesamten Schrift eine Vorbildfunktion. Dieser indirekte Dialog, der durch Abstimmung der Reden zueinander „geführt“ wird, enthält einen weiteren Tel der Antwort. Der eigentliche „Dialog“ muss aber schließlich zwischen der Leserin und dem „Symposion“ stattfinden. (shrink)

This article attempts to give a systematic analysis of the passage 67c4–68d7 from the Timaeus, in which we find Plato’s most detailed, but also extremely obscure, account of the nature and perception of colours. In particular, I focus first on the question how Plato conceives of colour, comparing Plato’s notion with that of Empedocles and showing Plato’s dependence on, but also divergence from, the Empedoclean tradition. Second, I discuss the question what, according to the Timaeus, makes things have the particular (...) colour they have; my interpretation is meant to give a better account of Plato’s view both of what he considers as basic colours and of what he considers as mixed colours. And third, I conclude with some remarks about the ontological status of colours on Plato’s theory, in part by contrasting it with Democritus’ conception of colours as secondary qualities. (shrink)

Plato's dialogue the Timaeus-Critias presents two connected accounts, that of the story of Atlantis and its defeat by ancient Athens and that of the creation of the cosmos by a divine craftsman. This book offers a unified reading of the dialogue. It tackles a wide range of interpretative and philosophical issues. Topics discussed include the function of the famous Atlantis story, the notion of cosmology as 'myth' and as 'likely', and the role of God in Platonic cosmology. Other areas commented (...) upon are Plato's concepts of 'necessity' and 'teleology', the nature of the 'receptacle', the relationship between the soul and the body, the use of perception in cosmology, and the work's peculiar monologue form. The unifying theme is teleology: Plato's attempt to show the cosmos to be organised for the good. A central lesson which emerges is that the Timaeus is closer to Aristotle's physics than previously thought. (shrink)

In the Phaedrus, Plato’s Socrates distinguishes himself from the natural scientists of his day and indicates that the true philosophical attitude, the love of realhuman wisdom, shares something essential with the mythical attitude. In the following essay, I argue that Socrates criticizes science here for its failure to attend to aporia, to recognize an essentially questionworthy aspect of the world of human experience, an aspect I will refer to as distance. Furthermore, I argue that Socrates aligns his own philosophical activity (...) with myth in its maintenance of this distance. (shrink)

The book "Theory of Forms: The Construction of Plato and Aristotle’s Criticism" focuses on two main aspects, construction and criticism. The constriction of Forms theory is the basis on which Plato built all of his philosophy and which influenced all forms of ideas philosophy that emerged after Plato. The research topic was completed by adding Aristotle's critique of the theory of Forms in order to put a clear picture in front of the reader, which was presented by Plato himself and (...) Aristotle's criticism of this theory. -/- Therefore, the book consists four chapters, the first chapter covers the following topics; The philosophical roots of Plato's theory of Forms, The numbers in the Pythagorean school, The Heraclitus' idea of change, Anaxagoras’ idea of Mind, Sophists. Chapter two, Plato's theory of Forms. Definitions of the Forms. The importance of the Forms, The existential and logical significance, Evidence of Forms, Evidence that knowledge is remembering. Chapter Three, Forms and Levels of Knowledge, Dialectic ,Inferential knowledge, Mental knowledge The fourth chapter, The nature of the Forms existence and its being Causes. Forms as numbers and their relationship to movement. The problem of Participation. The final Evaluation of Forms. (shrink)

Seeking to reassess Plato's views on how we might investigate and explain the natural world, this book argues that many of the common charges against Plato (disinterest, ignorance, dismissal of observation) are unfounded, and that Plato had a series of important and cogent criticisms of the early atomists and other physiologoi. His views on science, and on astronomy and cosmology in particular, develop in interesting ways. It also argues that Plato can best be seen as someone who is struggling with (...) the foundations of scientific realism, and that he has interesting epistemological, cosmological and nomological reasons for his teleological approach. (shrink)

_The Being of the Beautiful_ collects Plato’s three dialogues, the _Theaetetus_, _Sophist_, and _Statesmen_, in which Socrates formulates his conception of philosophy while preparing for trial. Renowned classicist Seth Benardete’s careful translations clearly illuminate the dramatic and philosophical unity of these dialogues and highlight Plato’s subtle interplay of language and structure. Extensive notes and commentaries, furthermore, underscore the trilogy’s motifs and relationships. “The translations are masterpieces of literalness.... They are honest, accurate, and give the reader a wonderful sense of the (...) Greek.”—Drew A. Hyland, _Review of Metaphysics_. (shrink)

In one of the most disputed passages of Greek literature Plato in the Republic, 7. 528e–530c prescribes astronomy as the fourth study in the education of the Guardians. But what sort of astronomy? According to one school of thought it is a purely speculative study of bodies in motion having no relation to the celestial objects that we see. While this interpretation has rejoiced the hearts of Plato's detractors, who regard him as an obstacle to the progress of science, it (...) has dismayed his admirers. Another school of thought holds that what Plato meant was that astronomers must get to know the real motions of the heavenly bodies as opposed to their apparent motions as seen by us on earth. The opposed interpretations may be set out in the following representative citations from Sir Thomas Heath and John Burnet. (shrink)

Almost everyone believes that the sciences have progressed tremendously since antiquity. It thus seems that only devout classicists would bother with the study of ancient science, not to mention with the study of ancient science as transfigured by characters in a Platonic dialogue. However, this transfiguration already mitigates the charge of irrelevance. For what may be true of empirical science is not necessarily true of the philosophy of science. Many of the same problems which preoccupy contemporary philosophers of science also (...) preoccupied the ancients. Does science have an "a priori" character, and if so, how is the a priori connected with the empirical? Does science reveal "essential truths" buried in the empirical, or must it always operate under the constraints of imperfect sense perception, so remaining in the realm of the "phenomenal"? There is no reason to assume that Plato's contributions to our understanding of such difficult questions are out of date. Hence the essays comprising the present volume should be of interest not only to Plato scholars but, ultimately, to philosophers of science as well. (shrink)