Metaphilosophy, Miscellaneous

What are academic hoaxes, and what should we make of them? This paper argues that academic hoaxes are exercises in pretense, with a complex structure involving both a focal item and a self‐revealing dimension, all governed by attitudes about the relevant sort of academic work, that are derivative yet different from the attitudes found in normal participation in publication. Hoaxes done primarily for humorous purposes are unproblematic. Serious academic hoaxes are both inherently risky and poorly suited to accomplish their ends, (...) making them an undesirable feature of the contemporary academic landscape. (shrink)

This book is based on four backgrounds: (1) the diversity of definitions of philosophy, (2) statements by several thingkers about the death/ending of philosophy, (3) the existence of Hassan Hanafi's writings about the definition, life and death of philosophy, and (4) the limitations of specific studies on philosophy according to Hanafi. On that basis, this book examines philosophy according to Hanafi, by revealing and reviewing his definition of philosophy and his views on when philosophy lives and when philosophy dies. In (...) general, this is metaphilosophical study of Hanafi's philosophy by disclosuring it descriptively and analytically on the one side, and by reviewing it falsificatively, interpretatively and axiologically on the other side. This metaphilosophical study of Hanafi philosophy found several things. First, Hanafi's definition of philosophy is still diverse and needs to be reanalyzed, so it cannot overcome the problem of the diversity of definitions of philosophy. Second, Hanafi's statement about those who kill philosophy and turn on it is inconsistent and falsifiable. Third, philosophy can still live in conditions that are considered to kill it. Fourth, although it has several weaknesses, Hanafi's philosophy is useful in particular for Muslims and researchers about Islam, Arab nations and researchers about Arab, and societies that face internal and external traditions; and also worthwhile in general for philosophy and practitioners of philosophy. Fifth, Hanafi's philosophy can overcome the problem of ongoing discourse about the death/ending of philosophy, because his philosophy can actually bring philosophy to life. (shrink)

An autobiographical reflection on some kinds of intellectual moves that tend to be revealing in philosophy. Written for emerging researchers.

Philosophy is a discipline of grand abstractions. Truth, justice, knowledge, goodness, democracy, beauty, freedom, and other venerable ideas have been at the ce.

The main objective of this paper is to address the problem of the philosophical method, which consists of the lack of consensus among philosophers regarding the proper procedure to carry out this human activity. In this sense, it examines a few methodological proposals put forward by some representatives of contemporary philosophy, emphasizing the impact that the development of modern science has had on such views. In addition, the plausibility of such proposals is assessed.

Conceptual engineering is the process of assessing and improving our conceptual repertoire. Some authors have claimed that introducing or revising concepts through conceptual engineering can go as far as expanding the realm of thinkable thoughts and thus enable us to form beliefs, hypotheses, wishes, or desires that we are currently unable to form. We call this kind of conceptual engineering heavy-duty conceptual engineering. As exciting as the idea of heavy-duty conceptual engineering sounds, it has never been developed or defended. In (...) this paper, we pursue a two-fold goal. First, to offer a theory of heavy-duty conceptual engineering that distinguishes it from other kinds of conceptual engineering; second, to show that heavy-duty conceptual engineering is possible, both in theory and in practice, and to explain how it can be pursued. The central idea is that conceptual engineering can enhance the semantic expressive power of a conceptual system by the use of bootstrapping processes. (shrink)

This paper outlines the case for a future research program that uses the tools of experimental cognitive science to investigate questions that traditionally fall under the remit of the philosophy of historiography. The central idea is this – the epistemic profile of historians’ representations of the past is largely an empirical matter, determined in no small part by the cognitive processes that produce these representations. However, as the philosophy of historiography is not presently equipped to investigate such cognitive questions, legitimate (...) concerns about evidential quality go largely overlooked. The case of mental state representation provides an excellent illustration of this. Representations of past mental states – the thoughts and fears and knowledge and desires of past agents – play much the same evidential role in historiography as in everyday life, serving in the causal explanation of agents’ behaviors and supporting normative evaluation of those behaviors. However, we have good reason to suspect that the theory of mind processes that support these representations may be more susceptible to error when deployed in the context of historiography than under everyday conditions. This raises worries about the quality of evidence that theory of mind can provide historiography, worries which require experimental cognitive science to properly address. (shrink)

'Pi' in mathematics is the technical term for 'mind' in philosophy. This creates Intelligent anarchy. Or, in more conventional 'language' the whole idea that there is only 'one' person in, what humans label, 'the universe.' This means, technically, then, there are always 'two' people in any 'universe.' Where all of these terms (words) are meaningless, because the conservation of a circle controls, again, what humans label, 'reality.' (Self, anti-self, other-self, relative self.) Again, meaning, every human (any unit) (in any discipline) (...) (including, and, especially, language) is the same human, automatically, in its own 'universe.' Intelligent. Anarchist. (Circular-linear relationship between any X and-or X) (X and-or Y) (X and-or X'). (shrink)

Communication strategies to shape public opinion can be applied to the philosophical program of conceptual engineering. I propose to look for answers to the implementation challenge for conceptual engineering on similar challenges that arise in other contexts, such as that of social movements. I claim that conceptual engineering is successfully practiced in other areas with direct consequences on the political landscape, and that we can apply to philosophy what we might learn from those successful practices. With that end in mind, (...) I explain the psychological approach to conceptual engineering. I present what has been called “the implementation challenge”, which is the problem that emerges from the possibility of control over the content of our concepts. The challenge consists in that if there is not such a control, conceptual engineering is not implementable. Then, I review some of the reactions that have been given to that challenge, and I defend the feasibility of conceptual engineering appealing to the collective action frames that social movements endorse as an instance of a successful kind of conceptual engineering and derive some strategies that might be of use for conceptual engineering in philosophy. Finally, I reply to some anticipated objections to my proposal. (shrink)

