Philosophy of Physics, Miscellaneous

The Systemic Continuum Paradigm (PCS) offers a unifying framework to understand how emergent properties—ranging from fundamental forces in physics to cognitive capacities in living systems—arise through systemic balances (BS) across multiple scales. While the Law of Structuring Systemic Emergence (LESSE) explains why one force can dominate its scale’s entire synergy in the physical domain (e.g., gravity at cosmic scales), the broader concept of Systemic Balance (BS) accounts for the emergence of non-monopolistic properties such as intelligence, consciousness, or social cooperation in (...) biological and sociotechnical contexts. This essay refines the notion of “extension of affectation” for forces that coincide with the General Systemic Balance (GSB) at a given scale, framing them as structural “monopolies,” while demonstrating that elsewhere, emergent properties operate through co-existence and catalysis rather than singular dominance. Finally, we explore how this paradigm eliminates the need for a single “Theory of Everything” in physics, while simultaneously explaining how intelligence in biological or AI systems can catalyze new configurations without invoking ex nihilo creation. We invite a transdisciplinary community—physicists, biologists, philosophers, AI researchers—to apply, critique, and expand the PCS toward a deeper understanding of cosmic, biological, and cognitive emergences. (shrink)

Recent literature has raised what I'll call the 'multiscale argument' against reduction (see e.g. Batterman (2013), Wilson (2017), Bursten (2018)). These authors observe that numerous successful scientific models appeal to features and properties from a wide range of spatial/temporal scales. This is taken to undermine views that the world is sharply divided into distinct levels, roughly corresponding to different scales, and that each higher level is reducible to the next lowest level. -/- While the multiscale argument does undermine a naive (...) conception of levels and reduction, in this paper I argue that alternative views of reduction and levels can withstand this argument. After articulating the multiscale argument in more detail, I show that this does not undermine a version of reduction that accepts methodological pluralism in science, yet maintains that the adequacy of any model can be explained by appeal to details at smaller scales. I go on to discuss a case study – dislocations in steel –e used by Batterman and Wilson in defence of the multiscale argument. I argue that the version of reduction advocated above is available in this context. I conclude by arguing that, in the face of the multiscale argument, levels are either everywhere or nowhere. (shrink)

This paper introduces the Observer-Observation Duality (OOD), a novel ontological framework that redefines reality as a process-based phenomenon rather than a system of independently existing objects. The core claim of OOD is that only two elements fundamentally exist: observation (O) and the act of observing (B). The observer (S) is demonstrated to be an emergent, dynamic construct rather than a fundamental entity. This framework is supported by quantum mechanics (Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, Schrödinger’s Cat), relativity, and epistemological arguments. Additionally, it refutes (...) the Infinite Creator Paradox (God as a necessary observer) and the Simulation Hypothesis (a simulated reality requiring an ultimate observer). By eliminating the necessity of a static observer, OOD provides a new foundation for understanding consciousness, cognition, and the physical structure of reality. (shrink)

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. There are various grounds for objecting to Dr. Hansson’s version of superdeterminism, but none hold any water. The most common (...) objections are easily dismissed on the basis of the objector’s ignorance that Dr. Hansson’s version of superdeterminism is unique and not subject to the same objections faced by the version of superdeterminism originally put forth by Dr. John Bell. Other objections based on the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics can be dismissed, because Dr. Hansson’s version of superdeterminism disproves the Copenhagen interpretation and there is no direct evidence that the Copenhagen interpretation is true. Finally, a wide range of remaining objections can be dismissed for various specific reasons. (shrink)

In this paper, we will introduce a novel argument (the “Region Argument”) that objects do not have frame-independent shapes in special relativity. The Region Argument lacks vulnerabilities present in David Chalmers' argument for that conclusion based on length contraction. We then examine how views on persistence interact with the Region Argument. We argue that this argument and standard four-dimensionalist assumptions entail that nothing in a relativistic world has any shape, not even stages or the regions occupied by them. We also (...) argue that endurantists have viable ways of preserving shape despite the Region Argument. The upshot of these arguments is that contrary to conventional wisdom, considerations about shape in relativity support endurantism rather than four-dimensionalism. We conclude by examining the implications of our discussion for the debate over Edenic shapes, noting that endurantists have a satisfying response to skeptical arguments about Edenic shapes similar to the one they have against the Region Argument. (shrink)

A description of a geometrical model of the structure of the volume of the universe has to clarify the existence of universal conservation laws, universal constants and universal principles (like the principle of non-locality). But the model envelopes observable and detectable phenomena too, so it is reasonable to expect calculated relations too.

