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  1. Conference paper on representation and pragmatism.Simon Blackburn - manuscript
  2. Higher-order attitudes, Frege's abyss, and the truth in propositions.Mark Schroeder - forthcoming - In Robert Johnson & Michael Smith (eds.), (unknown). Oxford University Press.
    In nearly forty years’ of work, Simon Blackburn has done more than anyone to expand our imaginations about the aspirations for broadly projectivist/expressivist theorizing in all areas of philosophy. I know that I am far from alone in that his work has often been a source of both inspiration and provocation for my own work. It might be tempting, in a volume of critical essays such as this, to pay tribute to Blackburn’s special talent for destructive polemic, by seeking to (...)
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  3. Hume’s “projectivism” explained.Miren Boehm - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):815-833.
    Hume appeals to a mysterious mental process to explain how to world appears to possess features that are not present in sense perceptions, namely causal, moral, and aesthetic properties. He famously writes that the mind spreads itself onto the external world, and that we stain or gild natural objects with our sentiments. Projectivism is founded on these texts but it assumes a reading of Hume’s language as merely metaphorical. This assumption, however, conflicts sharply with the important explanatory role that “spreading” (...)
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  4. Cast in a Bad Light or Reflected in a Dark Mirror? Cognitive Science and the Projecting Mind.Daniel Kelly - 2018 - In N. Strohminger and V. Kumar (ed.), The Moral Psychology of Disgust. pp. 171-194.
  5. Projection, indeterminacy and moral skepticism.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2018 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York: Routledge.
    According to moral error theory, morality is something invented, constructed or made; but mistakenly presents itself to us as if it were an independent object of discovery. According to moral constructivism, morality is something invented, constructed or made. In this paper I argue that constructivism is both compatible with, and in certain cases explanatory of, some of the allegedly mistaken commitments to which arguments for moral skepticism appeal. I focus on two particular allegations that are sometimes associated with moral skepticism. (...)
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  6. Moral Skepticism: New Essays.Diego E. Machuca (ed.) - 2018 - New York: Routledge.
    Moral skepticism is at present a vibrant topic of philosophical inquiry. Particularly since the turn of the millennium, the metaethical study of skepticism has profited from advances in general epistemology and findings in empirical sciences, in light of which new arguments for and against moral skepticism have been devised, while the traditional ones have been reexamined. This collection of original essays by leading metaethicists will advance the ongoing debates about various forms of moral skepticism by drawing on recent innovative work (...)
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  7. Review of Robert N. Johnson and Michael Smith (eds.), Passions & Projections: Themes from the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn[REVIEW]Noell Birondo - 2017 - The Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266):171-174.
    Simon Blackburn has not shied away from the use of vivid imagery in developing, over a long and prolific career, a large-scale philosophical vision. Here one might think, for instance, of ‘Practical Tortoise Raising’ or ‘Ramsey's Ladder’ or ‘Frege's Abyss’. Blackburn develops a ‘quasi-realist’ account of many of our philosophical and everyday commitments, both theoretical (e.g., modality and causation) and practical (e.g., moral judgement and normative reasons). Quasi-realism aims to provide a naturalistic treatment of its targeted phenomena while earning the (...)
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  8. Further problems with projectivism.Thomas Pölzler - 2016 - South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):92-102.
    From David Hume onwards, many philosophers have argued that moral thinking is characterized by a tendency to “project” our own mental states onto the world. This metaphor of projection may be understood as involving two empirical claims: the claim that humans experience morality as a realm of objective facts (the experiential hypothesis), and the claim that this moral experience is immediately caused by affective attitudes (the causal hypothesis). Elsewhere I argued in detail against one form of the experiential hypothesis. My (...)
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  9. Projectivism and the Metaethical Foundations of the Normativity of Law.Shivprasad Swaminathan - 2016 - Jurisprudence 7 (2):231-266.
    A successful account of the ‘normativity of law’ is meant to inter alia establish how legal requirements come to be morally binding. This question presupposes taking a stance on the metaethical debate about the nature of morality and moral bindingness between the cognitivist and non-cognitivist camps. An overwhelming majority of contemporary legal philosophers have an unspoken adherence to a cognitivist metaethic and the model of normativity of law emerging from it: the impinging model. Consequently, the problematic of the normativity of (...)