Ideas and values are important concepts in terms of both individual and social existence. It is no coincidence that these concepts have become the object of wide discussion in philosophy throughout history. Continuation of the moral and political existence of the societies is possible by analyzing the ideas and values specific to the societies. This point increases the importance and relevance of the study "The idea of social solidarity and the importance of religious and moral values: Philosophical-ethical analysis at the (...) level of Heydar Aliyev's state policy". The purpose of the research is to justify the importance of the idea of social solidarity and religious and moral values from the aspect of Heydar Aliyev's political strategy on a philosophical and ethical basis. The method of the research is to reanalyze the terms and concepts related to the topic based on the evaluation and results of the previous research works. One of the main theses of the article is that Heydar Aliyev attached great importance to the attachment to our national and moral roots, loyalty to national traditions, which is the moral basis of our independent statehood. In this sense, the ideology of Azerbaijaniism implies the inseparable unity of nationality and universality. Such an ideology can prevent the erosion of national characteristics based on national and moral values in the process of globalization by exposure to foreign influences, and reduce the risk of melting and disappearing. (shrink)

In many respects, N.M.L. Nathan's latest book feels timeless. Its brevity and pithiness especially remind one of Descartes’ Meditations; it even has similar ove.

Thomasson is a simple realist about the vast majority of entities: she thinks that they exist, and that their existence is to be accepted as a trivial consequence of the truth of various uncontroversial sentences (Thomasson, Ontology Made Easy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 156). This position is to be taken in contrast to the explanatory realism familiar from dominant post-Quinean metaontology: the view that entities are posited to explain phenomena, and that (very roughly) we should believe in whatever (...) we need in order for our best scientific theories to come out as true. Recent literature further suggests an approach I’ll call ‘fundamentality realism’: the idea that we should understand realism in connection with notions of fundamentality and metaphysical priority. I introduce these notions and the relations between them before describing an objection to Thomasson-style simple realism. I argue that this objection can be overcome by combining simple realism with elements of fundamentality realism, and that such a view can nevertheless be seen to fit with Thomasson's overall metaphysical worldview. (shrink)

At the heart of Mizrahi’s project lies a sociological narrative concerning the recent history of philosophers’ negative attitudes towards scientism. Critics (e.g. de Ridder (2019), Wilson (2019) and Bryant (2020)), have detected various empirical inadequacies in Mizrahi’s methodology for discussing these attitudes. Bryant (2020) points out one of the main pertinent methodological deficiencies here, namely that the mere appearance of the word ‘scientism’ in a text does not suffice in determining whether the author feels threatened by it. Not all philosophers (...) use the term in ‘inherently negative’ (29) or pejorative ways. In this paper, I not only corroborate Bryant’s critical claim, but argue that Mizrahi’s response to this part of Bryant’s objection is inadequate. (shrink)

Reflective equilibrium (RE) is often regarded as a powerful method in ethics, logic, and even philosophy in general. Despite this popularity, characterizations of the method have been fairly vague and unspecific so far. It thus may be doubted whether RE is more than a jumble of appealing but ultimately sketchy ideas that cannot be spelled out consistently. In this paper, we dispel such doubts by devising a formal model of RE. The model contains as components the agent’s commitments and a (...) theory that tries to systematize the commitments. It yields a precise picture of how the commitments and the theory are adjusted to each other. The model differentiates between equilibrium as a target state and the dynamic equilibration process. First solutions to the model, obtained by computer simulation, show that the method allows for consistent specification and that the model’s implications are plausible in view of expectations on RE. In particular, the mutual adjustment of commitments and theory can improve one’s commitments, as proponents of RE have suggested. We argue that our model is fruitful not only because it points to issues that need to be dealt with for a better understanding of RE, but also because it provides the means to address these issues. (shrink)

This paper provides an overview of 'analytic' philosophy of religion. It begins with a historical sketch. It then examines some of the kinds of questions that are investigated by 'analytic' philosophers of religion. It concludes with brief discussion of possible futures for 'analytic' philosophy of religion. There is also a very short appendix on the treatment of Islam and Arabic philosophy within 'analytic' philosophy of religion.

Playing in counterpoint with the general theoretical orientation of the book, this chapter does not focus its attention on the recording and archiving capabilities of the digital medium. Instead, it proposes an understanding of the digital medium that focuses on its disclosing various forms of “doing.” Gualeni’s chapter begins by offering an understanding of “doing in the digital” that methodologically separates “doing as acting” from “doing as making.” After setting its theoretical framework, the chapter discusses an “interactive thought experiment” designed (...) by the author that is analyzed as a digital artifact leveraging both dimensions of “doing in the digital” for philosophical purposes. In extreme synthesis, one could say that this chapter is about several kinds of soups. (shrink)

This paper explains some of the reasoning behind “Can a Good Philosophical Contribution Be Made Just by Asking a Question?,” a paper which consists solely in its title and which is published in the same issue of the journal as the present paper. The method for explaining that reasoning consists in making available a lightly edited version of a letter the authors sent to the editors when submitting the title-only paper. The editors permitted publication of that paper on the condition (...) that the authors also separately publish a version of that letter; the present paper aims to fulfil that condition. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question whether or not philosophical discourse can avail the categories of the scientific image. I argue that the clash of the images is bet- ter understood on the semantic rather than the ontologic level and that it results from the challenge to the representational adequacy of the categories tha articulate the conceptual repertoires of the manifest image. A challenge that will be met by a succesful recategoriza- tion of the concept of a person in the scientific (...) image. I suggest some reasons to believe that such a recategoritazion is possible in principle without dismantling the philosophical discourse. (shrink)