Forces mediate the differences between local amounts of energy in the universe at all scale sizes and determine the direction of the motion of energy configurations. But forces are not always easy to identify and to describe in a com­prehensive explan­atory model.

Yirminci yüzyıl bilimde büyük değişim ve dönüşümlerin gerçekleştiği bir dönemdir. Bu yüzyıl içerisinde moleküler biyoloji, kuantum fiziği, genetik mühendisliği ve biyoteknoloji gibi çeşitli bilimlerin temellerinin atıldığı, bilimsel keşifler ve yenilikler neticesinde kuramların ve teknolojilerin hızla geliştiği ve bu gelişmelerin insanlık tarihini köklü bir şekilde etkilediği bir dönem olmuştur. Yirminci yüzyılda bilimsel ilerleme önceki dönemlerden çok daha hızlı bir oranda gerçekleşmiş ve toplumsal yaşam üzerindeki etkisinin daha derin olduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Bu nedenle yirminci yüzyıl genellikle icatların ve teknolojik gelişmelerin yüzyılı olarak adlandırılmaktadır (...) çünkü bilimsel keşiflerin sayısı artmakla birlikte çok sayıda bilim insanı mevcut teknolojiyi daha etkin bir şekilde kullanarak çalıştıkları alanlarda kapsamlı sonuçlara ulaşmışlardır. Dolayısıyla bilim ve teknoloji bu süre zarfında geçmişte olduğundan çok daha yakın hale gelmiştir. Bununla birlikte, bilimin ilerlemesinin hızlı bir şekilde devam etmesi ve mevcut araştırmaların önemli bir kısmının tarihsel bir bakış açısıyla incelenemeyecek kadar yeni ve çok sayıda olması nedeniyle bu yüzyıldaki bütün bilimsel gelişmelerden ve disiplinlerden bahsetmek mümkün değildir. Bu sebeple yazının kapsamını daraltmak açısından yirminci yüzyılda bilimi ve teknolojiyi en çok etkileyen alan olan fizik bilimindeki önemli konulara değinmek bu dönemin ruhunu anlamak ve bilimin dönüşümüne yönelik bir kavrayışa sahip olmak açısından daha uygun gözükmektedir. Bu bağlamda, çalışmada Dünya’mızı ve evreninin işleyişini anlama konusunda başvurduğumuz disiplinlerden biri olan fizik biliminde yirminci yüzyılda devrimsel bir düşünce olarak karşımıza çıkan Albert Einstein’ın özel ve genel görelilik kuramına yer verilmekle birlikte aynı zamanda günümüzde etkileri bilimsel ve teknolojik düzeyde devam eden kuantum mekaniğine yönelik genel bir perspektif sunulmaktadır. (shrink)

Metaphysics is traditionally conceived as aiming at the truth — indeed, the most fundamental truths about the most general features of reality. Philosophical naturalists, urging that philosophical claims be grounded on science, have often assumed an eliminativist attitude towards metaphysics, consequently paying little attention to such a definition. In the more recent literature, however, naturalism has instead been taken to entail that the traditional conception of metaphysics can be accepted if and only if one is a scientific realist (and puts (...) the right constraints on acceptable metaphysical claims). Here, we want to suggest that naturalists can, and perhaps should, pick a third option, based on a significant yet acceptable revision of the established understanding of metaphysics. More particularly, we will claim that a fictionalist approach to metaphysics is compatible with both the idea that the discipline inquires into the fundamental features of reality and naturalistic methodology; at the same time, it meshes well with both scientific realism and instrumentalism. (shrink)