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  10. Passions and Projections: Themes From the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn.Robert Neal Johnson & Michael Smith (eds.) - 2015 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This volume presents fourteen original essays which explore the philosophy of Simon Blackburn, and his lifetime pursuit of a distinctive projectivist and anti-realist research program. The essays document the range and influence of Blackburn's work and reveal, among other things, the resourcefulness of his brand of philosophical pragmatism.
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  11. 22 Ethics makes strange bedfellows: intuitions and quasi-realism.Matt Bedke - 2013 - In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge. pp. 416.
    You know the story. You have a few intuitions. You propose a few theories that fit them. It’s a living. Of course, things are more complicated than this. We are sensitive to counterexamples raised by others and wish to accommodate or explain away an ever-wider base of intuitive starting points. And a great deal of the action occurs in rational reflection that can alter what is intuitive, and in theorizing that overturns formerly justified beliefs and moves us to new justified (...)
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  12. Projectivism.Anthony W. Price - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell.
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  13. A Truthmaking Account of Realism and Anti-Realism.Jamin Asay - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):373-394.
    Realism and anti-realism about a domain of thought are metaphysical theses that involve the natures of the truthmakers in that domain and the truthmaking relation that is operant in the domain. Truthmaker theory is not exclusive territory for realists: anti-realist views are also best understood in terms of how they understand truthmakers and truthmaking. In particular, I explore the possibility of projectivist truthmaking, and show how it makes sense of quasi-realism. In addition to critically examining some extant accounts of the (...)
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  14. Modals vs. Morals. Blackburn on Conceptual Supervenience. Dohrn - 2012 - GAP 8 Proceedings.
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  15. Modals vs. Morals. Blackburn on Conceptual Supervenience.Daniel Dohrn - 2012 - GAP 7 Proceedings.
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  16. Projectivism and Error in Hume’s Ethics.Jonas Olson - 2011 - Hume Studies 37 (1):19-42.
    This essay argues that while Hume believes both that morality is grounded in our ordinary moral practices, sentiments, and beliefs, and that moral properties are real, he also holds that ordinary moral thinking involves systematically erroneous beliefs about moral properties. These claims, on their face, seem difficult to square with one another but this paper argues that on Hume’s view, they are reconcilable. The reconciliation is effected by making a distinction between Hume’s descriptive metaethics, that is, his account of vulgar (...)
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  17. The steps from doing to saying.Simon Blackburn - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1):1-13.
    In this paper I consider recent developments in neo-pragmatism, and in particular the degree of convergence between such approaches and those placing greater emphasis on truth and truth-makers. I urge that although a global pragmatism has its merits, it by no means closes the space for a more Wittgensteinian, finer-grained, approach to the diversity of functions served by modal, causal, moral, or other modes of thought.
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  18. Projectivism without error.Andy Egan - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 68.
    I argue that a theory according to which some of the content of perception is self-locating gives us the resources to cash out the central thought behind projectivism, without having to go in for an error theory about the projected qualities. I first survey some of the phenomena that might motivate what I take to be the central projectivist thought, and then look at some ways of cashing out just what it would amount to for the thought to be correct. (...)
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  19. Sentimentalism: Its Scope and Limits.John Skorupski - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):125-136.
    The subject of this paper is sentimentalism. In broad terms this is the view that value concepts, moral concepts, practical reasons—some or all of these—can be analysed in terms of feeling, sentiment or emotion. More specifically, the paper discusses the following theses: (i) there are reasons to feel (‘evaluative’ reasons) that are not reducible to practical or epistemic reasons (ii) value is analysable in terms of these reasons to feel. (iii) all practical reasons are in one way or another grounded (...)
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  20. Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable?Richard Joyce - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):53 - 75.
    Different versions of moral projectivism are delineated: minimal, metaphysical, nihilistic, and noncognitivist. Minimal projectivism (the focus of this paper) is the conjunction of two subtheses: (1) that we experience morality as an objective aspect of the world and (2) that this experience has its origin in an affective attitude (e.g., an emotion) rather than in perceptual faculties. Both are empirical claims and must be tested as such. This paper does not offer ideas on any specific test procedures, but rather undertakes (...)