John Dewey coined the imperative that what we do in philosophy «must take effects in conduct» if it is not to be a sentimental indulgence for a few. This article asks whether it suffices when an insight only makes a difference in someone’s mind, to make it a legitimate aim of research. Four kinds of insights are distinguished: meta- physical insights, ethical insights, practical insights, and trivial insights. Metaphysical insights are those that bring us purely cognitive benefits – no other (...) benefits than a change in our thoughts. This article argues that metaphysical insights, properly demarcated, entail a particular kind of significance, which makes them worthy of pursuit, despite only yielding cognitive benefits. The article also points out, however, that we need to think carefully about how these cognitive benefits are socially distributed, and how we make the decision about which metaphysical inquiries are to be pursued. (shrink)

Richard Rorty notoriously maintained that philosophy is not an academic discipline. He thought that the only viable candidate for philosophy to be an academic discipline—where philosophy consists in a collection of permanent, pure topics—depends on a Cartesian conceptual framework. Once we overcome this framework, he maintained, there will be nothing left to be the distinct subject matter of philosophy. This article argues that there is a conception of philosophy that can be an academic discipline, even if we take Rorty's challenge (...) seriously. It remains even if we overcome the Cartesian conceptual framework. In the end the article goes beyond Rorty's challenge and considers two further criteria for philosophy to be an academic discipline: that it have a distinct method, and that it be able to be done for the public good. The article argues that philosophy can fulfill these two criteria, and therefore that it can be an academic discipline. (shrink)

Relying on euthanasia’s definitionally derived set of propositions to provide its purpose, claims, and benefit, we obtain the core concept. Nonetheless, given its core concept, euthanasia is demonstrated to provide no benefit to the animal to justify its use. Euthanasia 1) cannot possibly, and therefore does not, end unbearable suffering, 2) it fails to hasten death, and 3) it, therefore, provides no perceptible relief to the patient. These findings are significant because the argument’s validity does not permit euthanasia to satisfy (...) its definitionally derived purpose, claims, or benefit on logical grounds. In other words, the argument is that as a form of legalized assisted suicide, euthanasia is wrong but not in the way principled arguments would suggest. Additionally, irrespective of euthanasia actually doing what it claims, if it is allowed to be provisioned, then euthanasia will affect vulnerable populations exactly like nonprincipled arguments claim. Therefore, despite sharing aspects with each type of argument in the extant literature, my argument against euthanasia can be categorized as neither principled nor nonprincipled, which makes it significant because it may be the first of a new category of argument against the concept and practice to enter the discourse on euthanasia. As a corollary, since we prove that unbearable suffering logically entails death, when it is authentic signifying that death is imminent, because euthanasia’s only purpose is to end unbearable suffering by inducing death, euthanasia is completely obviated. (shrink)

Drawing on Laurie A. Paul’s notion of “transformative experience”, this paper explores transformative philosophical experiences and analyses the structure of the attitude underlying them. It is argued that these experiences have to be explained not in cognitive terms but as a change in our affective attitude. More precisely, these experiences lead us to feel values in a novel manner. However, in order to make the philosophical experience epistemically transformative and provide a new perspective from which we can acquire new philosophical (...) insights, this feeling of value must meet certain moral conditions such as being open, humble and aware of possible self-deceptive tendencies. Since affectivity is central to the person we are, epistemically transformative experiences in philosophy go hand in hand with personal transformation. (shrink)

This paper discusses the relation between Crispin Wright’s alethic pluralism and my global expressivism. I argue that on many topics Wright’s own view counts as expressivism in my sense, but that truth itself is a striking exception. Unlike me, Wright never seems to countenance an expressivist account of truth, though the materials needed are available to him in his approaches to other topics.

a collection of poems as companion to a collection of philosophical études.