It is standardly believed that the generally time-reversal symmetric fundamental laws of physics themselves cannot explain the apparent asymmetry of time. In particular, it is believed that CP (charge conjugation parity symmetry) violation is of no help. In this article, I want to push back against a quick dismissal of CP violation as a potential source for the arrow of time and argue that it should be taken more seriously for conceptualizing time in physics. After briefly reviewing the general debate (...) on the direction of time, I note that CP violation is a key feature of our best physical theory which also has large-scale explanatory import regarding the matter–anti-matter asymmetry of the universe. I then investigate how CP violation may help explain the directionality of time. I argue that accounts à la Maudlin, which posit an intrinsic fundamental direction of time, are not convincing and instead I propose using recent results from work on the dynamical approach to relativity theory: if matter field symmetries are more fundamental than spatiotemporal symmetries, the established (fundamental) directionality of the former may explain the (derivative) directionality of the latter. (shrink)

Husserl presents a scheme of his philosophy of physics in paragraphs 40 to 52 of treatise Ideas1, relying on the foundations of the idea of transcendental phenomenology. The main pillar of his theory is the discussion of the nature and existence of unobservable and theoretical entities in mathematical physics. He expands his opinion while rejecting and violating two theories of primary-secondary qualities and critical realism and tries to propose an alternative model. In this article, I will first reread the clear (...) and explicit aspect of Husserl's theory about unobservable entities by referring to the text of Ideas1, then by proposing an epistemological framework based on transcendental phenomenology, I will try to complete and reconstruct the ambiguous and controversial aspects of Husserl's theory. In this regard, I will argue that theoretical entities in physics have a "Universal" status, and therefore the discussion of what they are should be done using the doctrine of categorial intuition. In the following, while paying attention to the two ways of realizing universals in Husserl's view (Platonic and Kantian) and emphasizing the role of a ‘primary imaginary given’ in the constitution of universals, I will consider theoretical entities as universals in the Kantian sense and I will give evaluate the advantages and limitations of this interpretation. (shrink)

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) holds that, for everything that exists or occurs or holds true, there is a reason why that is the case. I consider three possible ways of relating physics to the PSR: past states as reasons for present states, reasons why the laws of physics take the form that they do, and reasons why there is anything at all. In each case I suggest that the PSR is not the best way of thinking about how (...) and why physics works. -/- Invited reflection for The Principle of Sufficient Reason (Oxford Philosophical Concepts), Eds. F. Amijee and M. Della Rocca (forthcoming 2024). (shrink)

With special relativity, we seem to be facing a conundrum. It is a very well-tested theory; in this way, the Minkowski spacetime must be “capturing” essential features of space and time. However, its geometry seems to be incompatible with any sort of global notion of time. We might only have local notions of now (present moment) and time flow, at best. In this note, we will explore the possibility that a pretty much global notion of now (and time flow) might (...) be hiding in plain sight in the geometry of the Minkowski spacetime. (shrink)

If an asymmetry in time does not arise from the fundamental dynamical laws of physics, it may be found in special boundary conditions. The argument normally goes that since thermodynamic entropy in the past is lower than in the future according to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, then tracing this back to the time around the Big Bang means the universe must have started off in a state of very low thermodynamic entropy: the Thermodynamic Past Hypothesis. In this paper, we (...) consider another boundary condition that plays a similar role, but for the decoherent arrow of time, i.e. the subsystems of the universe are more mixed in the future than in the past. According to what we call the Entanglement Past Hypothesis, the initial quantum state of the universe had very low entanglement entropy. We clarify the content of the Entanglement Past Hypothesis, compare it with the Thermodynamic Past Hypothesis, and identify some challenges and open questions for future research. (shrink)

