Locke: Abstract Ideas

In the Essay Locke argues abstract ideas within the framework of the descriptivist theory of reference. For him, abstract ideas are, in many cases, conceptual ideas that play the role of “descriptions” or “descriptive contents,” determining general terms’ referents. In contrast, in the introduction of the Principles, Berkeley denies Lockean abstract ideas adamantly from an imagistic point of view, and he offers his own theory of reference seemingly consisting of referring expressions and their referents alone. However, interestingly, he mentions a (...) general term’s “definition” and suggests that it determines the scope of the term’s referents. For example, he takes up the definition of a triangle as “a plain Surface comprehended by three right Lines” and suggests that just as Locke’s general idea of a triangle does, the definition determines the referents of the general term “triangle.” His definition reminds us of the fact that as Descartes grasps the content of the general idea of a triangle as “a figure enclosed by three lines,” so Locke grasps the abstract idea of a triangle as “a Figure including a Space between three Lines,” and so on. That is, since Berkeley is an imagist, he does not acknowledge Locke’s conceptual abstract ideas as “ideas,” but although he verbally denies “abstract ideas,” his theory of reference also actually has the same descriptivist framework consisting of referring expressions, their descriptive contents, and their referents. Thus, we understand the real reason why Berkeley’s criticism of Locke seems beside the point. (shrink)

Sobre el “triángulo general” de Locke, de Evert Willem Berth.

A great deal of the criticism directed at Locke's theory of abstract ideas assumes that a Lockean abstract idea is a special kind of idea which by its very nature either represents many diverse particulars or represents separately things that cannot exist in separation. This interpretation of Locke has been challenged by scholars such as Kenneth Winkler and Michael Ayers who regard it as uncharitable in light of the obvious problems faced by this theory of abstraction. Winkler and Ayers argue (...) that Locke instead held that to have an abstract idea is to attend selectively to some portion of the content of a particular idea. On this view, to have an abstract idea is not to have a special kind of idea but to have an ordinary idea in a special way. Ayers argues that Locke inherited this theory from Arnauld. I argue that the case made by Ayers for the attribution of the extrinsic theory to Locke rests on a misinterpretation of Arnauld. In fact, both Locke and Arnauld regard selective attention as part of a process whereby a new kind of idea is constructed. (shrink)

The paper discusses Berkeley's classical critique of Locke's theory of generating concepts by abstraction, rebuts it, and shows that endorses Lockean abstractionism concerning the formation of empirical concepts.

Philosophers have often claimed that general ideas or representations have their origin in abstraction, but it remains unclear exactly what abstraction as a psychological process consists in. We argue that the Lockean aspiration of using abstraction to explain the origins of all general representations cannot work and that at least some general representations have to be innate. We then offer an explicit framework for understanding abstraction, one that treats abstraction as a computational process that operates over an innate quality space (...) of fine-grained general representations. We argue that this framework has important philosophical implications for the nativism-empiricism dispute, for questions about the acquisition of unstructured representations, and for questions about the relation between human and animal minds. (shrink)

At least since Locke, philosophers and psychologists have usually held that concepts arise out of sensory perceptions, thoughts are built from concepts, and language enables speakers to convey their thoughts to hearers. Christopher Gauker holds that this tradition is mistaken about both concepts and language. The mind cannot abstract the building blocks of thoughts from perceptual representations. More generally, we have no account of the origin of concepts that grants them the requisite independence from language. Gauker's alternative is to show (...) that much of cognition consists in thinking by means of mental imagery, without the help of concepts, and that language is a tool by which interlocutors coordinate their actions in pursuit of shared goals. Imagistic cognition supports the acquisition and use of this tool, and when the use of this tool is internalized, it becomes the very medium of conceptual thought. (shrink)