21. yüzyılın üçüncü on yılının şafağında, insanlığın varlığı son derece tehlikeli hale geldi. Ormanlarımızı kesiyor, tatlı su akiferlerimizi tüketiyor ve hayati önem taşıyan topraklarımızı kaybediyoruz. Okyanuslarımızdaki yaşamı sıyırıp yerine yüz milyonlarca ton plastik atık koyuyoruz. Çevremizi toksik endüstriyel kimyasallarla dolduruyoruz. Kirliliğimiz, kıtalardaki yaşamın dokusunu parçalayan ısı dalgalarına, kuraklıklara ve vahşi yangınlara neden olan iklim değişikliğini tetikliyor. Ve dünyaya yeni nesiller getiriyoruz, onurlu bir varoluşun kaynaklarına erişmeye ihtiyaç duyan milyonlarca insan. Hayata yönelik tehditlerin kapsamı ve genişliği her geçen gün artmaktadır. Bu (...) sürdürülebilir bir kalkınma şekli değildir. -/- Hastalıklarımızın temel nedeni, yanlış bir düşünce tarzından kaynaklanır. Bu tam olarak ne anlama geliyor? bu, ruhsal doğamızı inkar ederken kendimizi esas olarak maddi varlıklar olarak düşündüğümüz anlamına gelir. Maddi varlıklar olarak var olduğumuzu ve başka bir şey olmadığını düşündüğümüz için öncelikle bedenlerimizi zararlardan korumaya ve maddi varlığımızı sürdürmeye önem veririz. Manevi doğamız, eğer hiç düşünülürse, fiziksel varlığımızın ikincil bir yönü olarak ele alınır - ciddiye alınmaması gereken bir şey. Bizim için önemli olan tek şey maddi dünyada ortaya çıkan fenomenlerdir - görülebilen, duyulabilen, dokunulabilen veya ölçülebilen şeyler, ancak duyularımızın bizi aldattığını biliyoruz, duyular beynin bir yapısıdır. . Gerçek bir dünya olarak kabul ettiğimiz şey bir yanılsamadır. Pozitivist ve materyalist düşüncenin tahakkümü mantıksızlığa ve yıkıma yol açar. -/- Peki bu yaklaşım bizi nereye götürdü? Bize bir mutluluk ve tatmin duygusu getirdi mi? Her günü neşeli bir işbirliği ruhu içinde, parlak umutlar ve mutlu beklentilerle dolu kalplerimizle yaşamak yerine, kendimizi diğerlerinden soyutladık ve onları rakip veya düşman olarak gördük. Düşüncelerimiz, sonsuz bir savaş, yoksulluk, açlık ve çevresel yıkım döngüsüne yol açan şüphe, korku ve açgözlülükle dolu. Yakında uyanmadıkça ve ruhsal doğamıza dikkat etmedikçe, Dünya'da insanlık için bir gelecek olmayacak. -/- Kelimeler hayattır. Kelimeler hafiftir. Kelimeler güçtür. Kelimeler enerjidir. Sözler gerçektir. Kelimeler canlandırabilir ve kelimeler de öldürebilir. Kelimeler umut verebilir veya bizi umutsuzluğa sürükleyebilir. İnsanlar barışı inşa etmek için kelimeleri, savaşmak için kelimeleri kullanırlar. Kelimeler kültürler, dinler ve milletler arasında duvarlar oluşturabilir. Ve kelimeler de köprüler kurabilir. Bir bireyin, bir ailenin, bir topluluğun, bir ülkenin ve gezegenimizin varlığı, konuştuğumuz kelimelerin gücüyle iyiye veya kötüye yönlendirilmektedir. Konuştuğumuz kelimeler bu dünyada olan her şeyden sorumludur. Bu nedenle, konuştuğumuz kelimelerden sorumlu olmalıyız. Gelecek nesiller adına, umarım her birimiz sadece parlak, ışık dolu sözler söylemek için elimizden gelen her şeyi yaparız, böylece bir gün torunlarımız ışıkla dolu bir dünyaya doğar. Kaybedecek vakit yok. Bu andan itibaren, umarım hepimiz kullandığımız kelimelere yakından bakar ve onları parlaklık ile doldurmak için sürekli çaba gösteririz. -/- Kimse bizim için hayatımızı değiştiremez. Kimse bizim için dünyayı değiştirmeyecek. Her birimizin, konuştuğumuz her kelimenin serbest bıraktığı olağanüstü, yaratıcı gücü tanımasının ve bilinçli olarak sadece şükran, teşvik ve iyi niyetle dolu kelimeleri konuşmanın zamanı geldi. Bu andan itibaren, kendimiz ve başkaları için sevgi ve bağışlama ile rezonansa giren kelimeleri seçelim. Sadece bir adım ileri gidersek bunu kesinlikle yapabiliriz. Her seferinde bir adım, her seferinde bir kelime, bilincimizdeki trajedi ve izolasyon tohumlarını söküp onları mutluluk ve uzlaşma dalgalarına dönüştürebiliriz. Kendimiz, Toprak Ana ve gelecek nesiller adına, insanlığın Dünya üzerindeki olumlu evrimine katkıda bulunan kelimeleri kullanalım. (shrink)

En los albores de la tercera del siglo XXI, la existencia de la humanidad se ha vuelto sumamente peligrosa. Estamos talando nuestros bosques, agotando nuestros acuíferos de agua dulce y perdendo nuestros suelos superiores vitais. Estamos eliminando a vida de nuestros oceanos e reemplazándola com cientos de milhões de toneladas de desechos plásticos. Estamos inundando nosso ambiente com produtos químicos industriais tóxicos. Nuestra contaminação está impulsando a mudança climática que provoca olas de calor, sequías e incêndios florestais que destrozan o (...) tejido de la vida en los continentes. Y estamos trazendo novas gerações no mundo, milhões que requerem acesso aos recursos de uma existência digna. El alcance y la amplitud de las amenazas a la vida aumentarn día tras día. Este não é um modo sustentável de desarrollo. A causa raíz de nuestros machos fornece uma forma de pensar equivocada. ¿Que significa exatamente? significa que hemos estado pensando em nosotros mismos principalmente como seres materiais, mientras negamos nuestra naturaleza espiritual. Debido a que pensamos que existimos como seres materiais e nada mais, damos prioridade a proteger nuestros cuerpos del daño y prolongar nuestra existencia material. Nuestra naturaleza espiritual, si é que se considera em absoluto, se trata como um aspecto secundário de nuestro ser físico, algo que não deve ser tomado em serio. Para nós, as únicas cosas que importam são os fenômenos que aparecem no mundo material, como se pueden ver, oír, tocar o mediterrâneo, por saber que nuestros sentidos nos engañan, los sentidos son una construção del cerebro. Lo que consideramos um mundo real é uma ilusão. A dominação do pensamento positivista e materialista conduz à irracionalidade e à destruição. Pero, ¿adónde nos ha llevado este enfoque? ¿Nos ha traído una sensación de felicidad y plenitud? No lugar de viver cada dia com um espírito de cooperação alegre, con nuestros corazones llenos de brillante esperanza y feliz antecipación, nos hemos aislado Diferenos de los demás y verlos como rivales o inemigos. Nuestros pensamientos estão inundados de sospecha, miedo y codicia, lo que lleva a un ciclo interminável de guerra, pobreza, hambruna y destruição ambiental. A menos que despertemos pronto e prestemos atenção a nossa naturaleza espiritual, não há futuro para a humanidade na Terra. Las palabras son vida. As palavras da luz. Las palabras son poder. Las palavras son energía. Las palabras son verdad. Las palabras pueden animar y las palabras también pueden matar. Las palabras pueden dar esperanza ou hundirnos en la desesperación. La gente usa palabras para construir la paz y usa palabras para hacer la guerra. Las palabras pueden crear muros entre culturas, religiões e nações. Y las palabras también pueden construir puentes. La existencia de un individuo, una familia, una comunidad, un país y nuestro planeta está conduzindo al been ou al mal a través del poder de las palabras que hablamos. Las palabras que hablamos son responsables de todo lo que sucede neste mundo. Nosotros, por lo tanto, debemos ser responsables de las palabras que hablamos. Em nome das gerações futuras, espero que cada um de nosotros haga todo o possível para hablar solo palabras brilhantes y llenas de luz, para que um dia, nuestros descendentes nazcan en un mundo lleno de luz. No hay tiempo que perder. A partir deste momento, espero que todos echemos uma vista de cerca das palavras que hemos estado usando e hagamos esfuerzos constantes para llenarlas de brillo. Nadie va a cambiar nuestra vida por nosotros. Nadie va a cambiar el mundo por nosotros. É hora de cada um de nós reconhecer o prodigioso poder criativo que se desata em cada palavra que pronuncia, e de maneira consciente pronunciemos apenas palavras de gratidão, alienação e boa intenção. A partir deste momento, elijamos palabras que resuenen con amor y perdón para nosotros mismos y para los demás. Ciertamente podemos fazer se damos um passo solo adelante. Un paso a la vez, uma palavra a la vez, podemos arrancar de raíz os gérmenes de tragédia e aislamiento de nossa consciência e conversão em ondas de felicidade e conciliação. Por nosostros mismos, por la Madre Tierra y por el bien de las generaciones futuras, usemos palavras que contribuem para a evolução positiva de la humanidad en la Tierra. (shrink)