In this contribution, I explore the possibility of characterizing the emergence of time in causal set theory (CST) in terms of the growing block universe (GBU) metaphysics. I show that although GBU seems to be the most intuitive time metaphysics for CST, it leaves us with a number of interpretation problems, independently of which dynamics we choose to favor for the theory —here I shall consider the Classical Sequential Growth and the Covariant model. Discrete general covariance of the CSG dynamics (...) does not allow us to individuate a single history of the universe (defined by a causal history of different causal sets), thereby making the claim that ‘the past exists’ at best problematic. In addition, because the evolution of the universe in CSG dynamics leads to an outward branching causal tree, it becomes impossible to determine a proper ‘line of becoming’, thereby blurring the presentists’ claim that only the present exists. Similarly, the covariant approach runs into the same, if not even more severe problems, since each configuration of the universe would amount to a set of possible causal sets, thereby making the individuation of a single configuration of the universe —and thus the physical interpretation of the theory— implausible. (shrink)

A serious examination of the viability of a static block universe, and an exploration of its repercussions in the fields of consciousness, causality, free will, cosmology, and quantum mechanics.

This paper explores the physical and metaphysical implications of time travel, focusing on the possibility of changing the past, through a comparative analysis of David Lewis' modal realism and Everett's many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. The existence of closed timelike curves (CTCs) in certain solutions to Einstein's field equations provides a theoretical basis for the possibility of backwards time travel, but this leads to a range of paradoxes, most notably the grandfather paradox. David Lewis argues that time travel must maintain (...) consistency and that the past cannot be changed, even if time travel were possible. His view is supported by his modal realism, which posits the existence of a plurality of possible worlds. In contrast, Everett's many-worlds interpretation, which holds that quantum mechanics describes a multiverse of branching realities, might seem to allow for the possibility of multiple, inconsistent histories. By examining these two ontological frameworks, this paper aims to shed light on the paradoxes of time travel and to explore whether the many-worlds interpretation provides a more satisfactory resolution to these paradoxes than Lewis' modal realism. It is argued that while Lewis' view provides a coherent model for maintaining consistency in time travel, Everett's interpretation may offer a more physically grounded and philosophically compelling account of the metaphysics of time travel. The paper concludes by suggesting that the many-worlds interpretation, by locating the branching of timelines within the structure of quantum mechanics itself, may provide a more promising framework for understanding the possibility and implications of time travel than Lewis' modal realism. However, significant questions remain about the nature of personal identity and free will in a branching multiverse. This comparative analysis aims to contribute to the ongoing debate about the metaphysical possibility of time travel and to highlight the value of engaging with interpretations of quantum mechanics in this context. Keywords: time travel, closed timelike curves, modal realism, many-worlds interpretation, grandfather paradox, metaphysics of time. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the experimental practices and reasoning strategies employed in nineteenth century investigations on the causal origin of the phenomenon of Brownian movement. It argues that there was an extensive and sophisticated experimental work done on the phenomenon throughout the nineteenth century. Investigators followed as rigorously as possible the methodological standards of their time to make causal claims and advance causal explanations of Brownian movement. Two major methodological strategies were employed. The first was the experimental strategy of varying (...) the circumstances. Suspected causal factors were varied and the resulting effect on Brownian movement was studied. The main goal of this strategy was the identification of difference-making factors, i.e., factors having a causal influence on the phenomenon. The second was the so-called method of hypothesis. Rather than relying exclusively on the ability of experiments to identify difference-making factors, its proponents tried to show how the independently developed tenets of the new kinetic-molecular conception of matter provided a plausible causal explanation of Brownian movement. Each one of these methodological strategies had its distinctive practices and notions of control. None of these strategies could, on its own, establish molecular motion as the cause of Brownian movement. It was only the fruitful combination of the two strategies and of their accompanying practices and notions of control that led, at the end of the nineteenth century, to the recognition of molecular motion as the most probable cause of Brownian movement. (shrink)

