Moral Risk

According to the modal account of luck it is a matter of luck that p if p is true at the actual world, but false in a wide‐range of nearby worlds. According to the modal account of risk, it is risky that p if p is true at some close world. I argue that the modal accounts of luck and risk do not mesh well together. The views entail that p can be both maximally risky and maximally lucky, but there (...) is nothing which is both maximally lucky and maximally risky. I offer a novel theory of risk that fits together with the modal account of luck and demonstrate that it is both extensionally and formally superior to extant proposals. (shrink)

A novel theory of comparative risk is developed and defended. Extant theories are criticized for failing the tests of extensional and formal adequacy. A unified diagnosis is proposed: extant theories consider risk to be a univariable function, but risk is a multivariate function. According to the theory proposed, which we call the unified theory of risk, the riskiness of a proposition is a function of both the proportion and the modal closeness of the possible worlds at which the proposition holds. (...) It is argued the theory passes the tests of extensional and formal adequacy. (shrink)

Cost-effectiveness analysis for health interventions is traditionally conducted in a risk-neutral way, insensitive to risk attitudes in the population, which are potentially non-neutral. While the standard outcome metric of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) aims to be deferential to people's valuations of health states, cost-effectiveness analysis of risky interventions using the QALY metric is not similarly deferential to people's risk attitudes. I argue that there is no good justification for this practice. Non-neutral attitudes to risk, especially where they concern individually life-changing (...) interventions need not be irrational, and so imposing neutrality is not justifiable as a way of debiasing preferences. Many common justifications for deference to health state preferences extend to risk attitudes. But even if reasons for deference do not extend, imposition of risk neutrality as opposed to any other rationally permissible risk attitude is under-motivated as default practice. Thus, either methods for measuring risk attitudes separately and incorporating them into cost-effectiveness analysis should be used more widely or a richer set of information should be presented to political decision-makers and the public to enable them to decide how to take into account the individual risks faced by members of the population, on top of aggregate effects on population health. (shrink)

Christian Barry and Garrett Cullity argue that there is a morally important distinction between offsetting by “sequestering” and offsetting by “forestalling.” They further claim that offsetting by sequestering will often make risk-imposing actions permissible, while offsetting by forestalling typically will not. In this article, I highlight some reasons to be skeptical about their view and suggest an alternative account of the conditions in which offsetting can make a risk-imposing action permissible. In addition, I note a significant implication of my argument (...) for the ethics of greenhouse gas offsetting. (shrink)

When an abortion is performed, someone dies. Are we killing a human person? Widespread disagreement exists. However, it is not necessary to establish personhood in order to establish the wrongness of abortion: a substantial chance of personhood is enough. We defend The Do Not Risk Homicide Argument: abortions are wrong after 10 weeks gestation because they substantially and unjustifiably risk homicide, the unjust killing of a human person. Why 10 weeks? Because the cumulative evidence establishes a substantial chance (a more (...) than one in five chance) that preborn human beings are persons after 10 weeks (if not before then). We submit evidence from our bad track record, widespread disagreement about personhood (after 10 weeks gestation), problems with theories of personhood, the similarity between preborn human beings and premature newborns, miscalculations of gestational age, and the common intuitive responses of women to their pregnancies and miscarriages. Our argument is cogent because it bypasses the stalemate over preborn personhood and rests on common ground rather than contentious metaphysics. It also strongly suggests that society must do more to protect preborn human beings. We briefly discuss its practical implications for fetal pain relief, social policy, and abortion law. (shrink)

Using a close reading of a single clause and its context in a section in A Pluralist Universe, we see the moral dangers James saw in traditional ontology, in particular its relation to war and peace. This analysis opens up James’s combining the personalist philosophy of his friend Borden Bowne (and others) with the pluralism he developed late in his career. This leads, further, to reflection of James’s performative philosophizing. Finding in James a theory of “pluralistic personalism” gives us a (...) fresh look at the far-reaching power of his basic concepts of moral philosophy. (shrink)