En los albores de la tercera década del siglo XXI, la existencia de la humanidad se ha vuelto sumamente peligrosa. Estamos talando nuestros bosques, agotando nuestros acuíferos de agua dulce y perdiendo nuestros suelos superiores vitales. Estamos eliminando la vida de nuestros océanos y reemplazándola con cientos de millones de toneladas de desechos plásticos. Estamos inundando nuestro medio ambiente con productos químicos industriales tóxicos. Nuestra contaminación está impulsando el cambio climático que provoca olas de calor, sequías e incendios forestales que (...) destrozan el tejido de la vida en los continentes. Y estamos trayendo nuevas generaciones al mundo, millones que requieren acceso a los recursos de una existencia digna. El alcance y la amplitud de las amenazas a la vida aumentan día tras día. Este no es un modo sostenible de desarrollo. La causa raíz de nuestros males proviene de una forma de pensar equivocada. ¿Qué significa esto exactamente? significa que hemos estado pensando en nosotros mismos principalmente como seres materiales, mientras negamos nuestra naturaleza espiritual. Debido a que pensamos que existimos como seres materiales y nada más, damos prioridad a proteger nuestros cuerpos del daño y prolongar nuestra existencia material. Nuestra naturaleza espiritual, si es que se la considera en absoluto, se trata como un aspecto secundario de nuestro ser físico, algo que no debe tomarse en serio. Para nosotros, las únicas cosas que importan son los fenómenos que aparecen en el mundo material, cosas que se pueden ver, oír, tocar o medir, pero sabemos que nuestros sentidos nos engañan, los sentidos son una construcción del cerebro. Lo que consideramos un mundo real es una ilusión. La dominación del pensamiento positivista y materialista conduce a la irracionalidad y la destrucción. Pero, ¿adónde nos ha llevado este enfoque? ¿Nos ha traído una sensación de felicidad y plenitud? En lugar de vivir cada día con un espíritu de alegre cooperación, con nuestros corazones llenos de brillante esperanza y feliz anticipación, nos hemos aislado Preimpresión de Academia Letters.©2021 por el autor – Acceso abierto – Distribuido bajo CC BY 4.0 1 diferenciarnos de los demás y verlos como rivales o enemigos. Nuestros pensamientos están inundados de sospecha, miedo y codicia, lo que lleva a un ciclo interminable de guerra, pobreza, hambruna y destrucción ambiental. A menos que despertemos pronto y prestemos atención a nuestra naturaleza espiritual, no habrá futuro para la humanidad en la Tierra. Las palabras son vida. Las palabras son luz. Las palabras son poder. Las palabras son energía. Las palabras son verdad. Las palabras pueden animar y las palabras también pueden matar. Las palabras pueden dar esperanza o hundirnos en la desesperación. La gente usa palabras para construir la paz y usa palabras para hacer la guerra. Las palabras pueden crear muros entre culturas, religiones y naciones. Y las palabras también pueden construir puentes. La existencia de un individuo, una familia, una comunidad, un país y nuestro planeta está siendo conducida al bien o al mal a través del poder de las palabras que hablamos. Las palabras que hablamos son responsables de todo lo que sucede en este mundo. Nosotros, por lo tanto, debemos ser responsables de las palabras que hablamos. En nombre de las generaciones futuras, espero que cada uno de nosotros haga todo lo posible para hablar solo palabras brillantes y llenas de luz, para que un día, nuestros descendientes nazcan en un mundo lleno de luz. No hay tiempo que perder. A partir de este mismo momento, espero que todos echemos un vistazo de cerca a las palabras que hemos estado usando y hagamos esfuerzos constantes para llenarlas de brillo. Nadie va a cambiar nuestra vida por nosotros. Nadie va a cambiar el mundo por nosotros. Es hora de que cada uno de nosotros reconozca el prodigioso poder creativo que se desata en cada palabra que pronunciamos, y de manera consciente pronunciemos sólo palabras llenas de gratitud, aliento y buena intención. A partir de este momento, elijamos palabras que resuenen con amor y perdón para nosotros mismos y para los demás. Ciertamente podemos hacerlo si damos un solo paso adelante. Un paso a la vez, una palabra a la vez, podemos arrancar de raíz los gérmenes de tragedia y aislamiento de nuestra conciencia y convertirlos en ondas de felicidad y conciliación. Por nosotros mismos, por la Madre Tierra y por el bien de de las generaciones futuras, usemos palabras que contribuyan a la evolución positiva de la humanidad en la Tierra . (shrink)