Widespread amongst scholars is the legend according to which Locke shows a strong aversion to abstract ideas, similar to that of Berkley in the Treatise. This legend is endorsed by influential commentators on Locke. He does not even propose the reduction of ideas to mental pictures (a reduction which in Berkeley and Hume will form the base of the negation of the existence of abstract ideas in the mind). Locke is not in the least afraid of abstract ideas; his constant (...) concern, which is evident in his treatment of the complex question of the relation between real and nominal essence, is to refute the position of the Scholastics, according to which a universal concept in the mind (post rem) reflects the universal present in all things as substantial form (the universal in re), without assuming positions which are purely conventionalist and nominalist with regard to knowledge, such as those of Mersenne, Gassendi, Hobbes and sceptical and anti-Cartesian free-thinkers. To show this, I offer an analysis of the relation Locke makes between real and nominal essence, with regard to the relations which link term to idea and idea to things. The nature of the relation between signifier and signified is variable, though, in the relation between ideas and things with respect to the various kinds of complex ideas which the human mind may frame. The greatest difference is to be found between complex ideas of mixed mode and complex ideas of substance. (shrink)

In Book III of the Essay, Locke says that general terms are capable of referring to more than one particular thing. How does general reference work? The basic Lockean view of language suggests that words refer by evoking in the mind an idea---or mental intermediary---that stands in just the right relationship to the object the word is said to refer to. So a word refers by standing for an idea which itself is a sign for the right object in the (...) world. So a general term must stand for an idea that stands in just the right relationship to many things. However, Locke's explanation of general reference is complicated by the fact that he also thinks that the ideas of particular things that we receive from the sensation are not themselves capable of standing in just the right relationship to more than one thing. So ideas gleaned passively from sensation cannot be the ideas evoked by general terms. ;So what idea, then? Locke suggests that the mind must perform an operation of 'abstraction' on an idea of a particular to produce what he calls the 'abstract idea', an idea which is different from an idea of a particular in a critical respect that allows it to function as a general sign. How to interpret this is debated. Some have argued that the abstract idea is an idea of a particular that is 'used' by the mind in a way that allows it to serve as a sign for many things. Others argue that Locke thinks by abstraction the mind literally removes features from an idea of a particular, with the resulting attenuated idea capable of serving as a general sign. The main goal of this dissertation is to ground the latter interpretation in the text itself and to defend it against the traditional objections that have been brought against it. (shrink)

JOHN YOLTON HAS CONTRIBUTED A Locke Dictionary as a recent addition to his many works on the life and philosophy of John Locke. In the entries on “abstraction” and on “abstract or general ideas ” in that text, Yolton makes some rather bold assertions. He argues that, despite Berkeley’s attack on Locke’s theory of abstract or general ideas, Locke’s theory is in fact quite similar to Berkeley’s own account. In the course of this discussion, Yolton concludes that, for Locke, abstract (...) or general ideas are fictions and that they exist only as “modes of mind.” In this paper I discuss the Lockean theory of abstraction and explain the meaning Locke gives to the term “fiction,” showing that, for Locke, to call an idea a fiction is by no means to say that the idea exists only as a mode of mind. I also show why Locke’s theory of abstraction cannot be understood to be similar to Berkeley’s account in the way Yolton suggests, focusing on the central point of Berkeley’s criticisms of Locke and emphasizing the essential difference between the two accounts. (shrink)

Tandis que l'histoire de la philosophie est traversée par la dichotomie entre le réalisme des universaux et le nominalisme, on tend à négliger la position intermédiaire — le conceptualisme — dont on a fait de Locke le plus illustre représentant, mais qu'on a tenu pour disqualifié par les célèbres critiques de Berkeley ou Leibniz. On peut cependant montrer que le conceptualisme est doublé d'une ontologie sous-jacente qui pourrait fournir aux philosophes contemporains une alternative originale à la philosophie des universaux. Whereas (...) the dichotomy between realism and nominalism, makes the problem of Universais a paradigm case of a philosophical problem, the mediate view put forward by conceptualism is generally neglected as being an erroneous view on language. Nevertheless, conceptualism is the counterpart of an original ontology — the philosophy of Resemblances — which might be regarded an alternative to the philosophy of Universals. (shrink)