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  21. Moral aus Interesse: Metaethik der Vertragstheorie.Michael von Grundherr - 2007 - Berlin: De Gruyter.
    One can justify moral rules on the basis of their advantageousness without equating morality and advantage.
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  22. Sensibility theory and projectivism.Justin D'Arms & Dan Jacobson - 2006 - In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 186--218.
    This chapter explores the debate between contemporary projectivists or expressivists, and the advocates of sensibility theory. Both positions are best viewed as forms of sentimentalism — the theory that evaluative concepts must be explicated by appeal to the sentiments. It argues that the sophisticated interpretation of such notions as “true” and “objective” that are offered by defenders of these competing views ultimately undermines the significance of their meta-ethical disputes over “cognitivism” and “realism” about value. Their fundamental disagreement lies in moral (...)
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  23. Ethical Instrumentalism.J. S. Biehl - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):353-369.
    The present essay offers a sketch of a philosophy of value, what I shall here refer to as ‘ethical instrumentalism.’ My primary aim is to say just what this view involves and what its commitments are. In the course of doing so, I find it necessary to distinguish this view from another with which it shares a common basis and which, in reference to its most influential proponent, I refer to as ‘Humeanism.’ A second, more general, aim is to make (...)
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  24. Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism.Simon Blackburn - 2005 - In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 322--338.
  25. Sensibility theory and conservative complancency.Peter W. Ross & Dale Turner - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):544–555.
    In Ruling Passions, Simon Blackburn contends that we should reject sensibility theory because it serves to support a conservative complacency. Blackburn's strategy is attractive in that it seeks to win this metaethical dispute – which ultimately stems from a deep disagreement over antireductionism – on the basis of an uncontroversial normative consideration. Therefore, Blackburn seems to offer an easy solution to an apparently intractable debate. We will show, however, that Blackburn's argument against sensibility theory does not succeed; it is no (...)
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  26. Quasi-realism's problem of autonomous effects.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):392–409.
    Simon Blackburn defends a 'quasi-realist' view intended to preserve much of what realists want to say about moral discourse. According to error theory, moral discourse is committed to indefensible metaphysical assumptions. Quasi-realism seems to preserve ontological frugality, attributing no mistaken commitments to our moral practices. In order to make good this claim, quasi-realism must show that (a) the seemingly realist features of the 'surface grammar' of moral discourse can be made compatible with projectivism; and (b) certain realist-sounding statements which we (...)
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  27. Quasi‐realism and Relativism. [REVIEW]A. W. Moore - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):150–156.
    1. If it is true that ‘an ethic is the propositional reflection of the dispositions and attitudes, policies and stances, of people,’ as Simon Blackburn says in summary of the quasi-realism that he champions in this excellent and wonderfully provocative book, then it seems to follow that different dispositions, attitudes, policies and stances—different conative states, for short—will issue in different ethics, each with an equal claim to truth; and this in turn seems to be one thing that could be reasonably (...)
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  28. Realism, projectivism and response-dependence: On the limits of 'best judgement'.Christopher Norris - 2002 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 28 (2):123-152.
    This essay offers a critical appraisal of some claims recently advanced by Crispin Wright and others in support of a response-dispositional (RD) approach to issues in epistemology, ethics, political theory, and philosophy of the social sciences. These claims take a lead from Plato's discussion of the status of moral value-judgements in the Euthyphro and from Locke's account of 'secondary qualities' such as colour, texture and taste. The idea is that a suitably specified description of best opinion (or optimal response) for (...)
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  29. Humeanism without Humean Supervenience: A Projectivist Account of Laws and Possibilities.Barry Ward - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (3):191-218.
    Acceptance of Humean Supervenience and thereductive Humean analyses that entail it leadsto a litany of inadequately explained conflictswith our intuitions regarding laws andpossibilities. However, the non-reductiveHumeanism developed here, on which law claimsare understood as normative rather than factstating, can accommodate those intuitions. Rational constraints on such norms provide aset of consistency relations that ground asemantics formulated in terms offactual-normative worlds, solving theFrege-Geach problem of construing unassertedcontexts. This set of factual-normative worldsincludes exactly the intuitive sets ofnomologically possible worlds associated witheach possible (...)