À l'aube de la troisième décennie du XXIe siècle, l'existence de l'humanité est devenue hautement périlleuse. Nous abattons nos forêts, épuisons nos aquifères d'eau douce et perdons nos sols vitaux. Nous enlevons la vie de nos océans et la remplaçons par des centaines de millions de tonnes de déchets plastiques. Nous inondons notre environnement de produits chimiques industriels toxiques. Notre pollution est à l'origine du changement climatique qui provoque des vagues de chaleur, des sécheresses et des incendies de forêt qui (...) déchirent le tissu de la vie sur les continents. Et nous mettons au monde de nouvelles générations, des millions qui ont besoin d'accéder aux ressources d'une existence digne. La portée et l'ampleur des menaces à la vie augmentent jour après jour. Ce n'est pas un mode de développement durable. La cause profonde de nos maux provient d'une façon de penser erronée. Qu'est-ce que cela signifie exactement? cela signifie que nous nous considérons principalement comme des êtres matériels, tout en niant notre nature spirituelle. Parce quenous pensons que nous existons en tant qu'êtres matériels et rien de plus, nous accordons la importance à la protection de notre corps contre les dommages et à la prolongation de notre existence matérielle. Notre nature spirituelle, si elle est considérée du tout, est traitée comme un aspect secondaire de notre être physique, quelque chose à ne pas prendre au sérieux. Pour nous, les seules choses qui comptent sont les phénomènes qui apparaissent dans le monde matériel - des choses qui peuvent être vues, ou entendues, ou touchées, ou mesurées, mais nous savons que nos sens nous trompent, les sens sont une construction du cerveau . Ce que nous considérons comme un monde réel est une illusion. La domination de la pensée positiviste et matérialiste conduit à l'irrationalité et à la destruction. Mais où cette approche nous a-t-elle menés ? Cela nous a-t-il apporté un sentiment de bonheur et d'épanouissement ? Plutôt que de vivre chaque jour dans un esprit de coopération joyeuse, avec nos cœurs remplis d'espoir brillant et d'anticipation heureuse, nous avons isolé la -/- TRADUCTION 1 prépublication des Lettres académiques. nous démarquer des autres et les considérait comme des rivaux ou des ennemis. Nos pensées sont inondées de suspicion, de peur et de cupidité, conduisant à un cycle sans fin de guerre, de pauvreté, de famine et de destruction de l'environnement. À moins que nous ne nous réveillions bientôt et que nous ne prêtions attention à notre nature spirituelle, il n'y aura pas d'avenir pour l'humanité sur Terre. Les mots sont la vie. Les mots sont légers. Les mots sont le pouvoir. Les mots sont énergie. Les mots sont la vérité. Les mots peuvent animer et les mots peuvent aussi tuer. Les mots peuvent donner de l'espoir ou nous plonger dans le désespoir. Les gens utilisent des mots pour construire la paix et utilisent des mots pour faire la guerre. Les mots peuvent créer des murs entre les cultures, les religions et les nations. Et les mots peuvent aussi construire des ponts. L'existence d'un individu, d'une famille, d'une communauté, d'un pays et de notre planète est conduite au bien ou au mal par le pouvoir des mots que nous prononçons. Les mots que nous prononçons sont responsables de tout ce qui se passe dans ce monde. Nous devons donc être responsables des paroles que nous prononçons. Au nom des générations futures, j'espère que chacun de nous fera tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour ne dire que des mots clairs et lumineux, afin qu'un jour, nos descendants naissent dans un monde rempli de lumière. Il n'y a pas de temps à perdre. À partir de ce moment précis, j'espère que nous examinerons tous de près les mots que nous avons utilisés et que nous ferons des efforts constants pour les remplir de luminosité. Personne ne changera nos vies à notre place. Personne ne changera le monde à notre place. Il est temps pour chacun de nous de reconnaître le pouvoir créatif prodigieux qui se dégage de chaque mot que nous prononçons et de ne prononcer consciemment que des mots remplis de gratitude, d'encouragement et de bonnes intentions. À partir de ce moment, choisissons des mots qui résonnent d'amour et de pardon pour nous-mêmes et pour les autres. Nous pouvons certainement le faire si nous ne faisons qu'un pas en avant. Un pas à la fois, un mot à la fois, nous pouvons déraciner les germes de la tragédie et de l'isolement dans notre conscience et les convertir en vagues de bonheur et de réconciliation. Pour nousmêmes, pour la Terre Mère et pour les générations futures, utilisons des mots qui contribuent à l'évolution positive de l'humanité sur Terre. (shrink)

Many philosophers suppose that sometimes we think we are saying or thinking something meaningful when in fact we’re not saying or thinking anything at all: we are producing nonsense. But what is nonsense? An account of nonsense must, I argue, meet two constraints. The first constraint requires that nonsense can be rationally engaged with, not just mentioned. In particular, we can reason with nonsense and use it within that-clauses. An account which fails to meet this constraint cannot explain why nonsense (...) appears meaningful. The second constraint requires that nonsense does not express thoughts. An account which fails to meet this constraint undercuts the critical force of the concept of nonsense. I offer an account which meets both constraints. The central idea is that to be under the illusion that some nonsense makes sense is to enter a pretence that the nonsense is meaningful. (shrink)

Technological (Einsteinian) relativity is zero entangled with one. Explaining philosophical, physical, and psychological, fusion.