The doctrine of abstract ideas contains Locke’s views on the nature of generality and how we think in general terms-the nature of universals, of general concepts, and how we classify. While Reid rejects abstract ideas, he accepts Locke’s insight that we have an ability to abstract. In this paper, I show how Reid preserves Locke’s insight, while providing a more versatile and forward-looking account of universals and concepts than Locke was able to give.Reid replaces abstract ideas with what he calls (...) “general conceptions.” But general conceptions are really three different things. First, they are universals---non-mental intrinsically general objects of acts of abstraction and conception. I show how Reid is able to make the claim that there are universals without being committed to holding that universals really exist. This claim, together with his type/token distinction, enables Reid to better explain how we have knowledge of attributes and use general terms meaningfully. The general features of our experience are not ideas and are not produced by the faculty of abstraction---but that faculty enables us to distinguish them.In the second sense, a general conception is an act of mind which takes universals as objects. Thinking in general tenns is not the manipulation of abstract ideas---it is engaging in acts of conceiving. Such acts are made possible by general conceptions in the third sense, namely, general concepts. While Reid does not distinguish this sense explicitly, I argue that he takes general concepts to be dispositions or abilities to distinguish general features of objects and to use the general terms of language as other users do. So rather than producing mental entities---abstract ideas---that act as standards to help us classify, abstraction makes possible the development of abilities to use general terms and classify objects. (shrink)

One of the most frequently discussed passages from Locke's An Essay Concerning the Human Understanding is that which occurs in IV.vii.9, where he writes:… the Ideas first in the Mind, ‘tis evident, are those of particular Things, from whence, by slow degrees, the Understanding proceeds to some few general ones; which being taken from the ordinary and familiar Objects of Sense, are settled in the Mind, with general Names to them. Thus particular Ideas are first received and distinguished, and so (...) Knowledge got about them: and next to them, the less general, or specifick, which are next to particular. For abstract Ideas are not so obvious or easie to Children, or the yet unexercised Mind, as particular ones. If they seem so to grown Men, ’tis only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. For when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find, that general Ideas are Fictions and Contrivances of the Mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves, as we are apt to imagine. For example, Does it not require some pains and skill to form the general Idea of a Triangle, for it must be neither Oblique, nor Rectangle, neither Equilateral, Equicrural, nor Scalenon; but all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist; an Idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent Ideas are put together.I shall not pretend that what Locke is claiming in this passage is wholly clear, nor shall I try to defend the views expressed in it. My intention is to show that what he says here has been widely misinterpreted. It has become common to treat the contents of the passage as aberrant; as presenting a ridiculous variant on his main thesis on abstraction, or that very thesis elaborated with a foolish rhetorical flourish. But what is said in this passage is not something said elsewhere, nor is it an alternative to something said elsewhere. Here, and nowhere else, Locke shows awareness of implications for his doctrine of abstraction, of views he holds about simple ideas. (shrink)

The dissertation is divided into two parts. In Part One, Locke's theory of abstract general ideas is introduced and it is explained how it is to be used in giving an account of how certain common nouns refer. In the second chapter, Berkeley's attack on the theory of abstract ideas is described. In the third chapter, a defense of the doctrine proposed by J. L. Mackie is considered. It is argued that this fails as it stands, but the chapter goes (...) on to suggest how Mackie's account can be revised so as to overcome these shortcomings. In Part Two, some aspects of current thinking concerning one of Berkeley's central arguments for Esse is Percipi is discussed. In the chapter following this discussion, another interpretation of the argument for Esse is Percipi is proposed and an attempt is made to explain how this interpretation overcomes some of the problems connected with other interpretations. In the last chapter, an attempt is made to show that there is a direct connection between the doctrine of abstract ideas and the Esse is Percipi thesis. More exactly, it is argued that if there are abstract ideas, then the Esse is Percipi thesis is false. (shrink)

While claiming to refute locke's theory of abstract ideas, Berkeley himself accepts a form of abstractionism. Locke's account of abstraction is indeterminate between two doctrines: 1) abstract ideas are representations of paradigm instances of kinds, 2) abstract ideas are schematic representations of the defining features of kinds. Berkeley's arguments are directed exclusively against 2, And refute only a specific version of it, Which there is no reason to ascribe to locke; berkeley himself accepts abstract ideas of the former type. Locke's (...) theory suffers from circularity and redundancy, Berkeley's from conflation of thought with imagination. (shrink)