Objects and Properties

Are there nonexistent objects? Can we make sense of objects having properties without thinking that there are nonexistent objects? Is existence a predicate? Can we make sense of necessarily existing objects depending on God? Tackling these central questions, Matthew Davidson explores the metaphysics of existence and nonexistence. -/- He presents an extended argument for independence actualism, a previously undefended view that objects can have properties in worlds and at times at which they do not exist. Among other unique points of (...) discussion, Davidson considers the nature of actualism, arguments for and against serious actualism, the semantics of “exists” as a predicate, the merits of different sorts of Meinongian theories, and different views on which God might ground the existence of necessarily existing abstracta. The book offers a Lewisian-style argument for adopting independence actualism in that the view may be used to solve many problems in metaphysics, philosophy of language and philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Your belief that Obama is a Democrat would not be the belief that it is if it did not represent Obama, nor would the pain in your ankle be the state that it is if, say, it felt like an itch. Accordingly, it is tempting to hold that phenomenal and representational properties are essential to the mental states that have them. But, as several theorists have forcefully argued (including Kripke (1980) and Burge (1979, 1982)) this attractive idea is seemingly in (...) tension with another equally attractive thesis, namely, the token-identity thesis; the thesis according to which every mental state token is identical with some or other token physical state. In this paper, we show that these seemingly incontrovertible essentialist intuitions are in fact compatible with “token physicalism” regarding the mental. Given a suitably plentitudinous ontology of objects, we argue that there are physical things with which our token mental states can be identified. This is preferable to existing views that give up the essentiality claims or simply reject the token-identity thesis. (shrink)

I give shape to a neglected debate in metaphysics, the debate over the ontological priority between individuality and collectivity. I distinguish the debate from more familiar ones in the recent literature and articulate what I call ontological collectivism, the view that collectivity is prior to individuality. I defend the in-principle intelligibility of the view from forceful general objections and argue that not only is it coherent but also of significant interest to the literature: it allows for overlooked alternatives on a (...) variety of central discussions. (shrink)

I discuss the idea that the objects of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus are propertyless bare particulars, an idea defended by Leonard Goddard and Brenda Judge in their monograph, The Metaphysics of the Tractatus. I present the difficulties that Goddard and Judge raise for this construal concerning the idea that Tractarian objects have natures that determine their possibilities of combination, and I assess the solution they propose. I offer an alternative construal of the notion with which these difficulties can be overcome.

It’s all about ‘The Singularity’… (Self-Referential Recursion)….

This essay champions the idea of substances, understood as things that can exist by themselves. I argue that this idea has a valuable role to play in present-day philosophy, in explaining what makes object-like things object-like, and an important place in the history of philosophy, from its roots in Aristotle to its full expression in Descartes. Both claims are unusual. For philosophers tend to regard the idea of something that could exist by itself as incoherent, and this has encouraged the (...) view that it will be useless to present-day philosophers and that it cannot charitably be attributed to Descartes. I argue that the charge of incoherence rests on a misunderstanding. I also address various other objections to the idea of substances as things that can exist by themselves. (shrink)

Данный текст представляет собой перевод статьи Тобиаса Розефельдта (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin) "Being Realistic about Kant’s Idealism", готовящейся к печати в сборнике "The Sensible and the Intelligible Worlds. New Essays on Kant’s Metaphysics and Epistemology" (ed. by K. Schafer, N. Stang. Oxford : Oxford University Press). Перевод выполнен мной в рамках научно-исследовательской стажировки в Берлинском университете им. братьев Гумбольдт.

ENG: The preface to the translation of Tobias Rosefeldt’s article into Russian provides a discussion context, in which the author settles an issue of interpreting the a posteriori aspects of the content of experience in Kant’s transcendental idealism. Key points of the article are briefly formulated and the translator’s choices of certain terms are justified. // RUS: В предисловии к переводу статьи Тобиаса Розефельдта (Берлин) на русский язык переводчик очерчивает контекст дискуссии, в русле которой автор решает проблему толкования апостериорного аспекта (...) содержания опыта в кантовском трансцендентальном идеализме. Кратко формулируются основные положения статьи и обосновывается переводческий выбор в пользу отдельных терминов. (shrink)