In the article’s first section, the author clarifies how the metaphilosophical question can be interpreted. In the second and third sections, a Hegelian phenomenological method is applied to the diachronic theoretical development of feminist philosophies – especially two of its moments, sexual difference thought and Judith Butler’s version of queer theory – to understand whether any indications emerge from this development concerning the contents, model of rationality, identity, and methods of these philosophies. The Hegelian metaphilosophical premise is that we can (...) understand what it means to do feminist philosophy only by observing, like the Owl of Minerva, the history of its theoretical development and interpreting the indispensability of each of its moments, and, at the same time, the presence in them of elements for their dialectical sublation. At the end of this analysis, some conclusions for the future of feminist philosophies are drawn. The author argues that the evolution of feminist philosophies shows that they cannot have a defined content or method. They are intrinsically open to their destabilization and sublation, passing from questions about women to general philosophical questions. How to understand the latter – and whether to welcome this ‘sunset’ as a positive, eminently queer event – is the topic of the final reflections. (shrink)

I show that some of the most initially attractive routes of refuting epistemological solipsism face serious obstacles. I also argue that for creatures like ourselves, solipsism is a genuine form of external world skepticism. I suggest that together these claims suggest the following morals: No proposed solution to external world skepticism can succeed which does not also solve the problem of epistemological solipsism. And, more tentatively: In assessing proposed solutions to external world skepticism, epistemologists should explicitly consider whether those solutions (...) extend to knowledge of other minds. Finally, and also tentatively: epistemological solipsism warrants more philosophical attention than it currently enjoys. (shrink)

This new edition of Collingwood's An Essay on Philosophical Method contains several previously unpublished papers including Collingwood's correspondence with Gilbert Ryle.

Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our concepts. However, little has been written about how best to conceive of concepts for the purposes of conceptual engineering. In this paper, I aim to fill this foundational gap, proceeding in three main steps: First, I propose a methodological framework for evaluating the conduciveness of a given concept of concept for conceptual engineering. Then, I develop a typology that contrasts two competing concepts of concept that can be used in conceptual (...) engineering — namely, the philosophical and psychological ones. Finally, I evaluate these two concepts of concept using the proposed methodological framework and I show that, when it comes to making conceptual engineering an actionable method, the psychological concept of concept outclasses its philosophical counterpart on all counts. This provides a baseline from which the concept of concept can be further improved for the purposes of conceptual engineering. (shrink)

The term scientism is used in several ways. It is used to denote an epistemological thesis according to which science is the source of our knowledge about the world and ourselves. Relatedly, it is used to denote a methodological thesis according to which the methods of science are superior to the methods of non-scientific fields or areas of inquiry, or even used to put forward a metaphysical thesis that what exists is what science says exists. In recent decades, the term (...) scientism has acquired a derogatory meaning when it is used in defense of non-scientific ways of knowing. In particular, some philosophers level the charge of “scientism” against those (mostly scientists) who are dismissive of philosophy. Other philosophers, however, embrace scientism, or some variant thereof, and object to the pejorative use of the term scientism. This book critically examines the arguments for and against scientism of various kinds to answer the central question: does scientism pose an existential threat to philosophy, or should philosophy become more scientific? (shrink)

In recent times, we have seen a resurgence of interest in the application of philosophy as a therapeutic for the purpose of alleviating the existential ills of human life. Within this paper, it is argued that not only can philosophy be applied as a therapeutic, but that the very act of doing philosophy is therapeutic. The paper begins with a discussion of human nature as bound to finitude and the suffering of existence. The necessity to labor along with the need (...) for relief from labor in the form of recreation and play is then discussed. Play is thereafter distinguished from leisure, and the concept of philosophical contemplation (theoria), following Aristotle, is introduced. It is argued that the activity of contemplation results in relief from the suffering of existence, and that its exercise may in consequence be considered a kind of therapeutic. (shrink)

The essay examines the ancient Greek origin of philosophy relative to the concept of wisdom. The nature of the sage is first considered. The sage is one who is deemed wise in his or her performances. But what is ‘wise’ about such performances? The Socratic denial of sage status is considered in reference to this. Socrates concludes that he is not wise as the gods are wise, but that he is wise insofar as he knows that he is not wise. (...) The apparent contradiction is resolved through the distinction between human (finite) and divine (infinite) wisdom. The latter notion is further examined in the works of Aristotle who articulates the “classical paradigm” of philosophy in pursuit of infinite wisdom. The attributes of infinite wisdom are identified, and the essay concludes with a discussion of the sagely performance of infinite wisdom, Aristotle himself serving as the representative example. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our representational devices. On its ‘broad-spectrum’ version, it is expected to be appropriately applicable to any of our representation-involving cognitive activities, with major consequences for our whole cognitive life. This paper is about the theoretical foundations of conceptual engineering thus characterised. With a view to ensuring the actionability of conceptual engineering as a broad-spectrum method, it addresses the issue of how best to construe the subject matter of conceptual engineering and successively (...) defends the theses that conceptual engineering should be: (i) About concepts, (ii) psychologically theorised, (iii) as multiply realised functional kinds. Thereby, I claim to theoretically secure and justify the maximum scope, flexibility, and impact for the method of conceptual engineering on our representational devices in our whole cognitive life—in other words, a broad-spectrum version of conceptual engineering. (shrink)

This paper explores a middle way between realism and eliminativism about grounding. Grounding-talk is intelligible and useful, but it fails to pick out grounding relations that exist or obtain in reality. Instead, grounding-talk allows us to convey facts about what metaphysically explains what, and about the worldly dependence relations that give rise to those explanations.