It is often said in physics that if two models of a theory are related by a symmetry, then the two models provide (or could provide) two different representations of the very same situation, alike the case of two maps of different color for the very same city. It is also said that the situations represented by two models of a theory are indiscernible in some ways when the models in question are related by a symmetry of the theory, just (...) like the situation in the interior of the cabin of a train when the train is at rest in the station is empirically indiscernible from the situation in the interior when the train is moving uniformly (in classical mechanics, these two situations are represented by two models related by a boost). In recent years, philosophers of physics have focused a lot of attention in developing various principles that aim to elucidate these and similar remarks on symmetries, models, physical equivalence, and representation that are widespread in physics practice. The goal of the current article is to provide a critical review of these principles, and suggest a new framework for thinking about these kinds of questions. One important upshot of the paper is that questions of indiscernibility, and questions of the representational capacity of models, must be distinguished from one another. (shrink)

Metaphysicians who are aware of modern physics usually follow Putnam (1967) in arguing that Special Theory of Relativity is incompatible with the view that what exists is only what exists now or presently. Partisans of presentism (the motto ‘only present things exist’) had very difficult times since, and no presentist theory of time seems to have been able to satisfactorily counter the objection raised from Special Relativity. One of the strategies offered to the presentist consists in relativizing existence to inertial (...) frames. This unfashionable strategy has been accused of counterfeiting, since the meaning of the concept of existence would be incompatible with its relativization. Therefore, existence could only be relativistically invariant. In this paper, I shall examine whether such an accusation hits its target, and I will do this by examining whether the different criteria of existence that have been suggested by the Philosophical Tradition from Plato onwards imply that existence cannot be relativized. (shrink)

I provide an account of the physical appropriate to the task of the physicalist while remaining faithful to the usage of “physical” natural to physicists. Physicalism is the thesis that everything in the world is physical, or reducible to the physical. I presuppose that some version of this position is a live epistemic possibility. The physicalist is confronted with Hempel’s dilemma: that physicalism is either false or contentless. The proposed account of the physical avoids both horns and generalizes a recent (...) proposal by Vicente (2011). My account defines physicalism as the thesis that there are no objects that cannot be described by physical quantities. A dimensional account of physical quantities is given: quantities are determined by measurement procedures. (shrink)

A standard line in the contemporary philosophical literature has it that physical theories are equivalent only when they agree on their empirical content, where this empirical content is often understood as being encoded in the equations of motion of those theories. In this article, we question whether it is indeed the case that the empirical content of a theory is exhausted by its equations of motion, showing that (for example) considerations of boundary conditions play a key role in the empirical (...) equivalence (or otherwise) of theories. Having argued for this, we show that philosophical claims made by Weatherall (2016) that electromagnetism in the Faraday tensor formalism is equivalent to electromagnetism in the vector potential formalism, and by Knox (2011) that general relativity is equivalent to teleparallel gravity, can both be called into question. We then show that properly considering the role of boundary conditions in theory structure can potentially restore these claims of equivalence and close with some remarks on the pragmatics of adjudications on theory identity. (shrink)

Douglas Wadle celebrates the juxtaposition of art and science while examining music's influence on humanity's understanding of our place in the universe. Tracing the millennia-old love affair between music and science, Wadle chronicles the surprising ubiquity of musical training among history's greatest thinkers. He shines a spotlight on the intertwining stories of pattern and form and how they complement one another in our search for creativity and insight. Einstein's Violin relies on extensive research to tell the story of how music (...) impacts the pattern recognition software in our brains, facilitating more creative problem solving. Without digression into technical treatise, it focuses on the historical stories that best display music's beautiful interaction with mind and universe"--Back cover. (shrink)

Physics Overwritten in a new perspective: “Epistemologically Different Worlds” (Einsteins’ relativities without “spacetime”, quantum me-chanics, pre-Big Bang, Big Bangs and “inflation”, dark mat-ter and dark energy, the superstring theory, and Bohr’s com-plementarity) -/- .