The debate over persistence currently involves three competing theories—one three-dimensionalist theory called “endurantism” and two four-dimensionalist theories called “perdurantism” and “exdurantism.” This inner debate between the latter two persistence theories is what I aim to clarify, and ultimately, I argue that perdurantism is superior to exdurantism because exdurantism is too extravagant in counting ordinary objects in the world. Extravagant for the reason that objects in their entirety are bound to their momentary stages, and there is practically an interminable number of (...) these stages, which is not reasonable when counting in the ordinary world. (shrink)

The grounding problem is related to the puzzle of numerically distinct spatiotemporally coincident objects. Suppose Lumpl –a lump of clay– and Goliath – the statue – are created and later destroyed, simultaneously. They would share all of their physical and spatiotemporal properties and relations. But, Goliath and Lumpl have different modal and sortal properties, which would suggest they are distinct entities, while at the same time entirely co-located. This issue creates a puzzle and raises the question of how two distinct (...) objects can be entirely colocated. Thus, on the one hand, monists (opponents of coincident objects) argue that even though we have given that thing two different names, we should keep in mind that Lumpl and Goliath, for as long as they exist, are entirely similar in terms of their physical and spatiotemporal structures. On the other hand, however, the lump and the statue have different properties. So, pluralists claim that based on Leibniz‘s law, Lumpl and Goliath would be distinct coincident objects. Monists have challenged the possibility and plausibility of the occurrence of coincident objects by the grounding problem: they think that if we accept pluralism, we have to deal with the thorny problem of what grounds the alleged modal differences between Lumpl and Goliath, given that they are similar in all their physical and spatiotemporal aspects. Some monists suspect that pluralists will not be able to find plausible grounds by means of which to explain Lumpl and Goliath‘s modal (and other) differences, and therefore conclude that the grounding problem is a compelling reason to reject pluralism as an untenable approach towards the puzzle of coincident objects. In this thesis, I attempt to show that the grounding problem, contrary to the false advertisement of some monists, does not seriously threaten the possibility and plausibility of the pluralism concerning the existence of numerically distinct spatiotemporally coincident objects. Underlining the plausibility and possibility of the pluralists‘ position, I specify most parts of this thesis as an investigation into how the grounding problem can be solved in support of pluralism. Various solutions to this problem have been proposed by pluralists from different standpoints. In general, most of these significant solutions, based upon general strategies they follow, can be classified into these two categories: the solutions which appeal to the supervenience relations (supervenience-based solutions), and the solutions which take primitivist approaches (primitivist strategies). My research proposes to take up the validity of the aforementioned strategies, and I assess them in relation to the pluralists‘ ability to solve the grounding problem. I argue that both supervenience-based solutions and the some of primitivist strategies – including the modal plenitude, sortal, and identity-based primitivism – are not winning strategies to settle the grounding problem. Considering the point mentioned, I put forward a new account of the primitivist solution to the grounding problem based on the Aristotelian notion of essence which I call ‗essential primitivism‘. I argue that the primitive essences of coincident objects can properly ground the modal and sortal properties making coincident objects distinct. (shrink)

A critique of ontology which introduces seepage, the process of properties revealing themselves from the matrix forms of an object. What follows is the observation that these properties have their own system of relations, placed in the context of a culture of objects which engages a revealing process. An argument is presented for considering organization as the principle which allows for seepage, understood as an inherently informative and intuitive process where the organization of objects reveals some property and consequently makes (...) us less uncertain about the object. Objects are deposited to be a continual process where the properties represented by the organization of its constituent parts change as they seep beyond its matrix. An object cannot inform us of all of its properties immediately, rather we acquaint ourselves with them as they are brought forth and become enframed as part of how we understand said object. (shrink)

Ontic structural realism refers to the novel, exciting, and widely discussed basic idea that the structure of physical reality is genuinely relational. In its radical form, the doctrine claims that there are, in fact, no objects but only structure, i.e., relations. More moderate approaches state that objects have only relational but no intrinsic properties. In its most moderate and most tenable form, ontic structural realism assumes that at the most fundamental level of physical reality there are only relational properties. This (...) means that the most fundamental objects only possess relational but no non-reducible intrinsic properties. The present paper will argue that our currently best physics refutes even this most moderate form of ontic structural realism. More precisely, I will claim that 1) according to quantum field theory, the most fundamental objects of matter are quantum fields and not particles, and show that 2) according to the Standard Model, quantum fields have intrinsic non-relational properties. (shrink)