Whenever philosophers try to include a “diverse” — in the sense of not currently recognised as canon — philosophy x into their teaching and their research, they inevitably get asked: “What is x philosophy?” and “Is x philosophy really philosophy?”. -/- These metaphilosophical questions do not only arise with attempts to include “diverse” intellectual traditions, but also with attempts to include “diverse” thinkers, works, topics, and methods. First, they are asked to prove that x exists. Second, they are asked to (...) prove that x is really philosophy. To refer to the pattern of debates that these questions engender, call it conversational dynamics of diversity. (shrink)

RESUMEN El objetivo de este trabajo es mostrar que la relación de Rorty con la tradición filosófica presenta muchos más matices de los que su reputación podría hacer creer. Se confrontan dos hechos: de un lado, el propósito rortiano de superar la tradición; de otro, la necesidad de la tradición para mantener la conversación, interés principal de la filosofía para Rorty. Por tanto, la relación de Rorty con la tradición es ambigua. Ahora bien, esa ambigüedad puede verse como no contradictoria: (...) Rorty no pretendió tanto ofrecer una argumentación alternativa a la de la tradición cuanto una alternativa a la argumentación de la tradición. Así, más que romper con la tradición, Rorty, a su modo, le da una oportunidad. ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to show that Rorty’s relationship with philosophical tradition has more nuances of meaning than his reputation might suggest. Two opposite facts are considered: on the one hand, Rorty’s intention to overcome tradition; on the other hand, the fact that there cannot be conversation, the main interest of philosophy for Rorty, without tradition. Rorty’s relationship to the philosophical tradition is, thus, ambiguous. Nevertheless, this ambiguity can be seen as not inconsistent. One reason might explain this fact: rather than an alternative argumentation to the traditional one, Rorty offered an alternative to the traditional argumentation. Therefore it makes more sense to read Rorty as giving the tradition a break rather than breaking with the tradition. (shrink)

‘No-platforming’—the practice of denying someone the opportunity to express their opinion at certain venues because of the perceived abhorrent or misguided nature of their view—is a hot topic. Several philosophers have advanced epistemic reasons for using the policy in certain cases. Here we introduce epistemic considerations against no-platforming that are relevant for the reflection on the cases at issue. We then contend that three recent epistemic arguments in favor of no-platforming fail to factor these considerations in and, as a result, (...) offer neither a conclusive justification nor strong epistemic support for no-platforming in any of the relevant cases. Moreover, we argue that, taken together, our epistemic considerations against no-platforming and the three arguments for the policy suggest that no-platforming poses an epistemic dilemma. While advocates and opponents of no-platforming alike have so far overlooked this dilemma, it should be addressed not only to prevent that actual no-platforming decisions create more epistemic harm than good, but also to put us into a better position to justify the policy when it is indeed warranted. (shrink)

Abstract: According to the realist about philosophy, the goal of philosophy is to come to know the truth about philosophical questions; according to what Helen Beebee calls equilibrism, by contrast, the goal is rather to place one’s commitments in a coherent system. In this paper, I present a critique of equilibrism in the form Beebee defends it, paying particular attention to her suggestion that various meta-philosophical remarks made by David Lewis may be recruited to defend equilibrism. At the end of (...) the paper, I point out that a realist about philosophy may also be a pluralist about philosophical culture, thus undermining one main motivation for equilibrism. (shrink)

Ce texte est le fruit d’une collaboration entre un astrophysicien, Jean-René Roy, et un philosophe de l’éducation, Normand Baillargeon. Ils ont en commun d’avoir été marqués par la fréquentation des oeuvres de Mario Bunge, auxquelles ils attachent un grand prix, sur un plan personnel, d’abord, mais aussi, et c’est ce qu’ils veulent rappeler dans ces pages : parce qu’ils estiment que les oeuvres de Bunge contribuent de manière extrêmement forte et positive à rendre plus salubre la vie de l’esprit, en (...) enrichissant notre intellect et en luttant contre diverses formes troublantes d’obscurantisme qui y sévissent parfois, notamment dans les domaines familiers aux deux auteurs. (shrink)

There is a salient contrast in how theoretical representations are regarded. Some are regarded as revealing the nature of what they represent, as in familiar cases of theoretical identification in physical chemistry where water is represented as hydrogen hydroxide and gold is represented as the element with atomic number 79. Other theoretical representations are regarded as serving other explanatory aims without being taken individually to reveal the nature of what they represent, as in the representation of gold as a standard (...) for pre-20th century monetary systems in economics or the representation of the meaning of an English sentence as a function from possible worlds to truth values in truth-conditional semantics. Call the first attitude towards a theoretical representation *realist* and the second attitude *instrumentalist*. Philosophical explanation purports to reveal the nature of whatever falls within its purview, so it would appear that a realist attitude towards its representations is a natural default. I offer reasons for skepticism about such default realism that emerge from attending to several case studies of philosophical explanation and drawing a general metaphilosophical moral from the foregoing discussion. (shrink)