The Meaning Circuit Hypothesis (MCH) is a synthesis of ideas providing John Wheeler’s outline of ultimate physics, which he fine-tuned over several decades from the 1970s onward. It is a ‘working hypothesis’ in which ‘existence is a ‘meaning circuit”’ that portrays the world as a “system self-synthesized by quantum networking.” It was strongly advocated by him for roughly two decades and since then has had an increasingly strong impact on the approach of many investigators of quantum theory; in particular, elements (...) such as the quantum participator and ‘it from bit’ are now considered by others as candidate components of a foundation for quantum theory in which information is involved essentially. Therefore, it is worthy of review and critique. (shrink)

With the present paper I maintain that the group field theory (GFT) approach to quantum gravity can help us clarify and distinguish the problems of spacetime emergence from the questions about the nature of the quanta of space. I will show that the mechanism of phase transition suggests a form of indifference between scales (or phases) and that such an indifference allows us to black-box questions about the nature of the ontology of the fundamental levels of the theory. I consider (...) the GFT approach to quantum gravity which derives spacetime as an emergent property from abstract non-geometrical tetrahedra through a processes of phase transition. Because the physical interpretation of the tetrahedra is problematic in view of their (non)-spatiotemporal nature, I will apply the considerations about phase transitions to GFT and conclude that the fundamental ontology of the theory and the mechanism of spacetime emergence can and should be treated separately. (shrink)

According to John D. Norton's Material Theory of Induction, all inductive inferences are justified by local facts, rather than their formal features or some grand principles of nature's uniformity. Recently, Richard Dawid (Found Phys 45(9):1101–1109, 2015) has offered a challenge to this theory: in an adaptation of Norton's own celebrated "Dome" thought experiment, it seems that there are certain inductions that are intuitively reasonable, but which do not have any local facts that could serve to justify them in accordance with (...) Norton's requirements. Dawid's suggestion is that “raw induction” might have a limited but important role for such inferences. I argue that the Material Theory can accommodate such inductions, because there are local facts concerning the combinatoric features of the induction’s target populations that can licence the inferences in an analogous way to existing examples of material induction. Since my arguments are largely independent of the details of the Dome, Norton's theory emerges as surprisingly robust against criticisms of excessive narrowness. (shrink)

I criticize Lockwood’s solution to the “paradoxes” of time travel, thus endorsing Lewis’s more conservative position. Lockwood argues that only in the context of a 5D space-time-actuality manifold is the possibility of time travel compatible with the Autonomy Principle (according to which global constraints cannot override what is physically possible locally). I argue that shifting from 4D space-time to 5D space-time-actuality does not change the situation with respect to the Autonomy Principle, since the shift does not allow us to have (...) a coincidence-free local dynamical theory. (shrink)

Idealizations are ubiquitous in physics. They are distortions or falsities that enter into theories, laws, models, and scientific representations. Various questions suggest themselves: What are idealizations? Why do we appeal to idealizations and how do we justify them? Are idealizations essential to physics and, if so, in what sense and for which purpose? How can idealizations provide genuine understanding? If our motivation for believing in the existence of unobservable entities like electrons and quarks is that they are indispensable to our (...) best theories, should we also believe in the existence of indispensable idealizations? This Element will tackle such questions and offer an opinionated and selective introduction to philosophical issues concerning idealizations in physics. Topics to be covered include the concept of and reasons for introducing idealization, abstraction, and approximation, possible taxonomy and justification, and application to issues of mathematical Platonism, scientific realism, and scientific understanding. (shrink)

Susan Stebbing (1885–1943), the UK’s first female professor of philosophy, was a key figure in the development of analytic philosophy. Stebbing wrote the world’s first accessible book on the new polyadic logic and its philosophy. She made major contributions to the philosophy of science, metaphysics, philosophical logic, critical thinking, and applied philosophy. Nonetheless she has remained largely neglected by historians of analytic philosophy. This Element provides a thorough yet accessible overview of Stebbing’s positive, original contributions, including her solution to the (...) paradox of analysis, her account of the relation of sense-data to physical objects, and her anti-idealist interpretation of the new Einsteinian physics. Stebbing’s innovative work in these and other areas helped move analytic philosophy from its early phase to its middle period. (shrink)