The concepts of particular and universal have grown so familiar that their significance has become difficult to discern, like coins that have been passed back and forth too many times, worn smooth so their values can no longer be read. On the Genealogy of Universals seeks to overcome our sense of over-familiarity with these concepts by providing a case study of their evolution during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, a study that shows how the history of these (...) concepts is bound up with the origins and development of analytic philosophy itself. Understanding how these concepts were taken up, transfigured, and given up by the early analytic philosophers, enables us to recover and reanimate the debate amongst them that otherwise remains Delphic. This book begins from the early, originating texts of analytic philosophy that have hitherto baffled commentators, including Moore's early papers, and engages afresh with the neglected contributions of philosophical figures that historians of analytic philosophy have mostly since forgotten, including Stout and Whitehead. This sheds new light upon the relationships of Moore to Russell, Russell to Wittgenstein, and Wittgenstein to Ramsey. (shrink)

One might well wonder—is there a category under which every thing falls? Offering an informative account of such a category is no easy task. For nothing would distinguish things that fall under it from those that don’t—there being, after all, none of the latter. It seems hard, then, to say much about any fully general category; and it would appear to do no carving or categorizing or dividing at all. Nonetheless there are candidates for such a fully general office, including (...) thing, being, entity, item, existent, and—especially—object.[ It is not obvious that there is any fully general category (whether object or otherwise). Accordingly, not all accounts of object assign it to a fully general category, instead allowing that there are non-objects. On those views, object does indeed divide. Accounts of object, then, differ with respect to whether there are non-objects. And this is not the only fault line. Other dimensions of difference include what objects there are and what objects are. Accordingly, this entry will survey three broad questions about the category object: What, if any, is its contrast or complement? What is its extension? What is its nature? (shrink)

Bare particulars have received a fair amount of bad press. Many find such entities to be obviously incoherent and dismiss them without much consideration. Proponents of bare particulars, on their part, have not done enough to clearly motivate and characterize bare particulars, thus leaving them open to misinterpretations. With this paper, I try to remedy this situation. I put forward a much-needed positive case for bare particulars through the four problems that they can be seen to solve—The Problem of Individuation, (...) The Problem of Change, The Problem of Having a Property, and The Problem of Subtraction. I then distinguish and characterize three possible types of bare particulars—genuinely bare, constitutively bare, and thinly clothed—and consider how each of these cope with some classical and recent objections to bare particulars. I argue that the most troubling objections do not come from familiar quarters, but from examining how well such entities address all four of the ontological problems outlined. I ultimately conclude that the best contenders among the three types of bare particulars are the constitutively bare variety, but argue that, if they are to earn their keep, they must either share or turn over their individuating role to the ordinary particulars that they constitute. (shrink)

As it is appropriate to regard mental events as properties of their subject rather than as entities, so it is appropriate to treat actions as properties of the agent rather than as particulars. It is argued that the property approach to action should not be rejected because of the implausibility of the theories of Goldman and Kim; for properties need not and should not be individuated in their way. It is also argued that the question of treating actions as particulars (...) or properties is to be settled on pragnatic grounds: it has no clear metaphysical significance. Finally it is argued that the logical form of action sentences, which Davidson endeavours to display by treating acts as particulars, can be shown with greater simplicity and plausibility on a property approach. (shrink)

Formal ontology as it is presented in Husserl`s Third Logical Investigation can be interpreted as a fundamental tool to describe objects in a formal sense. It is presented one of the main sources: chapter five of Carl Stumpf`s Ûber den psycholoogischen Ursprung der Raumovorstellung (1873), and then it is described how Husserlian Formal Ontology is applied in Fifth Logical Investigation. Finally, it is applied to dramatic structures, in the spirit of Roman Ingarden.

What is the Bare Particular Theory? Is it committed, like the Bundle Theory, to a constituent ontology: according to which a substance’s qualities—and according to the Bare Particular Theory, its substratum also—are proper parts of the substance? I argue that Bare Particularists need not, should not, and—if a recent objection to ‘the Bare Particular Theory’ succeeds—cannot endorse a constituent ontology. There is nothing, I show, in the motivations for Bare Particularism or the principles that distinguish Bare Particularism from rival views (...) that entails a constituent ontology. I outline a version of Bare Particularism that in rejecting a constituent ontology avoids the New Objection. I argue against Theodore Sider that this really is a distinct theory to the version of Bare Particularism that endorses a constituent ontology, and not a mere terminological variant. I show that this, the best version of the Bare Particular Theory, is also defensible against the old objections. (shrink)