The received view of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it precludes all moral luck. But I offer a plausible interpretation according to which Kant embraces moral luck in circumstance and constitution. I interpret the unconditioned nature of transcendental freedom as a person’s ability to do the right thing no matter how she is inclined by her circumstantial and constitutive luck. I argue that various passages about degrees of difficulty relating to circumstantial and constitutive luck provide a reason to accept a (...) pro-moral luck interpretation of Kant. (shrink)

Can it be rational to favour the status quo when the alternatives to the status quo promise considerable increases in overall value? For instance, can it be rational to favour the status quo over radical human enhancement? A reasonable response to these questions would be to say that it can only be rational if the status quo is indeed the better choice on some measure. In this paper, I argue that it can be rational to favour the status quo over (...) a radical improvement such as human germline genetic enhancement. First, I distinguish between three different meanings of the “status quo.” Then, I argue that the status quo enjoys modal and epistemic advantages that sometimes translate into other advantages. I propose eight parameters for comparison between the status quo and radical options. These parameters weigh in favour of the status quo but can be outweighed by the benefits of change. Each of these parameters needs to be assessed from case to case. I defend what I refer to as an Open Status Quo position over a Fixed Status Quo position. The former is decision-specific and does not entail a commitment to remaining with the status quo in later decisions. Lastly, I address the objection that an Open Status Quo position risk slipping into a Fixed Status Quo position that would, in turn, block radical progress, change, and discovery. (shrink)

Can we permissibly accelerate vaccine testing even if this increases risk to study participants? During the COVID-19 pandemic, researchers, policymakers, and bioethicists debated ways in which vaccine development could be expedited. One suggestion were human challenge trials which only started after safe and efficacious vaccine had already been developed. Was this hesitation justified? Can challenge trials play a role in future pandemics? I defend both a version of challenge trials – a low-dosage challenge trial – and a faster option for (...) post-challenge trial safety testing. My argument draws on a new framework for risks in biomedical research. The new framework, embedded in a broader approach to the ethics of risk, can justify seemingly risky research while remaining strongly protective of the rights and interests of research participants. My argument furthermore draws on considerations about the connection between the risks to study participants, the benefits to nonparticipants, and the number of participants involved. (shrink)

Illusionism claims that we are not conscious, that there is nothing it is like, in the usual sense of the word, to feel sad, or to smell lavender. According to Illusionists, we are, in a technical sense, zombies. Instead of arguing for the falsity of Illusionism directly, I will explain why the main philosophical motivations for it are mistaken – and I trust the rest will be taken care of by the extreme implausibility of the view. I want to spread (...) the good news to Illusionists that they don’t need to resort to this highly counterintuitive, strange, and as I will argue later, morally corrosive idea. One can be a physicalist and phenomenal realist since neither of the two types of arguments Illusionists rely on – the conceivability arguments, and the debunking arguments against physicalist phenomenal realism – work. In the last part of the paper, I will say something about the corrosive effect this metaphysics has on our moral and evaluative outlook. (shrink)

Are mandatory lockdown measures, which place restrictions on one’s freedom to move and assemble, justifiable? Offhand, such measures appear to compromise important rights to secure goals of public health. Proponents of such measures think the trade-off is worth it; opponents think it isn’t. However, one might think that casting the debate in these terms concedes too much to the opponents. Mandatory lockdown measures don’t infringe important rights because no one has a right to impose a risk of grievous harm on (...) others—and, in the context of a pandemic, participating in the prohibited activities (e.g., going out to the bar) does just that. -/- This chapter explores whether this defense of mandatory lockdown measures holds up. It, first, considers whether we have a right against risk imposition—and, if so, how such a right is best understood. It then considers the objection that, even if there is such a right, people who voluntarily choose to engage in the prohibited activities—at least if fully appraised of the risks involved—effectively waive it. The chapter argues that this objection fails. (shrink)

This paper is dedicated to articulating the ethical puzzles that arise from the possibility of time travel. I divide the puzzles into three different categories: permissibility puzzles, obligation puzzles, and conflicts between past and future selves. In each category, I suggest that ethical problems involving time travel are not as dissimilar to parallel “normal” ethical puzzles as one might think.