Modern physics encompasses theoretical and experimental research divided in subfields with specific features. For instance, high energy physics (HEP) attracts significant funding and has distinct organizational structures, i.e., large laboratories and cross-institutional collaborations. Expensive equipment and large experiments create a specific work atmosphere and human relations. While the gender misbalance is characteristic for STEM, early-career researchers are inherently dependent on their supervisors. This raises the question of how satisfied researchers with working in physics are and how different subgroups – female (...) and early-career researchers – perceive their work environment. We empirically investigated job satisfaction and satisfaction with the academic system among physicists (N=123) working in large laboratories, universities, and independent institutes. The scale for measuring the satisfaction with the academic system in physics yielded three factors: experience of research autonomy, opportunities to use one's knowledge, and appreciation of the research by the general public. The results show that physicists are less satisfied with the academic system than with their work environment. Moreover, female scientists and junior researchers experience their jobs more negatively. The results emphasize the need for improving work and research conditions for underprivileged groups in physics. Interestingly, no significant effect was found between different types of academic institutions and general job satisfaction. Finally, physicists felt that their work has not been well understood by the public. (shrink)

It is generally believed that the de Broglie-Bohm model does not admit a particle interpretation for massive relativistic spin-0 particles, on the basis that particle trajectories cannot be defined. We show this situation is due to the fact that in the standard representation of the Klein-Gordon equation the wavefunction systematically contains superpositions of particle and anti-particle contributions. We argue that by working in a Foldy-Wouthuysen type representation uncoupling the particle from the anti-particle evolutions, a positive conserved density for a particle (...) and associated density current can be defined. For the free Klein-Gordon equation the velocity field obtained from this current density appears to be well-behaved and sub-luminal in typical instances. As an illustration, Bohmian trajectories for a spin-0 boson distribution are computed numerically for free propagation in situations in which the standard velocity field would take arbitrarily high positive and negative values. (shrink)

This essay aims to inquiry into the main factors responsible for the growth of modern acoustics, which basically have to be traced back to the empirical turn occurred in science of music around 1600. Helmholtz’s theory of sound will be regarded as most scientifically significant archetype of modern acoustics. In Section 1 a general historical overview of the science of music will be given and its importance for the development of modern science and mathematics considered. In Section 2 the internal (...) historical roots of modern acoustics, thus of Helmholtz’s theory of sound will be analyzed. Finally, in Section 3 positive and negative elements of Helmholtz’s acoustic will be discussed and its external historical roots as well as its actual epistemological relevance examined. (shrink)

Originally appeared in the field of thermodynamics, the concept of entropy, especially in its statistical acceptation, has found applications in many different disciplines, both inside and outside science. In this work we focus on the possibility of drawing an isomorphism between the entropy of Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics and that of Xenakis’s stochastic music theory. We expose the major technical aspects of the two entropies and then consider affinities and differences between them, both at syntactic and at semantic level, hereto particularly (...) referring to the philosophical problem of the asymmetry of time. (shrink)

An explanation of the nature of space-time, and how it is incompatible with temporal flow and any dynamical change, including simple motion.

Although the Standard Model of particle physics is usually formulated in terms of fields, it can be equivalently formulated in terms of particles and strings. In this picture particles and open strings are always coupled. This offers an intuitive and graphical explanation for the otherwise mysterious gauge symmetry. In addition, the particle–string formulation avoids introducing redundant path integral configurations that are present in the field formulation. For its explanatory power and economy, the particle–string ontology may be preferred over the field (...) ontology for the Standard Model. (shrink)