I offer a mereological bundle of universals theory of material objects. The theory says that objects are identical to fusions of immanent universals at regions of space. Immanent universals are in the objects that instantiate them, and they can be wholly located at many regions of space. The version of the bundle theory I offer explains these characteristics of immanent universals, and it captures the instantiation relation in terms of the part-whole relation. The version of the theory I offer is (...) simpler and more unified than other mereological bundle theories. Yet, it is not as encompassing as other versions. For I suppose throughout that space is a particular substance, but not a bundle of properties. (shrink)

Let $X$ be a smooth projective curve defined over an algebraically closed field $k$, and let $F_X$ denote the absolute Frobenius morphism of $X$ when the characteristic of $k$ is positive. A vector bundle over $X$ is called virtually globally generated if its pull back, by some finite morphism to $X$ from some smooth projective curve, is generated by its global sections. We prove the following. If the characteristic of $k$ is positive, a vector bundle $E$ over $X$ is virtually (...) globally generated if and only if $^* E\, \cong \, E_a\oplus E_f$ for some $m$, where $E_a$ is some ample vector bundle and $E_f$ is some finite vector bundle over $X$. If the characteristic of $k$ is zero, a vector bundle $E$ over $X$ is virtually globally generated if and only if $E$ is a direct sum of an ample vector bundle and a finite vector bundle over $X$. (shrink)

This dissertation is an essay in analytic ontology whose main concern is to examine the ontological status of qualities and quality-instances. The primary thesis defended is that a Realist view of qualities is true--qualities are universals and not particulars--and quality-instances like red are complex entities with at least three constituents in them--a universal, an individuator, and a tie of predication. ;In the Introduction, six features of exemplification are clarified by examining different ways of assaying states of affairs like the-F-of-a . (...) The role of language in ontology is also discussed. It is argued that ontological problems cannot be reduced to linguistic phenomena, but the latter can provide limited, evidential support to a position taken on some ontological problem, such as the problems of universals. ;In chapters one through four, a view called Trope Nominalism is stated and criticized. In chapter one, Trope Nominalism is defined and the two main arguments for Trope Nominalism are refuted. Trope Nominalism is the view that quality-instances, such as red, are basic, simple, abstract particulars called tropes. "Universals," such as redness, are sets of red tropes that exactly resemble one another. Advocates are D. C. Williams and Keith Campbell. In chapter two, the Trope view of predication is criticized by focusing on the simplicity and individuation of tropes. In chapter three, the Trope view of abstract reference is criticized. In chapter four, the Trope view of exact similarity is rejected by showing it leads to a vicious infinite regress. ;In chapters five and six, different Realist accounts of qualities and quality-instances are treated. Chapter five shows that the Realist views of Nicholas Wolterstorff and Michael Loux are inadequate. Wolterstorff and Loux redefine Realism by holding that universals are kinds whose instances are simple entities that are members of their kinds. Chapter six presents what a Realist assay of qualities and quality-instances should look like and argues that, in one interpretation, Edmund Husserl held this view. Qualities are ones-in-many. Quality instances are complex entities. (shrink)

Consider two red disks having the same non-relational properties. That they are two and not one, it is claimed by some philosophers, can only be accounted for by claiming that each disk contains an individuator, i.e., a bare particular, which is merely numerically different from the particular in the other disk. While sucli a claim is clearly dialectical, one need not rest the case for bare particulars solely on the dialectical argument. One can, by giving an accurate phenomenological description of (...) the situation containing the two red disks, also attempt to show that one is in fact acquainted with such entities. This latter possibility, however, has recently been challenged by Trentman on the grounds that one cannot give such a description without presupposing the existence of bare particulars. (shrink)