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  30. Quasi-realism, sensibility theory, and ethical relativism.Simon Kirchin - 2000 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):413 – 427.
    This paper is a reply to Simon Blackburn's 'Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-realist Foundation?' Inquiry 42, pp. 213-28. Blackburn attempts to show how his version of non-cognitivism - quasi-realist projectivism - can evade the threat of ethical relativism, the thought that all ways of living are as ethically good as each other and every ethical judgment is as ethically true as any other. He further attempts to show that his position is superior in this respect to, amongst (...)
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  31. Expressivism, projectivism, and Santayana.Glenn Tiller - 2000 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (2):239-258.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Expressivism, Projectivism and SantayanaGlenn Tiller1. Santayana and Non-CognitivismThere is a general consensus that Santayana's metaethical analysis of moral judgments falls under the category of non-cognitivism. For instance, Timothy Sprigge writes that "Santayana's position shares some features with those attitudinist theories of ethics or values for which value judgments express attitudes rather than beliefs."1 In another example, John Lachs states that "Santayana agrees with the emotivists that moral terms have (...)
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  32. The incompleat projectivist: How to be an objectivist and an attitudinist.T. D. J. Chappell - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (190):50-66.
    What is at stake in the dispute between moral objectivism and subjectivism is how we are to give a rational grounding to ethical first principles or basic commitments. The search is for an explanation of what if anything makes any commitments good. Subjectivisms such as Blackburn's quasi‐realism can give any set of commitments no ‘rational grounding’ in this sense except in considerations about internal consistency. But this is inadequate. Internal consistency is not sufficient for ethical rationality, since a set of (...)
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  33. Comrades against quietism: Reply to Simon Blackburn on truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1998 - Mind 107 (425):183-203.
  34. Book review: The Moral Problem by Michael Smith. [REVIEW]James Dreier - 1996 - Mind 105 (418):363-367.
  35. Projectivism.James Dreier - 1996 - In Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan.
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  36. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. [REVIEW]Nicholas L. Sturgeon - 1995 - Noûs 29 (3):402-424.
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  37. Moral mind-independence.Nick Zangwill - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2):205-219.
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  38. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. [REVIEW]Abraham Edel - 1992 - International Studies in Philosophy 24 (3):143-144.
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  39. The expressivist theory of normative judgment.Alan H. Goldman - 1991 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):509-523.
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  40. Blackburn's projectivism — an objection.M. H. Brighouse - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 59 (2):225 - 233.
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  41. Quasi-quasi-realism.Nick Zangwill - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):583-594.
    I. Projcctivism, Subjcctivism, and Error (i) According to Simon Blackburn, somconc who wants t0 avoid a ‘rcalistic’ account of our motal thought faces a choice} Thc choicc is bctwccn his non-rcductionist ‘projcctivism’ and rcductionist ‘subjcctivism’. Thc foymcr is thc vicw that moral judgments cxprcss attitudcs (approval, disapproval, liking or disliking, for example), which wc ‘projcct’ or ‘sprcad’ onto thc world, while thc latter is thc vicw that moral judgments arc bclicfs about attitudes. Blackburn bcratcs philosophers for not sccing thc diffcrcncc, (...)
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  42. Scientific quasi-realism.Richard Jennings - 1989 - Mind 98 (390):225-245.
  43. Doubts about Projectivism.A. W. Price - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (236):215 - 228.
    How, in pursuit of ontological neutrality, should one talk about values? I propose to say: there are values. Those three words do nothing to define within what kind of conception of a world values are at home.1 I take it that the ‘realist’ must have more to say about values and their world. I recognize that an ‘anti-realist’ may prefer to talk of value-terms ; I ask him to wait and see whether taking the linguistic turn is the only way (...)
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  44. Minimalism and quasi-realism.Alan Thomas - manuscript
    Expressivism's problem in solving the Frege/Geach problem concerning unasserted contexts is evaluated in the light of Blackburn's own methodological commitment to assessing philosophical theories in terms of costs and benefits, notably quasi-realism's aim of minimising the ontological commitments of a broadly naturalistic worldview. The problem emerges when a competitor theory can explain the same phenomena at lower cost: the minimalist about truth has no problem with unasserted contexts whereas the quasi-realist/expressivist package does. However, this form of projectivism is supposed to (...)
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