This is a pdf of a Mathematica calculation that supplements the paper "Presentist Fragmentalism and Quantum Mechanics" forthcoming in Foundations of Physics. In that paper the Born rule (or at least a progenitor) is derived from experimental conditions on the mutual observations of two fragments. In this pdf the experimental conditions are applied to Hilbert space dimensions 3, 4, and 5. It turns out each of these have a 1-dimensional solution space which, it is hoped, can be interpretated as the (...) phase. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the causally symmetric version of the familiar de Broglie–Bohm interpretation, this version allowing the spacelike nonlocality and the configuration space ontology of the original model to be avoided via the addition of retrocausality. Two different features of this alternative formulation are considered here. With regard to probabilities, it is shown that the model provides a derivation of the Born rule identical to that in Bohm’s original formulation. This derivation holds just as well for a many-particle, (...) entangled state as for a single particle. With regard to “certainties”, the description of a particle’s spin is examined within the model and it is seen that a statistical description is no longer necessary once final boundary conditions are specified in addition to the usual initial state, with the particle then possessing a definite value for every spin component at intermediate times. These values are consistent with being the components of a single, underlying spin vector. The case of a two-particle entangled spin state is also examined and it is found that, due to the retrocausal aspect, each particle possesses its own definite spin during the entanglement, independent of the other particle. In formulating this picture, it is demonstrated how such a realistic model can preserve Lorentz invariance in the face of Bell’s theorem and avoid the need for a preferred reference frame. (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue that Aristotle’s doctrine of hylomorphism, which conceived the natural world as consisting of substances which are metaphysically composed of matter and form, is ripe for rehabilitation in the light of quantum physics. I begin by discussing Aristotle’s conception of matter and form, as it was understood by Aquinas, and how Aristotle’s doctrine of hylomorphism was ‘physicalised’ and eventually abandoned with the rise of microphysicalism. I argue that the phenomenon of quantum entanglement, and the emergence of (...) irreducibly macroscopic phenomena in finite temperature quantum systems, have given us good reasons to doubt the truth of microphysicalism. In support of my argument, I show how to construct a hylomorphic interpretation of the de Broglie-Bohm theory that posits a single Cosmic Substance. I then show how to construct a hylomorphic interpretation of an alternative ‘contextual’ wave function collapse theory (recently proposed by the physicists Barbara Drossel and George Ellis) which posits a plurality of thermal substances. Both of these neo-Aristotelian ontologies reject the microphysicalist dogma that nature consists solely of some set of microscopic constituents. (shrink)

I claim that Wittgenstein’s reference to Hertz’s “dynamical models” at 4.04 in the Tractatus provides evidence for the view that the Tractatus does not explain the sense of propositions by offering an account of the fundamental structure of reality. Just as Hertz’s dynamical models capture what all mechanical descriptions of the same system have in common, so Tractarian analysis captures what all propositions that express the same sense have in common, and in neither case is there a need to appeal (...) to an underlying ontology. (shrink)

This note gives 9 Temporal Knowledge Arguments and, also, makes a few observations about presentism.

Can we identify potential long-term consequences of digitalisation on public health? Environmental studies, metabolic research, and state of the art research in neurobiology point towards the reduced amount of natural day and sunlight exposure of the developing child, as a consequence of increasingly long hours spent indoors online, as the single unifying source of a whole set of health risks identified worldwide, as is made clear in this review of currently available literature. Over exposure to digital environments, from abuse to (...) addiction, now concerns even the youngest (ages 0 to 2) and triggers, as argued on the basis of clear examples herein, a chain of interdependent negative and potentially long-term metabolic changes. This leads to a deregulation of the serotonin and dopamine neurotransmitter pathways in the developing brain, currently associated with online activity abuse and/or internet addiction, and akin to that found in severe substance abuse syndromes. A general functional working model is proposed under the light of evidence brought to the forefront in this review. (shrink)

Time is what clocks are used to measure. Information about time tells the durations of events and when they occur and which events happen before which others, so time plays a very significant role in the universe’s structure, including the structure of our personal lives. But carefully describing time’s properties has led to many unresolved issues, both philosophical and scientific.

Programs in quantum gravity often claim that time emerges from fundamentally timeless physics. In the semiclassical time program time arises only after approximations are taken. Here we ask what justifies taking these approximations and show that time seems to sneak in when answering this question. This raises the worry that the approach is either unjustified or circular in deriving time from no–time.