The past thirty years has witnessed a resurgence of interest in 'realist ontologies': views that treat properties and relations realistically. Such views necessitate a metaphysical account of the structure of concrete particulars. One such account is the Substratum theory of concrete particulars, on which concrete particulars are composed of their properties together with a substratum that individuates them and bears these properties. A traditional objection to this account is that the substratum would be unknowable. Recently, several philosophers supporting a realist (...) ontology have argued for versions of this traditional Substratum theory, insisting that this epistemic objection to the substratum can be overcome. I argue that this cannot be done. Specifically, I claim that either the substratum leads to a vicious regress or else it fails to meet epistemic constraints widely enforced in metaphysics. Therefore, realist ontologies must provide a Bundle theory of concrete particulars . ;Consequently, the traditional version of the Bundle theory, which construes properties to be universals, is assessed. The main objections that have been raised against this version of the theory are rejected; this includes what has been traditionally the most prominent objection, the charge that it is committed to the necessitation of the Identity of Indiscernibles. However, I also show that the theory requires applying the notion of bi-location to concrete particulars. I claim that this violates strong pre-theoretic intuitions about concrete particulars and renders the traditional Bundle theory inconsistent with a view attractive to contemporary realists, spacetime substantivalism. For these reasons, it is argued that the realist should adopt a Bundle theory that treats properties as tropes, rather than as universals. A Bundle theory formulated using tropes does not face the above limitations because it does not require the bi-location of concrete particulars. I also argue that the Bundle of tropes view has a further advantage over competing accounts of concrete particulars: it defuses the most serious theoretical obstacle to spacetime substantivalism: the notorious 'hole argument'. (shrink)

The thesis is concerned with the outline of an ontology which admits only particulars and with the persistence of particulars through time. In Chapter 1 it is argued that a neglected class of particulars--the cases--have to be employed in order to solve the problem of universals, i.e., to give a satisfactory account of properties and kinds. In Chapter 2, two ways in which particulars could persist though time are distinguished. Difficulties are raised for the view that everything perdures through time, (...) i.e., the view that each persisting thing is a sum of continuous and dependent temporal parts. Objections to the view that people perdure are presented in Chapter 3, objections to the effect that such a view cannot capture salient truths about the nature of experience and wrongly implies that our special concern for ourselves, our friends and our familiars is irrational. An alternative account of persisting particulars is provided in Chapter 4 by way of given a theory of substances. Finally, in Chapter 5, this alternative account is applied to the issue of personal identity and to the issue of the identity over time of living things in general. A Hylomorphic View of living things is sketched and briefly defended. ;Throughout, certain themes recur: essentialism is taken to be relatively unproblematic, various connections between time and modality are exploited, reductionism is regarded as bearing the onus of proof, characterless entities such as prime matter, substrata, bare particulars and haecceities are rejected and the differences between the animate and the inanimate are emphasized. (shrink)

The following paper explores a notion of particulars that permeates recent and less recent literature in philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. This notion of particulars relates to a distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual thought content. In the literature, this relation is discussed in terms of a distinction between thought of particulars and general thought . I focus on this distinction as it relates to two different interpretations of Fregean sense: one that treats sense as descriptive and the other (...) that recognizes that sense is not descriptive. I argue that the descriptive interpretation of Frege leads one to postulate non-conceptual content, a position which I further argue is untenable. I ultimately propose and argue that the non-descriptive interpretation of sense avoids a dilemma between a near-idealist view that leaves no room for particulars, and a realist view that leaves us with an odd notion of non-conceptual mental content. (shrink)

In a recent article [Mertz 2001] in this journal I argued for the virtues of a realist ontology of relation instances (unit attributes). A major strength of this ontology is an assay of ontic ('material') predication that yields an account of individuation without the necessity of positing and defending 'bare particulars'. The crucial insight is that it is the unifying agency or combinatorial aspect of a relation instance as predicable that is for ontology the principium individuationis [Mertz 2002; 1996]. Or (...) in short, what is ontically predicable, precisely as such, is the cause of individuation. As a preface to this positive doctrine I offered arguments against the coherence of bare particulars as defended in an article by J. P. Moreland [1998]. In a reply contained in this issue Moreland and Timothy Pickavance (hereafter M/P) propose to answer my objections [2002]. The response that follows provides reasons why, I contend, M/P have not succeeded in parrying my objections to bare particulars. (shrink)

Not long ago, one of us has clarified and defended a bare particular theory of individuation. More recently, D. W. Mertz has raised a set of objections against this account and other accounts of bare particulars and proffered an alternative theory of individuation. He claims to have shown that 'the concept of bare particulars, and consequently substratum ontology that requires it, is untenable.' We disagree with this claim and believe there are adequate responses to the three arguments Mertz raises against (...) bare particulars. To substantiate this assertion, we clarify the nature of bare particulars as individuators, state Mertz's objections, and respond to them. We conclude that Mertz has failed to show that bare particular theory is untenable. (shrink)